I said the other way around. Rights are analyzable in terms of duties. — Pfhorrest

Indeed, because right and duty are terms that describe a reciprocal relationship. What Ciceronianus is pretending is like saying there is a father without children.

ou're free (have a right?) to define "moral virtue" (as opposed to "immoral virtue" or "piano-playing virtue" etc., I assume) as you see fit if it pleases you, — Ciceronianus the White

It's not a question of whether I like it or not. It's that there is a real difference between virtues that affect oneself and virtues that affect my duties to other people. It is the difference between something that is non-moral (not "immoral", as you write) and something that is. If the term "moral" also seems arbitrary to you, everything is.

As I said, one is obligated (has a duty) to live a particular way--i.e. virtuously--to live according to nature. That doesn't mean someone else has a right to one's virtuous conduct. — Ciceronianus the White

That's very good when we're talking about virtues that aren't moral. One can be a piano virtuoso without be dependent of others. Or one can have the virtue of self-control as an obligation to himself. But when virtue, as is the case with justice, is a function of what should be given to one's neighbor, the duty to be just is no more than to give each one what is rightfully his. And that is the moral virtue.

Aristotle is not my favorite (I prefer the Stoics, — Ciceronianus the White

Then you should read well Marcus Aurelius: Meditations, VIII, 5: duties and nature.

Then, with your eyes fixed on your task, investigate it well and bearing in mind that your duty is to be a good man, and what man's nature demands, fulfill it without deviation and in the way that seems most just to you — Marcus Aurelius

I think you got a bad read on Ryand. It happens.

So if Eratosthenes or Aristarchus weren't scientists or weren't "doing" science, and weren't performing experiments in the right way or the making the "right" observations, etc., because of some notion of "mathematicization" or whatever you like, then so be it. All that proves to me is that the notion of "science" has become completely useless -- even restricted to the "natural sciences." — Xtrix

You can apply the concept of science to whatever you want. You can apply it to the ritual dance of the geese in heat, if you like. As you expand it it will become more and more vague until it becomes meaningless. If you want you can put philosophy, science, alchemy, parapsychology and Donald Trump's twitters in the same bag. But that only serves to create confusion. What we are discussing is the difference between science (in the strict sense of what is done today as such) and philosophy (to the extent that this concept can be clarified) and for that, Trump's sermons have little to do with it.

For example, Putnam repeatedly speaks of philosophy and science as two different things. What is the basis for this difference? That's what's interesting.
And if you don't know exactly what Putnam is saying, why do you quote him?

The description of the hypothetical-deductive method may need many nuances. In fact, it does. Nobody thinks that Stuart Mill's methods of inductive logic are applicable to the letter (although Putnam seems to think so). But they are useful concepts to understand something that is an obviousness repeatedly forgotten by relativist philosophers in the middle of their mental entanglements: there is a clear difference between the activity of a philosopher and a scientist and that difference refers to the contrast of their statements by experience.

The rest is mandangas.

If you do not want to get into the mess of the undifferentiated and call what the Greeks did science, you will have to distinguish ancient science from modern science. Okay, make the distinction yourself.

You haven't read any of them, I see. Chomsky is not talking about linguistics and the social sciences, for example. When he talks of science, he's going back to Galileo and discusses mainly the development of physics. — Xtrix

I've read about Chomsky in both linguistics and politics. If you go to this bibliography and to Chomsky's official website at MIT, you will see how these are the subjects of his work. I don't know that he has written an article on science and Galileo - a book, of course not - but if you have that reference I would like to know about it. And a word of advice: you should be careful about your risky claims about what your opponent has or has not read. The shot may hit you in your own foot.

Lots of things are speculative, until confirmed. Many hypotheses are speculative. — Xtrix

Basic confusion: hypothesis can be speculation, but what differentiates it from metaphysical speculation is that it can be proven through experience.

Saying "mathematization" repeatedly is likewise vague and devoid of context. — Xtrix

Don't you know what it's like to write a formula mathematically? Gee, you're really lost.

