What Uber does is set up people to work for companies who can shut them off and tell them what to do, but the companies have no responsibilities for the workers because they consider them customers. So it is a worse kind of labor relation. — Coben

Before cashing out from my startup, I always worked as a contractor. For various reasons, I strongly preferred that arrangement. I never had a "boss". I always had a client. I cannot stand employment labour arrangements. Seriously, I hate employer-employee situations with a passion.

In the case of Uber, I would never, ever choose to be an employee of a taxi company. I would rather monetize some free hours, left and right, with Uber.

I really do not need an employer to "take responsibility" for any personal problem of mine. Of course, for that to work, you need to live in a country where the government hasn't taken over health care in order to make it unaffordable. Medication is up to 300 times cheaper here than in the USA. Furthermore, where I live, children take care of their elderly parents. So, I do not need a retirement pension either. I will just live in with one of my children, grow vegetables in the garden, raise a few hens, and be done with it. Unlike in the West, old people are happy here. No loneliness. No retirement home. No bullshit.

Id rather know that a human pilot can jump in at any time if the computer — Mark Dennis

That is how they fix issues with drones during their flight. Of course, these flights are closely monitored. There isn't anybody suggesting that flight control would no longer be needed. Still, why does that person need to sit inside the plane? In what way would that help anything?

By the way, there haven't been mechanical controls on planes for decades now. It's not that someone could still pull a lever or manually open a valve on commercial airplanes nowadays. If the electronic controls are out of order, there's nothing that you can do anymore. We are no longer in the 1950ies.

The problems are caused by people who memorize the 70-year old regulations but do not understand the underlying technology. They think that they know but in fact they don't.

We don't need pilots in airplanes. We don't need captains or navigation personnel on ships. We don't need paper-based bills of lading any more. A digital file will do. We don't need any of the paper-based stuff any longer. It is also time that the old people who insist on that bullshit, finally retire.

So yes, we do in fact still need pilots. — Mark Dennis

No, we don't.

We also no longer need taxis, because we have things like Uber. We don't need hotels, because we have things like Airbnb. All these technologies and business models are being held up in the West by the same problem: outdated and counterproductive regulations. Countries that do not have them will simply leapfrog ahead.

That is why is it now mucb easier and cheaper to get around in Saigon than in any American city. No need to buy your own car. Just use Grab. That is also why you can use your mobile to pay for a coffee in Shanghai but not in Seattle. The West is getting behind on even Africa in many ways.

All of these useless regulations are gradually making the West less and less competitive. It is no longer just a problem of labour cost because of excess taxation. The problems caused by misguided regulation are even larger.

They think they know, but they clearly don't. There are simply too many people trying to impose their stupidity onto others. The problem even starts at school and university. The students mostly regurgitate mere bullshit. They mistakenly think that they are learning something, but they aren't. They think that they are smart, but in reality, they are the dumbest people on the planet. They are even too stupid to see how stupid they are.

This phenomenon is busy leading up to the most spectacular economic implosion ever seen on the face of the earth. I don't give it even five years, before it will all be over. As I am writing this comment from Asia, I can guarantee that a spectacular surprise awaits the idiots in the West. That is simply inevitable.

How do you see this panning out with licensing for parents? What would be the consequences? — Brett

Since licensing for parents can only limit births in the country that introduces it, I see wholesale immigration of "unlicensed" people, born in unregulated locations, until the bottom of the labour market is no longer attractive to outsiders.

These wholesale suicidal policies are actually funny to watch. I am not against them, because it mostly backfires on people who believe in them. So, go for it!

I wonder how a Wittgenstein or a Plato or any notable philosopher of history would do on a regular forum like this. — schopenhauer1

You can look at how things are going for contemporary philosophy stars like Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who is a grandee in the epistemology of randomness. He is doing absolutely fine and has a large following on his subreddit, his twitter account, and his medium blog.

The cream will always rise to the top.
The dross will always sink to the bottom.

Technology does not change any of that.

By the way, people who merely read philosophy are not philosophers. Someone with a degree in philosophy is not a philosopher. You need to make meaningful, original publications for that. Plato did not have a degree in philosophy. At best, his students did (by learning from Plato).

We licence pilots because of the terrible harm a totally incompetent pilot can wreak on others. — Bartricks

We haven't needed pilots to fly planes for over thirty years now.

In fact, we use a lot of drone technology already, which is safer, better, and cheaper, but we do not use it for commercial passenger flights, the reason being the seventy-year old totally outdated regulations that were suitable for 1950ies technology, but which are still around today.

Seriously, we simply do not need pilots.

Licensing has a strong tendency to freeze situations as they were when the regulations were introduced. We started regulating trains in the 1920ies, and that is why the railways remain frozen like things were in 1920. Railways are as unusable today as they were back then.

Technology and regulations do not go well together.

The more regulations, the more outdated the country tends to become. Just give it enough time. For example, the USA has the most outdated banking system in the world. The USA are behind on even most African countries when it comes to mobile payments. It is slower and more expensive to wire money between two American bank accounts than between two bank accounts in Kenya.

Give it a few more decades, and the USA will be behind in terms of technology on literally everything, thanks to ... regulations.

In every respect, the USA will be worse off than third-world countries today.

Now the thing about licensing; of course some people are going to have kids without permission — Mark Dennis

These people will rather immigrate from elsewhere, gradually outnumber you, and then, sooner or later, simply get rid of you.

