You bring up a few interesting points.

For one, you ask, “Why would God need a petitionary prayer from someone in order to initiate those things we ask for which are in accordance with the overall good of the world?”

In response, I’d like to raise this question: what if petitionary prayer actually does serve as the turning factor in God deciding to do a certain good, but because of God’s omniscience, he already knew that you would pray for it, even way before you prayed for it, and simultaneously knew that he would grant you your request? Maybe God does grant petitionary prayers sometimes, as a sort of reward for the person who prays them.

And if the person did not pray the petitionary prayer, God wouldn’t necessarily punish them, but he might choose a different type of action that would still result in the same amount of net good that would’ve resulted if the person did ask God for something directly. For example, say that Christian really wants to go to College X. He prays that he is accepted to College X, and as a reward for his petitionary prayer, God grants his request. Christian is accepted into and attends College X. Let’s assign the arbitrary numerical value of 93/100 to denote the net good out of Christian’s experience at College X, in terms of his personal and academic happiness and success. In an alternate situation, Christian really wants to go to College X, but Christian doesn’t pray that he is accepted to College X. Christian isn’t accepted into College X, but he is accepted into College Y. He attends College Y, and this college experience also yields a 93/100 net good. Each of the two situations led to the same amount of net good – God just chose Christian’s preference of good, as a small reward for his petitionary prayer.

It’s important to note that God is omniscient and Christian has free will. Christian still has the free choice to decide where he wants to go to college, and he freely decides if he prays about it. But because God knows about Christian’s petitionary prayer in advance, he knows what he will decide in advance. If Christian changes his opinion last minute and decides not to pray, well then God already knew about that too. So just because God knew what Christian would do does not mean he chose what Christian would do.

In a different light – even if this answer above does not work, and God doesn’t need petitionary prayer at all in order to give him permission, so to speak, to initiate certain things – what if petitionary prayer has functions outside of just asking for something?
Maybe God’s intention with petitionary prayer is to grow his relationship with his followers – not in the sense that he grants them what they wish for, so their relationship grows in that way. But in the sense that he wants Christians to feel like time spent in prayer is time well spent, regardless of the type of prayer, because they are talking to God and partaking in fellowship with him. Maybe God’s chief purpose of petitionary prayer is to actually reveal things to the person praying – to give them insight or ideas about what they should do, or how to handle a certain situation.

In this way, petitionary prayer would have a valuable function outside of just influencing God to take action.

Hope these thoughts make sense. I’d be curious to hear your response.

I’d like to object to premise 1 of your argument. In the final paragraph of your argument, you say that emphasizing Jesus’ words “doesn’t mean we should ignore the other parts, it simply means to put an emphasis on these words and to merely use the other parts of the Bible as context that buttresses the Gospels.”

A problem arises when you look at instances where Jesus’ (“red-ink”) words contradict other scriptures, like the law. In that case, the other parts of the Bible can’t really be used as context or buttresses / support for Jesus’ words, because there are conflicting ideas being presented. Which side do you trust more? Is there one side that is more important, or more “right” than the other? If so, how can we distinguish that difference between what we can trust and what we should take with a grain of salt?

Examples of these contradictions are largely found when comparing the New Testament to the Old Testament. Deuteronomy, considered to be one of the Law books of the Bible, says in verse 19:21, “Show no pity: life shall be for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” But Jesus contradicts this directly in Matthew: “You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also” (5:38-39). “But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven” (5:43-48).

Other examples of contradictions between Jesus and the law include condemnation of adulterers (Leviticus 20:10 vs. John 8:3-11), working on the Sabbath (Deuteronomy 5:14 vs. John 5:8-10), and treatment of the righteous vs. the unrighteous (Deuteronomy 28:1-24 vs. Matthew 5:45).

Considering your argument, what do these contradictions mean in terms of the inerrancy of scripture? Do you believe that scripture is infallible, or does it contain flaws? If so, how do we reconcile these flaws to the degree that we can still trust the Bible?

Curious to hear your thoughts.

Although I agree with the conclusion of your argument (“if an omnibenevolent God exists, then evil is a necessary side effect”), I disagree with your second premise.

First of all, I don’t think your conditional follows. The existence of a standard of morals is not the reason that God must allow free will in order for good to exist.

Second, I disagree with your statement that “there must be free will in order for good to exist.” Can’t good exist independently of human’s free will in the matter? For example, God is good – independent of our free will in relation to him. His goodness exists before our free will, not as a result of our free will. So the existence of good is not dependent on the existence of free will. Here is this argument broken down into a modus tollens form:

1. If free will is necessary for good to exist, then all good things must be products of free will.
2. There is good that is not a product of free will (see example above).
3. Therefore, free will is not necessary in order for good to exist. (1, 2 MT)

As an improvement to your argument, I’d like to offer the following instead:

1. If an omnibenevolent, all-loving God exists, then he must grant humans free will (to freely choose to follow him instead of forcing them to do so).
2. An omnibenevolent, all-loving God exists.
3. Therefore, he must grant humans free will. (1,2 MP)
4. If humans have free will, there must be an alternative to choose from instead of following God.
5. Therefore, there must be an alternative to choose from instead of following God. (3, 4 MP)
6. If God is omnibenevolent, all-loving, and all-good, alternatives to following God must be worse than following God.
7. Therefore, alternatives to following God must be worse than following God. (2, 6 MP)
8. If alternatives to following God must be worse than following God, then evil is necessary to produce those alternatives.
9. Therefore, evil is a necessary side effect of free will. (7, 8 MP)

I hope this argument still resolves your dilemma about the problem of evil and free will. And to answer your final question – yes, I do believe that God’s gift of free will along with other necessary things, like the grace and salvation from Jesus’ death, means that God is an all-loving, omnibenevolent creature despite his allowance of evil in the world.

