• The Foundations of Mathematics
    Certainly through scientific method, we can discover truth — Wayfarer

    Well, since the scientific method cannot possibly discover any truths about itself, how would it be able to discover the complete truth? While mathematics does have the self-knowledge that it is necessarily incomplete, the scientific method is simply not capable of that kind of self-inquiry.

    Scientism is the Dunning-Kruger effect on steroids:

    In the field of psychology, the Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people mistakenly assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is. It is related to the cognitive bias of illusory superiority and comes from the inability of people to recognize their lack of ability. Without the self-awareness of metacognition, people cannot objectively evaluate their competence or incompetence.
  • What is progress?
    Or do you think that progress is primarily scientific and technological? — Pantagruel

    Through the fallacy of scientism, everything else seems to regress, to the point that scientific and technological progress have even become self-defeating. In my impression, people who believe in the fallacy of scientism will die out, simply because they are even failing to sexually reproduce.
  • American education vs. European Education
    So, I would take your evidence as showing that education works for maintaining a 2-3% increase in GDP every year. — ZhouBoTong

    In Antifragility, Nassim Taleb argues that the belief that university knowledge generates economic wealth stems more from superstition than empiricism. Empirical investigation, he writes, shows no evidence that raising the general level of education raises a country's income level. "But we know the opposite is true, that wealth leads to the rise of education - that's not an optical illusion."

    The reason why he says:

    "Too much education is bad. Don't over-educate the young"

    is:

    "In any case, he contends that education "removes entrepreneurs from the system and turns them into bureaucrats".

    In my own opinion, especially state-run education tends to destroy the social structure by its negative effects on sexual reproduction. Over time, societies that suffer from excess educationism will simply disappear.

    Japan seems to be an early example of how educationist societies gradually collapse. The USA and Europe will undoubtedly also implode.
  • Are science and religion compatible?
    Core claims in Christianity: God exists, there's an afterlife, Jesus is the son of God, The Holy Spirit of Jesus rose from the grave. Science has a method. Application of that method does not result in the above. — S

    If a question does not fall under the purview of a particular epistemic method, it could still be handled by another one. The fallacy of scientism, is that experimental testing would be the only legitimate, epistemic method.

    For example, It is not possible to determine if the Battle of Waterloo took place in 1815 using the method of experimental testing. The question is simply part of another epistemic domain, i.e. the historical method, and can only be handled by corroborating witness depositions.

    The question of completeness has been investigated for the axiomatic method.

    A set of axioms is (syntactically, or negation-) complete if, for any statement in the axioms' language, that statement or its negation is provable from the axioms. This is the notion relevant for Gödel's first Incompleteness theorem. There are sentences expressible in the language of first order logic that can be neither proved nor disproved from the axioms of logic alone.

    The axiomatic method is capable of self-investigation and determine by itself that it is incomplete. The scientific method is not even capable of carrying out that kind of self-investigation. So, how could the scientific method possibly be complete?

    Therefore, scientism is an irritating absurdity:

    Scientism is an ideology that promotes science as the only objective means by which society should determine normative and epistemological values. The term scientism is generally used critically, pointing to the cosmetic application of science in unwarranted situations not amenable to application of the scientific method or similar scientific standards.
  • The Foundations of Mathematics
    The problem with Hilbert's "language game" is again connotational. John Nash's game theoritical contribution concerning equilibria in n-person strategy "games" was otherwise good for a Nobel prize.

    There is nothing wrong with the technical term "game".

    In common parlance it is considered something unserious but that merely reflects the notorious ignorance of the unwashed masses who often tend to be inspired by their fake morality.
  • Are science and religion compatible?
    It depends on the definition of "science" and "religion".

    If science is popperian falsificationism and religion is axiomatic morality, then they do not even have common subject matter.

    The real question is whether scientism and religion are compatible. Answer: obviously not. The idea that there would be only one epistemic domain, i.e. falsificationism, should not even be taken seriously.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    I certainly think he was correct with respect his critique of the law of the excluded middle (as evidenced, in my mind, by the concept of complementarity in quantum physics). — fresco

    As far as I am concerned, the "quantum physics license" applies when investigating particles to which the size of a photon is noticeable, given the fact that light is so important to the process of visual observation; and electrical current and electromagnetic radiation for the purpose of measurement. That is probably the same as saying that the wave length and the distance measured are too close in each other's range. In those circumstances, we can reasonably expect disturbances to practices that are normal at larger scale, and therefore things to become fishy.

    It's not even that the law of the excluded middle no longer applies. We may just no longer be able to observe it. For all practical purposes, we can probably treat them as the same situation: "cannot possibly be observed" versus "not there at all".

    When things get too big or too small, normal expectations will not be met. The example that is the most interesting to me in that respect, is the Eddington limit. I personally suspect that there is also a corresponding lower limit (minimum size of a celestial body), and that it is in fact a range. However, in the standard model where "matter causes gravity" it will not be analysed as such. Why would you look for something that your standard model predicts not possibly to be there?

    Still, I do not really like physics, because you cannot do it with just pen and paper. Real-world disciplines do not suit my lifestyle of limiting the tools to just a (virtual) pen and paper, i.e. a linux laptop.

