Aristotle places metaphysics at the top of his classification of forms of knowledge. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Aristotle talks about φθσισ. You have to remember that "metaphysics" is a later designation, and has connotations that simply can't be applied to Aristotle if we're at all serious about trying to understand his thought.

It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all;
— Xtrix
Of course you remember when you open a door. It is your memories that allow you to recognize what is in front of you as a door and not a wall. — David Mo

Remembering and memory, at least in psychology (and as they're commonly understood), play no role opening a door any more than they have a role in breathing. If we want to argue that we have to "remember" each time we walk, or drive, or eat, it's a very strange way to look at things. It's far too abstract. If you say that it's not abstract, but simply compiled somewhere in the brain, and still call it "remembering," it's very misleading. I have to "remember" my to-to list, which the best route is to get to Cape Cod, and what this person's favorite ice cream is -- I'm not doing that when driving, in fact it's so transparent I can think and talk about anything I want. Am I still subconsciously "remembering"?

I don't see why we would need to invoke this term, given the above.

This indicates a kind of computer model view of the human mind. I reject that wholeheartedly.

If you hadn't had previous training you couldn't drive in an unreflective way. — David Mo

Very true. At least when it comes to driving, playing basketball, etc. Whether things like acquiring language requires "training" is another matter.

What I'm trying to explain to you is that there is a form of non-reflective "consciousness" that conceptualizes sensations to turn them into perceptions. — David Mo

Yes, I'm quite familiar with the arguments your presenting, which are mistakes. It's not "consciousness" at all.

What the central nervous system does with perception is an interesting topic; but again, not relevant here, any more than the the way the visual system creates images from sensations of light is relevant.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty has some interesting things to say about this in his Phenomenology of Perception, in fact. — Xtrix

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty has a lot to say for me when she discusses the merely automatic character of conditioned reflexes. In the Phenomenology of Perception, to be exact. — David Mo

Well he was a man, but maybe that was a typo. And yes, he has very interesting things to say about that indeed. Have you really read the book? Because it undermines everything you've said so far about consciousness and "implicit" abstraction.

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"?
— Xtrix
In the renaissance. — David Mo

I already mentioned Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, and others of the early scientific revolution. Remember the renaissance itself, including these men, was influenced by Greek thought. It's no surprise the Bacon and Galileo reference Aristotle so often, for example. So were the Greeks not doing science? Again, I always like to ask about Aristarchus. Was he not doing science? He didn't have the technology of later generations, of course, and he certainly lived before this special method was "discovered" in the Renaissance. But if he wasn't "doing" science, then it simply proves that we shouldn't take very seriously how we in the 21st century choose to define it. Which is my point.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view.
— Xtrix
There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation.
— Xtrix
Do you think a philosopher can teach atomic physics only through philosophy? Do you think philosophy is what has created the technified world in which we live? Just to cite two obvious differences. — David Mo

"Only through philosophy" is meaningless. Yes I think philosophers can contribute to science and often have been scientists and mathematicians. Kant taught astronomy, Descartes founded analytic geometry, Leibniz invented calculus, etc. etc. Even more recently, take a look at Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck, et al. Were they "only" doing science? Not at all: they actively engaged in philosophical thought and were explicit in who their influences were. That's in part what made them so trailblazing, I'd argue.

And yes, of course "philosophy" has created the technological world in which we live. One simply has to reject confining "philosophy" to 20th century university departments, completely separated from the "science" being done in other departments.

If you live in a world where science and philosophy are the same, you are a bit old-fashioned. You are a few centuries out of date. — David Mo

Yet no one can explain what the "scientific method" is, including you. And this is what's supposed to separate "doing science" from "doing philosophy." I'd be happy to be proven wrong. Poppers and others have tried to show how science differs from other activities, but I don't find much of that convincing. It also differs quite a lot from what you've claimed.

In reality, there's simply attempts to understand the world -- the rest is fine for abstraction and categorizing for convenience.

I understand that someone may express doubts that the scientific method can be defined rigidly (nobody pretends such a thing today) but to pretend that the method of philosophy and science are the same is an absurdity. — David Mo

People do indeed pretend that it can be rigidly defined. But if it isn't, and so philosophy and science as currently understood often interact simultaneously in thought and inquiry, then it's also absurd to talk about the absurdity that these "methods" are the "same."

The sciences study various domains of beings -- life, nature, rocks, stars, cells, etc. Philosophy is the study of being -- ontology in the Greek sense. This is the only "difference" I can see, and even here it's very difficult indeed to mark a clear distinction.

I'll go ahead and be "reprehensible." It's the fact that you think it's your right to judge that keeps me on the sidelines. You all think you're the judge, jury, and executioner. But it's your funeral. — neonspectraltoast

What a silly argument. It's your funeral, too. So you're willing to shoot yourself in the foot because some people online are mean and judgmental? Who cares about that? There's only one thing that matters: are they right? If it's pure name-calling, just ignore them. If they're giving facts and evidence and also being cantankerous, then ignore the latter and look at the facts.

Speaking for myself: I don't think you're reprehensible. I don't think people voting for Trump are evil, I don't think people voting third party are evil, etc. I certainly understand their frustration and wholeheartedly agree that Biden is a very weak candidate indeed. I say that those voting third party or not voting, when their stated goals are the same as mine, are assisting Trump in getting re-elected. I don't think it's evil or reprehensible, I just think it's an easily demonstrable mistake.

The entire argument hinges on what your goals are. The example I always use is climate change. If you profess to care about this issue, then it follows you should vote Biden. Why? Because when you look at the policies of Trump compared to what Biden is proposing or what Obama did, it's clear which is better for the environment. That's not saying much, given Trump's policies, but it's at least "better."

