Why we don't live in a simulation This assumes hardcore causality though. We already know that prediction is epistemically not always possible, which means that for certain processes we predict outcomes in terms of probability. This is an issue for things such as complex systems, chaos theory and quantum indeterminancy. I was not primarily suggesting anything about things that do not affect our observations but things not being relevant for our observations as they fall within the scope of probabilities. We'd never notice the absence of simulation of such objects. — Benkei
It doesn't actually assume hardcore causality since the uncertainty of a probability based world requires even more processing power. The probability based quantum world of ours is actually a very good argument against us living in a simulation since a probability based world where almost infinite number of possible quantum states affect the next possible quantum states and their probability distribution is almost infinitely complex to calculate. Classical mechanics require almost infinitely less processing power. Uncertainty doesn't remove causality until the wave function collapses. Before that all the possible quantum states causally determine the next probability distribution. The only non causal thing in quantum mechanics I'm aware of is the new information generated by the collapse of the wave function since it can't be predicted.
If you mean that you could create the illusion of probabilities by pretty much making a predetermined movie as our simulation, where none of the probabilities are actually calculated and are actually just predetermined, that could work to reduce the amount of processing needed to give us a simulation of our experiences(Although I'm quite dubious about this since I have no idea how to make a predermined set of experiences and what kind and how much of processing such would actually require). But you will still have to demonstrate that these "predetermined" worlds are hugely represented in simulations in order to show that our current processes are more likely in a simulation than in the "real" world.
But I do agree that this is a good start to show it possible that you can technically have more simulations of our experiences even without as many processes as in the "real" world. I don't think I ever disagreed with this. I even said in the original argument that one only needs to demonstrate that there are more simulations of our experiences in simulations with fewer processes than in the real world. You have only started to demonstrate it possible, but most possible simulations can still be something else than efficiently processed versions of our experiences, making it also possible that our experiences still happen more frequently in the processes of the "real" world than in the processes of a simulation.
Second, I don't think it's about "things" either but about qualities. How does the quality "weight" influence lenght and width of an object? How does smell do that? What I'm suggesting is that when I look at something from a distance, the simulation would not have to render weight or smell. The tree falling in the forest where there's no one to hear it, doesn't need to make a sound. It does not need to render completely anything happening beyond my field of observation. In more general terms, anything outside my reference frame doesn't need to be fully rendered. — Benkei
Already addressed this point. Try to come up with a quality you can both demonstrate to exist and that doesn't affect our observations in any way. I personally believe in a somewhat solipsistic world anyway where pretty much only the information that constitutes my observations exists for me for certain logically necessary reasons. But this information pretty much contains pretty much everything everyone else believes to exist too since pretty much everything observable for others ends up affecting my observations at least indirectly. Like a tree falling when I'm not seeing it still affects things like gravity in tiny ways affecting my observation.
So, while I believe in a world seemingly like something that is according to you, easier to calculate, I disagree with you since I think this is that is the way the "real" world is and because probability based worlds are harder to calculate. (Unless you demonstrate a way to create predetermined experiences with the illusion of probabilities. Usually a system that can process a complex simulation is always less complex physically than a system that can store all the occurences of a complex simulation. Computer memory is physically, although not technologically, more complex than the computer processor. Any reasonable amount of memory is physically bigger and contains more physical processes than a processor.)
I guess if one compares a non-solipsistic probability based world and a solipsistic probability based world, the logically possible non-solipsistic probability based worlds are more harder to calculate on average. But even then most of all processes happen in non-simulated worlds like the original argument demonstrates. You will still have to demonstrate that solipsistic worlds are hugely more represented in simulations in order to show that our current processes are more likely in a simulation than in the "real" world.