Is there the slightest evidence to support the contention that it is? — Graeme M

That you have conscious experiences.

Well, at the moment perhaps. Isn't it feasible that an explanation may be forthcoming? — Graeme M

Only if the arguments for the hard problem are flawed. Which perhaps they are in some subtle way, or are relying on faulty intuition. I guess we'll know if/when an explanation does emerge.

I'm not trying to dismiss panpsychism, I just don't get how it even flies as a serious contender. — Graeme M

Well, if the world contains both physical stuff and consciousness, but there doesn't seem to be a way for the physical stuff to produce consciousness, then an alternative would be that all physical stuff is conscious.

Why couldn't unexplained emergence be a brute fact? Are there some limits/preferences about what can and cannot be a brute fact? — Isaac

No, but I think complex novel things emerging is considered spooky in a way that brute fundamental things are not. The presumption being that emergence is produced by the fundamental building blocks, so how could you get something entirely novel out of that?

Something has to be fundamental because stuff exists. We just don't have an explanation for existence.

And that question is another category error. It's a dream; it doesn't take place at all. It happens in the magical land of unicorns. — unenlightened

But you have an experience of seeing a tree in your dream. That experience is like the experience of perceiving a tree. If the first is a mental image, why isn't the second experience?

Yes, it could be considered an abuse of language because language didn't develop to properly explain the true nature of perception, it developed according to the naive view that the properties present in the experience, like a red colour, are properties inherent in external world objects. — Michael

Exactly this. So for example we say the sky is blue without taking into account what that actually entails, because it's pragmatic to say skies are blue, not scientific or philosophical.

I have never, ever to my knowledge dreamed of a tree in my head, or any other object in my head. As I never experience anything being in my head, it doesn't feature in my dreams. — unenlightened

Where do you suppose the dream is taking place?

And anyway it is foolish to base a theory of vision on fantasies. Try again. — unenlightened

So perception is unlike all our other experiences? Some people think dreams are a form of hallucination.

If the object of perception is in my head, how do I see it? simple question How do I see what is in my head? If you don't mean that what do you mean that isn't an abuse of language? — unenlightened

The same way you see a tree in a dream. It's a mental image. The difference being the causal chain that produced the mental image.

No, that's not what he says. External reality is the stuff we see in everyday life, the empirically real. — jamalrob

So the categories of thought which organize the sense impressions into the empirical are mirroring the world outside the mind?

We certainly haven't reduced the mysteriousness - we've just re-invented the nature of the entire universe with a stuff that previously didn't exist and can't be measured. — Isaac

Sure, but it just becomes another brute fact of existence, along with the existence of QM, Relativity and fundamental properties and fields.

We haven't reduced the 'how' questions - we still have the question of how this stuff interacts with matter only now it's interacting with all matter. — Isaac

Well the matter interacts but it's also conscious. Combine the matter together and you have more consciousness. I'm not a panpsychist, so you'd have to see how they go about explaining combinations.

How can you claim this to be true? — Graeme M

There are plenty of arguments for the hard problem. Basically, no amount of objective explanation gets you to subjectivity. They're incompatible.

This might be a form of correlationism and so not as realist as you'd expect, but in the same way that Kant didn't think of himself as an idealist, neither do I. — jamalrob

Right, but what sort of realist was Kant? He thought there was an external reality of some kind, but we can't say anything positive about it, thus terming it the noumena.

Most realisms try to establish a connection between human thoughts, words, perceptions and the "furniture" of the world. The realist is saying that our minds carve up the world more or less at nature's joints. Get rid of the joints and for all the Kantian knows, reality could be the equivalent of a BIV, or some mystical godlike thing, or a damn sphere.

On the other hand, if by direct you mean to perceive something as it is beyond possible experience, yeah, that's not a road that I go down. I want to say that's incoherent. — jamalrob

Sure, however, I think that's what the direct realist is trying to say. The world basically looks the way it looks to us, once you account for lighting conditions, angles, and all the stuff we can't see.

