In other words, you, I and all of us, we are our history. The role of history should thus not be restricted to cultural philosophy, but should be given an ontological position in its role of making up the picture of the nature of human being!
This view has, of course, also implications for philosophical anthropology where man is viewed in a collective sense, but I will leave that for another day. — Daniel C
Being No One helps to explain why the traditional reliance on philosophical intuition has illuminated this subject so little. Human intuitions about consciousness and the self are shaped by consciousness and the self-model, as they are experienced by normal human adults. Both consciousness and the self-model are products of evolution, a natural process which favours gene reproduction. Evolution has no fundamental bias towards the truth. Although it is often adaptive for organisms to form accurate models of reality, it is by no means always so. Robert Trivers has shown that self-deception can be adaptive (because it helps us to deceive others) (Trivers, 2000); and so can ego-boosting misperceptions such as superiority bias. Another highly adaptive evolutionary product is what Metzinger calls the Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM). It has conferred such great advantages on our species, that Metzinger describes it as not only a tool, but (acknowledging Andy Clark for the metaphor):
…a weapon, developed in a cognitive arms race. Conscious selves are like instruments or abstract organs, invented and constantly optimized by biological systems. (Metzinger, 2004, p. 273)
To describe the model as effective is not to say that it is accurate. In fact, it is inaccurate in important respects. We are not the sort of beings that, influenced by our own self-models, we intuitively think we are. Discipline is required to overcome our biases, to arrive at truths about ourselves that are scientifically justified. — link
Relative to what is the ego-boosted self deceived? His community's shared self-deceptions? And I like various master thinkers (Lacan), but they too are masks, weapons, fellow mortals who dream of gazing on community-independent truth. Cult leaders all. And I dream that dream like maybe all of us do.Robert Trivers has shown that self-deception can be adaptive (because it helps us to deceive others) (Trivers, 2000); and so can ego-boosting misperceptions such as superiority bias. — link
i say get used to the dirt because its everywhere in life. you cant always stay clean. master everything at every level.
improvise, adapt, overcome — OmniscientNihilist
Hello everyone,
This discussion is about the time in between moments. It is impossible for every two moment to have time between it because It would result in infinite time between any two moments. — elucid
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-temporal/#BerHusRusBroIt belongs to the essence of perception not only that it has in view a punctual now and not only that it releases from its view something that has just been, while ‘still intending’ it in the original mode of ‘just-having-been’, but also that it passes over from now to now and, in anticipation, goes to meet the new now. The waking consciousness, the waking life, is a living-towards, a living that goes from the now towards the new now. — Husserl
I am arguing that at the point of the development of language and reason, h. sapiens is no longer understandable solely through the evolutionary perspective, but is capable of insights into the nature of being which are beyond anything available through a purely biological perspective. — Wayfarer
He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. — A
One person understands something about the world and teaches - communicates with - others so that they understand; the knowledge then, because that is what it is, becoming a general community property (of those educated and able to understand). And where is this general community property kept? Nowhere else but in the minds of individuals, there being enough of them to obscure the nature of the keeping place(s). — tim wood
It is precisely because the philosopher's questions can only be answered by careful reasoned reflection, whereas the therapist's questions require detailed empirical investigation, that we have separate disciplines dedicated to answering them. — Bartricks
https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1525&context=etdThe traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most
part, on reason and reflection. — link
Yeah, them meeting with the monolith at the start of the film must have been quite an experience, eh? — Wallows
What is more egoist and "evil"?
A) Developing a entire philosophical thought about the true nature of egoism, and trying to explain that you, indeed, is egoist, and that you have to accept the fact that all you do is only for your own benefit.
