Miracles by definition are events that cannot be explained by natural or scientific laws. I would say that miracles are not the best evidence for the existence of God. According to Bart Ehrman, miracles are so highly improbable that they are the least probable occurrence because of the way they violate the way nature naturally works. Along the same lines is Hume’s argument in against believing in miracles. Hume’s argument looks like this:
1. A miracle is a “a violation of a law of nature”
2. If it is “a violation of a law of nature”, then the prior probability of a miracle is very low.
3. Therefore, the prior probability of a miracle is very low. (1,2 MP)
4. If the prior probability of a miracle is very low, then we should believe in a miracle only if the evidence for it is very strong.
5. We should only believe in a miracle only if the evidence for it is extremely strong. (3,4 MP)
6. The evidence for a miracle is never extremely strong.
7. So, we should never believe in any miracle. (5,6 MT)
I agree with Hume’s general argument about how there is never strong evidence for miracles, but I stray away from agreeing or disagreeing that we should never believe in any miracles. I simply think that miracles should not be used as evidence for God because of how impossible it seems to be, let alone prove. God by itself is already a being that is hard to prove with natural or scientific laws, so trying to use another thing that is impossible to prove through natural or scientific laws as evidence for God seems to be a little redundant.

Petitionary prayer is basically a prayer in which you ask God for something. It seems to make no sense as it can be hard to see how human prayers could affect what God does. I say this because God would be omniscient and would already be aware of our needs.
I argue that petitionary prayer is useless is because of how it interacts with free will. Petitionary prayer seems to imply that God would intervene with the human world. If God were to intervene, then it would be to help us make the right choices to fix what we would create from our bad choices that were made freely. But if God is intervening in this way, then isn’t he technically overriding our freedom to make decisions? And the more God does this, our decisions are no longer really our decisions. And if they are not our decisions, then how are we supposed to be held responsible for them? And we need to be responsible for our choices for them to have any moral significance. So my argument would sort of go something like this:
1. If our decisions are not influenced through intervention by God, then we are held responsible for our decisions.
2. We are held responsible for our decisions.
3. Our decisions are not influenced through intervention by God. (1,2 MP)
4. If petitionary prayer was useful, then our decisions are influenced through intervention by God.
5. Petitionary prayer is useless. (3,4 MT)

The divine hiddenness argument against the existence of God roughly goes like this:
1. If there is a perfect God, then he is perfectly loving.
2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then reasonable non-belief should not occur.
3. But reasonable non-belief does occur.
4. So there is no perfectly loving God (2,3 MT).
5. If God exists, then he is perfectly loving.
6. God does not exists (4,5 MT).
The argument itself implies that God hiddenness allows for non-belief to occur and that the non-belief itself should not be possible if a perfectly loving God exists. But I would argue that it is his very hiddenness that allows for non-belief that religious followers can practice faith. And even those who do not believe in God’s existence due to his hiddenness can develop their own moral character.
An argument I read that is in response to God’s divine hiddenness is Michael Murray’s argument that the hiddenness of God is essential for developing our moral character. His argument roughly goes like this:
1. We have the ability to develop our own moral character only if we can intentionally choose between morally good and bad acts freely.
2. We can intentionally choose between morally good and bad acts freely.
3. We have the ability to develop our own moral character. (1,2 MP)
4. If God was not hidden, then we do not have the ability to develop our own moral character.
5. God is hidden. (3,4 MT)
I think that this argument does well in justifying the hiddenness of God because I do agree that if God was not hidden, our decisions would have to heavily depend on just the existence of God itself rather than making decisions to develop our own character. Our moral character would not be developed at all if we were to make just morally good decisions because it would be heavily influenced by God’s non-hiddenness since at that point we would make the decisions that we are told to be good through religious texts. Instead, his hiddenness allows us to determine what is good and bad ourselves and make decisions that are our own that reflect our own developing moral character, whether we believe in God’s existence or not.
One can argue that those who believe in God’s existence despite his hiddenness are still influenced to make decisions through religious texts. But the key part of all of this is that God’s hiddenness allows for us to question his very existence. All those who believe in the existence God have their faith challenged everyday and would still have to have a deep understanding of morality itself to further develop their moral characters. They still need to overcome temptations to do morally bad acts that are self-beneficial through their faith in God’s existence. If God simply existed, there would be no need for faith and everyone, theists and non-theists, would just do what is morally good because that is what is right in the eyes of God rather than choosing to do it for themselves. Even those who do not believe in God face the challenge of choosing between what is morally good and morally bad to develop their moral characters all the time and this is only possible because God is hidden.

One modern defense for the teleological argument come from Richard Swinburne saying that even if there’s another possible explanation for the universe, we should go with the explanation that’s most likely to be true. It’s simply more probable that God designed the world, than that it came about through the pure chance of evolutionary processes. This defense in the teleological argument is less about making assertions and more about making claims about probability. Fine-tuning arguments also fall into these kinds of probability-based defenses. This is because the probability of the world to become as we know it is extremely precise. These defenses accept scientific theories like the Big Bang and evolution, but explain that for the evolution of life to occur, it is most likely that God set up the exact conditions that were required for life to happen rather than having it come by chance or accident.
Almost everything about the basic structure of Earth for life to occur, let alone the universe, is balanced on a knife’s edge. This is because the possibility that the basic structure of our universe took shape just by chance is as statistically improbable as hitting a dart board that is one-foot wide from the other side of the galaxy. Unless the dart has hit the target, life would be impossible. For short, I am attempting to say something like this:
1. The possibility that the basic structure of our universe took shape just by chance is as statistically improbable as hitting a dart board that is one-foot wide from the other side of the galaxy.
2. The dart has indeed hit the target.
3. The fact that the dart has hit the target strongly suggests that someone aimed the dart as it would be extremely improbable that such a coincidence could have happened by chance.
4. So we should go with the explanation that is most likely to be true and accept the theism explanation over the non-theist explanations.