    In some sense, we could even say that the law of the excluded middle, and probably a lot of other laws, only apply in our typical scale range, i.e. when it is about things that are not too big and not too small.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Suppose I said 'football is not about anything'....or 'doing philosophy is not about anything' ... Neither statement is generally open to a truth value ... — fresco

    When I read the literal words of David Hilbert (formalist) I seem to pretty much always agree, because apparently, I experience things in the same way as he does. Sometimes I can explain why I agree with David Hilbert, but sometimes I cannot. Sometimes it is mere intuition.

    When I read what Brouwer (constructivist) says, I usually cringe, because his views sound utmost heretical to me. As far as I am concerned, he is an accomplice of Satan.

    Now, the strange thing is that I do not have this problem with Stephen Kleene, even though he is also a constructivist. I just happen to like his work really much. That is probably why I just ignore it when he writes something that I disagree with.

    I subscribe to formalism but also to Platonism in mathematics. That choice is just an opinion.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Math is meaningful. — creativesoul

    I guess that you say that because you attach a value judgement to the terms "meaningful" ("good") and "meaningless" ("bad").

    I don't.

    Furthermore, fake morality often throws a spanner in the works. If you cannot view the technical term "meaningless" as morally neutral, then you will invariably look for meaning/semantics, where there isn't any, especially by design.

    In semiotics, the meaning of a sign is its place in a sign relation, in other words, the set of roles that it occupies within a given sign relation. A symbol, which is the most abstract, does not resemble or bear any physical relation to the thing that it represents in any way. Peirce's model assumes that in order for a sign to be meaningful, it must refer to something external and cannot be self-contained, as it is for Saussure.

    Mathematics is symbol manipulation only, of symbols of which the meaning has been completely stripped away:

    According to formalism, the truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles or any other contensive subject matter — in fact, they aren't "about" anything at all.

    Furthermore, these "truths" are not correspondence-theory "true", because they do not correspond to anything in the real, physical world. So, I disagree with the use of the term "truth". It should be:

    The theorems expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets, or triangles ... they aren't "about" anything at all.
  • Philosophy (of) and Mental and Developmental Disorders (ie.autism)
    My point is, what do you guys think can be considered when looking at such anomalies such as autism spectrum disorders, BPD, ODD, personality disorders ect.? — Grre


    Unless you feel like doing something absolutely extreme, I guess that it is better not to worry about it. In my personal experience, these things go away pretty much completely when you take the time to pray on a daily basis. Unfortunately, it only works, if you believe that it will. Otherwise, it really doesn't.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    You seem to have taken great offense at Collingwood's essay. Is was not my intent to start a new discussion about it here. — T Clark

    I do not "take offence", of course.

    There is obviously quite a bit of presuppositionism going on in the field of knowledge, but not where Collingwood says it does. Still, yes, I do not particularly like the term "subject matter", because it is fundamentally arbitrary. I personally believe in the term "epistemic method", i.e. knowledge-justification method. So, I am beholden to epistemism.

    Arbitrary stuff invariably allows for lots of mischief; which, again, I am not necessarily up in arms against, because from my lazy chair, I enjoy letting the laws of nature run their course.
  • A Query about Noam Chomsky's Political Philosophy
    What are Grab, Lyft, Uber, Airbnb, et al if not corporations listed on stock exchanges? — Bitter Crank

    We are also working diligently on that "stock exchanges" issue.

    If you are a bit adventurous and not too scared of Big Brother -- and if you are, do it from Malta -- then issue an ICO instead (Initial Coin Offering) of listing on a bankster-controlled stock exchange.

    Yeah, as Donald Trump recently clarified, we still have work to do.

    So, according to our beloved Donald, bitcoin is not money, but you still need a "money" transmitter license, or else, you apparently qualify for an extra round of face fisting.

    So, yes, things are getting better and better. We are getting increasingly close to the point where our beloved Donald will have to admit that his views, "la chose et son contraire", have finally become openly trivialist.

    State-ochestrated fiat banksterism is undoubtedly in its last laps. With a bit of patience, we will be able to stare with awe and admiration at some more bouts of frantic bug fixing. Not that is going to make any difference, obviously, except for its capacity to amuse us.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Essay on Metaphysics PDF — T Clark

    Collingwood writes:

    The word ‘science’, in its original sense, which is still its proper sense not in the English language alone but in the international language of European civilization, means a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject-matter.

    That view is epistemically unsustainable.

    Dianetics is not science. There is no way to determine that, using his definition. The collected lyrics by Paul McCartney is not science. How can you derive this conclusion from his definition? Hence, I do not even agree on the definition of the term "definition" with Collingwood.

    It is of no importance what the original definition of 'science' may have been. It was wrong and we fixed it, but he apparently didn't.

    Science is the collection of propositions that can be tested experimentally.

    The sentence "Water boils at 100 degrees Celcius" is part of science if you write that in a test report in which you clarify that you tried it 11 times and you did not manage to black-swan it, i.e. produce a counterexample. Then, someone else can comment that all you need to do, is to reduce or increase the atmospheric pressure and see what happens.

