@MwwEmphasis added. You also need to understand that he wants money in exchange of the apples. So you need to understand his (subjective) intentions and he needs to understand yours. — Olivier5

Right, consider going to a foreign market. It helps to keep in mind that the grocer may see you as a naive tourist, and jack the price of the apples up. Or as an angry ex, they might lace the apples with cyanide. Just saying.

@Banno

Parmenides? We might just fit the whole of philosophy in this thread!

It's a conventional way of speaking. We also speak of a person who acts independently as having a mind of their own. But before assuming dualism, we should first investigate the contexts that give rise to those usages. — Andrew M

What about the hardware and software dichtomy in computers? Do you forgo that dualism in favor of just the hardware?

No brains for you, zombie Nazi!

Still, the models exist. — Book273

Sure, thousands of years after humans have been seeing color and feeling pain, a few ambitious behaviorists created some models to Quine the woo away.

Point being that it matters what’s going on the serial killers head, if you care about not being the next victim.

o. What goes on between the ears is irrelevant. That's rather the point pushed by PI, that it's what happens that counts, not what goes on in heads. "Can I have two apples, please" is understood if I get the two apples. What happens in the head of the grocer is irrelevant. — Banno

Unless the grocer is a serial killer who’s triggered when he’s asked for two apples. Then it kind of matters what’s going on between his ears.

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first.

You can't argue with a zombie.

Active inference presents not only a cogent alternative, but one which is better at making predictions than the Cartesian theatre version. — Isaac

Inference doesn't make colors or pains go away anymore than it does hands. Except for zombies.

Moore's argument was that the skeptic could not provide more reason to doubt than he had to not. That is evidendtly not the case for qualia as both knowledge of physiology and confusion over intuitions gives ample reason to doubt. — Isaac

Moore's waving his hand about is no different than us pointing out colors and pains. They're both just as much a part of experience.

"With eyes designed to shiver a color model according to a tiny faction of variation in their EM wavelength!"

Thread title changed again. Next version ought to read:

Not shivering Zombie Dennett's "Quining Color"

I’d count that as obvious and wonder why we would bother. — Banno

Wouldn't have taken you for a modal realist, but if we're going to defeat Trump so you can a very nice warm qualia inside, we best put all our cards on the table.

I don't want to be human! I want to see gamma rays. I want to hear X-Rays, and I want to smell dark matter. Do you see the absurdity of what I am? I can't even express these things properly because I have to conceptualize complex ideas in this stupd, limiting, spoken language. But I know I want to reach out with something other than these prehensile paws and feel a solar wind of a supernova FLOWING OVER over me. I'm a machine and I can know so much more, could experience so much more, but I'm trapped iin this absurd body ... — Brother Cavil, Battlestar Galactiica

Or like when Q on Star Trek Next Generation takes human form to annoy Picard.

Sarcasm doesn't translate well into written word alone. — creativesoul

1:45 the start of the good part where he complains about being designed to perceive like a limited human being.

So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition — Banno

What id I add, “In some possible universe, the present king of France is bald.”?

It was so much better back in the day. We walked indirectly to school and ideally home afterwords.

Because that's how it is! — creativesoul

Nonsense. Unless you can taste wavefunctions and see X-Rays.

I bet you can't even do sonar!

Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are. — Mww

Anyone who does that is truly naive, both philosophically and scientifically. One might be a direct realist, but it does take more work than just "things are exactly as they look". Or at least I hope they bother to do the work.

Because if not, their lack of philosophical rigor will be called out. Lazy bastards!

The thread has been revived, like a p-zombie at a picnic!

Nagel post you responded to.

I thought Davidson argued against incommensurability?

I updated to include McGinn's cognitive closue and a Wity reference.

I agree with Nagel the most. But McGinn's cognitive closure is a possibility.

That of which we cannot speak ...?

See directly above. Except I don't defend some form of panpyschism, because I don't know what consciousness is, other than it being strongly correlated with brain activity. It just seems like a hard problem.

Maybe I'm a little too close to the fence.

As I've repeatedly argued, regardless of whether one wishes to defend the concept of qualia, it's the colors, sounds, feels, etc. that do not fit easily with the mathematizeable explanations of science.

Or as Chalmers puts it, the structure and function does not account for the sensations of experience without positing some extra natural law, like integrated information theory.

We're not getting our gold stars, being on the wrong team in this thread.

@Banno

I guess this is because representation mechanisms can sit pretty uneasy with direct realism? — fdrake

Isaac is an indirect realist.

So in the context of consciousness, since we already know we're conscious, we can ask whether our physical explanations account for consciousness.

What about Hume's critique of causation? What about Kant's categories of thoughts? Or Berkeley's ideas? The empirical world has a consistent structure, whatever that means.

While I agree that a physical reality is the most compelling explanation for the empirical, it's not the only coherent one. And I don't agree that it's necessarily complete. As in, there could be more to the world than what physics, chemistry or biology posits, since those are explanations we come up with, not some God's eye view.

Wait, aren't you advocating for physicalism? How is that not a metaphysical position?

Distaste. — frank

The qualia Banno mixes into his morning coffee.

The Trump thread is the real goal.

What does that feel like? Do you experience an ineffable annoyance?

Fading qualia.

The problem is if we start off in the simulation/dream/vat, then we don't have the real world to compare glitching to.

But I agree, we can't be certain. I'd say the skeptical scenarios are unlikely.

All the world's a cartesian theatre?

It took a rumor to make me wonder
Now I'm convinced I'm going inner
How about red, pain, anger, looooOOOVE?