You know, let’s save that for another time, sorry. I’m sure that I’ll run into you again on the forum. Take care.

I’m only responding to the second half of your post, for the rest is ultimately irrelevant. Very simply put, is “substance” a conception? Is “substance” dependent on conception for its reality? If not, then no conception is “substance”, &, therefore, by definition, cannot be that which is in itself (as I’ve noted over & over). You’ve got no point here, let it go, your distinction is inadmissible, not to mention not supported by Spinoza’s statements in the least.

Firstly, what does “consciousness” mean to you? In order to begin to understand you from here, definitions must be sorted out. So what do you mean by “consciousness”, when you ask, “if we look in the body/brain do we see any consciousness in there?” What’s “consciousness” (apart from body/brain)?

“the mind gets everything backwards and inside out when it goes off on its own and does not rely on omniscience as the source of truth” — You seem to know about this first-hand...

2– So, to be sure, just for my own sake, you’re claiming that color & sound are conscious, in the same which we would say an animal or human is?

1— It’s not so much talking about metaphysics as it’s thinking about it (quite the difference): again, don’t focus on the characters or words themselves, but their significance. Moreover, in the truest sense of the word, “metaphysics” is only possible because of thought, conception or intellection, i.e., only because of “nous” (the Greek word for the intellect or mind [so there’s no “oxymoron” in thinking about it]); so, again, you simply claiming that the real, or, true metaphysics cannot be obtained is merely an empty assertion, without explanation or logical support (like most of what you’ve expressed through our back & forth), which is solely dependent on your personally nuanced definitions of terms, i.e., without legitimacy.

Also, the metaphysical isn’t the only reality, as you suggest, it’s just the ultimate one. There are levels to reality.

2– All of that’s beside the point...now, answer my question for once, is a scent, according to you, conscious but not sentient?

1– It doesn’t require belief but does require the foundation of reality (so, no escape in that respect for you); the former, you have a lot of, while the latter, you pretty much just skip over.

2– They may not signify the same exact thing but are still close enough in meaning (they simply refer to various kinds, or degrees, of consciousness) such that they can be, at certain times & in certain contexts, interchangeably used. Nonetheless, try & answer my question, are you claiming that a scent is not sentient but conscious, when you assert, “smell, must be conscious”?

1– .. except that possibilities are metaphysical, not merely objects of knowledge; if this weren’t the case, they would never in fact be possibilities. You’ve entirely missed the point. Believe whatever you want, though.

2– A scent, according to you, is/must be conscious/sentient? Boy, what are you smoking?

1– So you’re rejecting real, or the reality of, possibilities? Logically speaking, that is, apriori, reality is the very foundation of possibility. What are you taking about? You’re just making more empty assumptions.

“In reality everything exists absolutely.” — Yet, the point is that in a given state of reality, a possibility can exist absolutely, too, in as much as it really is a possibility, then & there.

2— The point is to focus on what these words literally refer to & not what they are themselves. Now based on what you’ve just said, do you accept that what you refer to as “qualia” is conscious?

delete please

1– Notice that you avoided answering my question, as I somewhat thought that you would’ve, & simply proceeded to repeat your prior assertions/assumptions without any explanations. Moreover, a new, actual substance, ideally speaking, doesn’t come out of an absolute nothingness, but out of an eternal possibility. You’re confusing yourself by thinking of this in terms of physical or material substance; which isn’t the case.

2– You realize that you neither describe or answer what either consciousness & or qualia is, nor answer my other question & explain what a “property” is & how it’s distinguishable from a “thing”, here, right? Again, simply assuming/asserting without any explaining. I see how you are, “mr. omniscience”.

3– I don’t want to dispute with you about this, I’ll simply just disagree without pressing the point.

1– First things first, according to you, what is (by definition) a “substance” (such that a new one cannot be created)? Moreover, no, I’m not talking about remixing any pre-existing form (as in modification), but creating an actual one that wasn’t as so before such a consequence was realized (it being a mere possibility, & not nothing, before this).

2– What’s the “property” of something, as opposed to the thing?

Also, how do the descriptions of the two differ, can you provide a concise description of them or their difference?

Omniscience? Lol, boy, you’re quite the character, with assumptions for days.