— Xtrix

Al-Baghdadi — Xtrix

What Muhadhdhab Al-Deen Al-Baghdadi was doing was not experimentation, but observation. The experiment is something else, as you can see here:

Experiments involve actively intervening in the course of nature, as opposed to observing events that would have happened anyway. When a molecular biologist inserts viral DNA into a bacterium in his laboratory, this is an experiment; but when an astronomer points his telescope at the heavens, this is an observation. Without the biologist’s handiwork the bacterium would never have contained foreign DNA; but the planets would have continued orbiting the sun whether or not the astronomer had directed his telescope skyward. The observational/experimental distinction would probably be difficult to make precise 1, as the notion of an ‘intervention’ is not easily defined, but it is intuitively fairly clear, and is frequently invoked by scientists and historians of science. Experimentation, or ‘putting questions to nature’, is often cited as a hallmark of the modern scientific method, something that permitted the enormous advances of the last 350 years. And it is sometimes said that the social sciences lag behind the natural because controlled experiments cannot be done so readily in the former. — Samir Okasha: Experiment, Observation and the Confirmation of Laws

I am not giving you more details of the article because it is one of hundreds you can find on this subject in an academic search engine. Incidentally, this belies Hilary Putnam's cavalier claim that the description of the scientific method in terms of "inductive logic" is outdated.
Your quote from Putnam is nothing more than a series of opinions poured out on a television show, which is not very interesting unless they are more reasoned. He is attacking a vision of the scientific method that did not defend even his worst enemy: Willard Van Orman Quine. It is absurd to pretend that all scientists "consciously" apply the scientific method. No one defends such a thing. That's why Putnam is attacking windmills. If you can't offer something else, I'm afraid there's little to discuss here.

I'm not sure what "include" means here. I'm not saying the questions and problems of physics is "philosophical" work. As I said, they're different, but they're connected. Natural philosophy, which we now call the various branches of science, always presupposes something about the world. — Xtrix

I suppose you must know what it means that "natural philosophy" includes the sciences. If you don't know it, the idea is "a little" confusing in your head.

I'm glad you've retracted your statement that Leibniz was a 'metaphysicist.' — Xtrix

I am sorry to displease you, but I did not say that Leibniz was not a metaphysicist, but that his metaphysics are intermingled with concepts of the new science. But the concept of the monad, which you vaguely relate to that of the atom, is central in Leibniz and one hundred percent metaphysical. And the difference between the atom, an entity that can be confirmed with scientific experience, and that of the monad, which is totally speculative, is abysmal. To begin with you are a monad, according to Leibniz, and you will not tell me that you are also an atom. I don't see you as an atom, really.

It has been maintained that 'being' is the 'most universal' concept[...]that it is indefinable, [...] and that it is held to be self-evident." — Xtrix

Don't quote Heidegger to me, please. After fighting hard with his unpalatable Being and Time I learned that he himself acknowledged that he didn't know what Being was. For gurus, the ones from India.

still a rather controversial topic in the philosophy of — Xtrix

Why? You say you don't like it, that scientists don't say that, that there's a lot of criticism, that it's a myth... but you never explain what you mean specifically. It all comes down to vague quotes and vague disqualifications.

There were plenty of experiments before the 16th century, l — Xtrix

Finally something concrete! Now all that remains is for you to tell us about some of those experiments you are referring to. Because when you spoke of the Aristarchus experiments you were mistaken about the author and the concept: it was not an experiment. I'm really interested in knowing the medieval experiments you're talking about. I'm not joking.

While waiting for you to concretize your criticisms I will advance you that they have a flaw in principle: if you recognize that science and philosophy are not the same, it will be because they have different methods. Why else?

I would appreciate it if you would repeat the reference where Putnam says that science does not follow inductive methods. I can't find it.

what makes science what it is is not a special inductive method — Xtrix

First of all: I prevented some comments ago that I was speaking of natural sciences. If you want speak of human sciences some clarifications should be added.
If you want to deny that sciences are inductive and methodical you are alone. Chomsky is speaking of linguistic and social sciences, Kuhn speaks only of periods of scientific revolutions and Feyerabend is a rara avis without many influence in philosophy of science. He is more popular in internet and pseudosciences, sure.