The reason why we - that is, why civilized people - license these activitites is fairly obvious: do them badly and you can cause others enormous harm. — Bartricks

The reason for licensure is first and foremost to restrict competition in the field and increase profits for the cartel that controls it.

Regulatory capture (also client politics) is a corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulatory agency is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group[1].[2] When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society.

Licensure is never in the interest of society. It is always in the interest of the oligarchy.

For example, why do so many people have no access to medical care in the USA? Why is it so expensive? Why is it so much cheaper in other countries? There is only one explanation that makes sense: They are ripping these people off by licensing away every cheaper option.

The reason why it is so easy to rip off these people, is because these people believe in the manipulative lies of the mainstream media and the public-school indoctrination camps. But then again, since these people believe these lies, they should be happy to get stripped clean; and they increasingly are. The same holds true for the student-loan idiots who will be made to pay off for the rest of their lives from the little money they make from serving coffee at Starbucks. They believe in the manipulative lies, and now they must pay. So, let them pay!

The definition would be something like: “Ownership is the legal right to control an object.” — Congau

That is how it works for physical property. For crypto-assets, it has nothing to do with any legal rights.

I own all unspent output in address:
1GomQsbposWNZDqEXn1jNMjQcKFGdfjDbm

because I know its secret:
KyQhFdcvAEw6mQ9xTP4oWjcmRrpx1A3qyHXcPpMfxEhgV55YuqJY

If I do not know the secret, then I also do not own the assets.

It is property-by-pure-knowledge as opposed to property-by-law-enforcement. It is pure knowledge alone that gives me property rights. Property-by-law-enforcement looks very primitive in comparison, and it also lacks purity.

Furthermore I do not trust property-by-law-enforcement, because I totally distrust the ruling elite. I prefer pure knowledge instead.

I own because I know. That is how I like it.

The state doesn't own anything except the power to defend what others own. — Harry Hindu

The ruling elite cannot be trusted.

In theory, the ruling elite protects your property rights. In practice, they are also the worst threat to them. The more you trust them, the more likely you will sooner or later lose what you have.

The ruling elite must never be trusted, and everything they say, must be treated with utmost suspicion. They are liars and manipulators. They will try to make you believe that they act in your interest, but in reality, they are only looking for an opportunity to strip your clean.

Some physicists are trying to find a way around the infinitely dense point of the universe starting. — DanielP

An infinitely dense starting point for the universe is indeed clearly an issue. Either they figure out how all the matter of the universe could be contained in something the size of a tennis ball or else they discover how the expansion of the universe leads to an expansion in matter-energy, because the current approach really doesn't add up.

So do you think the observable universe started with an infinitely dense point? — DanielP

Well, no. Without some good explanation as to why that kind of matter-energy densities would be possible, and why exactly it is no longer possible, I have a problem with the current approach. In my opinion, the infinitely-dense story simply does not add up. So, I am still waiting for an explanation from theoretical physicists as to why and how it would all add up, because at the moment, it doesn't.

What about before that, do you think there was something like the Big Bounce, or the membranes in a higher dimension that hit each other and cause Big Bangs every several billions of years? — DanielP

I really have no clue about that. It sounds very speculative, though.

Furthermore, it doesn't sound like there would be anything to experimentally test or at least observe in that story. In that sense, the story may even be epistemically unsound.

Power — Maw

Agreed.

Property rights only exist when the powers-that-be recognize them. If they refuse to enforce such property rights, then you do not have them.

There is currently only one exception: you own cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin because you know their secret, regardless of what the powers-that-be believe or enforce.

Since it is not possible to prove that someone knows a secret -- he can trivially deny that -- cryptocurrencies fall outside the range of political enforcement.

This claim is not substantiated in the argument unless Theodore Sider is privy to information we're not aware of. It's implausible at all levels of credulity. — TheMadFool

Yes, agreed.

Sider's speculations are ... just that: mere speculations.

matter cannot be created or destroyed — DanielP

The first law of thermodynamics doesn't actually specify that matter can neither be created nor destroyed, but instead that the total amount of energy in a closed system cannot be created nor destroyed (though it can be changed from one form to another).

Within its environmental range, matter will resist falling apart. If you manage to push it outside its stability range, matter does effectively disintegrate (and will change its energy form).

In the context of the Big Bang, this invariant is a problem because the idea that all matter-energy was contained in the initial singularity leads to postulating an impossibly high density of matter-energy:

In 1989 Hans Dehmelt attempted to modernize the idea of the primeval atom. In this hypothesis, Cosmonium would have been the heaviest form of matter at the beginning of the big bang.

That kind of incredible density cannot be observed anywhere in the universe. Where can such "Cosmonium" be observed?

Therefore, I rather believe that there was no such high-density primeval atom, while matter-energy is somehow -- still to be discovered -- a side effect of the expansion of the universe. The alternative simply does not add up.

Democracy would not be an option, because the country is run by tribes and democracy doesn´t work on a tribal and patriarchal network. — DiegoT

It is the Church that dismantled the tribal and patriarchal network in Europe. For obvious reasons, this is not an option in Afghanistan. Furthermore, such network is of tremendous value to an individual. It dramatically increases the number of people who will object, resist, and fight back, when he gets attacked by outsiders.

There are real and good reasons why people tend to be tribal.

A citizenship would have be slowly built, women would have to have less children, an internal cultural revolution (based on the pre-islamic past, like we did in Europe in the Renaissance) would need to be supported. — DiegoT

The more individualistic European social structure was shaped by Church policies, which dismantled the clans and the tribes, and by the same token spectacularly increased State -and Church power. Furthermore, it took almost a thousand years to achieve that; after which, the Church was no longer needed and was discarded.

