Very few philosophers accept modal realism, not because it is useless, but because it is extreme. Many philosophers endorse that modal realism contributes to metaphysics.
You merely show that you hate Lewis. Lewis is smarter than you, anyway.

Your information about Lewis is 100% incorrect. What are you attacking? Even Wikipedia entry is better than you.

I think it's enough that you never read Lewis really. You proved that you don't understand Lewis.
Lewis is the philosopher who can say about you: The head of Agustino has 100 holes.
Lewis can cut holes in your head.

However, Descartes is smarter than you.

What you criticize Lewis are all that Lewisian philosophers respond like "what the fuck is that guy talking about?"

Your interpretation of Lewis is not standard. Maybe you don't understand Lewis.

'Everything is possible' means 'everything has its counterparts'. Have you ever read his counterpart theory? I think that your accusation is not justified.

Susan Haack and Ruth Barcan Marcus are unfortunate omissions...

David Lewis is famous for several things in metaphysics: counterfactual theory of causation, Humean supervenience, possible world realism, reformed analysis of dispositions, metaphysics of holes, and so on. If you don't know about him, you aren't smart enough...

I voted for Gillian Russell, but Anscombe would be a rational choice, too.

I don't know much about Rebecca Goldstein... But there are some omissions: Sarah McGrath, Marianne Talbot, and so forth.

Although Whitehead was famous, many people don't remember him as a metaphysician...

I actually forgot Putnam at that time... Putnam is an obvious omission, unfortunately...
I voted for David Lewis, anyway.

Ah, it should be 'Nietzsche'!

Thanks for useful information.

'Nietzche' should be 'Nietsche'. It's a mistake. (I voted for Kant.)

Anselm and Kierkegaard are omissions. This site does not allow to edit the options in the poll.
I was surprised that Kant is ahead of Aquinas in philosophy of religion.

Conservatists want to make people stupid. Religions tend to make people stupid. This is why conservatists use religions.

Fodor's claim is understood as which Mentalese is prior to natural languages. English sentences have no meaning, but Mentalese gives meaning to them.

You can find Fodor's claim in 'LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited'. It's page 73.

Indirect realists say that what we perceive are sense-data of objects. Direct realists say that what we perceive are real objects themselves.
This follows that you are a direct realist, aren't you?

Davidson said that Humean impressions are not epistemological contents. This follows that perceptual contents need linguistic contents to be epistemological ones.

Rigid designators are about the criticism of the theory of descriptions. "Aristotle is the author of Metaphysics" is contingent. Aristotle could not have written Metaphysics. This implies that descriptions might not be the contents of names. "Aristotle is Aristotle" is necessary. Aristotle could not have failed to be Aristotle himself. This implies that the contents of names are the referents themselves.
The title of the book written by Kripke is 'Naming and Necessity'. It's about naming and necessity. Suppose that I name someone as 'Fred'. Then, subsequent uses of the name by me continuously refer to the same person in every possible world. The first is naming, and the second is necessity.

The logical form of "all dogs are animals" would be as follows:
For every x, if Fx, then Gx

The truth condition of "all dogs are animals" would be:
For every x, if x is a dog, then x is an animal.

Now I understand how they are different.

Logical forms are merely strings of symbols.
Truth conditions are what we are implying a meaning.
I understand.

I was reading Delia Graff Fara's 'Descriptions as Predicates'. She distinguishes logical forms from truth conditions. What she said as truth conditions is the same as what I've been thinking as logical forms. So, I asked a question about it here.

The truth condition of "all dogs are animals" would be as follows:
"All dogs are animals" is true if and only if for every x, if x is a dog, then x is an animal.
This seems to be the same as the logical form of "all dogs are animals".