But even in human sciences progress in the last years is fostered by the application of inductive methods and mathematizacion. For example, dating methods taken from natural sciences in archeology.

But you shoudl understand that when I was speaking of hypothetico-deductive method I was speaking of natural sciences.

You beg the question by insisting I address a situation involving a right. I don't address circumstances where someone has a right to what I have because I don't think such a right, or any right, exists unless it's a legal right. Remember? — Ciceronianus the White

I remember very well, but you have failed in two essential points of your explanation: you have not been able to explain how the obligation of someone to do or not to do x to Y does not imply a right of Y, and how one can be virtuous without this implying a duty to do or not to do.

Your error lies in the fact that you have led the defence of virtue to absurdity.Virtue theories do not deny the existence of moral duties and rights. Just as the theories of duty do not deny the existence of virtue. Kant, the model of the theory of duty, defended the need to be virtuous, and Aristotle, the model of the theory of virtue, understood it as the fulfillment of duties. It cannot be otherwise.By pretending that there are no moral rights, you have brought the theory of virtue to a dead end.

Philosophy is always involved in science; this doesn't mean they're the same.

It's worth remembering that both activities come from the human mind. They both attempt to question and understand the world consciously. Both are very careful, try to be precise, etc. — Xtrix

Again, the sciences being different of as branches of ontology (philosophy) — Xtrix

Philosophy does not includes the natural sciences. You have invented a meta-scientific knowledge that does not exist. Moreover, you give it a totally inappropriate name of scholastic origin: ontology. Ontology was the science of being qua being. Totally speculative. It was substituted little by little by natural sciences -mathematics is another thing-, which do not speak of the being as being but of concrete aspects of reality. There is no such thing as a science of Totality. Ontology is a vestige of the past or a non-scientific way of talking about what the sciences have in common. Philosophically, there is no way to contribute a single idea to physics, biology, etc. And if there is one I would like you to give an example.Because vagueness like "science and philosophy" are "careful" doesn't say anything. And to say that philosophy is "precise" requires saying in what way. My mother is also serious and precise in making chocolate cake and we're not going to say she's a philosopher or a scientist. Words are meant to clarify similarities and differences, not to make indiscernible molasses.

There's little evidence for monads in Leibniz' s formulation, if that's what you mean. Of course it's easy to make fun of minds far greater than your own after centuries of new knowledge, but the proposal wasn't unreasonable at the time. Not a huge leap from monads to atoms if you think about it. — Xtrix

"Leibniz was a metaphysicist" - sure. And also a mathematician, logician, inventor, natural scientist, and even to some a computer science pioneer. — Xtrix

Was it not the "same" science as Galileo's thought experiments of frictionless planes? — Xtrix

experiments were performed long before the Renaissance. — Xtrix

Leibniz was halfway between metaphysics and modern science. Mathematics is something else and we'll leave it at that. As long as he used data from Newtonian science he did not err, but when he tried to superimpose his peculiar philosophical preconceptions on them he gave rise to speculative theories without any value. Like the vortex theory. We must not laugh at him for this, but lament that such a precise mind could go astray by confusing science and metaphysics. For a time his mistake was quite common. Today things are clearer, and I do not believe there is any serious philosopher who would set out to discover monads and vortices. Today's philosophers usually know where the limits of philosophy lie better than you do.

Before the New Science, the scientific method of experimentation was not used. You confuse observation with experimentation. Since ancient times observation was a method used in the natural sciences. There is some isolated cases of experimentation in history. For example, the Pythagoreans experimented on sounds and the length of strings. But they did not create a method that applied to all fields of natural knowledge. That's why it's not the same as the hypothetical deductive method that Galileo devised and Newton perfected. Of course they didn't call it that.

