@180 Proof presents that lies are not bad if they do not cause bad things.
@tim wood sets up an interesting dilemma: can lies in the Aristotelian sense be compatible with CI, and with the classification I presented?
@tim wood presents Kant's view of every lie being bad is actually a correct assessment, and gives an empirical acount of how very probable each lie is to foster distrust.
@themadfool further argues that Kant was not a consequentialist, but his arguments used consequentialism; and that consequentialists on some level accept non-wonsequentialism, judging from the wording how one would defend his or her most well-meaning lies as well.
Humans, one of the arguers above expressed, are programmed to reject the moral validity of lying, even when it leads to good things. We are all apologetic; we try and rationalize why we lie; we don't want to be caught lying by others when we lie to effect a greater good to individuals.
I think, personally, that consequentialism wins out over the initial bad feelings one generates by the sin of lying. If betrayal is not generated, distrust won't be, either.
If one wants to bring the three presentations of lying on a moral field, one must realize that hurts get generated by lying, but the hurts are not necessarily permanent, and can be forgiven. This does not contradict the Kantian CI, since the view accepts that lying is bad and ought to be avoided; but if it happens, then (this does not contradict the CI) it can be of a forgivable nature. And some of the types of lies I presented are such.
While all along, lies are "words spoken that the speaker knows are not true."
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Another angle to consider the dilemma would be: can an unethical act be beneficial for all mankind?
According to the Kantian CI, yes. Because immorality lies not in the consequence, but in the intention. If one asks himself, "If everyone did what I'm about to do, would it serve mankind to create a better world?" then one only has to imagine the scenario, and decide whether to execute his planned act or not.
However; the question posed by the CI bases the desirability of the action on the consequence.
So whether the actual consequence is good, or bad, is of no consequence. What is important, is that the person who is about to solve a moral dilemma, imagines the outcome one way or the other, and he acts the way which according to his imagination better serves mankind.
But different people have different powers of imagination.
So suppose that one asks himself, "Would mankind be better off if everyone uttered a white lie in the situation I've found myself in". His answer is "yes". This negates the categorical rejection of all lies on moral grounds, yet it satisfies the rigorous criteria for the CI.
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"Truth hurts but it liberates."
Another way to examine our question would be to say, does knowledge liberate enough so it is worth the pain to go through that hearing the truth generates?
This is not at all an offshoot of Kant's CI, yet the impact of its strength is staggering. Here, not merely moral dilemma is present; but a social significance of being excommunicated from the community if an individual tells everyone every opportunity he gets, what the others are doing wrong. In this situation the person benefits the community, because he eliminates incompatible or undesirable behaviour; but he does not benefit himself, but rather, harms himself. Is this compatible with CI? NO, it is not, because the individual does something that serves NOT all mankind. It serves most of his community, but not himself, and he is part of mankind. So the CI fails here too.
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I venture to say that most moral conundrums can be made compatible with most moral theories, except with that of the CI of Kant.
This is not to discount Kant's genius. Instead, I am amazed that he managed to create a system that teaches people not to be categorical, but be instead flexible in their moral judgments, because the field is full of nuances that can be turned against each other. But only until you remove CI from the comparable set of moral theories.