So it follows for other policies as well. I reject that Biden and Trump are the same person with the same policies, and I reject that not voting or voting third party does any good whatsoever to change the DNC -- there's no evidence for that. I also reject the short-term argument, which completely ignores the very small window we have for addressing the climate crisis, and the re-shaping of the judiciary (which will have effects that will be felt for generations).

Nothing like defining yourself by countersignalling signals. Some would think that this way-of-living suggests a resentment that has metastasized - why would anyone base their choices around reactions to others' choices otherwise? — csalisbury

This has become the essence of the Republican party and supporters of Trump. Hate the liberals so much (thanks mainstream media -- i.e., conservative radio, Fox News, etc) that we'll destroy ourselves, our future, any notion of "truth" or expertise, etc.

It's certainly sad.

What role does reason play....wherein lays its weight....in humans generally, from a psychological point of view? — Mww

I can't speak for psychology generally, but my own view is that it plays a role when things break down, when we are consciously solving problems and making plans, etc. Much of our activity is seen as unconscious within psychology, as seen here for example -- a pretty well-known study.

Of course your question depends on what you mean by "reason." I see reason, rationality, and logic as meaning essentially the same thing in our Western tradition: conscious, abstract thought. Consequently, it's pretty clear that abstract thought is essential for philosophy and science and so is very important indeed, as it is in our daily lives as human beings. But we shouldn't forget that although it's a powerful mode of being, it is still, as Heidegger says, "a founded mode," and leaves out what we are "proximally and for the most part" in our "average everydayness." In other words, by viewing the world objectively, we have to leave out all of the aspects of life in which we spend most of our time and out of which we begin to philosophize to begin with.

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one. Therefore, to say we're a rational animal, as has been a common interpretation since Aristotle, isn't wrong. But the ζοον part is still there nonetheless, and shouldn't be forgotten or interpreted through the lens of "reason." Our instincts, habits, skills, our engagement with equipment, etc. - it does no good to describe these in rational terms.

Context here is important:

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems.
— David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.
— Xtrix

Again, this is exactly right.

So you can indeed avoid definitions, because we're simply not thinking this way in most of our everyday lives. We can discuss "meaning," but that's a different and more complicated story in linguistics. — Xtrix

Do you disagree with what I have said? Do you have another concept of definition or meaning? — David Mo

"Meaning," I repeat, is an interesting topic in linguistics and worth looking into. You can define it any way you like -- so that they're in the head or not in the head (as Putnam argued, for example). What we usually refer to when using "meaning" is a person's intentions -- "What did you mean by that?"

Meanings are often tied up with values, interests, goals, feelings, intuitions, etc. It can also mean a definition of a word, like we find in a dictionary. In the latter usage, there's no evidence to suggest this is how we "think" in our everyday activities. Which gets back to:

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have.
— Xtrix
Every experience is concrete. There is no such thing as the experience of the universal. Your mistake consists in believing that the universal categories do not intervene in experience. — David Mo

That's not what I'm saying. There's certainly a place for that.

Look for the difference between sensation and perception in contemporary psychology — David Mo

One, my background is in psychology. Two, your comment isn't relevant.

We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them.
— Xtrix

If you didn't remember how you opened past doors you couldn't open this door. If you did not compare the shape of the present door with others you have seen, you could not open this door. If you were not able to reason why the door has not been opened you would not be able to realize that it is because someone has thrown away the key. That these thoughts are not made explicit is frequent, but they work in your head constantly. — David Mo

No, they don't. This is the mistake. I don't have to do any of the above to open a door. All of what you mentioned are phenomena that occur in the human mind when it's in a completely different mode -- a consciously aware, rational mode, where we need to "recall" something, compare and contrast, deduce, etc. That's not what's happening in opening a door. It's like saying "muscle memory" involves the muscles activity "remembering" what to do. For that matter, why not apply these terms to reflexes as well? Would that even be coherent?

In fact there's all kinds of actions we perform on a daily basis that simply don't involve any of the above factors. It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all; I can be carrying on a conversation, thinking about physics, making plans for the future, etc. To describe these activities using the terms we apply to conscious, rational activity is at best very misleading, and at worst incoherent.

In other words, we know something happens in the brain and nervous system when it comes to habits and skills, but to invoke the terms we use for conscious, rational, abstract activity to explain it is the wrong way forward.

You are constantly thinking when you go to the dentist's office, when you park your car in the garage, when you bake a chicken, when you invite your friends over for a barbecue, when you read a book, when you get restless because your wife hasn't come home, etc. These are thoughts that do not require special concentration. In many cases you are not aware of yourself thinking about them, but they are working permanently, without you being able to avoid them. —

Sure. And this is a radically different kind of thinking than philosophical or scientific thinking, as you know. Likewise with activity. To say there's some kind of "thinking" involved in these activities is like saying there's "thinking" involved in our breathing. Sometimes you can become conscious of breathing and control it to a degree, but mostly it's completely unconscious and does not involve thoughts at all.

Ditto for walking, talking, hammering, or driving a car. All of these we had to learn at some point, and some (like driving and riding a bicycle) even required formal teaching, following rules, repetition, etc. But once those rules are used, they are not then compiled somewhere in the brain, being "invisibly" used once we achieve mastery -- they're just gone. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has some interesting things to say about this in his Phenomenology of Perception, in fact.

In other cases, the failure of this way of thinking -almost reflex- forces you to think about your way of reasoning about the problem. This is less common, but it also occurs abundantly in everyday life. You begin to think "How come...", "Why did she...?" And on a higher level when someone tells you, "You have no reason to think that..."