B) Developing a entire philosophical thought about how to, in supposedly "harmony and altruism", confiscate everything from everyone on behalf of "Communism". — Gus Lamarch
I wouldn’t label it ‘superstition’, but an abstraction, like point, line, circle, the continuum, etc., all mental constructs for purposes of measurement. They are practical conveniences — sandman
Yes, that's the gist. — Bartricks
That was my point about how it is possible to be insane and a philosopher. — Bartricks
But Reason doesn't just talk about the truth, but also about how we ought to behave. — Bartricks
Let's just focus on one of those bizarre assumptions that you insist I must make, namely that we "aren't essentially mythological as opposed to metaphysical beings". Now, what do you mean? Do you mean that I have to assume I exist? — Bartricks
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/from-conventionalism-to-social-authenticity-heideggers-anyone-and-contemporary-social-theory/Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.).
First of all and most of the time (Heidegger's zunächst und zumeist, BT 370), humans live following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner. — link
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects (i.e., as the bearers of determinate properties that exist independently of the Dasein-centred context of action in which the equipmental entity is involved). Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. — link
The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call ‘readiness-to-hand’. (Being and Time 15: 98) — H
Might interest you to know that Popper co-authored a book with neuroscientist Sir John Eccles on dualist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer
Substitute any empirical unity. All trees are the unity of trees, but the unity of trees doesn’t explain why some are hardwoods and some are soft, some broadleaf, some needle leaf. There’s something more needed than just being trees, to facilitate trees being hardwoods. — Mww
I won’t fight over that. Intersubjective still leaves concepts as purely subjective constructs with possibly real objects which conform to them, which we call experience. — Mww
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Doors_of_PerceptionAfter reading Osmond's paper, Huxley sent him a letter on Thursday, 10 April 1952, expressing interest in the research and putting himself forward as an experimental subject. His letter explained his motivations as being rooted in an idea that the brain is a reducing valve that restricts consciousness and hoping mescaline might help access a greater degree of awareness (an idea he later included in the book).[19] Reflecting on his stated motivations, Woodcock wrote that Huxley had realised that the ways to enlightenment were many, including prayer and meditation. He hoped drugs might also break down the barriers of the ego, and both draw him closer to spiritual enlightenment and satisfy his quest as a seeker of knowledge.[20] — Wiki
That's a misunderstanding of the film. Sure it was released in the 60's, and you had the audience at the time either high or inebriated in some sense. But, according to what I've seen in regards to commentary about the film by Spielberg, that wasn't the intended message. — Wallows
the last man is the goal that modern society and Western civilization have apparently set for themselves, with lives of pacifism and comfortableness, with no more distinction between ruler and ruled, strong over weak or supreme over the mediocre. Social conflict and challenges are minimized and every individual lives equally and in "superficial" harmony. — Gus Lamarch
I can only say, with regret, that we are going straightfoward towards the latter. — Gus Lamarch
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/preface.htmHitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged their relationships according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have got out of their hands. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let us revolt against the rule of thoughts. Let us teach men, says one, to exchange these imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of man; says the second, to take up a critical attitude to them; says the third, to knock them out of their heads; and -- existing reality will collapse.
These innocent and childlike fancies are the kernel of the modern Young-Hegelian philosophy, which not only is received by the German public with horror and awe, but is announced by our philosophic heroes with the solemn consciousness of its cataclysmic dangerousness and criminal ruthlessness. The first volume of the present publication has the aim of uncloaking these sheep, who take themselves and are taken for wolves; of showing how their bleating merely imitates in a philosophic form the conceptions of the German middle class; how the boasting of these philosophic commentators only mirrors the wretchedness of the real conditions in Germany. It is its aim to debunk and discredit the philosophic struggle with the shadows of reality, which appeals to the dreamy and muddled German nation.
Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. If they were to knock this notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a religious concept, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from water. His whole life long he fought against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful results all statistics brought him new and manifold evidence. This valiant fellow was the type of the new revolutionary philosophers in Germany. — Marx
It's really paradoxical that for open-minded people who want to explore space, to be so militant against a harmless mind-expanding compound. I suppose the people at NASA and engineers still think it's the 50's or something?? — Wallows
What reason could we have for submitting ourselves, as slaves, to truths that would merely destroy our well-being (if there are such truths)? — Janus
As insanity involves some kind of systematic failure to listen to Reason in some or other regard, it is possible to be a true philosopher and insane. — Bartricks
Therefore, An Enemy of the People tells the story of a man who dares to speak an unpalatable truth, and is punished for it. However, Ibsen took a somewhat skeptical view of his protagonist, suggesting that he may have gone too far in his zeal to tell the truth. Ibsen wrote to his publisher: "I am still uncertain as to whether I should call [An Enemy of the People] a comedy or a straight drama. It may [have] many traits of comedy, but it also is based on a serious idea." — wiki
I hesitate in granting that any concept is objective simply because it is grasped by many subjectivities. — Mww
Popper's World 3 contains the products of thought. This includes abstract objects such as scientific theories, stories, myths, tools, social institutions, and works of art.[2] World 3 is not to be conceived as a Platonic realm, because it is created by humans.[3] — link
Subject (pov)/gauge-invariant scientific models either defeasibly explain some transformation - physical or formal - or they don't. That's all they are used for. "The 'rational subject'" which uses scientific models cannot also be the object of scientific modeling anymore than eyes can also be within their field of vision. Territories necessarily exceed maps, or abstractions (i.e. informational compressions - simplifications) of territories; the map-maker - map-making - is always the enabling lacuna of every map and any lacuna-free map - corresponding 1:1 to a territory - would be useless as a map. — 180 Proof
If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics. — Feynman
A question that occurs to me is whether mathematical proofs are objectively true? I mean, they are in a sense, but on the other hand, strictly speaking they don't appeal to objects as such; they're perceivable by reason alone. — Wayfarer
Just trying to learn something, is what it boils down to. — Mww
On the one hand, no human is possible without the antecedent humanity, but on the other, a general condition of some empirical unity is in itself insufficient to explain the multiplicity of disparate conditions of its particulars. — Mww
In other words, why I’m this, or why I think this, doesn’t explain why you’re that, or why you think that, merely because we’re both human. — Mww
And if what we want to know is why, which is almost always the case, then we see it just won’t answer anything if we ground our investigation on some fundamental ontological condition. — Mww
When the lights go out at the end of the day, there’s nobody there but ourselves. “Know thy-self”, and all those other colloquial admonishments, doncha know. Which, ironically enough, leave off “as best you can”, or, “but you’re probably wrong”. — Mww
A nontrivial case - in the sense that a foundational belief - the ascendency of matter over the imagination - is thrown into question. To the zealous, the imagination-centered scheme ("blood") is a deeper reflection of reality than the matter-centered scheme ("wine"). So things are topsy-turvy. But there is still a background of common beliefs - for example a belief in the existence of the red liquid. — ZzzoneiroCosm
If "pure" is meant to denote something in it's most unadulterated uncorrupted and/or basic state, then it doesn't get any purer that what I've set out here. — creativesoul
Language, Saussure insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech possible. Derrida vehemently disagrees with this hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be claimed of writing - eg. that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs - is equally true of speech. But as well as criticising such a position for certain unjustifiable presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves in 'hearing' ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in which such a hierarchy is rendered untenable from within Saussure's own text. Most famously, Saussure is the proponent of the thesis that is commonly referred to as "the arbitrariness of the sign", and this asserts, to simplify matters considerably, that the signifier bears no necessary relationship to that which is signified. Saussure derives numerous consequences from this position, but as Derrida points out, this notion of arbitrariness and of "unmotivated institutions" of signs, would seem to deny the possibility of any natural attachment (OG 44). After all, if the sign is arbitrary and eschews any foundational reference to reality, it would seem that a certain type of sign (ie. the spoken) could not be more natural than another (ie. the written). However, it is precisely this idea of a natural attachment that Saussure relies upon to argue for our "natural bond" with sound (25), and his suggestion that sounds are more intimately related to our thoughts than the written word hence runs counter to his fundamental principle regarding the arbitrariness of the sign. — SEP
