Christian2017,

I am hoping to respond to your argument regarding free will and determinism. This is a common argument within the philosophy of religion and it seems to pose a problem for God’s omniscience. I have summarized and outlined your argument below:

1. If God is omniscient, then He can plan out the details of the lives of every individual before their existence.
2. If God can plan out the details of the lives of every individual before their existence, then no individual has free will.
3. If God is omniscient, then no individual has free will. (1, 2 HS)

I agree that this argument challenges the simultaneous existence of free will and God’s omniscience but I would have to disagree with your argument, namely challenging Premise 2. Aristotle made a similar argument that would challenge Premise 2, arguing that God can only know truths so if a statement is neither true nor false, then it is not a challenge to God’s omniscience or our free will. For example, let’s say that I’m hoping to go to the beach tomorrow but may need to stay at home and finish some work around the house. The statement ‘I will go to the beach tomorrow’ is neither true nor false, it is undecided, thus allowing God’s omniscience to only comprehend that I ‘intend’ to go to the beach, rather than ‘I will’ go to the beach. Although this argument is convincing for the compatibility of free will and God’s omniscience, it still seems that God’s omniscience would allow for Him to see future events, regardless of whether they are true, false, or neither. With that being said, I am unsure as to whether it truly solves the problem of determinism.

Another point I would like to bring up that challenges Premise 2 of your argument is that if determinism is true, then why would God predestine us to lives of sin, betrayal, and suffering? It seems incompatible that God, also being omnibenevolent, would allow for these tragedies to occur. It is only with free will that we can cause harm to ourselves and others, as God would not predestine us to inflict harm on other's lives and wellbeing or our own. You may argue that factors such as sin, betrayal, and suffering can all be human growth experiences and contribute to the betterment of character over time but it seems as if some suffering occurs without reason. This suffering that occurs without reason requires free will for us to go against God and God’s path for us for the compatibility of suffering and God’s omniscience and omnibenevolence to make sense. For example, consider genocides such as that of the Armenian and Rwandan Tutsi populations. These acts defy the wills of God completely and free will is required to commit acts of suffering and wrongdoing against our population. God would not allow for the mass genocide of certain groups of people for the betterment of others, requiring our own free will to make those decisions. Therefore, this argument counteracts determinism as if God knew these events would occur then He would have altered the course of history to prevent senseless acts of wrongdoing from the beginning of time.

Finally, you make the comparison of adults to babies as God to us. Although I understand that babies are incredibly predictable, just as we are likely predictable to God, it still seems like babies can do things with their own free will that we may not expect. For example, children react differently around pets; some children get scared, some hurt the pet, and some are comfortable. There does not seem to be a set blueprint for the acts of babies in every situation and I would argue that it is the same case with us and God. This meaning that we have our own free will and can choose to follow our path as we like, posing no harm to God's omniscience.

As a result, I think the argument you presented famously poses an issue for God’s omniscience but I think the definition of what qualifies as a truth statement and the prevalence of sin and wrongdoing in the world are both arguments against Premise 2 to assert that free will and God’s omniscience are, in fact, wholly compatible.

TheMadFool,

I have outlined the premises and conclusions of your argument below:

1. If we truly have free will, then we have the opportunity to freely make decisions that are good or bad.
2. We do not have the opportunity to freely make decisions that are good or bad because the threat of eternal pain in hell prompts us to do good.
3. We do not truly have free will. (1, 2 MT)
4. If we do not truly have free will, then our good deeds are not chosen freely.
5. Our good deeds are not chosen freely. (3, 4 MP)

Although I do follow your argument and am intrigued by the argument of free will being applied to the existence of hell and the problem of evil, I do not fully support Premise 2. I believe that the threat of hell does not immediately conclude that people will not sin or make decisions considered to be bad/evil. For example, as a kid, I was well aware of the conception of heaven and hell and the types of actions that can be perceived as sinning. One day at Michael's craft store I decided to take a small metal ruler and leave the store without paying. Although I was aware of the concept of sinning and how my act of stealing could be qualified as a sin and that people who sin go to hell, I still had the free will to make that decision. Now, with that being said, does theft of small ruler at a young age qualify for eternal damnation in Hell? I would hope not. It seems to me that your argument is missing the fact that one can commit acts of sin that may be bad or evil but still not face eternal hell. This would mean that we still have free will to choose between good and bad actions, just that occasional acts of sin do not qualify for eternal damnation. I do believe, though, that this requires some recognition at the immorality of our bad decisions. If I were to be on my deathbed and argued that me stealing the ruler when I had plenty of money to pay and no substantial reason to not pay was still morally correct, then maybe minor acts of sin or evil can reduce the likelihood of our entry to Heaven.