You can see how reason has weight in our daily life. —

Of course reason has weight in our daily lives. I'm not claiming otherwise.

Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure.
— Xtrix
Wittgenstein does not dismantle particular claims of Aristotle, but the heart of Aristotle's philosophy: metaphysics. — David Mo

Metaphysics isn't the heart of Aristotle's philosophy. The term "metaphysics" itself means "after the physics lectures." Take a look at Aristotle's physics. I haven't read much Wittgenstein, but I doubt he's "dismantled" much there. My hunch is he's very much moving in the space Aristotle opened up, but if he did dismantle it -- good for him. Not an easy task.

The fact that there are exceptions to a definition does not invalidate it. It is difficult to find a word that does not have margins of vagueness. But that natural science is based on controlled experimentation and observation and philosophy doesn't so, is a clear enough difference. Of course, if you go back to antiquity and the Middle Ages, where modern science did not exist, the confusion between philosophy and science is almost absolute. But we are in the 21st century of the Common Era and we talk about the difference between philosophy and science now. — David Mo

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"? By our current standards, what was Aristarchus and Newton doing?

Exceptions don't invalidate the definition, but in this case they make it rather arbitrary. There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation. All it does is drill into kids' heads that there is a special method that people consciously follow which makes them "scientists." And this simply isn't true.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view. The fact that Galileo and Descartes lived around the time of Francis Bacon and the rise of inductive logic, and that we've become nervous about Christian dogma and superstition creeping up into our attempts to understand the world, doesn't justify such rigid categorization. It's fine for university curricula -- but it has no bearing on the real world.

Also, I'm glad to have given you an outlet for your series Forrest. Very interesting indeed.

Well your system is fine -- as long as we don't take it too seriously.

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being
— Xtrix
You put a lot of things into your concept of consciousness. It is not the same to have perceptions as to capture the 'I'. Among other things because you do not grasp your "self" in the same way that you perceive a phenomenon. What is an empty abstraction is not the concept of consciousness, but the way you use it. It does not refer to anything concrete. The opposition between reason and consciousness that you make is meaningless. — David Mo

The lived world isn't "concrete"? Experience isn't concrete? On the contrary, it's the most "concrete" thing we have.

I disagree that I put a lot "into" the concept of consciousness -- which is not well defined in any sense: most of our decisions and our lives are probably un-conscious. So in that case I'm actually leaving a lot out when I say consciousness is our "lived world."

For the rest, it would be good for you to distinguish between discursive reason and reason. In your daily life you are constantly using reason. Even when you perceive things. You evaluate, compare, remember, draw conclusions... Making syllogisms is another thing. Of course. — David Mo

That's a common assumption, and in my view a common mistake. I don't believe we use "reason" either in the sense of syllogism or in the sense you're using it at all. That's just not what you see in everyday actions. We don't have to remember them, draw conclusions about them, or evaluate them at all -- we just do them. Take turning a doorknob, driving a car, walking, or the hundreds of habits and skills we use on a daily basis as examples. When you look at it, it's just a mistake to project "reason" on them. There's certainly a place for that -- and usually when something goes wrong, we have to concentrate and problem-solve, etc. Again, this is not so much my ideas as they are Heidegger's -- but the examples are mine (he uses "hammering").

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.
— Xtrix

The “evidence” part was just distinguishing it from religion. I said “reasons or evidence” then. Distinguishing it from science further narrows that down to basically “reason”. — Pfhorrest

OK. So then philosophy is the use of reason, in the sense of the a priori, and science likewise uses reason but also observation, experimentation, etc?

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell.
— Xtrix

That there are various scientific methods according to the various sciences and that they are the best way to present evidence about facts seems to me unquestionable. If you know of another method, I can reconsider my position. — David Mo

But you're not demonstrating that there is one, you're just taking it as a given that there is. I don't see it -- I don't see a special method that accounts for the success of the sciences or allows us to easily differentiate "it" from anything else, philosophy or otherwise. You can try, and many have, to formulate one, coming up with a list of factors -- observation, experimentation, predictability, peer review, data collection, hypothesis, theory, etc. -- and of course there are plenty of examples. But there are plenty of exceptions as well. Better to just think of this human activity we call "science" as all of the above -- a rational, reflective, thoughtful inquiry into the world -- which does not consciously follow any kind of "method" at all, other than perhaps attempting to understand the world sensibly.

That's not to say "science" isn't a useful concept, but simply that there's no "method" that distinguishes it from "non-science." Again I like to bring up Aristarchus -- was he doing "science"? Who knows.

To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle
— Xtrix
You don't say. Did Wittgenstein believe in prime mover and prima materia? First news.
You're exaggerating a little. — David Mo

Not really. Many of Aristotle's particular claims have been shown to be incorrect, sure. So what? That's not quite what I mean by being "in the shadow" of this man, as you know.

In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.
— Xtrix
The definition is only the use of the word. You may be aware of how you use it or not, but you cannot stop using it one way or another. That is its meaning. — David Mo

Context here is important:

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems.
— David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional. — Xtrix

Again, this is exactly right.

So you can indeed avoid definitions, because we're simply not thinking this way in most of our everyday lives. We can discuss "meaning," but that's a different and more complicated story in linguistics.

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different.
— Xtrix

Well, didn't you say they were the same? Are they the same or are they different? Because the same and different are opposites. Or aren't they? — David Mo

I never made a claim about St. Teresa and Plato -- you did. You said they inhabited opposite worlds, I'm saying they simply have different perspectives and hence make very different interpretations and, therefore, inhabit very different worlds. I don't see a justification for them being "opposite."