    Science is the epistemic domain generated by its distinct epistemic method. So is mathematics. So is history. So is epistemology itself.

    While mathematics is indeed all about presuppositionism, since its epistemic method is staunchly axiomatic, science is absolutely not. Everything is science is falsificationist. There are no presuppositions in falsificationism. If you cannot write something as a conclusion in a test report, then it is not science.

    Sometimes Collingwood writes things that we would consider utmost strange nowadays: Newtonian, Kantian, Einsteinian physics. Beg your pardon, Kantian physics? That has never been a thing.

    Then, he writes: "The business of a metaphysician is to find out that Newtonian scientists presuppose that some events have causes." There is no presuppositionism in Newtonian mechanics. Just go to a laboratory, test something, and report back. If it does not observably emerge out of your experimental test, then you should not write about it in your test report.

    Then, he writes: "He can study the presuppositions of Arabic science, of Indian science, of
    Chinese science."

    I must utterly reject this view.

    Science is justified by experimental testing. It does not matter if it is an Arab, an Indian, or a Chinese who repeats the experimental test, writes a test report, and notifies us that he has been able to black-swan some theory.

    Mathematics is justified by axiomatic derivation, i.e. proof. Who even cares that a theorem was provably derived by a person of whatever nationality? We just want the theorem and its proof. Hand over, please.

    Collingwood utterly confuses nationality with religion. Of course, there are the Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist theologies, which are axiomatically brought back to four different defining scriptures -- but note that the Papacy rejects axiomatic theology. So, this is not really or only partially the case for Christianity. There are Christian Arabs, Muslim Indians, and Rabbinically-orthodox Jewish Chinese. Nationality is one thing and religion is another.

    Of the various epistemic domains, only the axiomatic one is presuppositional.

    Subject matter is a rather arbitrary concept. Unlike Collingwood writes, it is rarely "determined". For example, when is a proposition part of economics, sociology, or psychology? The explanation will invariably revolve around random nonsense.

    Furthermore, in my opinion, a subject that does not specify a standard epistemic knowledge-justification method, is not a legitimate academic endeavour.

    Universities may teach "marketing", "international relations and dating", "cotton plantation management", "gender and confusion studies", and so on, but as far as I am concerned, they are merely selling snake oil with a view on cashing in on the juicy student loans.

    A fool and his money are easily parted. If you don't strip him clean, then someone else will. So, you could as well do it by yourself. Furthermore, if you hesitate too long, the money will be gone already. So, hurry up.

    That is why for me the snake-oil industry is not a major issue at all.

    Still, I would appreciate it if the university cash-generation machine reined in their sanctimonious, virtue-signalling, pseudo-morality a bit, especially, of how they are going to do good for the world, which they are undoubtedly also going to save.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    It's about how math emerged onto the world stage solely by virtue of our attribution of specific non-negotiable meaning to certain marks and quantities and how that evolved into also talking about non physical things with meaningful marks... — creativesoul

    Quantities, i.e. numbers, are not even needed for inadvertently dragging in an entire bureaucracy of verifiable formalisms, rules and regulations:

    assert Syllogism {
  all Socrates: univ, Man, Mortal: set univ |
      -- every man is mortal
      Man in Mortal
      -- Socrates is a man
      and (Socrates in Man)
      -- implies Socrates is mortal
      implies Socrates in Mortal
  }
check Syllogism

    These expression in algebra may have an overly modern look, but they are as much part of mathematics as number theory.

    Therefore, just saying "Every man is mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal." already triggers an entire regulatory framework in mathematics.

    The similarities between math and natural languages are many, but it seems you've neglected to take those into account. — creativesoul

    In my impression, natural language expressions and mathematical language expressions are very compatible Platonic abstractions. I am actually convinced that it is natural language that provides the interface points for mathematics. It is by mixing both types of expressions, even inadvertently, that mathematics kicks in.
  • A Query about Noam Chomsky's Political Philosophy
    inclusion of unions, worker inclusion on company boards — Noah Te Stroete

    In my opinion, the very first question is rather: do corporations even make sense any longer?

    We do not need taxi companies any longer, because we have Grab, Lyft, and Uber. We do not need hotels any longer, because we have Airbnb and similar networks. If it weren't for government regulations protecting existing cartels, this principle would now generalize much, much faster.

    If you don't know what to do with your time, and you want to make money, then just create the Uber of {X}, and duly disrupt the existing corporate nonsense.

    a strong social safety net — Noah Te Stroete

    It is obviously time that will tell, but in my opinion, the inevitable bankruptcy of the US social security system will undoubtedly put a stop to that particular social experiment.

    I believe that social safety needs to be provided, first and foremost, by the extended family. If that happens to fail, mandatory and voluntary charity will kick in.

    If that is still insufficient -- rather unlikely -- only then I could, as a matter of exception, agree to other urgent, emergency measures.

    You see, it used to be that people would make sure to have children to have someone to take care of them in their old age. Now they do not need to do that any more, because the government will take care of them. And where does the government get the resources to do that? Answer: from other people's children.

    The entire system works like that. Lots of women say that they do not need a man (as a provider). Why? Because the government will provide them with money and free services. And where does the government get the money for that? From the men, of course.