So my understanding of the ontological argument is that God is the greatest thing that we can think of. Things can exist only in our imaginations, or they can also exist in reality. Things that exist in reality are always better than things that exist only in our imaginations. If God existed only in our imaginations, he wouldn’t be the greatest thing that we can think of, because God in reality would be better. Therefore, God must exist in reality. This argument can be summarized as:
1. God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (the greatest possible being that can be imagined).
2. God exists as an idea in the mind.
3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
6. Therefore, God exists.
I know that one of the most well known objections to this argument is Gaunilo’s “The Lost Island” argument that uses the same structure as Anselm’s Ontological argument to prove the existence of the greatest island. But I am more convinced by another objection that I found more interesting by Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, existence is not a predicate. An example of what he says is that if a triangle exists, it necessarily has three sides. But it could be that no triangle exists at all. Because the idea of existence isn’t part of how we define a triangle. If God exists, then he must be the greatest being we can imagine. But that does not mean that he does exist. Predicates add to the essence of their subjects, but they can’t be used to prove their existence. Kant believed that the ontological argument was flawed and any argument for the existence of God based on the proposition that a God exists in reality is greater than a God that only in the imagination is based on confusion.

I argue that there is human freedom and evil is not created by God but is a byproduct of giving humans free will. Plantinga’s defense on free will that even if God desires to eliminate all evil, he desires free creatures more and so evil might still exist. So if God is one with the power to eliminate all evil, knowledge to eliminate all evil, and the desire to eliminate all evil allows it to exist, then he would not be the one to have created evil. Instead, Plantinga explains that its possible that if God exists, free will could be something that can only exist only if it is sometimes abused to make all sort of good and evil decisions. And creating such creatures with free will is so good that it outweighs the evil they could or will perform. This defense can be seen as:
1. A world containing creatures that are significantly free is better than a world containing no free creatures.
2. God can create significantly free creatures.
3. To be significantly free is to be capable of both moral good and moral evil.
4. If significantly free creatures were caused to do only what is right, they would not be free.
5. Therefore, God cannot cause significantly free creatures to do only what is right.
So I do not think God created evil, or allows evil to exists because he is evil. I believe that God wants his creations to be free and they can only be free if they are capable of both moral good and moral evil without being influenced to only do what is right.

I will attempt to address your second question in how to respond to Hume. Recently I was introduced to something call the Grim Reaper Paradox and when altered, shows that a world with an infinite regress cannot exist.
The original paradox goes something like this:
There are an infinite number of Grim Reapers that each have a deadline at which he is scheduled to kill person X. If X is alive at a time that a Grim Reaper is scheduled to kill X, he will kill X. If X is not alive, the Grim Reaper does nothing. Grim Reaper 1 is scheduled to kill X at 9:00AM, Grim Reaper 2 at 8:30AM, Grim Reaper 3 at 8:15AM, and so on continuously being scheduled at half the minute hand of the previous Grim Reaper for an infinite number of Grim Reapers. If you were to pick any of the Grim Reapers, X would not be alive when it becomes the time at which that Grim Reaper is supposed to kill X. Meaning no Grim Reaper would kill X because there will always be a Grim Reaper scheduled to kill X before their time comes.
The modified version of the paradox:
There are still an infinite number of Grim Reapers, but this time instead of killing anyone, they are assigned to a year and are tasked to pass along a note to the next Grim Reaper. Grim Reaper 1 is assigned to 1 B.C. Grim Reaper 2 at 2 B.C. and so on. This is also assuming that the past is indeed infinite. Each Grim Reaper receives a piece of paper on the first day of every year from his predecessor and hands it to his successor on the last day of the year he is assigned. If the paper is blank when received, he will write the number of the year he assigned on the piece of paper and pass it on. If the paper already has a piece of paper on it, he will just pass it along without writing anything on it. The paradox is, there must be a number on the piece of paper by the time it reaches the year 1 A.D. But there is no number that can be on that paper because the past would be infinite and no Grim Reaper would ever get a note without a number and there would be no Grim Reaper that would write down their number.
This leads to the argument that:
1. If there could be an infinite regress of causes, then the scenarios provided above would be possible.
2. But these scenarios are impossible.
3. So, there could not be an infinite regress of causes.

I would have agree with the view that an omnipotent being is only able to do anything that is logically possible. It only makes sense that an omnipotent being would not be able to do the impossible, or else the impossibility would not be impossible anymore. Things like “making a stone heavier than he can life” or anything that is contradictory are not doable, even for an infinitely powerful being. Not being able to do impossible or contradicting acts does not make God any less powerful simply because no being would be able to do what God cannot do.
So rather having God be something like this:
1. If God is an omniscient being that can do anything, he should be able to make a stone heavier than he can lift.
2. God cannot make a stone heavier than he can lift.
3. God is not an omniscient being that can do anything.
I would argue for it to go more like this:
1. If God is an omniscient being, he is infinitely powerful to do anything that is possible/doable.
2. God cannot make a stone heavier than he can lift.
a. But there is no being that can exist that can do this task as it is impossible for any being to make a stone heavier than it can lift.
3. God is still an omniscient being.
God as an omniscient being that has created this universe, including what is possible and impossible, would also have to abide by the rules he set for the universe. I also believe that God would be able to do the impossible outside the realms of this universe, but it will in be in ways where we cannot comprehend because we are beings that live and die by the rules of this universe.