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?
— Xtrix

A priori argument. — Pfhorrest

So philosophy, in your view, is restricted to the a priori. Since anything a priori does not rely on empirical observation or experimentation, it's quite a stretch to associate it with "evidence." If it's a priori, it needs no evidence.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."
— Xtrix

No, in the context of whether all philosophy starts with assumed axioms. — Pfhorrest

I don't recall saying all philosophy starts with axioms. Remember what I said:

There is no way around it -- you have to start somewhere. Any proposition in philosophy presupposes something, and in the end it does in fact come down to matters of belief. These core beliefs I call "axioms," but call it whatever you want. It's not that they're unquestionable -- it's that you have to accept them only in order to proceed. —

This includes your proposition about critical rationalism. There are plenty of suppositions there as well, namely about knowledge and truth. The point was made in the context of what "faith" means. Thus even the proposition of what constitutes "faith" is based on a number of suppositions, which if we keep questioning will eventually come down to matters we simply accept.

All of this is in the domain of abstract thought, however -- with its words, definitions, concepts, propositions, categories, syllogisms, etc. -- everything we consider rational, reasonable, logical. Within this "theoretical" domain arises these questions and propositions about knowledge, beauty, truth, etc. While we may claim this is the only way to truth, the fact that it is a particular mode of the human being, and an exceptional one at that, should tell you that a great deal gets left out of the picture. We know this is true in science, but it's true in traditional philosophy as well.

Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant.
— Xtrix

We’re not talking about an afterlife, but about continuing in more of the same kind of life again. If all of one’s conscious existence ceased permanently at death, that would guarantee an end to dukkha. It’s only against the prospect of that going on indefinitely that any special escape is needed. — Pfhorrest

From my reading, there's no mention of any kind of "conscious existence" going on. Other people go on, the world goes on, conscious life in general goes on. True enough. But what matters is what you do in this life, not what happens after you die: the point is to remove suffering -- that's all. All other ideas about samsara, reincarnation, karma, etc., aren't necessary to achieve nirvana in the here and now. Things change (anicca), there is suffering (dukkha), and there is really no "self" (anatta), all of which can be recognized right here and now in experience, through meditation (part of the eightfold path to nirvana, to the cessation of craving and desire) -- open to everyone. There's no forcing, there's no asking for accepting any of these "truths" on faith, etc.

I've found the Buddha was wrong about very little. A lot gets translated poorly -- like "life is suffering," etc. I don't think that's true, nor do I see them as "against" all "wanting" whatsoever (what about the "want" or the "desire" to not be suffering?). Nietzsche considered Buddhism a decadent religion, like Christianity (albeit a more sophisticated and mature one) based on these translations. But I digress.

That's like saying light is "what we gaze upon or look for". I don't think so. Rather: we see, as Plato might say, by light - by seeing, so to speak - which is not "given", not "seen" as such. — 180 Proof

It's not what we gaze upon or look for per se, because it's often in the background -- but it can be understood, hence why we have a concept of "light." As an analogy, light is the basis on which anything becomes visible. It's against this background, often overlooked and never itself seen as light, that we're able to make out anything visible at all.

The analogy fails in the this respect: light, unlike being, is not a given -- some people are blind. It is, however, a given for anything visible.

Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

By "presupposed" I understand, instead, conditions[...]which must obtain for 'thoughts and questions' to make sense, and not "what's thought and questioned" itself. Being is not a supposition - answer to the question "what is real?" (caveat: Heideggerian "what is" is a gnomic sentence-fragment, and not a question). — 180 Proof

Being is presupposed in that sense, yes -- as the condition of the possibility of understanding anything at all. It is embedded in our language as well, as in the copula. It's not a supposition or an answer to a question.

You're taking epistemological positions for granted, though. — Pfhorrest

In the context of the meaning of being (which I argue is what philosophy thinks). But in that case the nature of ἐπιστήμη is not being used in the sense you're using it, nor is "truth."

Anatta is the cure to samsara. If there was no samsara to worry about, there would be no need for a special path to anatta: everyone would get there inevitably when they died. If it were not thought possible to maintain some (however false) sense of self through the cycle of death and rebirth, and so to continue suffering beyond death, then the way to end suffering would be simple: just die. It's only against that background presumption of samsara that Buddhism makes any sense. — Pfhorrest

That's just not true. It's against the background of dukkha that Buddhism makes sense. It's clear in the teaching: there is suffering. This is the very first noble truth. The way out of suffering is the eightfold path, which is based around vipassana meditation (panja) and sila (ethical conduct). Whether or not there's an afterlife isn't relevant. Rather if you want to be happy, do this.

What remains still as philosophy is demarcated from science in that while philosophy relies only upon reason or evidence to reach its conclusions, rather than appeals to faith, as an activity it does not appeal to empirical observation either, even though within philosophy one may conclude that empirical observation is the correct way to reach conclusions about reality. — Pfhorrest

Philosophy doesn't appeal to empirical observation? What would be considered "evidence" in that case?

I just don't think it's this straightforward. If we decide we want to define philosophy in his way, I fail to see the motivation for it. You're quite right that science was natural philosophy, with "nature" as physics, and physics as a variation of the res extensa- substance that's extended in space. I don't see much reason for so rigidly separating the two, despite claims of a special method. It betrays a reaction to Christianity and has hints of scientism.

I agree that the real (i.e. MEon, or other-than-being) is fundamental, not as an object of "science" (i.e. academic) but as the immanent horizon, or enabling-constraint, of struggle (i.e. existential). — 180 Proof

I think I agree with this, although I have no way of completely understanding your terminology here until it's further explained. Yes, "being" and "reality" I too would argue are not simply objects of science -- they're what we philosophize out of and about. In that case, being is a given.