I also do not believe that it is the case that the threat of eternal hell will always prompt us to do good. For example, Jerry Walls in Eternal Hell and the Christian Concept of God states, “there is a perverse sense of satisfaction that the miserable can experience, a distorted kind of gratification that can motivate the choice to persist in their sin.” Walls cites the example of C.S. Lewis’ The Great Divorce in which a group of sinners travel from hell to heaven. One character, Big Ghost, meets one of his former employees in Heaven who had committed murder and, instead of accepting grace and transformation and entering the Kingdom of Heaven, Big Ghost decides to return to hell. We see a similar case in the real world with serial killers. According to the argument above, we are not free to make decisions that are bad or evil because of the threat of eternal pain in Hell but consider individuals who make evil decisions and then continue to repeat them. Serial killers and the case of Big Ghost both show that we can still have free will and make morally bad or evil decisions and that eternal pain in hell may not be “unacceptable” to some.

As a result, I believe that the issue of free will can still be used as a defense for the problem of evil. Although the eternal goodness of Heaven should prompt us to do good, that does not mean that we will always do good, whether it be the case of stealing a ruler or continuous homicide.

Bartricks,

In asking, “Can an omnipotent being do anything?” you side with Descartes’ view and argue that an omnipotent being can truly do anything at all, regardless of logical possibility. I have outlined your argument below:

If God is omnipotent, then He can do anything at all without regard to logical possibility.
God is omnipotent.
God can do anything at all without regard to logical possibility.

Although I do agree that omnipotence grants God a wide range of power that is otherwise unattainable to other beings, I would disagree with the argument that an omnipotent being can do anything, namely disagreeing with the first Premise of the outlined argument. I would argue that logical possibility is the greatest, and only, limit on the omnipotence of God.

For example, many incompatibilities exist within aspects of our world, such as the creation of a square circle or a married bachelor. Based on their definitions, a circle cannot have corners like a square and a bachelor cannot be married. These examples are simply things that God cannot create because they are logically impossible. Now you may argue that these definitions are merely constructs we have developed as a society to help us perceive the world around us and that God, being omnipotent, may have the power to create what, in our minds, would be impossible. To this, I would argue that God, also being omnibenevolent, would create a world we could comprehend, one that does not contain impossibilities by definition like that of a square circle. For, if God created a world like that, we would have a much harder time understanding the world we live in and an even greater struggle conceptualizing God. God’s creation of a world we can understand allows us to spend more time discussing the relevance of its creation.

Cases like God creating a stone heavier than He can lift also poses a logical impossibility. God’s omnipotence cannot be tested against two infinitives. To create a stone that has infinite weight and for God to have infinite strength cannot be compared as different amounts of infinity cannot be compared. It’s wrong to say that a being could be “able to create stones too heavy for him to lift, and then lift them” because if God created a stone that was too heavy for Him to lift, then He would not be able to lift it. As a result, comparisons of infinite value pose a logical impossibility of the omnipotence of God yet do not devalue His omnipotence.

Finally, regarding God’s creation of himself, I think it is safe to say that this is not a question of omnipotence. I would like to say that God has existed limitlessly throughout time, never requiring the necessity to be created, to begin with. This, as a result, would not require any omnipotent powers to lend to His creation although, this may be a personal preference in questioning how God has existed throughout time.

As a result, I do not believe God's omnipotence can do the logically impossible. This is based on impossibilities such as incompatible definitions we have created and the comparison of infinite values.

TheMadFool,

I have summarized and outlined your argument below:

1. If order is to explain the existence of God, then order should always assume a designer.
2. Order does not always assume a designer.
3. Order does not explain the existence of God.

Although I understand the argument that the existence of order should not assume the existence of a designer, I think it misses the argument asserted by the watchmaker analogy. The watchmaker analogy, or the fine-tuning argument, asserts that our world is so intricately set in tune with its natural laws that it requires a Creator. In this argument, I will disagree with Premise 2 of your argument and assert that the order we experience in our universe should always assume the existence of a designer, or God.