It is of little consequence whether or not Galileo carried out all the experiments he devised. What was important was the idea of the method that was used by his successors to carry out the experiments he had devised and new ones. Like Gassendi or Torricelli. Naturally the idea didn't come out of nowhere. Galileo admired Gilbert's experiments, for example.

But Bacon is a mere precursor. His methods of observation can be seen as an antecedent to Galileo, but if he doesn't cite them it's because they were something else different from what he was doing and proposing. Observation is limited to recording the data that nature offers, drawing consequences that are taken by inductive generalization. The hypothetical-deductive method is a framework in which mathematization, the formulation of hypotheses (in principle they were causal), the manipulation of circumstances and variables that concur and the confirmation by means of the repetition of the experiments are combined. "Hypothesis non fingo", Newton proudly said to differentiate himself from the Aristotelian and Cartesian scholastics. You won't find anything like that in Aristotle or Bacon, who nevertheless gave a more or less great role to experience. Nor will you find it in the Babylonians, who used mathematics and experience as a mere record, without transcending the formulation of legal hypotheses to be confirmed by experiments. The Greeks, especially from the Hellenistic period, are an advance on them. This explains Eratosthenes' success in calculating the circumference of the Earth (you were wrong: it wasn't Aristarchus). But they limited themselves to the mathematical formulation of the problems and their application to observation. They did not move on to the method of confirming legal hypotheses, which is that of the New Science.
And that it differs drastically from the philosophy of then and now.

Two previous data:

Where does he say experience is "based on" memory? — Xtrix

Aristotle, Metaphysics A1. 980aff. : "It is from memory that men acquire experience",

"You don't have a sense of a door" but "perceive the door" -- I won't try figuring out your semantics here. — Xtrix

Sensation and perception are two separate processes that are very closely related. Sensation is input about the physical world obtained by our sensory receptors, and perception is the process by which the brain selects, organizes, and interprets these sensations. In other words, senses are the physiological basis of perception. Perception of the same senses may vary from one person to another because each person’s brain interprets stimuli differently based on that individual’s learning, memory, emotions, and expectations. — LUMEN. Introduction to Psychology

As you can see, the distinction between sensation and perception is a major point in any psychology manual. I'll spare you the long list of academic articles you can find on this distinction. You can see a list here: https://philpapers.org/browse/construction-and-inference-in-perception . This list refers only to the processes of inference within perception. Some authors speak of "unconscious inference". I have called it implicit. Others call it "non-reflective" to distinguish it from the processes in which inference becomes conscious and discursive.
The list for articles dealing with the differences between sensation (also sometimes called sense data) and perception is much longer.
From all this we can conclude that the phenomena of categorization (socially or individually produced) are an essential part of the world of experience. If this is so, a radical distinction cannot be made between the lived world and the rational-abstract world. Both form part of a complex and inseparable world. And if I understand you correctly, this is what you denied at the beginning of our discussion.

If you agree with this point, either we have reached an agreement or we have had a misunderstanding.

Aristotle talks about φθσισ. You have to remember that "metaphysics" is a later designation, — Xtrix

It is well known that Aristotle did not coin the term "metaphysics". It is also well known that it was a good invention because the book to which this name was given contains what corresponds to the superior form of knowledge of the five that he established (episteme theoretiké). And it is this name -"metaphysics"- that corresponds to what Wittgenstein strongly criticizes. Including the term "essence," which is the core of Aristotelian metaphysics, whatever you want to call it. Don't mind names but concepts, please.

By the way, Aristotle is the first to point out that experience is based on memory. You see, even your idols take away your reason.