It's the activity of interpreting being through theories and concepts.
Okay, better - "being" as presupposed by "theories and concepts" (Collingwood? Spinoza?) — 180 Proof

Glad you approve. :) Yes, being is presupposed -- it's what's thought and questioned.

or

"Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology."

Agree? Disagree? Incoherent?

Incoherent. Seems (implicitly) 'epistemically anthropocentric', or idealist-essentialist (re: hypostatization). — 180 Proof

This one is harder, yes. It depends in this case on what I mean by "phenomenology" first and foremost. Phenomenology is a method, in this case the method for the science of being (ontology). The "universal" here indicates not some being (as in a particular being) or some group or class of beings (entities) like trees, dogs, planets, nature, beauty, mathematics -- but rather being itself.

This consciousness you speak of is nothing more than an abstraction.
So reason may be imperfect, but it's what we have and we should resign ourselves to it. Polishing it, perfecting it, handling it, but not inventing alternatives that are more lying than reason itself. — David Mo

On the contrary, it is consciousness that we have, if we mean by this our lived world -- our experiences, our being -- and reason in the sense of concepts, categories, words, and logic that is far more often "lying." If consciousness is an abstraction, so is reason itself.

When we're being the rational animal, we're leaving out how we mostly function in the world. It's like saying "thought" is only abstract thought. That's not the type of "thought" that goes through our heads 99% of the time when we're talking to ourselves and visualizing fragments of images. Likewise rationality, or reason, is one faculty of the human being -- and a very important one. But I think we should let go of seeing the human being as simply the animal with reason, especially if by reason we mean the above aspects.

They are not the same worlds but opposite worlds. — David Mo

I don't see why "opposite." They're just different. Not all differences are opposites.

We have to be careful, though, not to equate philosophy with some kind of therapy. In some cases, philosophical thought aims simply at understanding the world or an aspect of the world, like a hammer or a tree, without any real thought of morality or health per se. It still comes out of the human mind, with a human desire to understand, but that's still very different from questions regarding a good or healthy or happy life.

I like all of that very much. So by "kind of medicine" you mean in the sense of what's indicated in those passages. In that case, that's surely true.

But insofar as "science" presupposes "being", "the science of being", at best, begs the question, no? — 180 Proof

Good point -- it does indeed. Why? Because before we even "do" philosophy or science, we're in a world, we exist in a world, and with a pre-theoretical understanding of ourselves (and everything else that exists). Since it's from here which we start to philosophize, it is a sort of turning on itself.

That's foundationalism, which is far from uncontroversial. — Pfhorrest

Foundationalism concerns knowledge, yes, which has a long history in epistemology. I'm not concerned with epistemology.

As I said, you can instead -- as critical rationalism would have it -- start with a survey of possibilities, reduce to absurdity some of them, and then proceed from whatever is left. — Pfhorrest

You're still starting as a human being interested in these questions, yes? So whether you start inductively or deductively doesn't much matter to me. Both presuppose a human being making an inquiry or attempting to understand the world somehow. Whether or not that's "belief" or "faith" is questionable perhaps, but in any case it's a given. We can challenge whether or not we exist, of course, but I've always considered that an absurdity.

Just believing something yourself without adequate reason isn’t faith. To quote myself elsewhere:

I also don't mean just holding some opinion "on faith", as in without sufficient reason; I don't think you need reasons simply to hold an opinion yourself. I am only against appeals to faith, by which I mean I am against assertions — statements not merely to the effect that one is of some opinion oneself, but that it is the correct opinion, that everyone should adopt — that are made arbitrarily; not for any reason, not "because of..." anything, but "just because"; assertions that some claim is true because it just is, with no further justification to back that claim up. — Pfhorrest

That's a little more specific, and I happen to agree with it. I don't see why the term need apply only to factual statements. In my tentative semantics, "faith" is belief without evidence (or reason), whether personal opinions or universal prescriptions. Hence a little more general, and in that case, having "faith" in the airplane pilot or a belief that human beings are essentially "good" are matters of faith.

As for Buddhism -- no Buddhist, that I'm aware of, asks you to accept the "wisdom of Siddhartha" on faith. Quite the opposite.
— Xtrix

I am not aware of any Buddhist arguing for Buddhist principles in a way meant to convince someone who doesn’t already believe them. It’s all meant to be taken as self-evident wisdom that just needed someone wise enough to point it out, and now that it’s been pointed out, you’ve just got to either accept it and find peace or go on suffering in your miserable unenlightened life. — Pfhorrest

That's not what Buddhists argue at all -- if they ever do argue. The 4 Noble Truths, for example, are indeed seen as "truths," but nowhere does Buddha or Buddha's adherents ever ask one to accept them on faith. Rather, you can see for yourself through meditation, which is experiential. You can accept or reject it on this basis alone.

The Buddhist ideas (in some traditions) of reincarnation really have nothing to do with the supernatural, any more than a cloud becoming rain is supernatural.
— Xtrix

The idea of any kind of self surviving death to live another miserable life of suffering is sort of a key motivating factor in Buddhism — Pfhorrest

Not "any kind of self." Buddhists don't believe your individual personality survives after death. They do believe in continuation and transformation, as a cloud to rain or a dead leaf into soil, etc. At least in the variations I'm familiar with. I know in parts of Thailand they practically worship Buddha as a god, his statues are everywhere, and so maybe you can find beliefs in an afterlife there -- but from what I've read in the Sutras, Buddha himself never discusses the 'self' surviving or anything spooky like that. In fact, non-self is a basic tenant (anatta).