A lot of what you say is opinion-based, & not strictly logically determined, even though I get the feeling that you believe differently.

“No thing can create anything, because something can't come from nothing. True creation of any kind is impossible because at its heart is the claim that something came from nothing, which is magical thinking.” — An actual thing can most definitely create or make other things, this is the heart of what it means to cause what’s possible to become actual; the very fact of this consequence is creation, in as much as its being is impossible without its having been made actual, or created by, something other than itself; possibility cannot cause itself to become actual, & therefore necessitates something other than itself to make or create it to be as such. Thus creation isn’t impossible.

“We only have evidence for qualia and consciousness therefore they must both be the same substance, and be eternal. Neither can increase or decrease itself, or fundamentally change itself.” — How does having evidence for the former & the latter (signified by two different terms) lead, therefore, to concluding that they’re one & the same substance? Wouldn’t the very fact of having evidence for both of them prove that they’re not identical, i.e., not one & the same thing or substance, in as much as they’re distinguishable from each other? Thus, them being one & the same substance isn’t a rational/logical reality; nor are they invariantly united, for whatever is distinguishable from another thing doesn’t depend on that other thing for it to be (& so can be apart from & without each other); therefore the association of their reality isn’t rationally/logically necessary but merely presumed from a-posteriori experience.

The main question that your post revolves around, in my opinion, is that of creation. Based on what you say, how can a given consciousness be the creator of “all that exists”? If, for one, everything within/of itself is itself? If it’s all itself, then it could’ve never been the “creator” of them, in as much as this already presuppose the fact of their reality, as opposed to non-reality, before its very act of creating them, & therefore they would’ve never been non-real, thus being capable of being created or made actual, in the first place. Yet, on the other hand, if you’re to go on to claim that they’re not identical with consciousness, I still don’t see how consciousness can be, in your view, the creator of them? Moreover, & how you’re to avoid the conclusion that all consciousness is co-eternal (un-created) along with whatever is other than it? Since neither can create, or comes from, another. A view that’s in disagreement with both scientific consensus & religious or spiritualistic consensus.

“Spinoza's point is they are of identical reality. The a priori definition of the modes insentience and sentience in the attribute of thought are of the same reality. Both definitions are true of reality. It isn't the case we have one otherworldly plane with just the definition of sentience and another with just the definition of non-sentience.

Much like all the books on my shelf are entirely different objects, yet all of them are identical in being of my shelf.” — Dependency on another, &, being identical in reality aren’t the same thing (offspring are dependent on progenitors, not literally identical with them in reality), an important point that’s been repeated a few times now. Sure, Spinoza holds that both are dependent on one, single thing (indistinguishable from or identical with itself), but not that the modes of thought & the modes of extension are identical or of an identical reality; in fact, contrary to such a position, he maintains that both can only be conceived without & independently of each other.

Moreover, the relationship between the two can be, in fact, likened to one worldly plane in relation to another, sort of like parallel universes, in as much as he asserts a parallelism between the reality of states of thought & that of bodies or body, hence, he writes, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (“The Ethics”, Part. 2, Prop. VII); in other words, the series, order or connection of states of thought/ideas correspond or parallel the series, order or connection of states of bodies/bodily things (despite the fact of each of them only being conceivable independently of the other), according to him.

Also, your bookshelf comparison isn’t admissible in the way that you want to use it here, for a bookshelf is an empirical object that’s sensibly perceivable apart from, &, or, relatively positioned with, the book or books which it holds, while this isn’t the case for the modifications of “substance”; yet, nonetheless, simply note that not only is each book separable from the bookshelf, but also from one another, further proving how distinguishable things can never be identical, i.e., can never be thought of as being one & the same, & therefore necessitate a relation between diverse things as their justification or explanation.

“This is mistaken. For Spinoza, substance isn't predicated over other objects. It's self-defined. There is a thing, the absolute infinite of substance. It is not merely a subjective categorial term. Nor is it a mode of extension (e.g. an empirical state, an instance of some thinking the concept, etc.). Nor is it a mode of thought (e.g. an a priori definition of a mode of thought, like the meaning of sentient or non-seinteint).