No, he doesn't. Aristotle talks about φθσισ. You have to remember that "metaphysics" is a later designation — Xtrix

Remembering and memory, at least in psychology (and as they're commonly understood), play no role opening a door any more than they have a role in breathing. — Xtrix

Have you really read the book? Because it undermines everything you've said so far about consciousness and "implicit" abstraction. — Xtrix

I think you've lost sight of what we were discussing. We were discussing whether it's possible to capture the singular without prior abstractions. What I'm telling you is that our perception of the world is determined by our previous preconceptions. You keep referring to reflective consciousness when I am talking about a process of categorization that is prior to the formation of a simple perception. But implicitly. You don't have a sense of a door, but you perceive a door in a complex of sensations and preconceptions that implicit memory provides. Please note "implicit" and don't turn to me for reflection. This shows that when you are looking for something, the unthinking preconception you have of it can make you not see it even if it is right in front of your eyes.

If this is so in reference to a simple act of perception, it is even more so when we refer to an abstract concept of "lived world". The world we live in is not naively given, but is mediated by our conceptualisation and assessment of it. That is, by the world in our own way a priori, with Kant's permission.

I read a couple of books by Merleau-Ponty some time ago and, if I remember correctly, they agreed with what I am saying. Especially in his criticism of behaviourism based on Gestalt. But if not, I'd like you to refresh my memory.

Again, I always like to ask about Aristarchus. — Xtrix

Even more recently, take a look at Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck, et al. Were they "only" doing science? Not at all: they actively engaged in philosophical thought and were explicit in who their influences were. That's in part what made them so trailblazing, I'd argue.

And yes, of course "philosophy" has created the technological world in which we live. — Xtrix

Yet no one can explain what the "scientific method" is, including you. — Xtrix

That at certain levels of science there is an interaction between science and philosophy does not mean that they are the same. The fact that there were scientists who were philosophers (especially in the past) does not mean that they acted as philosophers doing science or vice versa, but that they were activities that were closely related at the time and in certain fields. Leibniz was a metaphysicist, and you won't tell me that monads are a scientific concept. (Actually, I'm afraid you're going to say that).

That technology has nothing to do with philosophy is demonstrated by the fact that those who work in it do not employ a single concept of philosophy. In fact, the vast majority of scientists today have no idea about philosophy.

Aristarchus may be considered a scientist, but not in the same way as Galileo. The proof is that his heliocentric theory did not go beyond being a hypothesis until the New Science appeared in the Renaissance. (You could have chosen a better example). It is the difference between ancient science and modern science.

That New Science can be clearly defined as different from the previous one because it is based on two new concepts: controlled experimentation and mathematization of variables. I don't know why you say you can't characterize the current scientific method if I'm doing it right now. (I have done this several times before.) Can you focus on my proposal?

I think anguish is caused by reading Sartre — Ciceronianus the White

Headache, more like. But this is another matter.

I allow someone to share food I'm eating. Or, someone takes some of the food I'm eating, and I don't prevent him/her from taking it. He/she isn't entitled to my food, has no right to it, in either case. — Ciceronianus the White

Indeed, because you have changed the instance from a question of right to a graceful donation. There are no recipient rights in a donation. That is not my point. My case is when the recipient has some right to something you have. Which is the same as saying that you have an obligation to do or should do something. You should give up this meal is a different case from you want to give up. The link between duty and right as two sides of the same act is what you can't explain with your theory of virtue.

But no, if you're now asking me to explain why being virtuous is good and not being virtuous is bad, I decline to do so. — Ciceronianus the White

No wonder you're declining. Because you can't do it. If you stick to a concept of virtue without specifying you can do all the verbal filigrees you want. If you are forced to explain what virtue is, you find yourself with the unavoidable chain of virtue-well-duties and rights.

Hedonism is not egotism. — Pfhorrest

And how do you justify this empirically?

Knowledge of the cause of anguish? Knowledge of what anguish really is? — Ciceronianus the White

Both.

It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all; — Xtrix

Of course you remember when you open a door. It is your memories that allow you to recognize what is in front of you as a door and not a wall. In an implicit way, of course. If you hadn't had previous training you couldn't drive in an unreflective way. What I'm trying to explain to you is that there is a form of non-reflective "consciousness" that conceptualizes sensations to turn them into perceptions. Therefore, knowledge of the individual is not something merely individual. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty has a lot to say for me when she discusses the merely automatic character of conditioned reflexes. In the Phenomenology of Perception, to be exact.

the only non-arbitrary way we can judge them is by how good or bad they make people feel — Pfhorrest

By that standard, killing a child is good if it makes the killer feel good. Experimentally proven.

