If all perception includes theory, the pre-discursive knowledge that is the basis of Heidegger's theory and his critique of metaphysics and science is also theory. — David Mo

Perception is not theory.

You do not distinguish between talking about a person's death and that the person is dead. When did my mother's death occur? In my memory? Is my mother's death "theoretical"? — David Mo

No.

When you remember your mother's death, you're remembering it right now. It's a kind of cognition. That doesn't mean it's a "theory." Not all thinking or cognizing is "theory." The question pertained to time, not theory or perception.

Heidegger's claim that the future is primordial needs to be argued.
— David Mo

Temporality is primordial, not just the future. — Xtrix

Heidegger says that the future is the primordial existential ecstasis. — David Mo

Temporality is primordial, it's what the ordinary concept of time emerges from. The future is one aspect of temporality, and a particularly important one in Heidegger.

The main reason is that the authenticity of the human being resides in the anticipatory resolution of being for death. But the mere concept of project already anticipates that priority of the future that gives meaning to the past. — David Mo

Yes...

I'm surprised you don't know this. — David Mo

:yawn:

I am talking to my father about going to visit my mother's grave. There is an obvious irreversible time sequence. — David Mo

Yes, in talk and thought. No one is arguing otherwise.

Anyone can perceive a similar one without the need for theories. — David Mo

In describing something, there is thinking and concepts involved. To argue this is "theory" is misleading. It is simply a common way of understanding and talking about the world -- as a sequence. But there is no "future" when you're at your mother's grave. When you're there, it'll be the present just as it is when you're talking about going.

Heidegger's claim that the future is primordial needs to be argued. — David Mo

Temporality is primordial, not just the future.

But it would be absurd to ask for reasons that my mother's death is prior to the conversation that precedes the visit to her grave. — David Mo

When does the memory of the death of your mother occur? In the past?

Sam Harris is in my opinion the absolute dumbest of the lot. He's just a stupid man that is — fishfry

Yeah, any person who says something as simplistic as this either hasn't truly engaged with the person they're condemning, or doesn't have the emotional intelligence to avoid equating someone they disagree with with "stupidity." Or, as is usually the case, they're simply envious of said person's success.

Sam Harris is by no means a stupid man, although I happen to disagree with him a lot.

Act less like an internet troll. Otherwise: try Twitter.

It's helpful to quote the text to support your interpretations. Honestly I don't see anything in Being and Time that implies any of this.

Since there's no "forward," I don't think he'd argue in favor of "backwards" either. This is still a linear sequence view of time -- the time that's measurable, that's mathematical, that's abstract. It's the time of physics, measured in the unit of a "second," etc., closely linked to space and motion. This is what Heidegger is saying does not describe the phenomenon of time accurately in terms of experience. This is why he goes through the concept of time through history, in part to show how we've arrived at this current formulation of time. In many ways, "time" is as concealed as "being" (in general); they are both related.

You seem interested enough in Heidegger, so I suggest giving Being and Time or Introduction to Metaphysics a read (or re-read). Not an easy task, of course. A lot of it is very unclear.

It's important to always keep in mind the things in Heidegger that are clear. My eyes glaze over many times in division II when he talks about conscience, anxiety, etc. There are many passages that I can't make heads or tails out of. But I don't think that's all that important if we keep in mind his general argument.

The most obvious (and superficial) thing to keep in mind is the title: Sein und Zeit. The question of being is central throughout the book and throughout Heidegger's life. Also central to the book is Zeit, time. Why the "and"? How are they related or connected? What does he mean by "being"? Does he ever give "it" a definition or interpretation? What of "time"? Does he mean clock time? How is thinking defined in Heideggerian thought? Or truth? Or human being? Etc. All things worth asking.

He says from the beginning that his analysis will be exceedingly difficult because he wants to essentially "get under" an entire tradition, whose set of assumptions we've take for granted for 2 and a half thousand years:

"With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar.'" (B&T, p. 63/39)

You (Heidegger? ) are mixing theories about time (succession of homogeneous instants) with perceptions of time (past not present). — David Mo

What you claim is "perception," isn't. Declaring it such proves nothing. One could argue, just as sincerely, that the mind/body dichotomy is also "perception." In fact many have.

The perception of the past and the future as something that is no longer or not yet here present is more authentic (i.e. immediate) than Heidegger's vision of the primacy of an "already been" future. — David Mo

Another assertion. And clearly the "already been" of the future is especially tripping you up. Which is odd, since he also says similar things about the past.

Then, you (Heidegger?) introduce your subjective theory of time with a false excuse: that the common perception of time is theory. Moreover, you assume that this statement validates your attribution of "authenticity". False: that your theory is an alternative to another does not imply that it is better. — David Mo

No one is proposing a theory, certainly not a "subjective" theory.

"Reading Heidegger is not easy. I've found I've had to read several books, several times. Best to avoid secondary sources at first and make sense of it yourself, if possible. My personal opinion is that no one can really interpret Heidegger clearly without at least 6 months or so of reading. "
Pretending to understand Heidegger without help is like pretending to climb Everest in a bathing suit.
6 months is a joke. That's what it took me to understand what I don't understand and what others who presume to understand don't understand. — David Mo

You've still not shown you really understand much, unfortunately. Not meant as a cheap shot, just my opinion. I don't think you're in any position to give advice. Your reading of Heidegger is about as accurate as your reading of my statement: I didn't say 6 months is all you need, I said it's at least what you need -- and even at that it's just an approximate number, which depends on how much time you have to read, your reading comprehension, your reading speed, etc. After that rough amount of time, a general picture of Heidegger will emerge. I agree that may indeed be a "joke" for you. Whatever time you've put in so far one might say is a "joke," based on many, many of your statements.