On Braver’s narrative, Kant’s Copernican revolution inaugurates anti-realism by allowing him to conceive of phenomena as dependent upon the structuring activity of the mind; this provides the basis, as well, for Kant’s rejection of correspondence truth. On the other hand, Kant still retains a realist view of the “transcendental” subject responsible for this structuring work, as well as the notorious “realist” commitment to the reality of noumena or things-in-themselves. It is Hegel’s critique of the latter commitment in particular, according to Braver, that produces the more thoroughgoing anti-realism of the Phenomenology of Spirit and substantially leads to the decisive Hegelian claim (essential to all varieties of continental anti-realism that follow) for the necessarily historical character of all philosophical inquiry. The rejection of realism about noumena also leads Hegel, according to Braver, to see reality as “mind-dependent” in another, and more radical, way than Kant had. In particular, relying rather heavily on contemporary “social pragmatist” interpretations, Braver suggests that Hegel ultimately sees Spirit as a kind of “communal intelligence” coming about through the intersubjectivity of a speech community and that the culmination of the system of the Phenomenology in “Absolute Knowledge” expresses the deeply anti-realist claim that “there is no higher court of appeal for our beliefs than our community”
It's mutual(shared) when a plurality of individuals draw the same correlations between the use and other things. — creativesoul
All attribution of meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul
All attribution of meaning by language less creatures requires only the creature capable of drawing correlations between different things... none of which are linguistic devices and/or marks(signs/symbols), and all of which are directly perceptible things. That situates the kinds of correlations that are drawn at a level some call 'beneath' common language. — creativesoul
OK. Thanks. — Mww
For some thing to have meaning, it has to be tied to a value for that person or people. Such as, a sense of status or independence.. An idea that encompasses a value or opposes them, would have meaning to it. It has to touch one of your higher values in a personal way. — halo
Put it in some context everyone can at least agree on first.. — halo
My view is that once h. sapiens evolves to the point of being a language-using and meaning-seeking being, then we have capabilities that are beyond the scope of biological theory per se. — Wayfarer
I submit that anything belonging to a subject’s rationality, per McDowell, is private, and to suggest that the totality of subjects in possession of rationality is the same as rationality itself being “essentially public and social” does not follow. — Mww
Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.).
First of all and most of the time (Heidegger's zunächst und zumeist, BT 370), humans live following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner. — link
The world may have been created by God, but it was now in the hands – for better or worse – of humanity. The world was a human stage, with human values, emotions, hopes, and fears, and this humanity was defined, in turn, by a universal human nature. — Robert Solomon
The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things. — creativesoul
You're free to dream what society says you can. — Gus Lamarch
Liberty in this case doesn't exist, but then we are arriving on my philosophical thought, and that's not what this discussion is about. — Gus Lamarch
Both/and - (but) must be we choose? :smirk: — 180 Proof
All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think. — creativesoul
Derrida (1930-2004) famously argued that writing preceded speech. By this I believe he meant that the “iterability” of language logically preceded its spontaneous performance...that is, repeatable in any context whatsoever, just as this very introduction to Derrida I’m writing now must be able to signify as an introduction to Derrida after this semester is over [hey! like now!], after I’m dead, after you cease to read it, after the expiration of every element of the context in which I am composing it now. That, writes Derrida, is the very condition of writing itself, without which we simply do not recognize writing as such: if the writing is not “iterable,” it is not writing. — from above
"Full" meaning is present?
I don't talk like that. Something else. — creativesoul
You mentioned suspicion about 'correlation' - which is my notion of thought and belief. All thought and belief consists of correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul
If one does not know the difference between you and I, well, there can be no distinction between who says what. — creativesoul
Is there a finite amount of signs that can get this right? What on earth is this? Is there a finite chain of signs that can be used to comprehend how we use the terms "I" and "you"???
Is that what you're asking me here? — creativesoul
Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.). — link
Undoubtedly, but that's true of asking anyone what they mean by any other term as well... — creativesoul