Philosophy ends when science establishes the facts. This has been the case since the time when science got a reliable method. Therefore, I do not include the philosophy of the past in my demarcation criteria. Aristotle is not Wittgenstein. — David Mo

This, again, assumes a scientific method, and no one so far has demonstrated there is one -- as far as I can tell. I'd be happy to be proven wrong.

Aristotle certainly is not Wittgenstein. The "philosophy of the past" has to be included in anything we discuss about philosophy. I see no way around it. To this day we're in the shadow of Aristotle -- including Wittgenstein. If we forget or disregard the "tradition," the development of Western thought, then we run into many risks indeed. And again, the best scientists are the ones who engage with this thought.

On spirituality: it is a vague word. It sounds like religion without god. I don't include spirituality as a kind of philosophy. — David Mo

"Religion" and "spirituality" are older than philosophy, certainly. But philosophy deals with the same questions. It's not always easy to decipher one from the other. Rather than defining things any way we like, it seems as if we know the difference when we see it in specific cases.

Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.
— Xtrix

You can't avoid definitions. If you don't make them explicit, they will work in the background. And this is a source of pseudo-problems. — David Mo

It depends on what you mean. In explicit, theoretical understanding -- that's certainly true. In everyday life, it's certainly not the case that definitions "work in the background" -- or if they do, it's exceptional.

On the other hand, even "formal" philosophy starts with axioms of some kind.
— Xtrix

Not necessarily. It can start with a survey of possibilities, reduce to absurdity some of them, and then proceed from whatever is left. I’d argue that to just put forth some unquestionable axioms simply is religion. — Pfhorrest

There is no way around it -- you have to start somewhere. Any proposition in philosophy presupposes something, and in the end it does in fact come down to matters of belief. These core beliefs I call "axioms," but call it whatever you want. It's not that they're unquestionable -- it's that you have to accept them only in order to proceed. Take Euclid's axioms in geometry, for example. Of course we can still question these, maybe even reject them -- it's not a dogma. Yet if you don't accept them, at least temporarily, the rest won't be very interesting or even coherent.

The same is true of philosophy -- it doesn't start from nowhere.

Yes, religion is anything that appeals to faith. And it’s not only claims about the supernatural that appeal to faith. Buddhism just stipulates its principles and asks you to accept them. Even if those principles make no appeal to the supernatural (which, inasmuch as they talk about reincarnation and escaping the cycle thereof, they actually do), just asking us to accept them on faith in the wisdom of Siddhartha makes it a religion still. — Pfhorrest

If we choose to define "religion" as anything that appeals to faith, then we should discuss exactly what we mean by faith. I say it's belief without evidence. But in that case, many things we do on a daily basis involves a good deal of faith as well, yet I wouldn't call it religion.

As for Buddhism -- no Buddhist, that I'm aware of, asks you to accept the "wisdom of Siddhartha" on faith. Quite the opposite.

The Buddhist ideas (in some traditions) of reincarnation really have nothing to do with the supernatural, any more than a cloud becoming rain is supernatural.

But we 'sophisticated' people in the 21st century are addicted to 'reason' and are conceited about any kind of knowledge that does not come from 'reason'. Reason is abstract, consciousness is concrete. Which is more truthful about the world? — EnPassant

Very good point.

Consciousness, awareness, attention, concentration -- all very similar in many ways. The latter two have perhaps more specific connotations as sustained or unwavering awareness.

Regardless, it's no wonder consciousness is where "modern philosophy" starts in Descartes. It's striking how often this is overlooked or misunderstood, but Descartes' cogito, ergo sum is not simply "thinking" as in the reasoning and abstracting you mentioned above, but rather "conscious awareness." He makes this clear in his Principles of Philosophy, which unfortunately almost never gets assigned to students but which I would argue (as would Descartes himself) is a much more important work than the Meditations or the Discourse.

The question becomes, in reaction to Descartes, what is "consciousness," what is the "I," and what is "being"? Heidegger essentially says that this should really be flipped: "I am, therefore I think." He'll claim that Descartes largely ignores ontology, taking up the Scholastic variation and moving on from there. I think this is very much true, and that we've thus almost completely ignored the question of being and have been stuck in a mind/body or subject/object divide for a long time now, wrapped up in our scientific pursuits while what's called "philosophy" gets relegated to simply an analysis of the results of science in college and university departments.

It's exactly the lived life, the average everyday life, that we ever begin to philosophize. Yet this either gets ignored, or else interpreted in the same light we interpret anything else in nature -- by de-worlding it. So your point of differentiating abstraction and consciousness is important indeed.

Particular instances of people acting in moral ways and holding moral opinions are part of reality or course, but the question “what is moral?” is separate from the question “what is real?”. That’s the is-ought or fact-value divide there. — Pfhorrest

Although it can be useful, the fact-value dichotomy was never very compelling to me. But this is beside the point: even morality as a concept is a being. Hence, morality and ethics is part of philosophy, because philosophy is ontology.

Or one could argue.

As regards the definition of philosophy, a quick and general answer would be that philosophy is about the fundamental topics that lie at the core of all other fields of inquiry, broad topics like reality, morality, knowledge, justice, reason, beauty, the mind and the will, social institutions of education and governance, and perhaps above all meaning, both in the abstract linguistic sense, and in the practical sense of what is important in life and why. — Pfhorrest

A very good interpretation, in my view. Philosophy as asking fundamental questions, which traverse all other fields. This is partly why I also like philosophy as ontology (in the Greek sense). You mentioned before that you believe this isn't quite right, because philosophy is also about morality -- but I'd say that morals, values, justice, "good" and "bad," actions, etc. -- are all "beings" as well. Maybe a better way to say it: they're all "things," after all. So taking "being" in a very broad sense, philosophy as ontology also includes morality.