So in answer to the question, no, I don't think Dennett is a p-zombie. Nevertheless, if not experiencing genuine phenomenal qualia is the definition of a p-zombie, then we are all p-zombies. — Graeme M

You certainly do philosophy like a p-zombie!

But to get to what you're interested in and state my positive position more explicitly: we always perceive under an aspect. We perceive affordances, what is relevant. Perception is a coupling with the environment in ways that depend on perceiver and environment. This might be a form of correlationism and so not as realist as you'd expect, but in the same way that Kant didn't think of himself as an idealist, neither do I. — jamalrob

The question would be in what sense is correlationiism a "direct awareness"? It sounds like the correlation is generating an experience of a table that is not what the table is like at all, since physical objects don't look, sound, smell, taste or feel like anything. They lack those properties, since those are affordances of perceiving.

Maybe an alternative would be to propose that perception is a direct awareness of a relationship to an object. That would allow for doing science without skepticism. But it wouldn't be what direct realists are arguing, which is a sophisticated form of stating a naive view of reality. The table looks like a table.

does it follow that if the problem of qualia were to be resolved in like manner to other physical matters (ie qualia are a describable and measurable physical event), would that undercut the rationale for positing panpsychism? — Graeme M

It wouldn't be describable or measurable. It would only be inferred, like with other people's minds. The hard problem is one of subjectivity, which can' be scientifically measured or described. Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging.

If minds were the function of systems to undertake say logical operations on information, ie to undertake computations, we'd have to conclude that computers do this. And that seems relatively explicable. We could expect that human brains are doing similar computational processes, also explicable. We could conclude that information is ubiquitous, that computations are possible, and that the universe has the property that systems can undertake computations. But isn't that already known, accepted and explained? So panpsychism can't be making that claim. — Graeme M

Right, that's just functionalism. You still need the qualia. An alternative to panpsychism would be to suppose some kinds of information are conscious. That's what Chalmers has suggested. And it's not explained by the functions or kind of information. It's just an additional fact. That's property dualism.

Are you? What IS the phenomenal experience of blue? I suspect nothing at all, beyond the distinctions it tokens. Blue just is what it is for your brain to be in a particular discriminatory state. — Graeme M

Would you say the same thing for pain or pleasure?

Let's say you're driving down a familiar road and you go into autopilot as you day dream. Now, your brain is still discriminating the steering wheel, gas pedal, lines on the road and anything else relevant for keeping the car on the road. But you're having a conscious experience of imagining something else entirely. How does that work on Dennett's account?

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno

To followup on creativesoul's comment, other animals can't state their beliefs in language. They might communicate them in a variety of other ways. But not necessarily and not always. Think of how long people have argued over what exactly their pet dog or cat thinks.

This video was posted in the, "Is Daniel Dennett a Zombie" thread. Right around the 10:30 minute mark he starts talking about color representation and brain states. They begin a discussion using the example of perceiving a blue door. That would tie into this discussion.

So Dennett is some kind of representationalist regarding consciousness. At other times, he sounds like a direct realist. I've never heard or read him say anything about this particular debate (direct versus indirect). Regardless, how does a direct realist handle consciousness?

Dennett does go on to say that color and consciousness are real, they just aren't what we thought they were.

I assume that my senses tell me something about the world, because it think it will make for a better live... and that's it essentially. — ChatteringMonkey

The indirect realists do as well and so do the idealists. It's only the skeptics who think our senses aren't telling us something about the world. The indirect realists would say we have to infer the knowledge instead of getting it directly. Which does raise the possibility of being wrong. And humans have been plenty wrong about the world over time.

Around 11:26 Dennett starts talking about color (pigment). He says there's no role for a property like pigment other than the light hitting the retina and activating cones. But there are brain states which represent to the perceiver the property of pigment. The interviewer says that's the difference between having a phenomenal quality of color (blue) instantiated by his brain and having the quality of blue represented by his brain. Dennett agrees.