Metaphysics isn't the heart of Aristotle's philosophy. — Xtrix

Aristotle places metaphysics at the top of his classification of forms of knowledge. See if it was important to him: the science of sciences.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein considers metaphysical propositions as true nonsense -Unsinn. In aphorism 6.53, for example, he maintains that to try to "say something of a metaphysical character" is to condemn oneself fatally to not being able "to give, in our propositions, a meaning to certain signs". Wittgenstein mentions the concept of essence as the typical metaphysical concept. You are not going to tell me that the concept of essence is not important in Aristotle!

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"? — Xtrix

In the renaissance. It was clear at the time that a Nuova Scienza was emerging. It basically consisted of two innovations: controlled experimentation and mathematization. Today's science is heir to that scientific revolution.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view. — Xtrix

There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation. — Xtrix

Do you think a philosopher can teach atomic physics only through philosophy? Do you think philosophy is what has created the technified world in which we live? Just to cite two obvious differences.

If you live in a world where science and philosophy are the same, you are a bit old-fashioned. You are a few centuries out of date.

I understand that someone may express doubts that the scientific method can be defined rigidly (nobody pretends such a thing today) but to pretend that the method of philosophy and science are the same is an absurdity.

Now there are moral rights as well as natural rights and legal rights? — Ciceronianus the White

No. There are moral rights and legal rights. Whether moral rights are natural or not is another question.

Well, I think I did, in a reply to him a portion of which you quote.
I mention once more virtue ethics. — Ciceronianus the White

This is not an explanation of the question. The question began with "What is the difference between...?" You haven't explained any difference between being allowed and being entitled.

Speaking of virtue you explain nothing because you do not explain why being virtuous implies that a man is allowed to die when his life is unbearable. Virtue is a disposition to do good, but before you know whether a man is virtuous you have to specify what good is. You cannot be virtuous by raping children. Virtue is not opposed to moral rights. In any case, it complements them. Since you establish that something is good you establish a duty to do. And since you establish a duty you establish a subject of rights. You should not kill is to say the same as others have the right not to be killed by you. Duty and right are two inseparable sides of the same coin.

And this is the only way to explain why you should allow someone to die a dignified death. Because he has the right to it.

You must think that our world is full of natural rights or legal rights, — Ciceronianus the White

I did not mention natural rights, but moral rights. Therefore, the rest of your comment does not relate to my proposal.
Furthermore, the examples you give referred to legal rights, which exist as soon as a law stipulates them. Not to moral rights that are of another order.

I don't have to accept that we all have a right to live to say that we should not kill one another. — Ciceronianus the White

If you say there's a "thou shalt not kill" rule, it's because there's a right to live. What else is it based on?

There can be moral duties without entitlements. — Ciceronianus the White

If there is a duty not to do something to someone it is because there is a right of someone not to suffer from something. Duty and right are two sides of the same coin. You can't claim for one without recognizing the other.

Marchesk asked you a question that you have not answered: what is the difference between X can do Y and X has the right to do Y? You have not explained the difference yet.

What Jolly Jean-Paul (sorry, I enjoy giving philosophers nicknames) felt — Ciceronianus the White

I did not propose the feeling of anguish as knowledge, but Sartre's theory on the feeling of anguish. They are two very different things.

What makes your opinions about the scope and definition of philosophy any more philosophically valid than mine? — VagabondSpectre

I think my philosophical opinions are better than yours because I raise objections and questions that you do not answer, while you ask me questions that I answer.
This is a criterion for judging two competing philosophies. We can raise more, if you like.

Why is it that your standard of evidence requires me to fetch ten bona fide philosophies or philosophers, while it allows you to just quote yourself ten times? — VagabondSpectre

I didn't ask you to look for ten bona fide philosophers. I asked you to look for ten cases of philosophers pontificating. It's not difficult. Above I have presented an instance to the contrary.