Lastly, it's not "pretending." I've demonstrated it over and over again and, if I'm off base, which I've rarely been, and this has been shown, I've corrected myself. But I never claimed to "understand" Heidegger completely. Do I understand his basic theses? Yes, I think I do. If I don't, no one has shown it to be the case -- least of all you.

Of course there has been help involved -- I've explicitly mentioned the help, in fact -- especially Hubert Dreyfus. Again, the point is not to start with secondary sources. Give yourself some time to read directly. Clearly you haven't heeded this advice, and it's shown from the beginning, when you started from the interpretations and criticisms of Carnap et al. So you're a good example of why it's important to read something first for yourself before summoning outside help.

I really don't like the term either, so I'm glad you called me out on it. In fact I think it's fairly useless -- what exactly am I NOT believing in? Besides, it's so ethnocentric -- we don't go around claiming we're non-believers of Shiva or Ba'al, etc.

Regardless, apropos of this discussion I figured it was only honest to label myself by the common term.

I've been pretty disappointed with this forum, overall. Someone reminded me that it is an "amateur" forum and that I shouldn't expect real expertise -- and that's probably true. Yet there are common mistakes I often see -- like appeals to the dictionary -- that are truly embarrassing even for amateurs. The level of discourse is another matter -- a lot of ego, defensiveness, insults, sarcasm, etc. I'm guilty of it myself, admittedly.

Like with any group, you get a few people who are truly interesting and worth dialoguing with. This is where I learn a thing or two, which is impossible almost anywhere else (try it on Twitter or YouTube), and for that I'm grateful.

I reject your false moralism that elevates error and delusion to a level of deserving intellectual respect. I deny this, and not only deny it, but will continue to deal critically with these sophists. — JerseyFlight

Don't take this the wrong way, but it seems like you really get emotional about theism and post quite a lot about it. I don't think your fellow atheists would appreciate that, would they?

Problem is, too, you seemingly can't get out of your own way LOL. — 3017amen

Eh, another kid who's on an atheism crusade. I was there once. Dawkins, Dennett, Sam Harris, Htichens, etc. Everything becomes about battling the the bad guys -- those religious people! We, on the other hand, who are educated in the truth (science), know for a certainty what reality is and so can feel superior in shitting on those of "faith."

You're absolutely right to say it gives atheists (like myself) a terrible name. I really don't give a damn about what people believe, I care about what they do. Beliefs are certainly an important component, but are almost always extremely stubborn -- the way to change them is not through demeaning people, but by leading from example and educating. Like all good teachers. Yelling about how stupid and ignorant they are serves only one purpose: making yourself feel better. It serves another purpose, too: it makes you look like a child.

My advice is to wish people like this well in their quest (they will fail), and hope they grow out of it. Their emotional immaturity betrays them, making them fairly easy to dismiss/ignore. Once they grow up in that department, they can be welcomed to the adult table. Because there is a lot to be said about superstitions and strange beliefs.

Having read S und Z and found it tough going but having a reasonable understanding of it, what to read next? I have only read his Opus Magnus, otherwise just secondary litterature. Any suggestion for some shorter, more accessible of his works to read to get a good picture of his thoughts/philosophy?

Did the ... interruption caused by certain events in Germany affect his philosophy? S und Z is pre-Nürmberg. — Ansiktsburk

I can't say for a certainty that WWII in particular changed his thinking, but neither can anyone else. As far as his writing goes, there's debate about what the "turn" really consisted of. Some say he became more about "openness" to the world, some say his thinking became more "historical," etc. He seems to have much more to say about art (particularly poetry) and technology.

Anyway, as far as what to read next -- I would listen to Heidegger himself. If you notice in the preface to the seventh edition of Being and Time, Heidegger recommends "Introduction to Metaphysics," and I highly recommend that as well. I found it much more clear than Being and Time in many ways. Otherwise "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" is important too.

Reading Heidegger is not easy. I've found I've had to read several books, several times. Best to avoid secondary sources at first and make sense of it yourself, if possible. My personal opinion is that no one can really interpret Heidegger clearly without at least 6 months or so of reading. There's just a certain minimum needed to read, ruminate, re-read, etc. Hunting down a lot of these books isn't always easy either. I think in the end it's very much worthwhile -- I don't see any other philosopher in the last 200 years, besides Nietzsche, who is as challenging and fascinating as Heidegger.

Does Heidegger agree that time is linear? — Gregory

Which "time"? The time of ordinary meaning and physics is linear, sure. Experiential time -- temporality -- is not linear.

It is very simple.