The first line of demarcation is between philosophy and religion, which also claims to hold answers to all of those big questions. I would draw the demarcation between them along the line dividing faith and reason, with religions appealing to faith for their answers to these questions, and philosophies attempting to argue for them with reasons. — Pfhorrest

A very good place to start. On the other hand, even "formal" philosophy starts with axioms of some kind. Granted, it does not justify it's propositions by appeals to "faith" as often as some religions do. But the problem then becomes: what is "religion"? Is religion simply beliefs held on faith and not reason? In that case, I'd argue Buddhism really isn't a religion at all. There are no gods, no supernaturalism, no accepting anything on faith. Other religions, including Christianity, use the faculty of reason a great deal, as in Scholasticism. Those thinkers weren't idiots, of course.

The very first philosopher recognized in western history, Thales, is noted for breaking from the use of mythology to explain the world, instead practicing a primitive precursor to what would eventually become science, appealing to observable phenomena as evidence for his attempted explanations. — Pfhorrest

This is the usual story, and probably correct in many ways -- although I have a hard time believing no other thought was occurring prior to Thales. Regardless, this is what is extant and so he earns his place. It's interesting that from his case alone we can shed light on what we're discussing here. He was certainly a believer in the gods, but also asked fundamental questions, and sought to answer them with reason and evidence. He's often said to be one of the "founders" of what would become (much later) "science," but he alone embodies all three aspects we've been discussing -- religion, philosophy, science.

Clarify both definitions so I/we can evaluate them. — 180 Proof

I'll try: philosophy is, essentially, ontology -- the science of being. It's the activity of interpreting being through theories and concepts.

So in Aristotle, "First philosophy" is (although often translated anachronistically as "metaphysics") ontology; "Second philosophy" is essentially natural philosophy, and so all the positive sciences in our time (many of which he founded).

I think that's a decent place to start. This raises a welter of questions, of course. But I'm being deliberately provocative.

By “therapeutically satisfying way of life” I meant to distinguish between philosophy as it is practiced in academia today, and, for example, that of the Hellenistic philosophers for whom philosophizing was a kind of medicine. — Statilius

I'm still not sure what you mean by a "kind of medicine."

See, here it's tricky in my view. On the one hand, of course philosophy isn't science or religion -- they differ in many ways. But on the other hand, they deal with very similar questions.
— Xtrix
Being interested in someone's work does not mean interfering with what they are doing. The philosopher and the scientist who operates on a certain theoretical level are interested in similar problems, as you say. But philosophy cannot claim to rival the scientist in establishing the facts. It can interpret what science is doing (philosophy of science), but it cannot correct or replace it. — David Mo

You're presupposing a difference, though. When does philosophy end and science begin? Or religion and spirituality, for that matter. I agree wholeheartedly there are examples where it does appear to be fairly clear-cut and obvious, but other times not so much. So, for example, we could ask whether Kant or Newton or Galileo were "doing" science or philosophy, but that question wouldn't really arise in their day. Was Aristarchus a scientist? I'd say absolutely. Was Thales or Anaximander? Democritus?

You see what I'm getting at. Like I said before, I'm not saying there is never a difference. In today's world there certainly appears to be in terms of university departments and the kind of papers being published, etc. But like many things, we don't have a real rule or solid "definition" for determining which is which -- although we may feel like there's one. Maybe we simply have to say "So much the worse for definitions," and leave it to intuition and specific situations.

On the other hand, the scientist would do well to have a philosophical background if he wants to get into the field. Usually theoretical scientists confuse the philosophies of the past with those of the present. They think they have refuted "philosophy" when they have dismantled some beliefs of Plato or Thomas Aquinas. Although there are often contacts between scientists and philosophers, the great popes on both sides are often surprisingly misinformed. A matter of egocentricity, I suppose. — David Mo

Very true. It's no big surprise that the real trailblazers in science are the individuals who engage with the thinkers of the past, rather than dismissing it all as useless (while inadvertently presupposing the philosophy of 80 years ago).

Many centuries of empty metaphysics have made me apprehensive about these kinds of "universal" tasks. When I hear the word "Being" it gives me chills. A conditioned reflex I suppose. — David Mo

Rightfully so. What did Nietzsche say about being -- that it's an "error" and a "vapor"?

Missing half the picture. Philosophy isn’t just about being and ontology, i.e. reality. It’s also about morality. — Pfhorrest

Is not morality a part of reality?

What do we think of this:

“Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities.”

or

"Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology."

Agree? Disagree? Incoherent?

Judging from some recent polls in battleground states, looks like we're in for another four years of Trump -- largely owing to the DNC's putting up terrible candidates, and voters willing to sit out or protest-vote in response and thus helping Trump get another four years of systematically destroying environmental regulations (needed more than ever), accelerating climate change, appointing lifetime judges to the circuit court, giving department heads to his friends, massive tax cuts to the wealthy, etc. etc.

Let's hope the DNC "learns its lesson" this time. Let's also hope our grandkids have a planet to inhabit in 2060.

Of the many types of human inquiry, philosophy is inquiry by means of rigorous reasoning in the pursuit and formation of creditable beliefs. As such, it is not bound to any specific field, concern or interest. Many, if not every, cosmic dimension and question can be approached by way of philosophy: religion, science, literature, farming, cinema, education, politics, cooking, etc. Philosophy is one of many tools humans employ to render the world and their experience more intelligible. While, for some, philosophy is strictly a theoretical enterprise, for others it is a therapeutically satisfying way of life. — Statilius

Inquiry certainly plays a role, as does reasoning. Whether it's the pursuit of "creditable" beliefs (do you mean credible?), this too has a long history going back at least in some ways to Plato, but obviously the question then becomes "What is belief?" and "What is truth?"