Ay caramba, I repeat myself because you repeat the same question like if I have not answered previously.

It's a way of differentiating two things that are different. — David Mo

For example:

Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty. And this applies to dreams and hallucinations as well as to normal perceptions: when we dream or see a ghost, we certainly do have the sensations we think we have, but for various reasons it is held that no physical object corresponds to these sensations. Thus the certainty of our knowledge of our own experiences does not have to be limited in any way to allow for exceptional cases. Here, therefore, we have, for what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of knowledge. — Text 1

The Only-begotten Son of God ever paid to His Most Holy Mother indubitable marks of honour. During His private life on earth He associated her with Himself in each of His first two miracles: the miracle of grace, when, at the salutation of Mary, the infant leaped in the womb of Elizabeth; the miracle of nature, when He turned water into wine at the marriage - feast of Cana. And, at the supreme moment of His public life, when sealing the New Testament in His precious Blood, He committed her to his beloved Apostle in those sweet words, "Behold, thy Mother!" (John xix., 27). — Text 2

You choose which is the philosophical one. It's not difficult.

What is philosophy? — VagabondSpectre

Philosophy is what philosophers do in academia. It is not that a philosopher cannot be self-taught, but if we want to avoid philosophy being an empty field, we must limit it. Knowing what philosophers do in the academic field is a first criterion to separate cheap mysticism, pseudoscience and youtubers from serious philosophy.
Philosophy is about the human being. Although it sometimes seems to treat the universe, it always does so from the perspective or background of the human being.
Philosophy is not based on authority but on the exercise of personal reason.
Philosophy is revolutionary. It does not stop at the commonplace or the impositions of authority. It questions everything.
Philosophy is formed in debate. Bearing in mind that there are no universal philosophical truths, philosophical knowledge can only arise from free debate between various options. Let a hundred flowers open.
Philosophy is clarity. Philosophical discourse is pronounced to clarify the problem in some way, not to make it darker.
Philosophy is rationality. Even when it defends the irrational, it must do so with arguments that can be shared.
Philosophy does not rival science as a form of knowledge of facts.
Philosophy asks. Philosophy does not stop at any question. Nor does it always guarantee solutions. But it helps to ask the right questions.
Philosophy is inevitable. Since it is faced with radical problems that affect the human at their root, philosophy cannot be avoided. It is like freedom: one cannot stop being free even if one wants to.

You're welcome.

What is philosophy? — VagabondSpectre

See here, please:

These are my criteria for distinguishing philosophy from what is not. — David Mo

Do you not consider them philosophies because they don't reason what they say?

If so, then that's circular reasoning — VagabondSpectre

Yes.
No.
It's a way of differentiating two things that are different. If you want to call the pope a philosopher, you have to differentiate him from those who do not speak from the pulpit. I think the difference is strong enough to justify the usual differentiation between philosophy and religion. If you want to call them by another name, that is your right, but do not use terms that lead to the confusion of what is different.

If something is bad, it’s bad because it hurts someone. — Pfhorrest

You've skipped the hedonism here. Hedonism claims that something is good when it produces pleasure. If I find pleasure in hurting, hurting is good.

And that this is analogous to how empirical experiences are the only public criteria by which we can judge things real or not, — Pfhorrest

I didn’t claim that hedonism was a scientific truth, but that it’s the moral analogue of empiricism, which underlies the physical sciences. — Pfhorrest

Of course, because you're not treating hedonism from an ethical point of view, but from the point of view of psychology: People look for what gives them pleasure and they say it's good.
Now the problems are not ethical, they are of a different nature. Is it true that everybody looks for what produces pleasure? What do we do with those who look for suffering? What do we do with those who choose a pleasure knowing that it will produce more pain in the long run? Are they not human beings?