"His valid reasons for "changing" the common usage of the word "time" is partially based on this new analysis, and partially based on a historical and linguistic analysis".(Xtrix)

I'm waiting for you to refresh my memory with some of those valid reasons you mention. Obviously, I don't think they exist. — David Mo

I've done so. Yet:

I insist: I am not talking about any objective concept of time. I am talking about time lived subjectively. I believe that there are certain common traits in all this subjectivity. I believe that Heidegger's "existential" description is in contradiction with them. — David Mo

What is time lived subjectively? Because that's essentially all Heidegger means by temporality -- existential time as opposed to clock time, without talking about "subjects" or "objects." If you're arguing that "subjective" time is a sequence of nows, of a future being not-here-yet and a past being no-longer-here, etc., then what you're describing is indeed the ordinary conception of time and which has been influenced by Aristotle and the tradition generally. Aristotle's ideas did not exclusively influence the field of physics, but our ordinary lives as well. In a way, so did Descartes' conception of the world as mind and body. And this is exactly the reason why Heidegger questions it and wants to describe it anew -- because it is not even seen (including by you) as something questionable. It appears as the most self-evident, obvious thing on earth. But it isn't. So why is it important to question and re-interpret? Because it's this long tradition of conceptualizing time which has blocked off other lines of inquiry -- particularly about Being itself, which has itself been interpreted as something "present" (in the sense of this "ordinary conception of time").

And why is that important? Because we're living with the results of such an understanding -- namely, how we interpret and define ourselves as human beings. This has consequences for the future of the species. If we're not calling into question our most basic assumptions, there's less of a chance to change things. Heidegger doesn't say this specifically (although he alludes to it with references to the "fate of the West"), but it's what he has to mean. There's also interesting passages about the foundations of science, and how real revolutions in science occur when their foundations are challenged:

"Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by that understanding. [...] The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basis concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level wh ice a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts." (B&T p 29/9)

I bring this up because this applies to "ontology" as well, its basic question being the question of the meaning of being in general. Heidegger is calling for such a revolution in thinking.

Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc -- are themselves so varied and range from one moral extreme to another that it's difficult to lump them in to "dumb" or sluggish or whatever.
— Xtrix

Not true. Man is only religious in his psychology. Reality is material, religion is not. You are here thinking about religion absent from meta-cognition, instead of comprehending it from the inescapable reality of materialism you are interpreting it through culture, which makes you, in one sense or another, duped by it. — JerseyFlight

You don't know what you're talking about.

First of all, the assumption that reality is "material" has a long history -- and no one yet, certainly not you, have shown this to be the case. In fact no one can tell us what "material" is. There was a conception of it in the mechanical philosophy of Galileo, Descartes, etc., but was abandoned shortly after Newton. There hasn't been a technical notion of "body" since then, or material. If you want to be "duped" by scientism, and a dogmatic belief in materialism, that's your business.

Secondly, my statement is factually accurate to anyone who's made the slightest effort to understand what is typically called "religion" (itself an amorphous term) -- namely, that they're diverse, varied, difficult to categorize (are the tenants of Buddhism "religious"? No god, often no mysticism, etc), and often very moral indeed. In fact we wouldn't have modern science without religion.

For the record -- your sophomoric accusations aside -- I'm as non-religious and atheistic as they come, nor do I ever give quarter to supernaturalism or evidence-free appeals to faith.

Third and lastly, to criticize "interpreting it through culture," while prior to this saying that materialism is "inescapable," is truly embarrassing. If you still can't see why, there's no sense in talking.

Subtle ideologies do not begin with the assertion of phantom deities. This could not be cruder or more stupid. Subtle ideologies usually begin with socially normative precepts, trying carefully to avoid all criticism regarding the intelligence or fairness of such activity, working to reinforce the status quo. — JerseyFlight

Again, in attempting to make authoritative assertions you come off sounding like a high school student who's just read some Karl Marx.

The equating of religion with the assertion of "phantom deities" is really not even worth the effort here.

What I was correctly saying, and which should be obvious, is that today's ideologies (take neoliberalism, which is a variant of capitalism) are all around us. They're not hidden. They are indeed "obvious," but in being so are that much more overlooked -- in the same way it's "obvious" we're breathing, yet we very often overlook this fact. You want to restrict "religion" to invisible deities and myth-like creatures, but what is truly harmful in religion is dogmatism. Yet this shows up in politics and economics as well, and in many ways has been far more damaging. Examples abound.

Yeah I'm not sure what you're driving at anymore.

Religion is just a crude form of ideology, the master ideologies of the world do not reveal their presence so easy. I always try to tell young atheists not to feel like they accomplished something by escaping religion, there is no congratulations here, religion is but the dumbest and lowest slug on the ideological tree. — JerseyFlight

It depends on what we're calling "religion," of course. More or less a matter of definition, but the typically acknowledged religions -- Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc -- are themselves so varied and range from one moral extreme to another that it's difficult to lump them in to "dumb" or sluggish or whatever.

Master ideologies are often right in front of us as well. I view beliefs about capitalism to be pretty in-your-face, especially in the US, yet few escape it.

This has been an interesting thread. My readings of Heidegger have been limited to BT, Intro to M, some of the shorter works and supplemental material - have found your posts to be helpful as well as waarala's and other earlier posts - even some of the criticisms, although the criticisms for the most part seem here to range from the fairly weak to the cartoonish. If nothing else this forum is good for reading notes - upon coming across this thread I think I'll take a look at History of the Concept of Time next or Contributions. — Kevin

You've already read, in my view, very essential ones. I'd add "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" to the list. The History of the Concept of Time isn't all that informative, in my view. "Basic Questions of Philosophy" is also important.

As Friedman said, the corporation's only objective is to maximize profit. Our current age of a handful of multinational corporations owning nearly everything in the world -- the age of neoliberalism -- is (hopefully) coming to an end. They're determined to bring the rest of the world down with them, however.