    As far as I am concerned, that particular social experiment is just a pile of steaming bullshit. I am 100% convinced that it won't keep flying. The long-term trends for that particular social experiment are all pointing off the cliff and into the abyss. Good riddance!
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood — T Clark

    It is actually hard, convoluted, and rather pricey to get hold of the publication:

    https://www.bookdepository.com/Essay-on-Metaphysics-Collingwood/9780199241415

    I do not store paper copies. Someone would have to put in the effort to scan it back first. It would use up space already assigned for other purposes. I would rather store live trees than dead ones in my living room.

    Ideally, I use a text file that I can read on my phone while I am at the swimming pool, or so. I usually also simplify pdf files (duh) with the pdftotext utility.

    So, I am incompatible with the practices of Oxford University Press. Furthermore, there is no doubt that I am more stubborn than them. There is simply no hope for them that they would defeat me in nay saying. That kind of people cannot make me adjust to them, because I have a long history of doing exactly the opposite, and always winning at that. As Nassim Taleb so beautifully wrote: The most intolerant wins.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    The idea of falsification is not science, it's metaphysics. The scientific method is metaphysics. Induction is metaphysics. — T Clark

    I have always thought of these things as subjects of epistemology, i.e. theory of knowledge.

    Metaphysics study is conducted using deduction from that which is known a priori. Like foundational mathematics (which is sometimes considered a special case of metaphysics applied to the existence of number), it tries to give a coherent account of the structure of the world, capable of explaining our everyday and scientific perception of the world, and being free from contradictions.

    I don't think that this is possible.

    The strong, classical view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist independently of any observer, so that the subject is the most fundamental of all sciences. Some philosophers, such as the logical positivists, and many scientists, reject the strong view of metaphysics as meaningless and unverifiable.

    I am afraid that I have to agree with the logical positivist view on the matter. As far as I am concerned, epistemology is the flagship of philosophy, while at the same time it is not clear whether metaphysics even makes sense.
  • Advantages of a single cell organism over a multi cell organism
    What are the advantages of being a multi cell organism? — christian2017

    Specialization? Division of labour? The possibility for individual cells to specialize, so that they can carry out specific functions more efficiently ...

    In "The wealth of nations", Adam Smith argued this thesis extensively for the economy of human societies. Well, Xenophon seems to be the first one to have pointed out these advantages:

    Just as the various trades are most highly developed in large cities, in the same way, food at the palace is prepared in a far superior manner. In small towns, the same man makes couches, doors, ploughs and tables, and often he even builds houses, and still, he is thankful if only he can find enough work to support himself. And it is impossible for a man of many trades to do all of them well. In large cities, however, because many make demands on each trade, one alone is enough to support a man, and often less than one: for instance one man makes shoes for men, another for women, there are places even where one man earns a living just by mending shoes, another by cutting them out, another just by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of these operations but assembles the parts. Of necessity, he who pursues a very specialized task will do it best.

    Maybe it spares each cell from digesting individually by themselves the coffee I have just had? While they also would have to take care of breathing, responding to differences in light and colour, checking the smell of things it should not try to eat, as well as tasting, and so on.

    What are the advantages of a single cell organism? — christian2017

    Less fragile. More robust. Less overhead. No need for an entire bureaucracy to protect with a thick skull; a bureaucracy undoubtedly worse than the European Union's commission in Brussels, which incessantly sends memos and other emails to lots of unwilling other cells about what the new rules for food labelling are all about. That narcissistic thing may even end up consuming most of the available resources and starve the other cells for its own benefit. That is easy to do for that cerebral bureaucrat, because it is in charge of everything anyway.
  • I can’t know that I know about many things
    I think negative justification as the determinant for true belief is weak at best. — Noah Te Stroete

    Positive and negative justification are computationally different.

    The quantifier, "there exists" (∃), does not need to traverse the entire domain. It can stop at the first occurrence. The quantifier, "there does not exist" (∄), has no other option than to traverse the entire domain.

    In abstract, Platonic worlds, computational issues are ignored. So, positive and negative justification are equally strong beliefs:

    In classical mathematics, one can prove the existence of a mathematical object without "finding" that object explicitly, by assuming its non-existence and then deriving a contradiction from that assumption.
    (constructivism)

    In virtual worlds, computational issues cannot be ignored. So, arguing or querying non-existence is allowed but known to be computationally intensive. For example, the SQL "not exists" operator is known to cause serious performance issues:

    The problem is when I have many data in my table (like million of rows), the execution of the WHERE NOT EXISTS clause is very slow. I have to do this verification because I can't insert duplicated data.

    You can find lots of examples (if you Google for them) of people complaining about the slow performance of the NOT EXISTS operator.

    In the real, physical world, support for complete traversal of a domain (unrestricted comprehension) is the exception and not the rule. E.g. the propositions, "All humans own a pair of trousers", but also, "There does not exist a human who does not own a pair of trousers", are not supported. Since the "not exists" quantifier always requiring complete traversal of the domain, you can often assume that you will not be able to expend the energy and other resources required to traverse a relatively large real-world collection.

