A. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE POLICE-VS-COMMUNITY OPPOSITION - As a condition for (essential services) federal funds, each state legistlature is required to establish statutory (phased-in) residency requirements (MINIMUM 5 YEARS) for all Municiple & County civil servants including, and especially, Police and Prosecutors so that they are required to live in the communities (i.e. neighborhoods, towns, cities & counties) in which they have sworn "to serve and protect"; the 5 YEAR MINIMUM is intended to prevent former police officers FIRED FOR A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT to be rehired soon thereafter by any other Police Department; — 180 Proof
It's kind of linear though, since it began with slavery>low class society>mixed society. — EpicTyrant
After the first recognized western philosopher, Thales, in the period that we now call Presocratic philosophy, there were two broad schools of thought. One was the Ionians, following mostly after Thales' student Anaximander, who focused largely on reasoning about the natural world. The other was the Italiotes, following mostly after Anaximander's student Pythagoras, who placed heavy emphasis on mathematics.
That period ended with the work of Socrates, which incorporated elements of both schools of thought. But then in what we call the Classical era of philosophy, there were again two broad schools of thought. One followed after Socrates' student Plato, and echoed the more abstract leanings of the Italiotes. The other followed after Plato's student Aristotle, and echoed the more practical leanings of the Ionians.
The field was again united much later under the Scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas, which again incorporated elements of both Platonism and Aristotelianism, in what we call the Medieval period of philosophy. But out of that unified Scholasticism the field was again divided, at the start of what we call the Modern period of philosophy. One side of that division came to be called the Rationalists, following largely after philosophers like Rene Descartes and echoing the abstract leanings of the Platonists. The other were called the Empiricists, following largely after philosophers like John Locke and echoing the practical leanings of the Aristotelians.
Then Immanuel Kant once again briefly reunited philosophy, explicitly creating a synthesis of Rationalist and Empiricist thought. But following Kant, in what I like to call the Postkantian period (as historians disagree about where or whether the Modern period ended), philosophy was again divided. On the one hand, what was called the Continental school, following philosophers such as Georg Hegel, echoed the practical leanings of the Empiricists. On the other hand, the Analytic school, following philosophers such as Bertrand Russel, echoed the abstract leanings of the Rationalists. — “The Codex Quaerentis: Introduction”
When I discovered professional philosophy [...] I thought that that field was the place where I would find what I was looking for, and that that was the name for it: the right philosophy.
I didn't find it. But in time I found most of the parts of it. They just needed to be shaped and polished a bit, assembled together in the right way, and a few gaps filled in. While studying, I "tried on" the many different philosophies I learned of, but never found one that felt like "the right fit" — an existing, notable "-ism" that I could endorse without reservation. I found that often opposite sides of a philosophical disagreement each made strong points and weak points, and that their strong points were not necessarily in conflict, even as they defeated the other side's weak points. Yet I was disappointed that nobody seemed to espouse a position that combined all the strong without any of the weak. I found also that views on one topic depended heavily on views on another topic, but those dependencies were often not accounted for. Likewise, I found that solutions to problems in one area often had parallel solutions to problems in another area, appealing to the same principles but in different domains, which were again often not accounted for.
So I began this work, documenting my own views on the various topics within philosophy, the combinations of strong points made by everyone on every side of every topic, the missing pieces still unaccounted for after that, and the symmetries and interrelations between them, tracing both all of my own views and all of those I found problematic back to small sets of very general principles. — “The Codex Quaerentis: Introduction”
For me the ambivalent/ironic position is connected to a realization of thrownness, of how history lives in us, constraining us while making us possible.The earnest philosopher (the totalizer who has it all tied up in a nice little bundle, his existence and ours) ignores that he was shaped by a past that also limits what he can see and understand. — path
You misquoted me — RogueAI
Assume a miracle happens and people shrink down to electrons — RogueAI
Or would it, because it has eyes instantly collapse/split because it gets entangled with itself and as such never see all positions at once? — ChatteringMonkey
...some philosophers such as Plato were vehemently opposed to rhetoric, seeing it as manipulative sophistry without regard for truth, in contrast with the logical, rational dialectic that he and his teacher Socrates advocated. His student Aristotle, on the other hand, had a less negative opinion of rhetoric, viewing it as neither inherently good nor bad but as useful toward either end, and holding that because many people sadly do not think in perfectly rational ways, rhetorical appeals to emotion and character and such are often necessary to get such people to accept truths that they might otherwise irrationally reject. I side much more with Aristotle's view on this matter, viewing logic and rhetoric as complimentary to each other, not in competition. — The Codex Quaerentis: On Rhetoric and the Arts
... The particular occasions of experience are thus the most fundamentally concrete parts of the world, and everything else that we postulate the existence of, including things as elementary as matter, is some abstraction that's only real inasmuch as postulating its existence helps explain the particular occasions of experience that we have.