Turns out economic dogma is worse than religious dogma, and is more likely to kill us. When you have the Pope coming out in favor of climate change action and Republican party denying anything is happening, it's a strange world indeed.

I think it's important to be rational when we can, despite most of our lives living fairly "irrationally." Rational planning out our lives and time, in accordance with the goals which we've concluded are what we want to achieve in life, certainly has a very real and very important role. I find it related to self-control in many ways.

So, playing fast and loose here, a sketch of what I think he's doing here (or if one likes, what he seems to be attempting or what he thinks he's doing/attempting) is showing our vulgar concept of time as an endless succession of nows to be taken as the expression of inauthentic temporality - which is our understanding of time in terms of our everyday dealings and entangled being-with others ("public time"), which is a levelling down of primordial time (the ecstases, finitude, and the potentiality-of being-a-whole disclosed by my death). — Kevin

This wouldn't be surprising, I suppose. If this is correct, I don't see why he calls common notions of time "inauthentic temporality" -- why not just call it "ordinary time" as he does elsewhere? But I'll have to re-read most of it for a useful opinion. Your analysis seems reasonable.

If you don't quote any valid reason you are blocking the discussion. — David Mo

I've gone through his description of temporality, and I think it's quite accurate and, if you get into his terminology, quite elegant. His valid reasons for "changing" the common usage of the word "time" is partially based on this new analysis, and partially based on a historical and linguistic analysis. I've gone over this several times as well. If none of these are considered valid reasons, I'm not interested.

"So you stick with Aristotle"
I do not adhere to anyone. — David Mo

We all have influences. The common description of time in physics is largely influenced by Aristotle's Physics and common notions are likewise influenced. In fact mostly we treat time as something measurable in clocks and calendars.

I am affirming the common perception of time that Heidegger violates without valid reason. — David Mo

The "common perception" has a long history, and in fact is not common everywhere. However, Heidegger isn't 'violating' anything -- in fact he spends hundreds of pages distinguishing between "time" (which he reserves for the ordinary conception) and "temporality" (which is his analysis of time as experienced, rather than a present-at-hand phenomenon the tradition has always held).

That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism.
— Xtrix

He does not destroy anything. — David Mo

In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", — David Mo

He changes the common sense of a word without giving a valid reason. — David Mo

Most of division II of Being and Time is dedicated to giving multiple "valid reasons," in fact.

When he speaks of temporality he is speaking of something else that is not temporary. According to you what reason do you have to "destroy" the common concept of time? Any sensible person understands that the football match to be played tomorrow is not now and that the car I bought yesterday is not in the future. For him everything is part of the same amalgam. That is, a play on words that serves only to mislead.
I understand that mystics and Buddhists like this verbal entanglement. I do not. — David Mo

So you stick with Aristotle. Nothing wrong with that. I myself use it, of course -- we all do. Heidegger goes beneath this "common" conception, however. The use of a "time line," a sequence of "nows," an equating time with "motion" or space, and the measuring/quantifying of repeatable changes in clocks, etc., is not necessarily how we experience "time." The experiential component, when analyzed phenomenologically, has little to do with "seconds" and "minutes," "befores" and "afters." Thus why he dubs it "temporality" rather than "time."

I found a dozen references to authentic or inauthentic temporality in 10''. Advantages of computer science. — David Mo

Still doesn't make sense to me, but thanks for pointing them out.

1) doesnt post modernism say that most language is inherently ambiguous? — Gregory

I'm not sure what postmodernism says, to be honest. I suspect, from my little reading, that it says very little.

2) Heidegger wrote "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" during an age when everyone was talking about relativity. I'm sure it's covered in the book. — Gregory

Well if he covers relativity somewhere I'm happy to take a look.

3) what would a conversation between Heisenberg and Heidegger have been like?? Energy was being discovered as the principle of everything, and the conclusion seemed to be that energy could create its own forces out of nothing. So much for a need for supernatural intervention! Heidegger must have found this interesting — Gregory

Heisenberg was a physicist, and Heidegger has a lot to say about physics (in the sense of its origins and ontological underpinnings). Whether or not he was interested in (or fully understood) all of Heisenberg's ideas, I have no idea.

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless.
— Xtrix

For Heidegger it's meaningingless? He says "the facticity of Being is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something objectively present. Existing Being does not encounter itself as something objectively present within the world." This might be a starting point to seeing a difference in time-structure. — Gregory

He's making a distinction between the present-at-hand, "objectively present" mode of being, the being of "objects" in our environment, and ourselves (Dasein). He's not talking about temporality here, and certainly not about authentic or inauthentic temporality -- which is meaningless.

"The problem of possible wholeness of the being, who we ourselves actually are, exists justifiably IF care, as the fundamental constitution of Being, 'is connected' with DEATH as the most extreme possibility OF this Being."

So there is possibility of Being in death. Heidegger doesn't say we then go from Being to infinite nothingness. He doesn't speak of ETERNAL life at all. But Being does not leave us in death — Gregory

Page number?

This passage in itself says nothing about what you're thinking. Death is connected to "this being," meaning Dasein. Yes, dasein lives with the knowledge that it will eventually die. Death is the end of possibilities in Heidegger. There's nothing about an afterlife anywhere.

"..death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypssed possibility OF Being".

All these quotes are from B&T — Gregory

Where? Pages are helpful.

"Possibility of being" is in relation to dasein -- and yes, in that case death is, as I mentioned above, the most extreme possibility -- the possibility which cancels all possibilities.