Two more generations, and until them, the doctor prescribes an authoritarian transition to keep peace and order and to make changes possible. — DiegoT

Authoritarianism is not particularly viable when the other side does not hesitate to shoot back. You would need to convince them not to shoot back, but that requires them to believe that they shouldn't.

That is where religion kicks in.

In Europe, it was the role of the Church to preach against rebellion and in favour of accepting State power. There is no centralized Church in Islam. There is no organization with control over the belief system that has the credibility to do that.

I propose a post-islamic, civilized (not religious, not tribal) vision for all Afghans. — DiegoT

Individuals benefit tremendously from tribal solidarity. Hence, they will not give it up, unless a power like religion manages to convince them to do that.

Islam protects tribal solidarity, and the tribes protect Islam.

For example, promiscuity and rampant divorce would substantially weaken tribal ties. However, they have an elaborate honour system to prevent exactly that. Anybody who dares to contemplate engaging in that kind of behaviour, is at risk of getting unceremoniously terminated by their own relatives. You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs.

Furthermore, it is clearly in their own interest to remain tribal and Islamic. What would they even gain from an atheist, individualistic alternative? Thanks to their tribal, Islamic ways, they have managed for almost twenty years to keep the upper hand on a superpower like the United States. Prior to that, they happily bankrupted the Soviet Union. Why would they give up that kind of power and ability? Would you do that? I admire them for what they have achieved.

The sun will still be around in five billion years, therefore Hume was right that the sun might not rise tomorrow? :-) — Andrew M

Technically, yes. Some day it will be true.

Because my views are not universal is the reason that I bring the topic up — chromechris

It is perfectly ok that your views are not universal, but in that case, do not try to present them as such. There are multiple belief systems on the globe, with two or three major ones, and dozens of minor ones.

The communities around a belief system have their own views on various matters of morality. Sometimes I would not adopt these views by myself, but I will usually, readily acknowledge that they seem to work fine for that community.

Furthermore, if you no longer like tennis, then try football instead. Going through life as an anti-tennis person is silly, ridiculous, and actually counterproductive. Tennis may not work for you, but it surely works for other people. So, just get something else to believe in, strive for, and aspire to, instead of criticizing what otherwise seems to work fine for other people.

The forum owner and administration can do whatever they want. It’s not a democracy, so this is a wasted effort. — praxis

Yes, agreed, and based on my experience, let me emphasize that we should not even want a democracy in these matters. The populace should have no say whatsoever over the rules, let alone, be allowed to vote over them. I hate democracy, because I profoundly hate the stupidity and ignorance of the unwashed masses.

Vulgus, plebs imperitum ad deteriora promptum.

I was convinced of the existence of God, and I tried to prove God's existence in my head when faced with cues or facts that questioned such existence of "him". — chromechris

In my opinion, someone who tries to prove the existence of God, is not truly a believer in God. In that sense, you never really believed. You only somehow pretended that you did.

According to most societies, children are under their parents authority for the first 18 years (ordinarily) of the child's life. — chromechris

No, that is just an arbitrary, western view. In other societies, parents usually remain in authority until they die. That would be the view of around 85% of humanity.

In other words, your entire argument existentially depends on an undetected western ethnocentric twist that is absolutely not universal at all.

It is a very conflict-prone and even dangerous practice to generalize the opinions of merely 15% of the world population to the unwilling, remaining 85%. It has led to violent combat in the past and will undoubtedly lead to new, violent combat in the future. I suspect that many more millions, if not hundreds of millions, will die over this.

So, no, your views are not universal at all.
Seriously, they are not.
Understanding that principle may even save you your life one day.

A God to me seems like a slave owner, who by virtue can never be overcome. The existence of a God to me seems immoral. — chromechris

In terms of what system of morality would that be immoral?

Either you reason within a system, or else you reason about a system, because in all other cases you are doing system-less bullshit.

Why? P, P -> Q | Q is just right because it follow from some rules. But these rules can change overnight, can they? — Pippen

Propositional logic is an axiomatic theory, derivable from 14 arbitrary, speculative beliefs with no justification. We have no clue as to why these axioms are the starting-point beliefs of this system. If we knew, then they would not be axioms.

In the Platonic view, we sense that these axioms may have some connection somehow to the physical universe. In the intuitionistic view, we argue that these axioms are somehow connected to our natural predisposition to believe them.

In every case, however, we commit to refrain from trying to justify axioms from within mathematics, unless we can replace them by more fundamental axioms. That would, however, still not change the axiomatic nature of the system.

Since we do not know why these axioms are there in the first place, we also do not know on what grounds they could change. Hence, your question is fundamentally undecidable.

I really do not get it, why Hume judged at his time, it was possible at any time, the sun could not rise tomorrow (experience as an unreliable source of knowledge) — Pippen

Nowadays, Hume's intuition about the sun is considered to be quite right:

The Solar System will remain roughly as we know it today until the hydrogen in the core of the Sun has been entirely converted to helium, which will occur roughly 5 billion years from now. This will mark the end of the Sun's main-sequence life. At this time, the core of the Sun will contract with hydrogen fusion occurring along a shell surrounding the inert helium, and the energy output will be much greater than at present. The outer layers of the Sun will expand to roughly 260 times its current diameter, and the Sun will become a red giant. Because of its vastly increased surface area, the surface of the Sun will be considerably cooler (2,600 K at its coolest) than it is on the main sequence.[51] The expanding Sun is expected to vaporize Mercury and render Earth uninhabitable.

that from p and p -> q from tomorrow no more q follows (logic as an unreliable source of knowledge) — Pippen

As long as P does not change, then Q will keep necessarily following. If P is a Platonic abstraction, then there are no reasons for it to change.