    The quantifier, "there exists", is obviously much better supported in the real, physical world, even for very large domains, because you can just stop at the first occurrence that arises.

    So, I agree that in the real, physical world, negative justification is often not even possible.
  • A Query about Noam Chomsky's Political Philosophy
    You can find a summary of Noam Chomsky's political views, in his Wikipedia page, along with attribution to his original publications (in the footnotes). For the sake of the argument, I will just assume that the page is neutral and objective in its description of his political philosophy. You can also find examples of criticism on his Wikipedia page, external to Wikipedia. These critics do fret about details that they do not agree with, but they seem to find his page on the whole rather satisfactory.

    and they tend to start from the assumption that selfishness or individualism is true and good, something I strongly disagree with. — Noah Te Stroete

    My own opinion on the matter is that western thinking has some kind of indigestion concerning the issue of self-interest, spectacularly exemplified during that silly bout of 20th-century Soviet Marxism. Other cultures have much better handled, and adjusted to, the scaling problem of the hamlet economy.

    In the hamlet economy, people don't engage much in tit-for-tat trade. They rather tend to share. For example, today, you get a chicken from me, and tomorrow I can get a piece of the ox that you will slaughter. Fine, very lofty, but unfortunately it does not scale. If you live in a metropolis of ten million inhabitants, you cannot allow all of them to exercise hamlet-style sharing rights on your assets. No matter how many resources you have, you will undoubtedly still go under in Gambler's Ruin.

    A switch to tit-for-tat trade, instead of liberally sharing resources, is not inspired by individualistic selfishness. It is rather a strategy to cope with the scaling problem of the hamlet economy.

    The Soviet approach to solving the scaling problem of hamlet-style sharing, which already dramatically fails to scale at relatively small scale, was to implement it at the largest possible scale, i.e. the national scale. It obviously did not work.

    If you look at Chomsky's political philosophy:

    [Noam Chomsky] envisions an anarcho-syndicalist future with direct worker control of the means of production and government by workers' councils, who would select representatives to meet together at general assemblies.

    And concerning Chomsky's "workers' councils":

    According to the official historiography of the Soviet Union, the first workers' council (soviet) formed in May 1905 in Ivanovo (north-east of Moscow) during the 1905 Russian Revolution (Ivanovsky Soviet). However, in his memoirs, the Russian Anarchist Volin claims that he witnessed the beginnings of the St Petersburg Soviet in January 1905.

    You can see that Chomsky advocates a return to the initial, embryonic stage of Soviet collectivism; of which the later stages can be assumed to be a natural consequence and dramatic sequel of their otherwise modest beginnings.

    There is actually no need for grand social experiments. In other cultures, such as for example Islamic one, (tit-for-tat) trade is considered a viable social practice, if it is respectful of not engaging in explicitly forbidden behaviours, and if it is supplemented with a system of mandatory (zakaat) and voluntary charity (sadaqah); with mandatory charity not required to exceed a preset level of assets/income.

    In my opinion, human society is effectively capable of scaling into the millions (and even billions) without unduly restricting personal freedom or imposing ill-founding collectivism; which is what Noam Chomsky's political philosophy would lead to. (Well, it historically certainly did.)
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    I think that you're mistaken on several levels here. — creativesoul

    It is a connotational issue.

    For example, in common parlance, "laziness" is bad; even very bad. In a technical context, laziness, as in "lazy evaluation", is a lofty ideal to aspire to. The lazier, the better, because less is more.

    In a technical context, "Your approach is lazy", is a compliment. It means that you are an expert at avoiding work, and therefore, an example to be emulated.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    There are many meaningful terms within the defining vocabulary of natural languages that do not have a real world physical referent. — creativesoul

    You could be right. I am not familiar with the semiotics thing.

    Structuring meaning is not equivalent to being meaningless. — creativesoul

    Well, if all the meaning is necessarily elsewhere ... I think that the problem is rather the negative connotation of the term "meaningless".

    That said, to say that mathematics is meaningless given it's historical evolution through time through people, is suspect to say the least. — creativesoul

    With "meaningless" considered to be "bad", and "meaningful" considered to be "good", in common parlance, I certainly understand your objection. The problem is that this view can easily lead astray.

    Therefore, the problem is rather to overcome the resistance to considering "meaningless" and "useless" as neutral terms. In a technical context, these terms should probably not be used to make value judgements.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Is being nonterminal equivalent to being meaningless? — creativesoul

    Only if the terminals in that system are meaningless. Otherwise, no.

    For example, the terminals in natural language ("the defining vocabulary") are explicitly meaningful. You can explain each of them by showing one or more real-world images. No need for words. Just show one or more images of a "man" and a "woman", and it should be roughly clear what these terminals mean.

    In my impression, meaning/semantics somehow requires real-world terminals. I am not sure, though, because semiotics is obviously an endless rant.

    According to formalist philosophy, to which I subscribe (without denying Platonism), mathematics is syntax-only:

    Syntactics is the Morris'ean branch of semiotics that deals with the formal properties of signs and symbols; the interrelation of the signs, without regard to meaning.