It is real outside anyone existing conception and judgement. It is, in the the terms you are using, a thing-itself. Substance is there whether or not anyone thinks about it.” — The referent of the term “substance” or “thing” isn’t a categorical qualification, the point is that the determination of a given thing being in-itself, or, in-another, is; this fact of being either is never self-evident in any bare perception or experience, & so only ever categorically understood. Moreover, “substance” is predicated over “objects”, in as much as it’s acknowledged to not be restricted to or entirely immanent in any particular states of objectification, for it’s beyond & transcends such limitations & constraints, though it’s the condition of them.

“I wasn't suggesting they were contingent states. For that, I would have to be referring to a contingent entity which was sentient or non-sentient. I was talking about the a priori (so definitely not contingent) and how as a mode of thought, it could not justify itself. The point being explaining a priori concepts is more complex than just asserting their necessity (though asserting their necessity is a description enough to describe that feature).” — In the way that you’re speaking of it, to “have” something, or to possess something, particularly sentience or insentience, is or would be a contingent state, though; in as much as possessor & possession are never necessarily related but only contingently (like your books & bookshelf, there’s no necessary relation between them [those books weren’t always & don’t have to be there]), & so aren’t absolutely united (as mode & substance are). Yet, to be clear, it’s not solely about asserting the want of logical necessity, when objecting to Spinoza’s conception of “substance” & “mode”, but also that of a qualitative essentiality which is lacking in his very formation of the conception itself.

Determining distinctions between kinds of conception is one thing, understanding Spinoza another; your attempts at both, either way, are quite dissatisfactory. Moreover, no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P.; for this can only be asserted of “substance”, according to Spinoza, not of any conception (no conception is “substance”, therefore no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself [as I’ve maintained in the O.P.]). You have no idea what you’re talking about.

The supposed force of the statements of the author in question are beside the point, if you understand them & thereby their flaws.

“It also means, paradoxically, that extension, when truly conceived by the intellect, is at once infinite AND indivisible AND identical with thought (and all the other infinite number of attributes of the one substance).” — This directly opposes the view of the author in question (I don’t know, where’d you get this from?); &, moreover, is the crux of where your problem lies, as well as the author’s, in defending his view.

(“The Ethics”, Part 2., Prop. VI, Proof.) “Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other;” — So, you see, no two attributes, namely, thought & extension (the only two that Spinoza ever refers to [thereby, inadvertently, positing a latent dualism]), is or can be conceived by “the intellect” as being identical with one another, like you claim; indeed this directly contradicts Spinoza’s statements (specifically the one quoted above), in as much as each attribute is conceived through itself, i.e., is distinguishable from another, & therefore incapable of being the same as, identical with or identified by, any other, in thought or conception, i.e., in “the intellect.”

Understanding that, now, my thing is, what’s the relationship between the conception of an “attribute” or “attributes” to that of “substance”? If it’s simply claimed that the latter is in-itself or independent of the former, this would, then, render its conception (that of “substance”), speaking as logically as is possible, merely negative, empty & void; that is, if it’s only distinguished or defined as being in-itself & independent of any particular attribute’s conception, then no conception of it is ever formed but only as in a negative relation to attributes, i.e., it not being these & independent of them, thus, leaving one without any actual knowledge or conception of what it is which is independent of these or them (but just that “it” [“substance”] is so).

Are you denying that “conceiving” or conception is a mode?

“Substance is in itself and conceives through itself.” — Substance is conceived through itself, granted, but the point is that the conception itself, as a mode, isn’t, nor can be.

Conception is a mode of substance. There is no self-contradiction here.” — I never claimed that he contradicted himself by merely asserting conception as a mode.

”Only reality (substance/justification) can predicate an instance of insentience or/and sentience (depending on what modes we are talking about).” — This is wrong, firstly because “reality”, per se, cannot actually predicate or support anything, in as much this is merely a subjective categorical term that’s applied onto or over designated things/objects (it isn’t really a thing or object itself); & secondly because predication isn’t real outside of conception or judgement (it cannot be a reality independently of these), & therefore remains (as the categorical term of “reality”) wholly ideal or subjective in nature & character. Which goes back to me saying that Spinoza, &, moreover, all monists, only ever nominally express the reality of this supposed all encompassing & homogeneous single substance, while failing to demonstrate its rational/logical possibility (indeed, because it’s inherently contradictory).