I don't understand the difference. We still have the experience of the blue sky (or blue door at this point in the conversation). Dennett is replacing talk of the phenomenal experience with talk of brain states. That's just a semantic move.

So if you don't like the implications of a particular philosophical argument, just change the words used to avoid those implications! If only Chalmers had realized he could have used different words, he could have remained a good physicalist.

Ah yes, we do need to know that. The direct realists emphasize that perception is different from other experiences. I'm not as convinced.

If the two were not separate processes it seems to me that there wouldn't be experiences of not knowing what a sound is caused by between hearing the sound and categorizing it. — Harry Hindu

Well sure. There are a bunch of processes we're not aware of in conscious experience unless something goes wrong or we can't identify what we're experiencing.

So we would need a direct perception of perception? — Harry Hindu

No, the external object. I'm asking how a perceptual experience is direct awareness of the external world.

One anything. — EnPassant

Actually not quite. You can't have one infinity divided by one zero. Or if you can, the mathematical universe goes all indeterminate on you.

The double slit and various related experiments do come close to suggesting the universe likes paradox. But probably we just don't understand what's going on.

Seeing is the whole process, not the result of the process. — unenlightened

Even granting this over singling out the neural activity, the end result of the entire process is still an experience. The experience is not the thing being experienced. So the direct realist needs to explain that the experience is a direct awareness. I just don't know exactly what that means.

The other elephant lurking in the room is consciousness and the hard problem. External objects are described in objective terms, but our perceptual experience includes subjective qualities. I might see a blue shade of color and feel calmed, but whatever surface has that shade does not have any calming property, nor does the reflected light. That's entirely an animal response. However, it didn't stop people in the past (or even some today) from thinking objects had those kinds of properties.

1 can count the 0. 'One zero'. — EnPassant

'One infinity'.

I do not see as a result of a process leading to neural activity. — unenlightened

The reason to think you do is because of all the other experiences which aren't perceptions, but sometimes can be mistaken for perception. A dream of seeing a tree isn't the process of seeing a tree, but it is the experience. Same with a hallucination, visualization, memory or neural stimulation.

You could have your eyes removed and still dream of seeing a tree. But if your visual cortex were cut out, you would lose the ability to have any mental images. So that pinpoints where the experience takes place. Most likely, the other experiences similar to perception are using the same neural circuitry to generate the imagery, or sound, etc.

One interesting article I read about schizophrenia suggested that it's a result of the brain losing the ability to flag the correct sources of experience. So a person starts mistaking their random thoughts for a perception of external voices.

Here is an illustration of direct realism from the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hs-jJMTjHoo . The thing to note is that there are two depictions of the furniture. One is the external object being seen, and the other is inside the dude's head, which is the perception. This is supposed to be direct awareness.

However, the two depictions cannot be the same thing. External objects like chairs, tables and lamps don't get into the brain, on pain of death. Rather, a perception is formed as the result of seeing. So the direct realist needs to explain how that perception formed in the mind is a direct awareness of the external world, even though the perception is not and cannot be the the external object(s) being seen.

Some direct realist might be tempted to deny the perception depicted in the head and say there's just the dude seeing the furniture. But that's an impossibility given how perception works. The senses are stimulated by various things in the environment which the brain makes sense of, resulting in the experience we have of interacting with the world.

We all do this consciously or unconsciously not because we are in essence good people, but because we all want to be "seen" by others as good people. — Gus Lamarch

Is it therefore more important to be seen as good, than to actually be good? It's interesting how our stated moral systems say the opposite.

at what point in the decimal representation of the surreal does it depart from and differ from sqrt(2), keeping in mind that it cannot be the next largest real number, because that real number is infinitely far away? — tim wood

I don't know. Is there a way we can construct that?