I’d like to respond to your question, “How might one respond to Hume?” I do believe that your reconstruction of the argument and Hume’s objections to it are accurate.

Hume is misrepresenting Paley by accusing him of committing the fallacy of composition. Although Paley discusses the design of both human artifacts and natural objects, he is not stating that the design of human artifacts serves as the basis of proof for the design of natural objects. He is not saying that because that part is X, the whole is X.

Here is what Paley’s argument would look like if Hume was accurate in his representation. Notice how, as a fallacious argument, it doesn’t follow any of the common argument forms.

1. Human artifacts are a part of the universe.
2. Human artifacts are intelligently designed.
3. Therefore, the universe is intelligently designed.

This is what the fallacy of composition actually looks like, but as you can see this is not Paley’s argument. Hume is claiming that Paley’s argument relies on the relationship between the part and the whole. However, Paley is not even considering this relationship. Here is an argument form that clarifies that Paley isn’t concerned with the part-whole relationship.

1. All man-made objects that we’ve ever observed are created by an intelligent designer.
2. Man-made objects are simpler than natural objects.
3. If simpler man-made objects require an intelligent designer, then more complex natural objects must also require an intelligent designer.
4. Therefore, natural objects require an intelligent designer. (1, 2, 3 MP)

So, Paley clearly isn’t considering the part-whole relationship, because his argument does not hinge on that relationship in order to prove why natural objects require an intelligent designer. Hume’s objection therefore fails because it is aimed at a misrepresented argument.

Let me know your thoughts on this.

According to your numbered argument, you conclude that God can do all things, which means that he could even do the logically impossible things, such as create a square circle or a stone heavier than he can lift. Can you explain how God would be able to do such a thing? Your reasoning attempts to prove why God could do all things, yet you don’t explain how he could physically complete such a contradictory task. What would that even look like? How could God physically make a square circle, then, or a stone heavier than he can lift?

Additionally, I’d like to object to premise 2.2 of your argument: “If God is limited by logical laws, then he is not all-powerful.”

This “limiting” idea regarding logical impossibilities often seems to be the big issue when it comes to God’s omnipotence. Many believe that God’s inability to perform logical impossibilities limits him in a negative sense, making him “lesser” or not as powerful as he should be. But I’d like to argue that it’s acceptable if God cannot perform logical impossibilities. In fact, sometimes it’s good that God cannot perform such contradictory acts. For example, God cannot do evil or sin. That would be a contradictory act, because it goes against the nature of God’s goodness and his innate God-ness. But it is good that he cannot perform that contradictory act, because it would not be good for God to do evil.

In the same way, God’s inability to do the logically impossible does not make him “less than,” because no one can perform logical impossibilities. So God still possesses the highest level of power possible and is thus still omnipotent. We just have to accept that with omnipotence comes an inability to do logically impossible things – and that’s okay; that’s not limiting.

My argument takes the following form:

1. If a being can do the logically impossible, then that being can make a contradiction true.
2. No one can make a contradiction true.
3. Therefore, no one can do the logically impossible (1, 2 MT).
4. An omnipotent being is someone.
5. Therefore, an omnipotent being cannot do the logically impossible (3, 4, MP).

So, to answer your initial question… No, God does not limit his own omnipotence with logical laws, at least not in a negative sense.

You say, “But they (one “who can do anything logically possible”) do not have as much [power] as one who can also do the logically impossible.”

First, I would like to clarify the definition of logical impossibility. This doesn’t mean just anything that would seem illogical to achieve — for example, me eating ice cream before working out might seem illogical. But when we refer to logical possibility, we really mean anything that does not cause a logical contradiction to properly think of it. For example, claiming that both “P” and “not P” are true at the same time and in the same way would be a logical contradiction. Another example would be asking someone to think of a square circle. These contradictions are instances of logical impossibilities.

So referring back to your claim, then, that a being that could do the logically impossible has more power than one that cannot, is in and of itself a contradiction. By definition, what is logically impossible is that which one cannot do (my first and second premises below). There is no reason to think omnipotent beings are not included in this (my fourth premise below). So when you assert that there is a being that can do something which, by definition, no one can do, I think it fails to grasp the definition of omnipotence correctly.