You're just misreading it, I'm afraid.

Heidegger specifically spoke of relativity. Being Kantian, time does not have parts. SO would inauthentic time be Newton's and authentic be Kant's? I suppose. — Gregory

No, because "inauthentic/authentic time" is meaningless. Heidegger rarely spoke about relativity.

Heidegger says in B&T that death is a possibility FOR being. I guess this implies an afterlife where we experience time truly instead.of in an illusion. Any comments? — Gregory

You'll have to provide some quotations, because I see nothing about an afterlife in Heidegger -- ever.

This is exactly what you do from here. Nothing you say refers to my objection. You recite what you more or less know and forget the terms of our debate. — David Mo

Because the "terms" are based on no understanding of Heidegger's concepts, hence why I have to go back over and over to them. If you understood them, you'd quickly see how the "terms" melt away. Regardless:

Notice he doesn't mention temporality here.
— Xtrix
I suggest that you read the context of the texts I have provided. — David Mo

As far as I see, he never once mentions "authentic temporality." That doesn't make sense. What you're referring to is being-towards-death, which is a different topic.

I don't see it as a mess really.
— Xtrix
Because you don't pay attention to what I say and you respond to something else that comes to mind. The problem is not that they form a unity (at least not the one I was aiming at) but that in that unity the future is defined in terms of having been (past). — David Mo

All three ecstases are defined in terms of the others. The past, therefore, is just as much defined by the future as the future is in terms of the past. Take a look at the quote you provided again, then the following:

"Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded ithe totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling -- that is, the unity o the care-structure." (B&T p. 350/401 -- emphasis Heidegger's)

The entire paragraph is helpful, but I don't feel like typing it all out.

"Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been." (ibid. p 350/401)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". To build that unity he equates the future with "having been", that is, what is normally understood as the past. And the present is "liberated" from itself we don't quite know how nor from what. In other words, the construction of that unity destroys the common meaning of the word "time", without proposing an intelligible alternative. — David Mo

He does not "equate" it, he's saying it's all happening at once and so should not be thought of as "later" or "not-yet." Likewise, the past is very much dependent on the future -- and if you look at how we live, or even how we think about our history or world history, our current values and goals plays a huge role in how we interpret the past. It's not a construction, it's a description. And it is indeed an intelligible alternative -- it makes good sense, in fact -- at least to me. Does it "destroy" the common meaning of the word "time"? Sure it does, of time as a sequence of "nows" that we measure, quantitatively, with clocks and calendars, etc. That "ordinary conception of time" has been destroyed isn't a criticism.

Ley us see:
His letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [[i]als zukünftiges[/i]], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. (B&T: 326/372-3)

Two things are clear here: There is an authentic and an inauthentic temporality and both are based on "futural”. But what temporality means is gibberish. — David Mo

Not really. Notice he doesn't mention temporality here. Being-towards-death is a separate, but related, issue. It's true that it deals with the future, but that doesn't mean it's synonymous with "temporality," which he'll later talk about in terms of "ecstases," etc.

The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" (or better, which "is in the process of having been") releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality" (B&T: 326/374)

This is a mess because Heidegger identifies past, present and future in a "unity". — David Mo

I don't see it as a mess really. What I gather here is his claiming that, in ordinary experience, all three are happening essentially at once, and only in detached, abstract thinking do they become separate "things" on a number line which happen in a sequence. It always has struck me as quasi-Buddhist, but I think they emphasize more that the "past" and "future" are indeed separate but illusory and that only the present matters.

In any case, again and again it's always helpful to keep in mind the separation of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand" modes of being, ordinary everyday (average) experience, and contrasting with what the "tradition" (which has always privileged abstract, theoretical thinking and "logic") claims "time" and "being" are (i.e., how they get interpreted). By using phenomenology as a method, and as something that essentially studies the "hidden" or "concealedness" of things, Heidegger is trying to throw out all traditional concepts and describe "being-in-the-world" anew -- hence "Dasein" and "temporality" and "unconcealedness," etc.

To take Being and Time in reverse order: we essentially are temporality (as beings), which manifests are "care," which shows up in average everyday experiences as the "ready-to-hand" activities we're mostly engaged in and which are transparent to us because they're so "close," and have thus been ignored by the tradition. He layers these analyses, I think rather poorly, in the first two Divisions, but this (in my view) remains the thesis, apart from his "deconstruction" of the history of time and Being.

Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception
— Xtrix

What is pure perception? An intellectual vision, since it is pure. But there is nothing in Parmenides that suggests contemplation in the sense of intuitive grasping (I use intuition in the Kantian sense), but reasoning. Of course, if we equate every thought with "pure perception" everything is "vision". But it is an unjustifiable assimilation that only serves to create confusion of language. — David Mo

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. — Xtrix

This "beholding" and "discovering" is related to aletheia, to unconcealedness, to "disclosure" or "open-ness" of the world. Remember this is what Heidegger asserts that the tradition has always believed, but with the emphasis on what's present before us. What he will constantly emphasize, however, is absence -- that which withdraws, conceals, and hides.