For example, Pythagoras' theorem will forever remain provable from Euclid's classical axioms. You would have to modify Euclid's Platonic abstractions, i.e. the basic beliefs (axioms) that construct the abstract world of classical geometry, to effect a change that would render Pythagoras' theorem unsound.

You could also try to modify the axioms of first-order logic to make the inferences, in the proof for Pythagoras' theorem, invalid.

The difference between Hume's physical world and the abstract, Platonic worlds on which logic operates, is that there are no changes possible outside our control in abstract, Platonic worlds.

What prevents us from imagining that we all wake up tomorrow and apply other logical rules? — Pippen

You actually can. Hilbert calculi are an exercise on doing exactly that:

In logic, especially mathematical logic, a Hilbert system, sometimes called Hilbert calculus, Hilbert-style deductive system or Hilbert–Ackermann system, is a type of system of formal deduction attributed to Gottlob Frege[1] and David Hilbert. These deductive systems are most often studied for first-order logic, but are of interest for other logics as well. Most variants of Hilbert systems take a characteristic tack in the way they balance a trade-off between logical axioms and rules of inference.[1] Hilbert systems can be characterised by the choice of a large number of schemes of logical axioms and a small set of rules of inference.

It does not seem to be possible to create more powerful systems of logic by adding axioms:

Because Hilbert-style systems have very few deduction rules, it is common to prove metatheorems that show that additional deduction rules add no deductive power, in the sense that a deduction using the new deduction rules can be converted into a deduction using only the original deduction rules.

In fact, this is a well-known phenomenon in mathematics. Beyond the basic construction, adding axioms usually does not make a system stronger. The system rarely knows more through these new axioms. It will just trust more.

For example, arithmetic theory can "see" all theorems and proofs of all other systems, including the "more powerful" ones, such as set theory. So, it actually knows these theorems, but it does not trust them. More axioms often means that your system does not become more knowledgeable or more powerful, but only more gullible.

Wouldn't that be against complexity by preventing all possible relationships? — TheMadFool

All states are actually, equally probable.

Therefore, you see the elements in all other states too, but because they have no interest in staying in these normal states, they regularly keep changing state.

At some point, however, an element will randomly/accidentally enter the very stable state, which happens to be a game-theoretical equilibrium. The element no longer want to leave. It no longer want to change its state, because its own, internal stability benefits handsomely from being in this particular state.

The other items -- which can be other types of elements -- that constitute the equilibrium happen to react in the same way: they do not want to leave, for the same reason. It is the entire collection of items in the equilibrium that is now very stable. This collection of sub-things thereby forms a new thing.

Complexity grows because a thing (=the equilibrium) consists of multiple sub-things. This composition strategy of sub-things into things is able to yield increasingly complex things.

There is no isomorphism within the Platonic realm either, each concept is unique.

The formalisation of 2+2=4 as just symbols is different to the concept of two plus equals four, which is turn different from another concept using the symbols 2+2=4, which is in turn different to a translation of two equals two equals four form one language to another.

I'm not speaking about a correspondence to the physical realm, but rather the distinction and identity of different concepts or meanings within the Platonic realm. One concept is never another, is not doing the same thing as another. I'm talking about the necessary distinctions of the platonic realm, which render isomorphism incoherent.

To assign isomorphism in Platonic realm is to tell a falsehood about the distinctions of the Platonic realm. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You reject a very fundamental notion of the Platonic realm:

The interest of isomorphisms lies in the fact that two isomorphic objects cannot be distinguished by using only the properties used to define morphisms; thus isomorphic objects may be considered the same as long as one considers only these properties and their consequences.

It is probably also a rejection of the very concept of abstraction.

Platonic objects are beliefs expressed in language that arise in an abstract world constructed from basic beliefs. It is a core belief in mathematics that such belief objects can be isomorphic. But then again, there cannot be compulsion in matters of belief. Therefore, you do not need to believe it.

The mathematical way of thinking ultimately always rests on arbitrary, speculative beliefs with no justification possible, as its epistemic domain is staunchly axiomatic. It invariably seeks to strip away (real-world) meaning. In that sense, it is not meaningful either. It does not seek to be necessarily useful either, and it is often probably not. It only seeks to ensure that derived beliefs are provable from basic beliefs. Hence, at best, it is consistent.

A ToE is impossible because it cannot cross distinction. Whether in the physical or Platonic realm, any proposed ToE is but one distinction of reality. In being the ToE, as opposed to everything else, it necessarily leaves something out. It always fails to cover of something the distinction which are not it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If we limit the ToE to a compressed digital version of the physical universe, then Chaitin's incompleteness theorem insists that you cannot exclude that it may exist. Such digital file may not leave out anything that would be considered relevant.

The problem isn't given in the particular length or cycles a representation might have or not, it is that the representation is never thing it describes. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Even though I agree that a map is not the territory, depending on what you use it for, the map may not need to be the territory.