    Natural language wants to convey meaning while formal language wants to structure it.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    “Work sets you free.” At one time a spiritual lesson, then made sinister by Auschwitz. Fucking Nazis. — Noah Te Stroete

    Ever since the publication of "The Kingdom of Auschwitz", by Otto Friedrich, it seems to be ok to mock the literal German version too. In fact, Orwell had already spectacularly pulled that off in "1984" in English, published belatedly in 1949 (it is obvious that Orwell had wanted to publish it in 1948).

    Thinking of it, the slogan is indeed something sinister and truly Orwellian.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Dare I ask for a translation? — Noah Te Stroete

    I was just making fun of these long German words by inventing a mostly meaningless one.

    Apparently, I am not the only one doing that! ;-)

    This used to be the longest one, until they deprecated and archived it:

    Rindfleischetikettierungsüberwachungsaufgabenübertragungsgesetz

    It is the name of an abandoned regulatory arrangement for beef labelling.

    Selbstverständlich!
  • The Identity and Morality of a soldier
    He must not obey if the order violates others' human dignity, international law or consists of a crime (including a misdemeanor). Otherwise, subordinates are guilty of their deeds if their criminal character was obvious to them. — WerMaat

    Ha, they blatantly copied that from the Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement"). 8 August 1945:

    Article 8

    The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

    Even though the point of view expressed in article 8 sounds absolutely sensible, it is still a case of retroactively fixing of law:

    An ex post facto law (corrupted from Latin: ex postfacto, lit. 'out of the aftermath') is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law.

    The Nuremberg tribunal happily used it to criminalize and prosecute behaviour from before 8 August 1945. That was very, very flawed. If was just a round of failed bug fixing.

    Furthermore, it is an utmost inconsistent view, because it denies the supremacy and sovereignty of Nazi politically-invented law using ... some other politically-invented law.

    Hence, that view is simply circular, and therefore, it absolutely does not solve the problem.

    Politically-invented morality is obviously bullshit, because as Albert Einstein so beautifully pointed out:

    We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.

    Politically-invented morality has always been, and will always be, bullshit.

    For once, I have to agree with the Holy See and repeat his denunciation of politically-invented morality, as he did in "With Burning Concern" ("Mit brennender Sorge"):

    Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, or a particular form of State, or the depositories of power, or any other fundamental value of the human community - however necessary and honorable be their function in worldly things - whoever raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God.

    In other words, they have not fixed anything, and it is still the same bullshit. The London Agreement/Charter was a joke and the equally politically-invented Bundeswehr morality is also a stupid joke.

    Seriously, all of that does not deserve any respect whatsoever. I spit on it.
  • Atheist Take on Reincarnation and Karma
    Who am “I”? — Nicholasm5581

    Carefully look at a person when he is still alive. You can even talk to him, discuss with him, or go for a walk with him. Later on, when the time comes, go to his funeral and carefully look at him again. Look at his dead body. There is a difference. You can clearly see it. Something is gone.

    That "something" was "him".

    So, where is "him" now? Huh?
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    I can’t tell if you’re being admonishing, analytical, or comical. I suspect it’s all of the above. — Noah Te Stroete

    Art. 71b. Arbeit macht frei !

    Das bundesfederationlich Zusammenarbeitsgesamtsamt
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Ha ha! I would go bananas if I had to do those jobs. — Noah Te Stroete

    Well, when people become semantical, they are often intentionally motivated. It is a real-world job to help other people discover and/or achieve their goal. Still, for various reasons, the job of "consultant" actually has a bad reputation.

    Ultimately, the reason why there are accountants is the same as why there are trash collectors, sewer divers, or any other real-life jobs, really. The work just needs to be done. So, someone will end up getting dragged into it, kicking and screaming, and then also getting paid to do it. There will also always be some kind of manager equipped with a whip, keeping an eye on the situation. Slavery is freedom.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    So, is counting apples meaningless? — Noah Te Stroete

    No, it is the apples that provide the semantics/meaning. So, it is not meaningless.

    Or is that not mathematics? — Noah Te Stroete

    It is application of mathematics and not mathematics proper. So, you are possibly doing inventory control, or so? Is it about accounting and financial reporting?
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    I think alcontali is talking about meta-mathematics. I could be mistaken. — Noah Te Stroete

    Unlike metaphysics, which is epistemically not a legitimate subdiscipline of physics -- as it cannot experimentally test its propositions -- metamathematics does derive its propositions axiomatically -- i.e. is subject to provability -- and is therefore epistemically a legitimate subdiscipline of mathematics.

    Seriously, metamathematics is NOT to mathematics what metaphysics is to physics.

    So, no, I do not particularly distinguish between metamathematics and mathematics, because there is simply no need for that. For example, Hilbert calculi may be metamathematical but that is a non-issue in their discussion. They have absolutely no fundamentally different nature.

    Mathematics has absolutely no problem talking about itself. So, yes, mathematics is vain. It definitely has narcissistic qualities.

    As a side remark, I always thought that science cannot legitimately talk about itself -- it generally cannot -- but I think that there may be a twist to that.

    Falsificationism is in my impression subject to falsification, because Pavlov's dog is a falsificationist animal. You can repeatedly carry out Pavlov's experiments to look for a black swan in that context, i.e. to find a dog or another animal assumed to subscribe to falsificationism, but that refuses to learn to salivate when repeatedly served with a bell ring. Therefore, falsificationism seems to "eat its own dog food".