George Steiner is my main guide to (not) understanding Heidegger. In his own words, the subject of time "is watertight even by Heideggerian standards". Indeed, Heidegger creates around the concept of temporality a tangle of metaphors, neologisms and undefined concepts that make what he says unintelligible. A labyrinth only suitable for lovers of the cabala and masochists. :yum: — David Mo

Not easy, but I wouldn't say unintelligible. That "projection" and "anticipation" are the basis for ordinary concepts about the "future" as a "not-yet-now" isn't all that hard to understand: our experience and involvement in the world ("being-in-the-world") is where we always start from when we begin to philosophize -- but like when a hammer breaks down, it's a different mode of being than when simply acting.

What I am clear about is that Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic temporality. — David Mo

Maybe you could explain it to me then, because this is something I'm certainly not clear on. I'm not even sure if "authentic temporality" really makes sense. Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic, but I don't see how these ideas apply to temporality as Dasein's being.

I agree with what you've written on this thread. I think for Heidegger, time is meditation on being by the Kantian self — Gregory

I'm not sure what this means exactly, but perhaps it's true.

Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure
— Xtrix
What do you mean, we don't know? The text we are discussing accuses Parmenides of having directly raised the problem of Being in temporal (present) mode. — David Mo

Very true, but I was referring to:

He [Heidegger] thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

Whether Parmenides is part of the tradition of mistaking being for a being, or focusing entirely on "beings" (the ontical) is not clear to me, I'd have to go back and check a number of books, but my sense is that Heidegger considers Parmenides to be a true "thinker," a primordial one, one who raises the question of Being.

"Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure beholding. This thesis has remained the foundation of western philosophy ever since [Parmenides]." (B&T, p. 215/171 -- context is important here, the brackets are mine but if you read the previous part he's referring to Parmenides' famous 'For thinking and being are the same' sentence, although 'thinking' here is interpreted by Heidegger as 'to perceive with the eyes" as the footnote explains.)

But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."
— Xtrix

I don't know how time can be defined without reference to change, evolution or whatever you want to call it. I would like to know how you do it. Seriously. — David Mo

Well not me, really, but Heidegger -- or at least my take on him. He sees Aristotle as treating "time" as something already present-at-hand, as something measurable, as change in the sense of a sequence of "nows" -- I think of a moving point on a number line, for example. One of the basis units of physics, as you know, is the unit fo time: the second, as measured by a repetitive, consistent change (something to do with caesium, but I won't pretend to understand it).

What Heidegger will say, however, is that this understanding of time is itself grounded in our "temporality," which in B&T is tied to Sorge, care. We're projecting, anticipating, expecting -- that's the "future." He'll call the past/present/future different "ecstases," but that temporality is really a unity and happening all at once, so that there is no "before" and "after," really. So in a weird way, there is no "time" without humans:

"Strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At all times man was and is and will be, because time temporalities itself only insofar as man is." (Intro to Metaphysics, p. 71)

"There is no nature-time, since all time belongs essential to Dasein." (Basic Problems, p. 262)

All of this is admittedly very strange, but I wonder: what do you think he's driving at in Being and Time? He says from the beginning that "time" will have to be re-interpreted, that a new understanding of it needs to be "explicated," etc. His thesis stands or falls on whether he's adequately describing things, and so this is why "time" is particularly relevant here -- if he's wrong about "time," then he's completely useless (in my view).

Says who? Why should we start with the assumption that "reality" means anything that "exists" independently of our "minds"?
— Xtrix

If that's false then dreams must be real. — TheMadFool

Begging the question. Dreams are real, in my view. They're just as much part of the world as anything else -- different than waking life, but certainly still there.

I think we should move on from Descartes.

being real - as in existing independently of X's mind — TheMadFool

Says who? Why should we start with the assumption that "reality" means anything that "exists" independently of our "minds"?

If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in tho
— Xtrix
Math is not based on what we visualize or imagine. Mathematical proofs are based on formal criteria, independent of empirical intuition. That's why there are totally counterintuitive mathematics. The same for logic. — David Mo

I didn't say mathematics is based on visualization or imagination. On the other hand, there are formal principles involved in vision as well -- yet without the triggering effect of experience we wouldn't know what they are. Regardless, assuming arithmetic is a completely formal system, it's still a part of the human mind. As is logic. As is language.

The life of human being is subject to temporality. But he can formulate propositions that refer to non-temporal objects. — David Mo

Again, "non-temporal object" is meaningless until we explain what "temporal" means. If we define "temporal" as something that moves/changes, then no -- abstractions aren't, in that sense, temporal objects. Quite true. But this is why I said "It comes down to how we're defining time."

Summarizing: I think Parmenides was trying to do an a-temporal and counterintuitive theory of Being and Heidegger misunderstood him because he had a preconceived idea. He thought that all the metaphysical tradition was infected by the ontical. — David Mo

"Ontical," in Heidegger, refers to beings (plural). That metaphysics has lost the question of Being itself, according to Heidegger, is quite true -- in the sense that "Being" gets interpreted as *a* being -- as permanence, as becoming, as Idea (enduring prototype), as ousia (substance). Whether Heidegger considers Parmenides as part of this I'm not sure. It seems Parmenides was truly doing ontology and raising the question of Being, but leaving unquestioned (phenomenologically) the perspective which guided his questioning. According to Heidegger, that concealed perspective was temporality.

Before continuing, I have to same I'm a little disappointed -- you seem to have avoided a large part of my post, which was aiming at understanding your position. I'll assume I have described your position (fairly) accurately.