Any thing, physical or Platonic, can only be given by itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but according to the formalist philosophy, a Platonic object is its representation. The number 12 is just the string "12". It is equal to itself up to isomorphism. Platonic objects are language expressions only. In that sense, they are different from physical objects, which can consist of matter, energy, and so on.

Our descriptions only give an account of this thing when it describes it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but what is the description of a description if not the description itself?

(essentially unique up to isomorphism ...)

Mathematical objects do not have isomorphism either, for each is it own particular concept. 2+2=4 is not the same as another, different concept of 2+2=4. One mathematical rule is not another. — TheWillowOfDarkness

For example, "2+2=4" is not identical to "two plus two is four" but these expressions are still isomorphic under translation. That is why the equality operator needs to be defined explicitly as to clarify when we will still acknowledge these expressions as being equal. The idea in math is that expressions can only be unique up to isomorphism. In the physical world, however, we assume that objects can be really unique.

By the way, in the formalist view, "2+2=4" is a string, i.e. symbolic language only. it is just a string of symbols. It does not represent anything else than that. Seeking correspondence with the physical universe is not the job of mathematics. It is the prerogative of downstream disciplines, such as science, that will institute empirical formalisms, such as experimental testing, to establish such correspondence.

In mathematics, the symbol "2" and "4" are exclusively Platonic abstractions, i.e. language expressions, that live in their own abstract, Platonic world. The world of natural numbers are a model for arithmetic theory, in a sense that all theorems provable in arithmetic theory are true in the world of natural numbers. Furthermore, the physical universe is not even isomorphic with the Platonic world of natural numbers. From the point of view of mathematics, these two worlds are unrelated.

The very point of a description, theory or definition is it accounts for one specific thing. None of these things are everything, so a ToE will always fail. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The ToE is a completely hypothetical theory to which we do not have access, and of which the physical universe is a model. An existing model, i.e. collection of true sentences, always has a theory, if only the model itself. In terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the ToE is the shortest possible summary of the physical universe as model:

In algorithmic information theory (a subfield of computer science and mathematics), the Kolmogorov complexity of an object, such as a piece of text, is the length of the shortest computer program (in a predetermined programming language) that produces the object as output.

Asserting that the physical universe has no theory of which the representation is shorter than the full details of the physical universe itself, pretty much amounts to claiming that the universe is completely random. This amounts to asserting that any digital representation of the physical universe is an incompressible string.

Because of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, there is no proof possible for this view:

We know that, in the set of all possible strings, most strings are complex in the sense that they cannot be described in any significantly "compressed" way. However, it turns out that the fact that a specific string is complex cannot be formally proven, if the complexity of the string is above a certain threshold. The precise formalization is as follows [...]

Hence, the situation is rather as following.

It is not possible to prove that there exists a ToE, because then you would need to produce a copy of it, which is clearly not available. It is, however, also not possible to prove that there does not exist a ToE, because that assertion would be in violation of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem.

What does it even mean to be intelligent without having no any information about anything? — Zelebg

Quite a bit of behaviour emerges from learning how to react to a posteriori information, in Kant's lingo. Still, pure reason, i.e. a priori cognition only, is also possible. Mathematics, being language about language, has gradually become exclusively a priori, i.e. pure reason.

Or do we get born with some kind of basic information with which we could then derive some basic concepts and eventually geometry and math? — Zelebg

When you look at the basic beliefs, i.e. system-wide premises, in propositional logic (14 axioms), standard number theory (9 axioms) and standard set theory (10 axioms), you can clearly see that these axiomatic beliefs look arbitrary, speculative, and without possible justification. The fact that we readily adopt these seemingly arbitrary beliefs certainly suggests that they could be somehow part of our nature, i.e. our innate disposition.

Seriously, there is nothing rationally meaningful about these basic beliefs. That does not mean that they are wrong. It just means that reason itself is not possible without having such basic, unjustified, and therefore seemingly unreasonable beliefs. In other words, the foundations of reason are not reasonable.

the mathematical order of the cosmos is what makes science possible, aside from being intrinsic to the fabric of the cosmos. — Wayfarer

There is a Platonic intuition that senses that there is somewhere a connection between mathematics and the physical universe, but we (should) never make use of it in mathematics.

Doing so, would trivially degenerate in dangerous constructivism, i.e. assuming correspondence with the physical universe, while bypassing the scientific requirements and formalisms such as experimental testing.

Therefore, it is necessary to strictly enforce the rules: If you intend to assert anything about the physical universe, you will have to experimentally test. Merely calculating is not allowed.

Each of these 27 possibilities then have further possible combinations which we can assume to be again in threes. We now have 27 × 27 × 27 = 19683 permutations possible. — TheMadFool

Yes, but most of these permutations are useless for these parts.

According to game theory, these parts will only pick those possibilities that substantially improve their own stability.

So, you will end up noticing large numbers of parts picking permutation 5897 (for example). In terms of probability, this option is very unlikely (only 1 chance out of 19683), but it happens to be a combination in which the internal stability of each of the three parts improves dramatically.

Part A is way less likely to fall apart in that option, but also part B and part C. So, none of these parts wants to leave this permutation for another one. Hence, this permutation turns out to be improbably stable.

So, layer after layer, these increasingly unlikely compositions become more and more stable, and that is exactly the opposite of what you would expect.

I would have thought that the whole basis of mathematical physics and indeed much of science in general, is that in finding the kinds of things, and the orderly relations between things, we are perceiving the elements of a Platonic order in the apparent disorder of sensory perception, so as to be amenable to mathematical representation. — Wayfarer

That is science.