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have. — Xtrix

Every experience is concrete. There is no such thing as the experience of the universal. Your mistake consists in believing that the universal categories do not intervene in experience. You do not see a thing; the thing is constructed by your mind with impressions and ideas. That your mind does it automatically does not mean that it does not do it. Look for the difference between sensation and perception in contemporary psychology. It will confirm what I am saying.

We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them. — Xtrix

If you didn't remember how you opened past doors you couldn't open this door. If you did not compare the shape of the present door with others you have seen, you could not open this door. If you were not able to reason why the door has not been opened you would not be able to realize that it is because someone has thrown away the key. That these thoughts are not made explicit is frequent, but they work in your head constantly.

You are constantly thinking when you go to the dentist's office, when you park your car in the garage, when you bake a chicken, when you invite your friends over for a barbecue, when you read a book, when you get restless because your wife hasn't come home, etc. These are thoughts that do not require special concentration. In many cases you are not aware of yourself thinking about them, but they are working permanently, without you being able to avoid them.

In other cases, the failure of this way of thinking -almost reflex- forces you to think about your way of reasoning about the problem. This is less common, but it also occurs abundantly in everyday life. You begin to think "How come...", "Why did she...?" And on a higher level when someone tells you, "You have no reason to think that..."

You can see how reason has weight in our daily life.

In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional. — Xtrix

I repeat my argument: the definition of a word is to make its meaning explicit and the meaning is the use of that word. You cannot avoid using a word in one way or another. Therefore, you cannot avoid using an implicit meaning of the word when you speak. You can avoid the explicit definition, but not the implicit one. In certain circumstances this can create a problem of confusion that is at the root of many false problems that arise even in specialized languages. In metaphysics, especially.
Do you disagree with what I have said? Do you have another concept of definition or meaning?

Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure. — Xtrix

Wittgenstein does not dismantle particular claims of Aristotle, but the heart of Aristotle's philosophy: metaphysics.

You can try, and many have, to formulate one, coming up with a list of factors -- observation, experimentation, predictability, peer review, data collection, hypothesis, theory, etc. -- and of course there are plenty of examples. But there are plenty of exceptions as well. — Xtrix

The fact that there are exceptions to a definition does not invalidate it. It is difficult to find a word that does not have margins of vagueness. But that natural science is based on controlled experimentation and observation and philosophy doesn't so, is a clear enough difference. Of course, if you go back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, where modern science did not exist, the confusion between philosophy and science is almost absolute. But we are in the 21st century of the Common Era and we talk about the difference between philosophy and science now.

List of religions and spiritual traditions. — VagabondSpectre

Sorry, I asked him for examples of philosophers pontificating. I don't think the Pope is an example of a philosopher. And the list of "spiritualisms" I don't know what it's about.

I think you're conflating different threads of this conversation. — Pfhorrest

You are right. I have deleted my previous comment.

Hedonism by itself doesn’t tell you what particular things are good, it just provides a criterion for assessing the goodness of things: does it feel good? Just like empiricism provides a criterion for assessing the truth: does it look true? — Pfhorrest

First: To say that it is good that produces pleasure is an empty statement if you do not specify what pleasure you are talking about. The difficulties of hedonism in giving content to the term "pleasure" are well known to all those who know a little about ethics. For example, the "scientifically" unsolvable alternative between quantitative and qualitative hedonism.

Second: you cannot find a circumstance that generates pleasure in every person, unless there are a few basic situations that do not serve to "scientifically" resolve the moral problems that arise every day.

Third: Even if you find that there is a situation that produces pleasure in every person, that does not mean that it is morally good. Human beings could be conditioned by society or their instincts to enjoy violence, and that would not make violence good. This is the old problem that you can't start from being to conclude the duty. An old problem that no one has solved, in my opinion.

I think these three points disarm your claim that hedonism can be justified as a scientific truth.

But they don’t provide a way of telling what is good for someone who doesn’t already know, the way that “the scientific method” provides a way of telling what is true for someone who doesn’t already know. — Pfhorrest

Sorry, comment deleted. It was not directed to you.