Let us accept that every human being live in the experience of time (temporality). This is not the same than saying that every human proposition implies time because it is based on existence of things (presence).
"A is A" is not a temporal assertion. It is assumed to refer to objects without circumstances of present, past and future. Very different to say "The corpse was on the table". This is temporal because I can ask "When?" and I understand that it is different to "The corpse is on the table" or "We will put the corpse on the table". But asking "When A is A?" has no sense. You are badly asking. The answer is: "Under any circumstance of time and space" This is to say, without any circumstance of time and space. — David Mo

Seems to me that you are taking the propositions of logic to be timeless, in a sense. In that case, the same applies to arithmetic, which is also not temporal assertions. But these formal propositions and assertions are still coming out of the human mind -- I think we both agree with that. If the human mind is essentially temporal, and if the symbols of logic and mathematics are themselves beings which occur in the mind (in thought, reason, etc.), it's difficult to see how they're somehow beyond or outside time -- unless of course by "time" we mean the time of physics, in which case we mean essentially change/motion, and of course A = A doesn't change or move. So again it really all depends on what we mean by "time." Which is why I bring it up so much.

But this is very different from saying that we cannot formulate propositions that escape the a priori conditions of temporality. We can and do so constantly. In fact, Heidegger claims that it must be done, since he accuses Parmenides of defining being in terms of temporality, in terms of the present. But what I doubt is that both Parmenides' and Heidegger's metaphysical statements are referential, that they refer to something real. They are simple escapes from reality. Very typical of myth, religion and poetry. — David Mo

"Real" is problematic for me. Is discussing Being any less "real" than laws of logic? I also think ideas of referentiality are questionable.

Logic, math, language, etc., are all involved in thought. Thinking is a human activity (maybe exclusively, maybe not), along with feeling, willing, etc. Thoughts occur at some point in time -- so even the "objects" or "representations" of thought arise in a present. If I visualize a triangle, it's not that the triangle is somewhere "outside" myself that can decay, but neither is anything in thought. So yes, in that case almost anything we think or imagine is "timeless" -- they never change, they never move, they never decay. In that case the moon illusion is also timeless, in a sense -- it's in our heads as perception, and always has been, even though it is indeed an illusion.

But this opens up many questions as well, particularly about what we mean by "thinking," which is also an important one. Heidegger, in Intro to Metaphysics, talks at length about thought as traditionally associated with what you're talking about -- namely, with logic -- and goes on to claim that the distinction between being and thinking is the dominant one in the West.

This was back in January. I wonder if "epidemics" would receive at least one vote now? My how things change.

George Steiner: Heidegger, p. 153

The fatal deception of metaphysical-philosophical thought has been to consider Being as a kind of eternal "being before the eyes" (Vorhandesein). Already Saint Augustine had called attention against the obsessive concupiscentia oculorum of the philosophers, their Platonic insistence on the "vision" of the essence of things instead of living them with patience and with an existential commitment that implied the temporarily limited nature of being.

I think this brief fragment says much more than your twists and turns in the void. — David Mo

Well what can I say? I'm glad you find this person a better communicator. I agree with the above wholeheartedly.

Parmenides' concept of being is not based on any "vision" or "presence" as he says. It is the fruit of a rational analysis -by the Goddess- of the discourse of men. This analysis does not focus on any contemplation or vision, but on a Truth of proto-logical order: it is not possible that the non-being is. Where is the vision here? — David Mo

No "vision" perhaps, but certainly thought, perception and interpretation. As you say, "rational analysis." Well Heidegger would say "Where is this rational analysis/thinking/interpreting coming from, if not the human being?" So if (1) this is an interpretation of Being, (2) we assume Parmenides is a human being (Dasein), (3) the Heideggerian interpretation of the "essence" of Dasein is its "existence" (it's "there-ness," its "being-in-the-world"), (4) that this "existence" manifests itself in the ready-to-hand, involved engagement with the world and with others (as its common and typical everyday "average" mode), and lastly that (5) this involved engagement is connected to plans and goals ("for the sake of which...", "in order to," "towards which"), which can be re-interpreted as "projecting" (i.e., towards a future), then (6) we see that the essence of the being (Dasein) asking the question of Being is essentially a caring-temporal one.

Very long winded, I know. But each step is in this layered analysis is very important. All Heidegger is really doing is focusing more on the practical, everyday stuff -- in a reaction to logic and analysis, like many others have done (the Pragmatists, other "existentialist" thinkers, etc) -- and doing so with a phenomenological method that focuses on absence and withdrawal, the "transparent" stuff that gets overlooked, the "hidden," the "concealed." In his hands, Kant's thesis still stands but in his phenomenological/hermeneutic anlaysis "time" becomes something very different, all with the incorporation of Nietzsche's "perspectivism."

Briefer: According to Heidegger, since Parmenides is a human being, and ontologically "human being" means "temporality" (again, in his formulation), then he cannot escape interpreting "Being" in terms of ("on the basis of") this temporality. I think B&T page 46-47/25 says it clearly, but especially Intro to Metaphysics page 157, as I think I quoted elsewhere, with reference to page 127 (concerning what is meant by "perspective").

From 157:

But why time, precisely? Because in the inception of Western philosophy, the perspective that guides the opening up of Being is time, but in such a way that this perspective as such still remained and had to remain concealed. [...] But this "time" still has not been unfolded in its essence, nor can it be unfolded (on the basis and within the purview of "physics"). For as soon as meditation on the essence of time begins, at the end of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself must be taken as something that is somehow coming to presence, ousia tis. This is expressed in the fact that time is conceived on the basis of the "now," that which is in each case uniquely present. The past is the "no-longer-now," the future is the "not-yet-now." Being in the sense of presence at hand (presence) becomes the perspective for the determination of time. But time does not become the perspective that is especially selected for the interpretation of being. —

(Italics all Heidegger's)

Again, long winded but maybe helpful.