Science is simply another activity, and absolutely not the same activity as mathematics.

Scientists spend an inordinate amount of effort establishing correspondence between their theories and the real, physical world. The number one tool for that is: experimental testing. The epistemological keyword for scientists is: correspondence.

Mathematical physics is still physics. It will ultimately still seek to experimentally test and in that way ensure correspondence between their theories and the physical universe. It is actually quite stricter than that. Mathematical physics is not allowed to talk about anything that does not concern the physical universe.

Physics consists of language expressions about real-world facts in the physical universe.

(Pure) mathematicians don't do that at all. Mathematical theories are not about the real, physical world. There is no correspondence. Any claim to correspondence is more likely than not a constructivist heresy.

The model for a mathematical theory is a set of language expressions that fits the rules -- i.e. other language expressions -- of the theory at hand. Example: Provable Peano-arithmetic theorems are true in the abstract, Platonic world of the natural numbers (=model). The epistemological keyword in mathematics is: provability.

Mathematics consists of language expressions about other language expressions (that live in abstract, Platonic worlds).

It's not as if the two realms of mathematics and physical objects are entirely divorced — Wayfarer

They have an interface in language alone. Physics uses the language and regulations produced by mathematics to maintain consistency in its own use of language. Mathematics never says what physics should be talking about. The semantics are entirely produced by physics itself. Mathematics only helps keeping the language of physics consistent.

Atheism precludes any good approach to ethics because of an imminent, but unspecified in timing and nature, debt based economic crisis. — fdrake

What does system-less so-called "ethics" translate into? Well, obviously into: The Special-Interest effect: Increasing The Size, Scope, and Cost Of Government

But then again, on the long run it does not matter, because the next financial crisis will indeed take care of that any time soon.

Truly a high point of a rational approach to ethics, and not an ossification of historical codes with the normative weight of tradition at all. — fdrake

We cannot be far away from witnessing with our own eyes how the $22 trillion of debt and $46 trillion of unfunded liabilities are going to pan out, in a system where the "normative weight of tradition" has been replaced by a ridiculous collection of haphazard, system-less, single-issue concerns.

Even the most stubborn atheist will soon discover that all of it still is a system, and that an exponentially growing burden of accumulated deficits cannot possibly remain workable. Just wait until the next economic-financial crisis which is clearly just around the corner. The bullshit is about to implode any time now. Watch that space!

Am I then to conclude that the belief simplicity leads to complexity is baseless and ergo, logically, to be open to discussion? — TheMadFool

It is not provable from a mathematical theory, but it may very well be true. Statements that are not provable are not necessarily baseless. That would mean that everything we ever say about the real, physical world would be baseless, because there is nothing you can prove about it.

The empirical epistemic domain, including science, does not require proof. It necessarily accepts substantially lowered standards of evidence.

Furthermore, even within mathematics, there are statements that are true in one model (and false in another) but not provable. Only statements that are true in all its models could ever be provable from the mathematical theory.

Also I think equlibrium has nothing to do with the issue of simplicity and complexity. — TheMadFool

In game theory it does. The equilibrium between individual players (=subthings) is a new thing. So, when two protons, a neutron, and two electrons form an equilibrium, you get an atom, which is a new thing. It is not just the composition of its subatomic constituents. An atom has substantially different emergent properties from its constituent parts. Iron has electrons in its equilibrium and gold has them too, but iron and gold are noticeably different things.

es equilibrium may describe a relationship between systems but it, as a concept, doesn't form part of the definition of simplicity or complexity. — TheMadFool

For example, a water molecule, H20, consists of three atoms, i.e. two times H(ydrogen) and one time O(xygen). H20 is substantially more complex than its constituent atoms. When these water molecules get absorbed in your body, they form even more complex biochemical cocktails, which are essentially also equilibria. These cocktails are noticeably different and more complex than pure water. Composition layer after composition layer, you obtain increasingly more complex compositions that are noticeably different from their constituent parts.

People believe that simplicity evolves into complexity — TheMadFool

That is a legitimate belief. For example, a game-theoretical equilibrium is more complex than its constituent parts. That alone explains much of why simplicity evolves into complexity.

Humans can't create anything more complex than themselves — TheMadFool

Human societies are conceivably more complex than individual humans.

If 1 is true then 2 should be false. — TheMadFool

It depends on whether a group of person is more complex than a person.

There's a difference between an amateur philosopher and a trained philosopher as an example. — TheMadFool

A trained philosopher is someone who is an expert reader of real philosophers, most of whom were not trained at expert reading other philosophers. Trained philosophers are like literary critics, who never write a book by themselves, while authors who do, are rarely or never interested in criticizing work by other authors. It is not possible to train someone into developing talent. Hence, the old adage: The ones who can, do. The ones who cannot do, teach. The ones who cannot teach, administer and become bureaucrats.

So, no. Someone who trains at executing procedures, such as reading other people's philosophies, has no real talent. Otherwise, he would just use his own talent instead.

If you don't want to answer that then can you kindly try and provide a proof for the belief that simplicity leads to complexity or vice versa or perhaps you want to do something else. — TheMadFool

Proof only exists in mathematics, i.e. in the axiomatic epistemic domain. It is not possible to prove even one single theorem about the real, physical world. That would require access to the theory of which all provable claims are true in the physical universe, i.e. the Theory of Everything (ToE). We do not have that access. Hence, the answer is that there is no proof possible that simplicity leads to complexity in the physical universe.

