Yes. Notice that the process need not result in conscious awareness if we’re paying attention to something else. Such as daydreaming while driving on the highway.

Reflective surfaces, photons, eyes, nerves, brain for vision.

The process does. Notice that a description of the process does not include the experience. It ends at neurons firing.

Hence, the meaning of "red" cannot be the experience it points to. — Banno

But it can be the thing that produces an experience in us. Which would be the visual perception of an apple.

There is no part of your brain which shows you a colour, it cannot happen, brains are made up of neurons, not colours — Isaac

Where oh where does the color come from?

Why the third, that in addition to there being an apple and there being it's taste, there is also 'the way' it tastes? — Isaac

The taste is the way it tastes. It’s a conscious sensation. Stating what it’s like is just to point that out.

It’s like when you’re listening to a boring lecture, and you start thinking of other things. Your conscious experience of the talk goes in and out. Maybe you hear every other sentence.

An apple tastes precisely and exactly just like an apple... to all apple eaters. That's how... — creativesoul

Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same objects appear different. The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after an extended period of cold winter weather (it feels warm) than after mild weather in the autumn (it feels cold). Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. A person with influenza will feel cold and shiver even though she is hot with a fever. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhonism#The_ten_modes_of_Aenesidemus

The apple isn't always going to taste the same to everyone. It won't always taste the same to you, depending on your "circumstances, conditions or dispositions".

ou know, it's like the taste of beer; there's no experience of the taste of beer since the taste of beer is the experience, and to say that there is an experience of the taste of beer is like saying there is an experience of the experience. So how much less is there a quality of the experience of the taste of beer? — Janus

No, it's just noting that there is a conscious experience to tasting beer, and this taste is not in the beer itself, but rather the taster.

What does "qualia" pick out to the exclusion of all else? — creativesoul

Conscious experience.

But you're Australian??? You don't know what Thanksgiving turkey is like!

Would that be a direct sort of pain in your behind?

Not in America.

Either you can explain what you're referring to when you use "conscious sensations" or you cannot. — creativesoul

The colors you see, the pains you feel. I thought that was clear.

What conscious sensations? — creativesoul

The one's you're aware of.

The answer poses a puzzle.

You don't shiver conscious sensations?

Colors and sounds are empty notions?

Would you consider this a form of emergentism?

I prefer my woo to be shivered in a more supervenient fashion than the microphysical.

Yes, but could B&W Mary know what yellow looks like before seeing it?

(I simply can't resist) Could she shiver the yellow empirically in her room?

Woo tech putting the sound quivers into her brain.

I don't know how to evaluate that. Why do you think it's the superposition of all the cells that results in consciousness? I think Jaron Lanier did suggest something along those lines.

It would be wicked cool if we could tie quantum weirdness to consciousness, but color me a little skeptical.

Quantum Brain Shivers

Colors ain't coming from out there. Some brain shivering is going on.

Shivers in my mind
I am searching for your qualia
Everything shivers
In gray matter

@Andrew M@Banno@creativesoul@Janus

What is it like to have synesthesia? Some people will see number symbols and letters shaded or tinged with color. The shadings are not the same across individuals, although there are some commonalities. For some reason, "A" is often seen as red. There's lots of other interesting types of synesthesia.

The reason for bringing this up is because those people will experience some things differently than the rest of us. Seeing black "A" as red tinged or shaded is surprising, because a black symbol is not reflecting red light. So where does the red come from?

A term that explains why from your vantage point it appears that my brain is shivering and from my vantage point it appears that the world is shivering colors and shapes and sounds, etc. — Harry Hindu

I propose "shivering qualia". This is a harder problem, because one cannot just quine the shivering away. Actually, I kind of like the term "shivering" now.

I believe the qualia-phobes think our brains are not shivering hard enough when it comes to consciousness, thus our belief in color woo. We can tell that Dennett's brain shivers particularly hard, because of his zombie views.

This is nothing more than the usual -of-the-gaps argument: If science were capable of explaining consciousness, it would have already (impossibility of future scientific discovery); Science has not already explained consciousness; Therefore science cannot explain consciousness (and therefore consciousness is magic). — Kenosha Kid

It's not a god-of-the-gaps argument if the difficulty is conceptual. It's more of either something is wrong with physicalism or something is wrong with consciousness. The reason for this could be epistemological, or it could be ontological.

How do the colors, sounds, feels, etc come from the color-less, soundless, feel-less matter? We know about the matter because we experience it with colors, sounds, feels, etc. but our scientific understanding is a necessary abstraction from the particulars of our human experience. So either our abstract understanding is leaving something out, or our particular experiences is not what we think it is. Or there is some way to derive the particulars from the abstract.

Or one can go off in a different metaphysical direction and avoid the hard problem in favor of other difficulties. Philosophy demands some bullet-biting sacrifice from all of us.

Quining illusory brain shivers, and how hard brain shivers give us direct access to darkness.

Chalmers goes into detail about this, but life can be explained fully in terms of structure and function, but consciousness is different, because our sensations are not the properties of structure and function. It's like saying that color just emerges from neuronal activity. Okay, but how and what does that mean? Is it spooky emergence?

I don't think it's that simple. I have yet to see a satisfying explanation for the conscious sensations of color, sound, etc. Sure, one can change the philosophical assumptions which lead to the hard problem. Like by rejecting physicalism, embracing Kantianism, panpsychism, Wittgenstein or whatever. But those all have their own issues.

I do think many other animals have conscious experiences. I don't know whether our talk and introspection is what makes it seem like a hard problem. It's one possibility to explore. I'm a bit unclear as to the implications.

Oh you're right, I did copy the wrong link. I had both open.

Instead, it seems to me that we experience the world, which includes sunsets and red apples and human beings. And those are the things that we seek to explain. — Andrew M

Sunsets and red apples are experienced a particular way because we're human. The physiology doesn't account for why we experience it in terms of colors and other sensations.

Isn't this an explanation that could equally be applied to any possible outcome? That is, it merely restates that since all properties of the mind are evolved, qualia must also be evolved. But it doesn't provide any account of how this works. — Echarmion

Yeah, presumably the task is left up to neuroscience.

The usage of the word illusion in this context strikes me as strange. What is it an illusion of? If the experience is "real" but doesn't involve any qualia, then the qualia are not an illusion. They're a representation. But that just brings us back to the view Frankish rejects. — Echarmion

I think he said in this podcast that perception is representational, but introspection of perception is where it seems like the representation has special properties of qualia. And that's the illusion. But it's a useful one.

This sounds like a metacognition approach.

This also seems consistent with what Dennett says: it's not that qualia -- which are familiar, everyday phenomena -- do not exist, but that they are not what we think about them. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, except they wouldn't have the properties for us to use the word qualia. We're conscious, just not in the way it seems, I guess. That does raise the question of what it means to be conscious.

Wouldn't that be a form of panpsychism?

Quining the Qualia Proponents in This Thread.

Edit - better yet:

Quining the Qualia Lovers and their Bastard Zombies