With all due respect, if one isn’t incompetent & were to actually peruse the objections to Spinoza in this, my thread, my point should be very obvious... Spinoza’s definitions of “substance” (& what he bases thereon) are irrational/illogical & flawed; & so are to be rejected. You’ve got a problem with it? Peruse the thread, bring on a counter-argument.

“No. I'm not saying anything close to that. I would be willing to say that Newtonian physics are a huge improvement over Cartesian physics and cosmology. Newtonian physics have been made more precise by Einstein's theory, but Einstein's equations still require Newton's g for gravitational constant and the value remains the same.”

Cartesian physics, in its many errors, nonetheless, does still have one major advantage over that of Newton’s, in not positing any absolute nature of space & motion; so as to be able to understand these in only a relative sense, which can, then, be mathematically calculated & represented according a coordinate system, that Descartes himself created for this very purpose. Which is, ultimately, the foundation & precursor of relativity in German physics, first through Leibiniz (a well-known intellectual opponent of Newton), & then, eventually, through Mach, leading to Einstein’s view (a view that he didn’t make more precise from a previous Newtonian one but was altogether changed [mainly due to his roots in German physics, which stems back to Descartes as was just noted]).

Plus, not to mention that Einstein didn’t merely work on or improve but completely changed the physical explanation of gravity itself, from Newton’s previous one; no longer viewing it as some occult quality, which magically pulls distant matter together (action-at-a-distance, in its own form), but as a warping or modification of the space-time manifold or substratum in which matter is suspended (there being understood direct action [not at a distance] between these [Einstein being entirely against the notion of action-at-a-distance]); despite if the gravitational constant for the “attraction” of matter remains.

why would you accept it between objects?

For, very strictly empirically speaking, in no relation between the states of any objects is there ever experienced one actually producing another (if we understand the effect to involve the cause, & vice versa); in as much as one is self-evidently insufficient to be explanation of the production of another, i.e., one doesn’t involve any other, & so it cannot be maintained as the cause of another (again, if we understand the effect to involve the cause, & vice versa).

Let’s take Hume’s billiards example, in this case, no state of any of the experienced objects, for example, a state of contact between two observed billiard balls, i.e., state A, involves or requires another, such as a state of motion of the two observed billiard balls after contact, i.e., state B, for it to be; such that we cannot hold that state A caused or produced state B, since it’s possible for either one to actually be without the other (observation of their contact doesn’t absolutely involve the observation of their motion upon it, nor does the observation of their motion absolutely involve the observation of their contact); & therefore no state of any of the experienced objects are ever actually observed to produce another, but are only observed to precede or succeed another.

Interesting topic as it specifically relates to Hume. A quick question arises, though, are you suggesting that on principle, Newtonian physics is acceptable in this day & age (independently of whether Hume’s causal objection impugned it or not)?

Regardless, I agree that Hume’s causal objection is objectionable (even if, not for the same reason or reasons), although only to an extent; so, nonetheless, I personally still accept Hume’s argument in regards to the relation between sensible things or objects of experience, but, I don’t accept it when comes to the relation between sensible & sentient things (& as all sensible things or objects of experience cannot be, in truth, taken as sentient, the reality of the distinction between sensible & sentient things is admitted [which leads me to my partial rejection of Hume’s objection]).

I think how strongly subjective Descartes was, in his search of a first principle, was intentional; in as much as he wanted to obtain certainty or truth independently of any external means/intermediary/apparatus, i.e., unmediated knowledge for the individual (thus to empower it by freeing it from absolute dependency on another, itself being the source or reason of the obtainment of truth or certainty [which is the whole spirit behind “the enlightenment’s” motto, “sapere aude”]), hence, the references to immediate perception in my last post; yet, nevertheless, he was still as objective as he possibly could be, in as much as he proceeded along in his ascertainment in the most universal & general possible way, by only pointing out what could be predicated upon any mind, self or “I”, i.e., all of them, & not solely his subject alone, i.e., a single mind.

(2) “Exactly. Therefore - because thinking without existing is impossible - thinking proofs that we exist! (With all its further implications …..)”

... but the WHOLE point is, that, “existence”, outside of this or any particular state of thought, itself is never something which is actually observed or known by us! Thus the reality or existence of ourself is observable & identifiable with these particular & actual states of thought or perception, & isn’t to be looked for beyond or outside of these.