What kind of paradigm for defining human behavior philosophically would be relevant in a modern discourse? What are the currently prevailing theories in this area? — Enrique

Unlike religious morality, atheist "ethics" revolve around a haphazard and ever-changing collection of single-issue concerns such as "climate change", workers' rights, women's rights, animal rights, and so on. It is not a cohesive system where they carefully consider tradeoffs that automatically occur in a complete system.

Either you reason within a system, or else you reason about a system, because in all other cases, you are just doing system-less bullshit.

Reminded me of the oft bandied about but usually misunderstood (count me in) concept of entropy. I guess the difference between a closed and an open system explains the complexity, especially life, we see on earth. — TheMadFool

Entropy is also at work. Its effect is to gradually dismantle complex systems, i.e. erode them into simpler ones. Entropy is, however, a weak phenomenon, compared to the stubborn resilience of a game-theoretical equilibrium between constituent parts of an object (dead or living).

Furthermore, the universe keeps expanding. The mainstream view is that all matter-energy that exists today was originally contained in the initial singularity. I do not believe in that view, simply because we cannot detect similar dense concentrations of matter-energy anywhere in the universe today. That kind of density of matter-energy is most likely even impossible. For example, if you try to concentrate all matter-energy of just our solar system or just our galaxy inside the volume of a tennis ball, it would not work. Therefore, I believe that matter-energy is somehow a byproduct of the expansion of the universe, and that it did not even exist in the initial singularity. This matter-generation process would then also work in the opposite direction of entropy. In my opinion, the standard Lambda-CDM cosmological model has lots of implications that cannot possibly be true and that are clearly bullshit. I don't have an alternative for it, but I don't believe it either.

Tegmark is not suggesting the universe is a structure of language expressions. — noAxioms

I wasn't discussing Tegmark's views there. The ToE is a theory of which the physical universe -- with its matter, energy, and other physical phenomena -- is a model, while number theory is a theory of which the set of natural numbers -- essentially, language expressions -- is another model. This is not Tegmark's view. It is my own opinion.

You're confusing mathematics with the methods used to convey mathematical concepts. — noAxioms

Mathematics are language expressions about other language expressions. Both the methods and the objects being manipulated by these methods are language expressions. Certainly the formalist philosophy sees it 100% like that:

In the philosophy of mathematics, formalism is the view that holds that statements of mathematics and logic can be considered to be statements about the consequences of the manipulation of strings (alphanumeric sequences of symbols, usually as equations) using established manipulation rules.

Mathematical statements are strings which manipulate other strings. A number is just a string, i.e. a language expression.

Now, this is not the only aspect of mathematics. This does not mean that I would reject the Platonist, logicist, or structuralist views on mathematics. These are other aspects of the same thing. In this context, however, in my impression, the formalist aspect dominates: Math is language about language.

Tegmark's mathematical universe is an ontological proposition, not an epistemological one. — noAxioms

When Tegmark talks about the ToE, I actually agree with what he says, but only, because the ToE has special status: its model is the physical universe. I disagree with the idea that it would apply in general. When the model for a mathematical theory is not the physical universe, such as in number theory or set theory, I do not believe that these models physically exist in our universe. They exist in their own abstract, Platonic world.

Concerning Tegmark's view:

Mathematical existence equals physical existence, and all structures that exist mathematically exist physically as well.

I agree when it is about the ToE (Theory of Everything) and I disagree for all other mathematical theories.

Is it now? You have some evidence of this? — noAxioms

There is no entirely conclusive evidence for the theory of the Big Bang, but the theory is considered quite mainstream. If the universe started expanding from a high-density initial state, i.e. a singularity, it cannot be infinitely large today.

As I wrote before, if the physical universe has a finite size, it cannot possibly be isomorphic with the natural numbers under arithmetic, because the cardinality of the natural numbers is countable infinity.

At the same time, I certainly admit that there is no entirely conclusive evidence concerning the size of the physical universe.

Nobody said the universe was the set of natural numbers. I can think of plenty of finite sized mathematical structures. — noAxioms

Yes, of course. Arithmetic is allowed in finite natural-number calculation fields as long as their size is a prime power ("Galois fields"). You do not even need first-order theories for them, because you can always apply quantifier elimination. But then again, that is only true for natural-number calculation. Real numbers always require -- at minimum -- second-order theories, and therefore, reintroduce the original problem with a vengeance.

The physical universe is indeed not the set of natural numbers, but it is not even isomorphic with the natural numbers. Except for the ToE, there are no mathematical theories that have models that are isomorphic with the physical universe. That is why, out of the box, mathematics has no connection with the real, physical world.

Claiming any such connection is epistemically acceptable, only when the theory first goes through a bureaucracy of correspondence-seeking formalisms, such as experimental testing in science. In all other cases, the model fitting a mathematical theory is just a Platonic abstraction that consists of language expressions describing other language expressions that are completely divorced from the physical universe.

“There is no natural number n that is the number of a proof of this statement”. So, G doesn’t hold in M, but that’s because M has nonstandard numbers. We can loosely say that there’s a nonstandard number which is the number of an “infinitely long proof” of G. — John Baez - professor of mathematics at the University of California, Riverside

That sounds intriguing and intuitively correct, but unfortunately, also difficult to verify, because these nonstandard numbers are infinite cardinalities. So, yes, if there is a proof it will be encoded in one of these infinite cardinalities, which is indeed not a natural number n.