”Since neither the distinction of insentience or sentience is justified on its own (what do either of those concepts mean? Are there any sentient beings in a backyard? What about non-seinteint ones?), they can only be justified under the same substance.” — The distinction between the two is very justified, in as much as it’s conceivable, & is therefore capable of possibly being rationally/logically distinguished, which is ipso facto the evidence of the reality of their distinction; for if they weren’t really rationally/logically distinguishable, their distinction would be inconceivable in the very first place. Correspondingly, consider the sun, shining light onto your backyard, are you claiming that either it or its functions cannot be expressed without involving sentience in what’s explained? In explaining nuclear fission, is sentience explained or needed to be? So obviously they cannot be justified in or as the same substance; for one insentient substance doesn’t involve the reality of another sentient one for it be (as is clear from the example of the sun & nuclear fission); but only in the relation of diverse substances.

“To have insentience, it must be of reality. To have sentience, it must be of reality. To have both, they must be of reality.” — One doesn’t “have” insentience or sentience, one either is sentient or insentient. This is a very important distinction, for it excludes sentience & insentience from being viewed as contingent states, such that they cannot rationally/logically be maintained as being modes of a substance, since they aren’t possessions of, i.e., they cannot be “had” by, it.

“Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.” — Both are of “reality”, sure, the point is just that they’re not the same or identical realities. Simultaneity of being isn’t identicality.

”Unlike a sentient mode or a insentience mode, substance is not limited to being only of one.” — As I’ve just explained above in the third paragraph of this post reply, sentience & insentience aren’t something that one can have, it’s something which one is or isn’t. This point alone should show you not only show how these are not, nor can be modes of a substance, let alone modes of the same individual substance.

But notice that this “substance”, which is different than its modes, is never observed outside of definition! That which is in itself, is only expressed in definition; & so its ability to justify or explain the reality of two distinct kinds of modes, such as that of thought & extension, is only nominally advanced, & never on rational/logical grounds (since it’s altogether apriori rationally/logically contradictory, as contradictory as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same subject or object).

No, I’ve never either directly or indirectly maintained that Spinoza’s “substance” is a conception; but, according to Spinoza himself, “substance” is “that which is in self”, such that a conception of it cannot be dependent on any other conception, i.e., it cannot be conceived through another but only in itself; my point is just that Spinoza’s definition or reasoning never leads to a knowledge or rational/logical conception of what this “substance” is.

Moreover, I don’t introduce a dualism in Spinoza, in as much as he himself acknowledges the contrariety between mental & physical, extended or bodily, forms, thus he states, “That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that is, it is not body.” (“The Ethics”, Prop. II, Proof.)

I’m just pointing out that he can’t rationally/logically explain the reality of mental & physical, extended or bodily, phenomena, by merely posting their coexistence in a single subject (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object); for it’s rationally/logically contradictory, & so false.

”So, it's wrong to say that a conception cannot be in itself according to Spinoza.” — Your knowledge of Spinoza is obviously lacking... “Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes..” (“Ethics”, Part. 2, Prop. 1, Proof.), “By mode, I mean..,.. that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself” (Part. 1, Definition V.).

So, obviously, thoughts or conception cannot be in itself (as I’ve expressed at the beginning of my first objection that you’ve quoted), in as much as they’re modes, & therefore must exist in or through something other than itself (not in itself [according Spinoza’s own statements]).

“Modes in the attribute of thought also have to be justified in something else (substance) because there a priori distinctions which are not part of reality (contradictions, misidentifications, etc.).

Substance isn't specifically mental either. It's not the mental substance being posed against the physical substance. Spinoza is rejecting such a separation of substance (hence one substance rather than two).” — Though the whole point is that the very possibility of the justification or explanation for a mode of thinking, like that of conception, can only be had apriori through the reality of some mental, & never a physical, extended or bodily, form; & therefore if the mode of conception is real, then ultimately so must a real mental substance upon which it depends.