    Furthermore, when Hardy quipped that real mathematics is useless, he was referring to his own experience in exploring number theory; which is not part of metamathematics at all.

    Real number theory is obviously as useless and meaningless -- no direct use or application possible and utterly devoid of meaning/semantics -- as every other axiomatic theory in mathematics.

    The good stuff is also quite lazy, as it minimizes what it actually wants to talk about, besides, of course, being purposely useless and meaningless. Therefore the good stuff, i.e. in Hardy's terms, the "real mathematics", tends to be fairly ridiculous. If it does not make you laugh, the stuff is probably just too serious.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    but the difference with number is that it's predictive. Through maths, I can discover many things I couldn't otherwise know — Wayfarer

    Agreed.

    In Kant's lingo, mathematics truly is synthetic, i.e. knowledge.

    It is, however, "a priori", i.e. divorced from the real, physical world; unlike science, which is a "posteriori".

    Kant insists on the existence of synthetic knowledge a priori (purely abstract), "pure reason", which is separate from synthetic knowledge a posteriori (i.e. real-world).

    Unfortunately, Kant did not insist on the fact that pure reason, divorced as it is from the real, physical world, is in and of itself, necessarily meaningless, i.e. free of any possible (real-world) semantics. It is its extreme purity that makes this type of knowledge meaningless and also useless, to be understood as: having no real-world semantics and no direct use or direct application.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    No ! All languages, including the metalanguage of mathematics exist ie. are useful concepts in the only 'domain' that matters to humanity i.e actions and interactions connected with prediction and control. — fresco

    That still does not mean that language would be a physical phenomenon with size, weight, temperature, electromagnetic radiation. Does language have any particular color or smell?

    Seriously, language is an abstraction that lives in its own Platonic world. We cannot avoid using such abstractions, simply, because we communicate.

    Still, we should not confuse these abstractions with the real, physical world.

    The word "cat" is not a cat. It is a word. It is a language expression. It is not the real, physical thing at all.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    But so much of what we use every day - every minute! - depends on maths, and without maths it wouldn’t exist. — Wayfarer

    Yes, daily life pretty much unavoidably gets trapped into the web of mathematics, simply, by inadvertently using an abstract, Platonic object of mathematical nature. That's indeed it. The enslavement process will unstoppably start, because the formalisms will kick in, if you want to do it consistently.

    So declaring that maths exists in some ethereal platonic domain doesn’t do justice to the facts of history. — Wayfarer

    Mathematics has interface points everywhere. It is almost impossible to speak for longer than a minute or so, before the speaker has dragged into the fray a regulated language expression, causing him to become subject to an entire regulatory framework that governs the use of these regulated language expressions.

    Still, that does not mean that these regulated language expression are real. They are not. Language expressions do not appear as real, physical objects with physical characteristics. They have no size, weight, temperature, or any other physical characteristic. They are mere abstractions.

    It is not just mathematics that exists in some ethereal platonic domain. All language does.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Are symbols meaningless? — creativesoul

    If a symbol is a nonterminal, then it can be explained in terms of other nonterminals and terminals, using a production rule, which gives it its definition. Terminals are axiomatic starting points. They are not further explained.

    That is how it more or less works for formal languages that abide by a context-free grammar.

    In natural language, these terminals are the defining vocabulary. If judiciously chosen, the defining vocabulary can be associated with just images.

    For example, you do not need words to explain what an apple is. Just show one or more images, and that will do too.

    Apparently, the smallest defining vocabulary is 360 words that gets expanded through a layered system to approx. 3000 words. The origins of this hierarchical system are attributed to Samuel Johnson, who argued that:

    Words should be defined using terms less abstruse than that which is to be explained.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    I still find that impossible to reconcile with engineering which relies heavily on the application of mathematics to the physical world. What am I not understanding? — Wayfarer

    Engineering is a semantical and even a very intentional thing.

    For example, you want to build a boat. It must be 55 meters long.

    By dragging "55" into the fray, which are symbols that have inherently absolutely nothing to do with boats, you have subjected yourself to number theory. You cannot do whatever you want with "55", if you want to do it consistently.

    You are now bound by a bureaucracy of formalisms, i.e. rules and regulations that govern the abstract, Platonic world of numbers. It constrains you and reins you in. With every mathematical object that you drag into the fray, you will become increasingly beholden to the formalisms that govern them.

    Before you know, you are the prisoner of a web of constraining formalisms that will tightly wrap up your boat project.

    It is not that you wanted to do mathematics. No, you just wanted to build a boat.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    Are you a platonist? — Joshs

    Yes, but not necessarily outside the realm of mathematics. I believe that mathematics more or less enforces Platonism by its metarules on the declaration of variables. In the following example:

    ∀ m ∈ A: m² ≥ m

    The expression declares a variable m from a domain A. Mathematical notation is strongly typed, and the metarule does not allow the use of m without such prior declaration. Furthermore, the domain A is never the real world, because it is not possible to traverse the real world for all occurrences of a domain. That would cost too much energy. Therefore, the metarule insists on the use of objects from an abstract, Platonic world.