Going to have to give me some examples so I can figure out what you mean by this. — noAxioms

Every sentence that is provable in a theory is true in every of its models. The physical universe is a model of the ToE. A true fact in the physical universe will be directly visible to us.

it's true in our world. — noAxioms

Number theory are rules about numbers, which are language expressions. A theorem provable in number theory will be true in its models (of language expressions). The physical universe cannot be a model of number theory, because it is not a structure that consists exclusively of language expressions. A particular subset of English or French or Chinese could be models of number theory.

The world of natural numbers can be real or just abstract, and it is still true for that world in both cases. — noAxioms

No. Imagine that you associate natural numbers to successive physical miles in the universe. At some point, you will run out of physical miles, because the universe is deemed finite. You will not run out of natural numbers, though. From there on, you will run into facts that are true in the natural numbers but not true in the physical universe. Hence, there is no one-to-one correspondence between both worlds. They are simply not isomorphic for arithmetic.

he relationship is the reverse: no matter how similar things might be (natural numbers, different instances of atoms, different instances of human, etc.), they are each a unique difference. Even those who are the same in a representation are entirely different. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The real, physical universe is not an abstract, Platonic world which can verbatim serve as a model for a mathematical theory. In mathematics, objects are unique up to isomorphism. In the physical universe, they are (assumed to be) always really unique. This is one of the (many) difficulties and mismatches between mathematics and the physical universe. It is probably also one of the (many) reasons why science is only a poor Platonic-cave shadow of the real Theory of Everything (ToE).

There is no isomorphism between any of them — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, yeah, in an empirical environment, while looking at the real, physical world, I certainly agree. In abstract, Platonic worlds, no. These Platonic abstractions are not the physical world.

For example, the natural numbers are not part of the physical universe. They are just a Platonic abstraction, i.e. a sequence of language expressions. That is why the language expression "2+2=4" is such a bad example about the physical universe. It is unrelated to the physical universe.

However, if you carefully apply a correspondence-seeking bureaucracy of scientific formalisms, heavily backed by experimental testing, then you can possibly (and safely) use that kind of language expressions in science.

Mathematics is not science, and neither of both are a complete theory of the physical universe. Given the unpredictability of human behaviour, giving us the impression of free will, there can undoubtedly not even be a complete theory of the physical universe.

I think a good response there was never any base in the first place, the arbitrary is nothing more than a ghost of imagination. — TheWillowOfDarkness

At the core of every system, you will find unexplained starting points. If you do not "see" that, then you do not understand what a system is.

That is not without consequences.

Logic itself is a belief system based on fourteen unexplained starting points. Either you reason within a system, or else about a system, or else you are doing system-less bullshit.

So, why does religion have a core of unexplained starting points?

Well, because every system is like that. Expecting something else, is simply wrong, unsound, and even obviously impossible.

If we take a mathematical relationship, like 2+2=4, the question of the arbitrariness makes no sense because there would never be 2+2=4 (what is known here) which would be anything other than a 2+2=4. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Wrong. Unique up to isomorphism only.

We are long past Skolem's 1934 publication from which became clear that the natural numbers cannot possibly be the only model that fits Peano arithmetic theory. There must be, and there are, nonstandard models of arithmetic. In fact, we already knew that from Gödel's 1931 publication concerning the incompleteness of Peano arithmetic theory. You are almost a century behind with your views.

All these nonstandard models of arithmetic theory are somehow carbon copies of the natural numbers, and are somehow isomorphic, but not perfectly so, depending on what "perfect" means in this context.

Essentially unique is never really unique, because it is necessary to allow for the existence of isomorphisms.

What I want to focus on is what I perceive is a claim that complexity evolves from simplicity. — TheMadFool

In the physical world, you can have simple objects of which their simple, disconnected state is much more probable than when they collectively form a more improbable, complex object. This is possible because such complex object is a game-theoretical equilibrium that is surprisingly stable, no matter how improbable.

For example, the reason why an electron prefers to orbit around the nucleus of an atom is ultimately because the electron's internal structure becomes itself more stable by doing that. The electron itself will less easily fall apart into smaller constituents, if it is itself part of that larger whole (the atom).

In fact, this hypothesis could probably even be tested scientifically. It should be easier to (cost substantially less energy) to smash a free electron apart than one that is orbiting around an atom. The same should be true for a proton or neutron. A free particle should be easier to smash apart than one that is embedded inside the nucleus of an atom.

If this idea that simplicity evolves into complexity is true then what explains the quite obvious fact that humans when engaged in creative acts can never produce something more complex than humans themselves? — TheMadFool

If you compare two ideas, then one could be better than the other one. In this context, we could define the term "better idea" as an idea that will live longer. Combining ideas into larger ones, however, does not necessarily create a game-theoretical equilibrium between them. For that to happen, each idea of a combination of two ideas should be able to survive longer, exactly because it is combined with the other one.

Why would this be the case?

For example, the nine axioms of Peano standard arithmetic theory are a combination of nine ideas. Would you improve the strength of arithmetic theory by adding new axioms? Not necessarily, because it will be possible to produce most candidate axioms as theorems of the nine existing ones. So, they would mostly be redundant. Without claiming that it will be impossible to do, it is hard to find an additional axiom that is truly independent from the existing ones, and that would meaningfully extend number theory. Another problem is that adding a new axiom would make you trust more, while increasing the amount of trust is not necessarily a good idea. Furthermore, number theory will never really die. It is not a living thing anyway.