Thus in Spinoza accepting the reality of the mode of conception, he apriori excludes the rational/logical possibility of justifying or explaining the reality of physical, extended or bodily, phenomena; such that he never did justify or explain the reality of these, which he considered himself to have done past Descartes, but only irrationality/illogically maintained their coexistence in the same subject in which he based modes of thought (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object).

So, to be clear, I’m not introducing dualism into Spinoza, I’m merely demonstrating that he never actually escaped it.

What’s a problem with my definition? Are you stating that Spinoza grants that a conception is that which is in itself & is conceived through itself??? Or is that something which you’re personally maintaining? I’m not just denying Spinoza’s definitions, I’m simply eliminating them due to the rational/logical inconsistencies between them (or what follows from them).

“an idea or conception of a mode is not enough to justify it” — I think that it’s important to note that I’m speaking about the mode of conception, in general, & not an individual conception, which can or cannot be, of some particular mode; the former isn’t capable of being or not being as such, as the latter is, for the mode of conception is apriori defined as only being through something other than itself, namely, a mental thing, & therefore cannot be rationally/logically justified as being in any other way; unlike your example of a “tree in your backyard”, which can or cannot be as such, or, in another way, in as much as its determinate reality isn’t apriori contained or justified in its mere idea or conception (it could be a big tree or a small tree, this kind of tree or that kind of tree, the general idea or conception of it doesn’t necessarily determine such a fact). So, to be clear, an individual instance of a particular conception of a mode is capable of being or not being as such, while the nature of modes apriori cannot be otherwise than it is (I refer to Spinoza’s definition of “mode”, cited in the O.P.).

So, now, on the grounds of Spinoza’s acceptance of modes of thought, like conception, one can raise the same problem or contradiction to him that Descartes was faced with when positing the absolute reality of both mental & physical forms. Such that Spinoza’s “substance” being able to explain the reality of physical or extended forms is downright false, something which he pretends to have done past Descartes, & cannot be rationally/logically maintained, for it involves contradiction or inconsistency (as the first objection in my O.P. notes).

The O.P. does help, & in fact subtly addresses all possible logical objections, if one peruses it properly. Why have you quoted all of Spinoza’s definitions? In the O.P., I’ve already quoted all of those statements of his from the “Ethics” that I needed to contradict his view (& can be found referenced therein), & so most of what you’ve quoted is useless or irrelevant to my case. Moreover, the arguments are there in the O.P., so either directly quote a part of it & explain, where you find room for objection? Or just go on about your day.

Pretty much what everyone else means by that word. So, to be clear, genius, the question isn’t about what different kind of way that I’m using the word, but what kind of way whichever you’ve understood me to use it wherein it seems to differ the common meaning?

Partially, yes...

Lol, “charging” Spinoza? If it’s not clear to you from the O.P. what my view on Spinoza is, then that’s really not my problem, so, yea,...

Incoherence, though, can be judged in relation to the standard of rational/logical truth, such that any instance of it possesses rational/logical falsehood. So, again, to be sure, my objections to Spinoza’s philosophy of “substance” are strictly rational/logical, & so require no other standard of truth (for their advancement) other than that of reason itself.

Invoking the term “semantics” in order to describe some proposed difference in an argument or statement isn’t semantics, but, a real distinction, between that of meaning & a lack thereof. Your differentiation of “denying” as opposed to “challenging” claims can be said to depend on semantics because your distinction between these two terms, in this particular instance, has no real meaning of difference; since nowhere have you established, how “denying” the truth of a claim is somehow different than “challenging” the truth of a claim? Thus your distinction depends on semantics.

Moreover, I don’t see how finding rational/logical, i.e., intellectual, incoherency or inconsistency & contradiction in Spinoza is necessarily a matter of semantics? Since his instances of error in reasoning on “substance” aren’t solely nominalistic, but are actual rational/logical contradictions & impossibilities.

Attempting to deny claims, as opposed to challenge them, is, in this particular instance, a matter of semantics & quibbling with words, which is of no significance. Either way, I’m opposed to their truth, with strict reason or logic supporting my opposition.

I’m challenging the internal or rational/logical self-consistency of Spinoza’s philosophy on “substance.” Now as to the parsing of my sentence that you’ve quoted, let me rephrase it: by definition, a conception is not itself something which is in itself (i.e., something which is independent, &, or, in itself). Moreover, the key to understanding my or the first objection is to review all of the parts of its paragraph, in relation to each other; & not solely that one part, over & over, which you’ve quoted.