    In other words, it is not even possible to write anything about the real, physical world. That impossibility is strictly enforced in mathematics.

    Are you comfortable with Kant's notion of math as originating from the a priori categorical formal attributes of a transcendental subject? If so, then quantity may seem to you as something we could think apart from meaningful semantic quality, as arising from a different world, that of the a priori purely empty subjective formalism. — Joshs

    Yes, that even follows from the metarules.

    It is for this reason that each historical innovation in mathematics (Greek geometry, classical logic, analytic geometry and calculus, etc. arise out of the intellectual milieu of their time n the same fashion as does every scientific theory. — Joshs

    The publication of Algorithmi's work, "The Art of Hindu Reckoning", originally published in Arabic, later on translated into Latin in the 12th century, suggests that mathematics trivially traverses cultural and linguistic barriers. Two mathematicians have much more in common with each other, regardless of nationality, than say, two Americans.

    Mathematics did not make any significant progress in Europe, beyond what the Greek had developed, until the decimal positional notation ("Hindu Reckoning") and the treatise on algebra ("Liber algebrae") came in from external origin in the 12th century. That was a standstill spanning around a millennium. It was clearly Algoritmi's publications (Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi) that kicked off new activity in mathematics.

    Formalisms , whether of a mathematical or any other nature, stand for a semantic content. They mean something in order to to do something. — Joshs

    A good example of a popular formalism are regular expressions, i.e. Kleene's closure. In term of real-world semantics they do not mean anything, because they were not even abstracted away from anything that exists in the real, physical world.

    Kleene algebra is an abstraction that came out of the blue when Stephen Kleene, acting as a consultant for the Rand Corporation, wrote his report on finite automata for the U.S. Air Force in 1951.

    Finite automata are again, an abstraction that was never abstracted away from the real, physical world. Automata do not occur in nature. You need to painstakingly build them. They are always artificial.

    It was not even clear how to build them -- there were several competing theoretical models -- until in 1945, John Von Neumann wrote his winning proposal, "First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC" for the United States Army Ordnance Department.

    Finite automata do not mean anything, really. They are just an abstraction, meaningless (=divorced from the real world) and even useless (=no direct use).

    We can think color in general abstracted from all other aspects of the world. — Joshs

    Mathematics does not even need to abstract away from the real world, which used to be the primary source for abstraction, but that is no longer the case any more. Many, if not most, 20th century publications in mathematics were not abstracted away from the real, physical world.

    For example, I do not believe that anything in Alan Turing's work was ever abstracted away from the real, physical world.

    Without connection, no matter how flimsy, to the real, physical world, an abstraction has no meaning, i.e. semantics.

    But the fact that we can separate our formalisms from specific objects that we want to apply them to does not mean that these forms are not in themselves meaningful — Joshs

    When an abstraction was originally abstracted away from the real, physical world, it is its origin that may still suggest meaning/semantics. If it was never abstracted away from anything real or physical, however, what could possibly be its meaning?

    Pre-20th century mathematical theories still had some kind of connection to the real, physical world, if only, their origin. It was not "real mathematics", in Hardy's terminology:

    We have concluded that the trivial mathematics is, on the whole, useful, and that the real mathematics, on the whole, is not.

    Meaning and usefulness are treated as grave defects in pure mathematics. Seriously, "real mathematics" is necessarily meaningless and useless.
  • Hume on why we use induction
    But which, if it is so framed, will - as I think you are rightly pointing out - imply a universal hypothesis about the appropriateness of a particular statistical or probabilistic framework. — bongo fury

    Yes, as to the universality of Popper's falsificationism, you can even subject Pavlov's dogs, who are clearly falsificationist animals, to repeated attempts at falsification, in order to find a counterexample of a dog who is not.

    In that sense, falsificationism itself can be subjected to the rigours of falsificationism.

    Falsficationism clearly "eats its own dog food".
  • Mind development
    what is the philosophy behind discovery/invention? — regel

    "The" philosophy may not exist.

    The main ingredient in the discovery of new knowledge cannot possibly be knowledge. Otherwise, humanity would not have discovered any knowledge at all, or else, discovered all possible knowledge already.

    Since the main ingredient is not knowledge, we cannot "know" it, and therefore, it can most likely not be expressed in language. That could be the reason why "the" philosophy behind discovery/invention does not exist.

    Furthermore, that is why the accumulation of databases full of knowledge is highly ineffective for discovering new knowledge. Therefore, advanced degrees attesting to your knowledge, will not turn you into a productive researcher.

    In practical terms, it means that the academia are not particularly better positioned for the job of scientific or any other kind of research.

    Academics are generally only good at regurgitating existing knowledge, if even, and not at discovering any new knowledge. New knowledge is as likely, and possibly even more, to be discovered by outsiders.

    Hence, the Einstein phenomenon (and lots of other, similar cases).
  • Hume on why we use induction
    To cut a long story short, in my opinion, Hume makes sense by supporting falsifcationism because Pavlov's dog does that too. I guess that is why Karl Popper struck a chord by publishing "Science as Falsification".
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