1. Time is not only present. A present without past or future does not pass and therefore is the lack of time: eternal immobility. — David Mo

There's two claims here.

1) I agree time is not only present -- but I never claimed that.

2) I noticed you mentioned "does not pass" and "eternal immobility." That's interesting. In this case your conception of time is equivalent to (or closely associated with) change (becoming, happening, or the Buddhist "impermanence" [arising and passing]) and/or motion (mobile vs. immobile). Am I misinterpreting? I think the latter is the basic formulation of time in physics, and an important one.

2. Parmenides defended that Being is eternal in this sense. — David Mo

That change is impossible, because nothing truly arises or passes -- or put another way, that there is only being, and no such thing as non-being (and thus no arising and passing, since for something to arise it has to arise from non-being into being, or pass out of being into non-being, which is impossible). Hence, as Zeno later points out (as you mentioned), no such thing as motion either.

This is my understanding of the standard interpretation of Parmenides from most scholars, or at least from the (limited) secondary sources I've read. You subscribe to this view, in my understanding- perhaps put in slightly different terms, but nonetheless essentially accurate?

I want to at least get all this correct, otherwise going on further is fruitless.

3. It cannot be said, as Heidegger (you) claims, that Parmenides' concept of Being is temporal. Unless Heidegger (you) twist the word time to make it say something else and then say that others do not know what the word means. I wouldn't be surprised. It is the quintessential Heideggerian method. — David Mo

Well I would lose the term "twist," and I would also reject that me or Heidegger would have deride someone for "not knowing what the word means." I have indeed mentioned that you don't fully understand (yet) what Heidegger is meaning with "time" and "temporality," yes. For good reason: it's not an easy topic. It's still very difficult for me in many ways, and there's no doubt I don't have it all 100% accurate.

4. In the same sense, Parmenides represents a tradition that worries his followers, especially Plato and Aristotle who try to correct him. They cannot be expected to be mere continuators of his concept of Being. But this is another issue. — David Mo

I don't think they're continuators of his concept of Being at all. I think you're right when you say both Plato and Aristotle tried to "correct" him, or at least synthesize or appropriate his thought. The "being of beings" in Plato and Aristotle are very different from Parmenides, without a doubt.

"YouTube" Heidegger?
— Xtrix
Apart from the Introduction to Metaphysics and some loose lines, your recommendations are excerpts from an interview and a Dreyfuss course on Heidegger. Both on Youtube. Draw your own conclusions. — David Mo

I don't understand -- I have now twice given you several relevant books. Why ignore this? And yes, I really have read these. Here's a third attempt:

"Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics"

Obviously that's a lot of reading, but you'll find very quickly in each of these from the outline and indexes what you're looking for regarding Parmenides, time, and the history of philosophy.

Someone walks up to a protester, a so-called Trump supporter, executes him, and rather than condemn the act we condemn the partisanship. Brains rotting from the inside out. — NOS4A2

No, it's the fact that you're deluded in your partisanship, hence why the selective outrage.

Indeed.

Question:
What does Parmenides have to do with presence and time?
Answer:
In any case, Parmenides is still "presencing",
— Xtrix
Is that what you call a response? To repeat the question? — David Mo

I'm sure it appears that way. The reason it appears this way is that you don't understand what "presencing" means, in Heideggerian terminology. Presencing is related to aletheia, to phusis -- that which is unconcealed, that which emerges and endures. The connection to "time"? Fairly obvious: "presence" is something present. The present is a dimension of time. Again, "time" has to be explained further -- hence Being and Time. Heidegger differentiates between "time" and "temporality," which has to be understood. You don't seem interested in understanding this distinction. Fine -- in that case, you get your answer in one step.

So where's the connection between presencing (in the present) and Parmenides? You quoted a relevant passage from Being and Time. Heidegger is claiming that Parmenides was likewise in this "mode" when philosophizing. I think the point is a truism -- or a "banality" if you like, until we find out why pointing this out is relevant. Heidegger spends hundreds of pages elaborating on it, especially regarding time (yet you go on to question why I continually bring this up, as if it were irrelevant) and how on its basis Being gets interpreted. The "seeds" of the meaning of Being as "ousia" (and hence substance, nature, object, etc) were already there with Parmenides, as the beginning of the great tradition (which he claims is now in its end, or has peaked with Hegel and came to an end with Nietzsche). Its important to understand this tradition and what it's come to if we're interested in understanding our modern situation and the possibilities of the future. This is Heidegger in a nutshell. This is why there's so much time spent on the Greeks and on history (of ontology and of the concept of time).

Stop strutting around. Your Youtube Heidegger doesn't interest me. — David Mo

Hmm...

If you want truly want to learn about what Heidegger thinks of Parmenides, since you refuse to learn from me (after all, I "don't understand" any of it) then here are the relevant texts: Parmenides, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The History of the Concept of Time, Basic Questions of Philosophy, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, and even Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. This of course assumes you've truly and carefully read Being and Time and Introduction to Metaphysics, which I highly doubt. — Xtrix

"YouTube" Heidegger?