“Nothing is built on them, but rather with them” — On a closer consideration, to say that a structure isn’t built on but with something, is merely semantics, to quibble about words, something which I’m not into doing; so, again, the whole point is that either way the structure is built by means of them (these definitions), & couldn’t be without them, &, therefore, if the definitions are rationally/logically flawed, then whatever is either built with or on (following from) them, will also be as such. There’s no way around it. Thus basically Spinoza’s entire philosophy of “substance” is to be rejected, on grounds of rational/logical error in first principles.

I’ve particularly misunderstood you there, you’re right; I’m low on sleep, I can admit that I’ve made a simple & unimportant mistake in that part of one of my replies to you, no big deal. Nonetheless, a definition can inherently be contradictory & so false & untrue in a rational/logical way, which is how I’ve critiqued Spinoza’s definitions. Go figure.

“And yet you've only taken issue with definitions. Not "premises" (i.e. propositions). Not axioms. Not deductions, from either axioms or propositions. Mere definitions which, again, do not convey truth values because they are not truth claims. I don't see any destroyed, refuted or invalidated "premises", friend; you still have all your work - if that's your task - ahead of you.” — Though, again, if there’s contradiction or rational/logical inconsistency found in the definitions, on which everything else is based, such as the axioms, premises or propositions & proofs, then the entire edifice of deduction becomes undermined & questionable; & so there’s no need to argue against these latter determinations, when the founding definitions are known & acknowledged to be rationally/logically inconsistent or contradictory in the first place. A point that you seem to repeatedly overlook.

”The point was never that he didn't grant reality to both (acomist speech aside, of course), but rather they are not each other.” — My O.P. is not at odds with & clearly accepts & requires a distinction between the two. I don’t see your point here?

”As such, substance cannot account for a mode in terms of the mode (e.g. what exists, how things are caused, which states are caused).” — I don’t know if this supposed to be a part of your own philosophy, or your personal interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy? But it’s clearly in conflict with Spinoza’s sentiments. He unequivocally defines a “mode” as what is accounted for through another thing, not itself, when he writes, ”By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.”

“You've yet to make an argument worthy of a considered counter.” — If my tone really be, in your view, touchy, I should like to say that it’s nothing in comparison to your self-righteous & ever so subtle obnoxious tone: but that’s neither here nor there, friend. “.. yet to make an argument worthy of a considered counter.” Awfully subjective & opinionated; but, hey, the arguments are there, rationally/logically speaking; whether they’re “worthy” of your consideration is another matter. So I’ll leave that, again, to your own personal discretion.

”And as definitions are not truth-claims or axioms (which is why they are introduced subsequently in the first place), whatever their logical status,..” — Axioms are most definitely truth-statements. What are you talking about? The point is just that their introduced as self-evident, without requiring to be proven as true.

”Spinoza's system is quite rigorously coherent” — Well, like it or not, I’ve just shown that his first definitions or axioms, from the consideration of the relation between his own proposed terms of “substance”, “mode”, & “attribute”, to be conflicting.

”Or, maybe, you can competently demonstrate how, rather than merely leap to an assertion that, Spinoza's system collapses thereby refuting his conclusions.” Destroy, refute or invalidate the premise or premises of an argument, & the core of its conclusion will also be rendered thus. I don’t see where there’s any room for disagreement with this?

I’m not confusing modes & substance. Moreover, Spinoza grants reality to both of them, not just one, you’re wrong; thus he states in the “Proof” of prop., IV, “nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications.” So, you see, he grants reality to both, he just has one as being dependent on the other (he grants ultimate reality to one & not the other [a distinction of his that I’ve acknowledged in my O.P.]). So I’ve never claimed that substance is the definition of a mode, as you believe I have, when you say, “substance cannot be the definition of a mode”, but have merely pointed out that the definition of one is necessarily dependent on that of the other‘s.

I pretty much need only to refer to part. 1, in as much as if one destroys the basis, the whole edifice built upon it collapses. So in regard to my objections, pretty much forget any other part of the “Ethics” beside the first.