Some of these abstract things are so fundamental that we could scarcely conceive of any intelligent beings comprehending reality without the use of them. Immanuel Kant called these kinds of things, things we cannot exactly observe but which we cannot help but use to structure the things that we do observe, "categories". The ones that I will describe here are not exactly the ones that he describes, though there is significant overlap. The first thing we need to do to structure our experiences is to identify patterns in them. To do that, we need a pair of concepts that I call "quality" and "quantity", which allow us to think of there being several things that are nevertheless the same, without them being just one thing: they can be qualitatively the same, while being quantitatively different. Any two electrons, for instance, are identical inasmuch as they are indistinguishable from each other, because every electron is alike, but they are nevertheless two separate electrons, not one electron. In contrast, the fictional character Clark Kent is, in his fictional universe, identical to the character of Superman in a quantitative way, not just a qualitative way: though they seem vastly different to casual observers, they are in fact the same single person. If two people are said to drive "the same car", there are two things that that might mean: it could mean that they drive qualitatively identical cars (or as close to it as realistically possible, e.g. the same year, make, and model), or it could mean that they drive the same, single, quantitatively identical car, one car shared between both of them. With these concepts of quality and quantity, we can describe patterns in our experience as quantitatively different instances or tokens of qualitatively the same tropes or types. Out of this arise the notion of several different things being members of the same set of things ("qualities" as I mean them here mapping roughly to the mathematical concept of "classes", an abstraction away from sets, and "quantities" as I mean them here mapping roughly to the mathematical concept of "cardinality", an abstraction away from the measure of a set or class). And with that can be conducted all of the construction of increasingly complex abstract objects built from sets as detailed in my previous essay on logic and mathematics... — “The Codex Quaerentis: On Ontology, Being, and the Objects of Reality”
I was called a "one note liberal" earlier which is kind of funny because I don't remember the last time I was ever called a liberal. I'm center-right/libertarian. — BitconnectCarlos
The 'important cosmic enigmas' are also known as or at least entangled with issues of prime concern. Of course philosophy can retreat from these difficult issues into a kind of bland technicity, but that's a long way from Socrates, for better or worse. — path
I believe that the main method of philosophy is not rhetorical but dialectical. Large discourses with persuasive rhetorical intentions - in a sophistic way - are the negation of philosophy. — David Mo
I like to use an analogy of prescribing someone medicine: the actual medicinal content is most important of course, but you stand a much better chance of getting someone to actually swallow that content if it's packaged in a small, smooth, sweet-tasting pill than if it's packaged in a big, jagged, bitter pill. In this analogy, the medicinal content of the pill is the logical, rational content of a speech-act, while the size, texture, and flavor of the pill is the rhetorical packaging and delivery of the speech-act. It is of course important that the "medicine" (logic) be right, but it's just as important that the "pill" (rhetoric) be such that people will actually swallow it. — “The Codex Quaerentis: On Rhetoric and the Arts”
If that, then the synthesis of them should follow, or, the synthesis of them and something else subsumed under them, in order to complete a method. — Mww
Antifa is going down, it will be proscribed. — Chester
If we must consult the dictionary, it means a more emotional or forcible response than is justified. Justified means having, done for, or marked by a good or legitimate reason.
What you're calling an overreaction is "far less bad" than what it's a reaction to but is nevertheless an overreaction because it's unjustified. Unjustified means not shown to be right or reasonable. Reasonable means having sound judgment; fair and sensible. — praxis
I think we can all agree that violent rioting is not fair or sensible, but then we can also agree that murder by police is not fair or sensible and that systematic racism is not fair or sensible. So maybe we can stop talking about fairness and sensibility and start talking about the emotional response. — praxis
"This is not an overreaction" sounds to me like "this is the appropriate, just, and fully warranted response", in other words, "it's perfectly okay". — Pfhorrest
I have no words... — praxis
It's far less bad than, as you say, the incalculable suffering caused by systematic racism that is now symbolized by the George Floyd murder. — Pfhorrest
I don't see how it can be said to be an overreaction then. — praxis
But just being less bad than that doesn't make it perfectly okay. — Pfhorrest
What is this either/or? has anyone actually said it was okay? — praxis