This virus is with us long term. It will join the other coronaviruses and flus that kill a bunch of people every year. — frank

Why didn't influenza stick around? Did it kill too many people back in 1918/19?

So, we perceive whatever else by interaction, not by becoming the perceived, whereas dreams, hallucinations, etc, are parts of us when occurring. — jorndoe

That is a good approach. The crux of the matter turns on whether the experience of the other is what we're aware of, or whether that experience is the awareness of the other. The interaction happens regardless.

It's also possible that the answer is a mix of both and it just depends. For example, I hear what sounds like footsteps late at night in an old building where I thought I was alone. Turns out it was just the building settling.

So I do have a perception of the building making noises, but my experience of footsteps was inaccurate. Of course that's an auditory illusion, but it does illustrate a mixed state. I can't be directly aware of footsteps if there are none, but I am aware of perceiving a sound.

Let's say you had a neural implant which did two things:

1. It corrects refracted images so that the stick in water looked straight.

2. It occasionally receives video transmissions of objects otherwise out of sight.

Both of theses result in perceptions. Are they direct?

What if I hack the implant and refract straight light and send the wrong video? What is the nature of the resulting perceptions?

Are you sure you read the article? — jamalrob

I did. So you think the perception is the object? The neural activity produces the object? That can't be right.

Direct realism must mean it produces an awareness of the object via the perceptual experience. But in what sense is it "direct"?

You see as a result of a process leading to neural activity in your brain. Call it what you like, but that result is not the object. How could it be?

Distrust of the senses has been a perennial issue in Western philosophy it seems, but ironically we only started to make progress historically when we started taking perceptions seriously. — ChatteringMonkey

I believe ancient Indian philosophy was also aware of the issues around perception. Indian idealism has long been a focus in that tradition.

People like me. I typically buy a pack of four apples that all look similar. And the one I have on Monday, also tastes similar to the one I have on Tuesday. So I tend to think that Tuesday's apple was tasty on Monday, even though I did not taste it. This idea that apples remain apples when the fridge door is shut seems to work for the shape, the colour and the taste. — unenlightened

Only because you're thinking in terms of how the apple will look and taste for you as a human being. Being tasty is something animals with taste buds perceive. And that can vary quite a bit. It's not a property of the apple. The color is probably also a property of perception, since it's really photons of certain wavelength bouncing off molecular surfaces. And the colors seen can vary as well. Normal sighted humans have tetrachromatic vision, but there are other kinds.

And why would the narrow range of visible EM be colored? What about X-Rays and microwaves?

What is the argument though? We agree that seeing is remote sensing. A blind man uses a stick for remote sensing. He feels the curb 'through' the unfeeling stick. I feel the same curb through the unfeeling ambient light. Do you want to say that the sense of touch is indirect? When I shake your hand, I do not directly feel your hand, I only feel sensations in my hand? Well I can sort of make sense of that, but really- why bother? And sure, I don't need actual pins and needles to feel pins and needles... — unenlightened

The argument is that if perception is indirect, skepticism is more of a worry, because we have to infer the nature of external objects on the assumption that perception is indeed indirect and not something else entirely. So the status of knowledge and the nature of the world we experience are potentially at stake.

Direct realism would tend to avoid those issues. But only if we actually do have direct perception.

Dreams, illusion etc don't seem to be that detailed, vivid... or they seem to be 'lower resolution' if you will. I can try to imagine a face of someone I haven't seen or a while, but the imagination is never as accurate as the 'direct' perception. — ChatteringMonkey

I think that very much depends on the person. Some people have very detailed imaginations and some have very vivid dreams. I have rather poor visualization, but my dreams are visually richer. Some people can compose music in their heads, and some have very detailed memories.

There are two potential traps here when arguing this stuff. One is to assume everyone else has the same experience (limited visualization of the non-artist for example), and the other is to focus only on vision. Which could be misleading, since vision is very much a remote sense, unlike taste or touch.