My argument takes the following form:

1. If a being can do the logically impossible, then that being can make a contradiction true.
2. No one can make a contradiction true.
3. Therefore, no one can do the logically impossible (1, 2 MT).
4. An omnipotent being is someone.
5. Therefore, an omnipotent being cannot do the logically impossible (3, 4, MP).

So since no one can do the logically impossible, then it is not a decrease in anyone’s power to not be able to do the logically impossible. So, an omnipotent being still maintains the highest possible level of power without being able to do the logically impossible. Because there is no contradiction between an omnipotent being and a being that cannot do the logically impossible, then, I think your argument, and your conclusions regarding Descartes’ paradox, fail to succeed.

I believe you are arguing the following. Let me know if I am wrong.

1. If God does not show himself, then he fears to show himself.
2. God does not show himself.
3. Therefore, God fears to show himself. (1, 2 MP)

4. If God fears to show himself, then God is a coward.
5. Therefore, God is a coward. (3, 4 MP)

6. If God is a coward, then he is not worthy of the title “God.”
7. Therefore, God is not God. (5, 6 MP)

I’d like to object to premises 1 and 2.

First – an objection to the inference in premise 1. You are claiming that the reason that God does not show himself is out of fear. You have not offered any evidence to support this claim. I think your inference is incorrect because there are other reasons that God might not show himself, if that is true. For example, if God were to show himself to us, to an extent that we would know for certain that he exists, we would have no choice but to believe in him. If we had no choice but to believe in him, then we would not have free will in our act of belief.

For clarification, here is my argument in a hypothetical syllogism.

1. If God were to clearly show himself to us (to an extent that we would know for certain that he exists) then we would have no choice but to believe in him.
2. If we had no choice but to believe in him, then we would not have free will in our act of belief.
3. If God were to clearly show himself to us, then we would not have free will in our act of belief.

If your conception of God values free will, then this justifies why one could think that your inference is incorrect.

Second – an objection to premise 2, “God does not show himself.”

We’ve established that if you believe mankind should have free will, then God cannot clearly show himself to the extent that the evidence would be insurmountable. Our only other option is to look for subtler signs of God. Many people have argued that there are signs of God in the organization of the world, and how intricately it appears designed. Others believe they can see God manifested in instances of selflessness and love between other people. Clearly, both of these arguments are complex and require further justification. But for the sake of the objection, I think these two points makes your second premise unsound.

My argument is as follows:

1. If you believe mankind should have free will, then God cannot clearly show himself.
2. Mankind should have free will.
3. Therefore, God cannot clearly show himself. (1, 2 MP)
4. If God cannot clearly show himself, then he either doesn’t show himself at all, or he shows himself subtly.
5. So, either God doesn’t show himself at all, or he shows himself subtly. (3, 4 MP)
6. God shows himself subtly.
7. Therefore, it is not true that God doesn’t show himself at all. (5, 6 DS)

Let me know your thoughts and if I have inaccurately represented your argument.

In this argument, you state that you are sympathetic to Descartes’ view. The following is Descartes view on the omnipotence of God in a modus ponens argument:

1. If God can perform both actions in the boulder paradox, then he is omnipotent.
2. God can perform both actions in the boulder paradox.
3. Therefore, God is omnipotent. (1,2 MP)

It seems that you want to find this argument to be true because accepting anything otherwise would make God incapable of certain abilities, and therefore fail in the category of omnipotence (as per your definition of omnipotence), which could potentially discredit his Godlike nature.
However, Descartes’ argument nonetheless seems ridiculous. So in order to make sense of that, you offer the following modus ponens argument:

1. If God can do anything logically possible, then he is omnipotent.
2. God can do anything logically possible.
3. Therefore, God is omnipotent. (1,2 MP)

This argument seems to be the more relevant view of what you are trying to decipher. So I will make my objection in terms of this modus ponens argument.
The key issue here is your definition of omnipotence. You seem to have a good attempt to define it, but it falls short for the following reason. I object to premise 2, that God can do anything logically possible. My modus tollens argument is as follows:

1. If God can do anything logically possible, then he is omnipotent.
2. There are some logically possible things that God can’t do.
3. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

There are some logical possibilities that God cannot do. An example of this would be lying. Lying is objectively logically possible. But God cannot lie, because it goes against his nature. Therefore, that presents a contradiction. A similar example would be the logical possibility of making a mistake – God can’t do this either.

So it seems that you need to redefine omnipotence. In my argument, my conclusion claims, “Therefore, God is not omnipotent,” only in terms of your definition of omnipotence, specifically, that an omnipotent being can do anything logically possible. I would also like to accept that God is omnipotent. But to do this, you need to redefine omnipotence, not just using the ability do any logically possible things as the basis for the definition. It’s more than just logical possibility.

For example, you can maintain the claim that God is omnipotent if you alter the antecedent in your original premise to “God can do anything that is logically possible for God.” This narrows the scope of what is logically possible to whatever is both logically possible in general and what does not contradict God’s nature (e.g., lying, erring).

A final important note – The fact that there are logically possible things that God cannot do does not undermine him as God. We wouldn’t want him to lie or make a mistake. So the fact that he is unable to do some of these logically possible things is actually a good thing, as it preserves his good nature.