I don’t see how, as no intuition cannot not be a representation, thus the latter cannot be a mere sub-set of the former. That’s the whole case with Kant, we can never intuit things as they are in themselves, but only representations of these, thus all of our intuitions are representations (they’re no different).

“Intuition” & “representation”, in strict & proper Kantian terminology, are interchangeable words, i.e., synonyms; accordingly, there are three different kinds of intuitions or representations, namely, “pure”, “empirical”, & “intellectual” or “categorical.”

Correspondingly, an “object” is what is intuited or represented, by a given subject, in the three possible manners aforementioned.

Now as to the question that you ask, why intuitions aren’t to be considered as knowledge? I can’t answer now due to both place & time constraints, but I’ll check back later & give an answer when I’m home & have more time.

This is wrong. Descartes doesn't presuppose, or beg the question of, the existence or reality of the “I” as a premise. Thinking that is a result of a superficial view of Descartes’ work, & not the contrary.

Descartes doesn’t merely presume, as you’d have it, the “I” as a premise, indeed, he demonstrates (so it cannot be a mere presumption) that, when in doubt, doubting its existence is impossible (while doubting virtually everything else is possible, like the reality of external things [after all, these could all possibly be mere items of a dream, i.e., perception-dependent objects]), such that the reality of it is immediately perceived in this very particular moment of attempting to do so. Thus no presumption, but immediate perception.

In one of his replies to the objections to the Meditations, he even addressed this himself, "When someone says, 'I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist', he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise, 'Everything which thinks is, or exists'; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing."

Thank you very much, Michael, for fixing & clearing up the matter. Also, if it’s not too much, can you please delete those posts in which I inquired about my previously blocked post (for some reason I can’t), & even this one in which I’m replying to you right now, as well? Since my blocked post is up now, those others are needlessly taking up thread space. Thank you.

Save the advice; really, though, you got my post deleted? All that I said was that you’re not as smart as you believe yourself to be, is that really that harsh of a comment that it & along with everything else which I wrote in that particular post, outside of questioning your intelligence, should’ve been deleted as well? Huh, never mind, let me just rewrite what I wrote in that deleted post, without questioning your intelligence, & see if you’ll actually respond to it this time? Since you didn’t the first time round but instead solely focused on what was/is ultimately irrelevant.

Now, Noblosh, let me ask you again, is the noun-term of “philosophy”, in your view, composed of elements or components (is it a complex term or not)? Or, are you altogether lost as to a definition of philosophy? Answering this question’ll reveal to me how to explain to you that philosophy in general is equivalent with the rational/logical method.


Thank you for your compliment, Pantagruel (&, also, as is evident, for arguing on my behalf to some extent; but, please, don’t in any way feel either obliged or obligated to).

Indeed, though, yes, your assertion that the in manner in which “philosophy” is defined, in my original post, renders it as a kind of “meta-science” is spot-on; & its whole meta-physical(empirical) value lies in this alone; &, moreover, you’re also right that this gives it a dimension of praxis or practically, in terms of observing or deductively demonstrating the relations of empirically perceived objects, i.e., particular sensations, & rationally/logically perceived objects, i.e., general concepts or categories/classes (relations either between themselves or between each other; observing the relations of the former kind of objects between themselves constitutes the scientific branch of philosophy [“natural philosophy”, as some in the past from the modern era have referred to it], while observing the relations of the latter kind of objects either between themselves, or to the former kind of objects, constitutes the meta-physical[empirical] branch of philosophy).

Which, furthermore, for the most part, agrees with what you accept the definition of philosophy as entailing, namely, the conscious, systematic effort, attempt or act to transcend egocentric, i.e., particularly sensible, perceptions.

My posts keep getting deleted, why? I’m not swearing or insulting anyone.

...one question: What are those “things” (which you’ve referenced) that it does with words? Your explanation of this will be quite elucidative for argument’s sake.

In my view, “philosophy” refers to a particular method of obtaining knowledge (as does “science” [the empirical method]), namely, the rational/logical method. Whatever is observed or deduced by means or way of rational/logical qualifications, is to be (again, in my personally defined view), in one manner or another, considered “philosophical.”