So to tweak what you've said a little bit, does philosophy as the "pursuit of truth through rational inquiry" sound good? Or have I misunderstood you?

Also, regarding "therapeutically satisfying way of life," I'm not totally clear on that -- how does this differ from a rational or theoretical enterprise? Or does it?

Appreciate the responses.

See, here it's tricky in my view. On the one hand, of course philosophy isn't science or religion -- they differ in many ways. But on the other hand, they deal with very similar questions.
— Xtrix

True, but it is the ways that they approach those questions that differentiates them. — Pfhorrest

Sure, but here we get into the issue of a scientific "method" that differentiates it from the others -- especially religion and philosophy, which are often looked down on in science -- and to which science owes its success. Personally I'm not convinced by the arguments in favor of such an "inductive method," although others on this forum have emphasized predictability as an essential feature above the rest. That's all debatable.

Regardless, this isn't really about science, but since science was originally called "natural philosophy," and since religions throughout history (not simply Christianity) have asked the same basic questions philosophers ask and have come to conclusions that don't involve the "supernatural" at all (like some Buddhist and Daoist ideas), it's sometimes not so easy to see where religion ends and philosophy begins. After all, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Anselm are considered philosophers. Galileo and Newton were pretty religious men yet are considered great scientists.

You see my point. Again, it's not that there aren't differences -- they are often quite clear, in fact -- but when pushed to answer it does get a bit tricky. I think our Western answers and attitudes are shaped in reaction to specifically Christian dogma, and so science and philosophy get separated from this dogma (which comes to represent "religion") and hence against things like heaven, hell, the supernatural, angels, a humanoid sky-Father, miracles, etc.

What do you mean by 'thinking'? — EnPassant

Excellent question. I wish I had a definitive answer.

Abstract 'rational' thinking? — EnPassant

I see that as one mode of thought, yes.

Isn't simply being conscious thinking? — EnPassant

Again, it depends on what we mean. Is thought equated to words and concepts and abstractions? If so, then I'm sure I "think" without these at times -- in imagery, for example.

But if "thinking" means anything we're consciously aware of, then we're very much agreeing with Descartes, and in which case it'd be hard to differentiate philosophy from "thinking" in this sense. or really anything at all -- since conscious awareness seems to be involved in nearly everything to we do. I don't feel this is quite right, but it's a powerful position.

If thought is energy 'flowing' through the mind then being is thinking. Thought is being. Being is thought. — EnPassant

I think you've actually touched on something that has been a dominant view in the West for a long time indeed, namely that being and thinking are either the same or that "being" is really subsumed by thought (in the sense of consciousness), which sounds to me a little like Kant's representations -- not that "being" in the sense of the objective world isn't there, but that the mind contributes to it. Here we're in the subject/object form of knowledge, with time and space being the forms of perception and hence everything knowable.

Whether being and conscious awareness ("thinking") are the same is an interesting question. Again I find Heidegger a very interesting resource on these issues. I don't want to make this about Heidegger -- I have another thread for that -- but needless to say your question is a good one.

An interesting list indeed.

Philosophy is about the human being. Although it sometimes seems to treat the universe, it always does so from the perspective or background of the human being. — David Mo

I very much agree with this especially -- and it's striking how often it's forgotten. I think this is largely because science is so successful and is thus seen as the ultimate court of appeals for truth. Since science deals with objects in nature, with matter in motion, it can very easily be forgotten that these sets "facts" are also interpretations, parts of explanatory theories, etc.

Obviously this isn't new -- Kant pointed this out as well, to name one major figure, but it's still worth bearing in mind.

Philosophy is rationality. Even when it defends the irrational, it must do so with arguments that can be shared. — David Mo

I think this is in fact what the view has been for over 2,000 years. That philosophy is the ratio or logos: that we're thinking entities, or the rational animal, or the primate with language, and so on -- philosophy being thus the human being's highest activity.

Philosophy is not religion — Pfhorrest

Philosophy is not science — Pfhorrest

See, here it's tricky in my view. On the one hand, of course philosophy isn't science or religion -- they differ in many ways. But on the other hand, they deal with very similar questions.

Let me throw in another question: how does philosophy differ from "thinking" generally? Or does it?

All interesting so far.

Worth repeating:

Let's say both men are equally terrible as people, man A and man B. One will destroy the planet (terrible man A), one will not (terrible man B) -- and we acknowledge this fact, say fact "X."

Given X, who do you want to see in charge? (Fully acknowledging it's still a bad choice indeed.)

If it's the latter (B), then the next question is: what if I sit out, or vote for someone besides the two terrible men?

If the answer turns out to be: it helps man A, what then? Do we change our mind and vote directly for man B? If not, and given we accept X, how can we live with this choice? Is it not saying that doing the "right thing" is a greater priority than human existence?

I think the problem with the people on this thread is that they don't accept X. But that's exactly what I want to discuss, because I think there's overwhelming evidence supporting it, which comes directly from science.
_______

That's logic. If the premises aren't accepted, my conclusion is wrong. So far as I know, however, there hasn't been a very cogent argument against the premises.

So if we care about what we profess to care about -- whether it's rape, or the DNC, or climate change, or any progressive policy, the logic is quite clear.

For those who don't care about these things, or believe the opposite, the logical thing is to vote for Trump.