The thought experiment you provide of room A and room B seems to miss the argument of the watchmaker analogy. First, it should not be assumed that occupying a space and designing a space are interchangeable. Second, the fact that processes of thermodynamics naturally lead to chaos or disorder, also known as entropy, makes the case that room A is more likely to have a designer. The fact that order exists in room A and not in room B assumes that somebody entered and cleaned the room to create that order. The fact that things naturally move to states of disorder explains the disorder of room B as well as the future disorder of room A upon human interaction. Consider a new thought experiment, imagine infinite possible rooms in which each one contains all the normal fixings of a room. Each room has the capability for each desk, table, nightstand, chair or other items included in the room to be situated in any possible manner. Some rooms have furniture situated on the ceiling while some have upside-down desks and tables. The fine-tuning argument for God’s existence postulates that our world is one in which, if placed in the thought experiment of infinite rooms, would have all of the furniture correctly situated, a perfectly made bed, a full color-coded closet, the perfect color palette, and, on top of it all, an ocean view. The point here is not simply that the evidence of order and design leads to the conclusion that God exists, but rather that our world is so finely tuned in regards to physics, gravity, molecules, and other scientific factors for human life to persist that there must be a Creator. The thought experiment of infinite rooms proves that having a room that is perfectly designed is much more unlikely than having a room that experiences any sort of disorder whatsoever.

Even if you were assuming a sort of many-universes hypothesis in which universes can be randomly generated and one universe is destined to have life-permitting natural laws, it still would not prove against the existence of God. For example, if universes were randomly generated then what scientific process would facilitate the continual creation of universes? This universe generator of sorts would need to be designed by a Creator. The generator would also be required to self-select the laws of physics but who is to determine what those laws are? A creator is needed to determine the boundaries of natural laws. And finally, why was the universe originally created with such meticulous order despite the laws of entropy? A creator is needed to explain the order that exists within the universe.

In conclusion, although disorder can be symbolic of human life, like that of an unorganized room, complete and perfect order requires the existence of a Creator for its' explanation. The order we experience in our universe is so finely tuned for human life that the existence of a designer is simply necessary.

Bartricks,

In analyzing your argument regarding the problem of evil I first sought to outline your argument, noting the premises and conclusion below:

If God were omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good, then He would create a moral world that is suitable for innocent, sentient life to live without evil.
Our world is not moral for innocent, sentient life to live without evil.
Therefore, God is not omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good. (1, 2 MT)

In identifying your argument, it is important to recognize which evils exist in our world that you identify as being immoral for innocent, sentient life. In assuming you are referring to moral evils, or evils requiring human intervention (opposed with natural evils which require no human intervention), I will argue from the Free Will Defender perspective that the existence of moral evil is not incompatible with God’s omnipotence, omniscience, or His moral goodness.

Assuming individuals have free will from God, the choices they make can be deemed morally right or wrong. God could not have created a world with moral good without the inclusion of a world with moral evil. This is a challenge to Premise 2 of the outlined argument. For example, some decisions can be made that encompass both moral good and moral evil. Take for example animal experimentation. According to the Foundation for Biomedical Research, testing on animals has improved scientific research in diseases including but not limited to malaria, polio, ebola, smallpox, and cancer. This improvement in scientific research has required the deaths of many innocent, sentient beings in labs. It seems that cases similar to this one, encompassing both moral goods (scientific research to save the lives of humans) and moral evils (killing innocent, sentient animals), pose a problem for the complete existence of moral good without moral evil.

Your argument goes on to pose that it would be moral for God to create a universe like this one that is devoid of innocent life, solving the problem of eliminating moral evil. Although this resolution would eliminate moral evil, it would also eliminate moral good. Would it be moral of God to create a world with moral goodness but to not create any other being to experience that moral goodness? This does not seem like a morally good God, this seems like a selfish God. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally good, He would use His powers to create innocent, sentient beings that have the capabilities to experience moral goodness.

I pose the same problem for your argument that procreation is immoral because you are willingly imposing the moral evils of this world on your children. Although procreation does assume that your child will experience at least one moral evil throughout their life, procreation also not only assumes that your child can experience the moral goodness created by God but also continue to create moral goodness of their own. I would argue that failing to reproduce is a greater moral failing than reproducing as you directly prohibit future generations stemming from your child to experience moral goodness and to create that goodness of their own.

“Animal Research Achievements.” n.d. Foundation for Biomedical Research. Accessed October 26, 2019. https://fbresearch.org/medical-advances/animal-research-achievements/.