I occasionally say that one can know things independent of one's own mind. — Punshhh
Barrett’s theory is constructionist - she successfully refutes essentialist assumptions made in classical emotion theory, which claim from intuitive and unconscious relational behaviour and historically misappropriated information that all ‘emotions’ must therefore be instinctual, and that each ‘emotion’, from pain to happiness, comes from an essence or fingerprint that is universal and identifiable across all human experience. Yet no such fingerprint can be found. — Possibility
Well, we’re in disagreement there. Your thoughts have a greater impact on your biochemical state than you realise — Possibility
just as you can quantify and construct a probabilistic experience of ‘red’. — Possibility
I disagree - If you read what I wrote, I mentioned that Barrett uses the term ‘affect’ to distinguish between ‘emotions’ of everyday language, as concepts constructed in the brain, and your idea of ‘emotion-information’ - what Denton confusingly refers to as ‘emotion’ (not to be confused with ‘emotions’) - as a relational structure consisting of qualitative information at a bio-chemical level. — Possibility
You’re effectively trying to isolate some arbitrary concept of ‘brain consciousness’ not only from any relation to cellular structures, but also from our integrated multi-cellular system, and then claiming it isn’t as complex as cellular-level consciousness. It’s a whole other level of complexity. — Possibility
I think what you refer to as ‘an emotionally charged setting’ IS that qualitative information: the relational structure of reality. Qualitative information manifests as this relational structure (matter); quantitative information manifests as energy. Not charge AND information (again with the dualism?). It isn’t just a matter of unentangling - it’s about understanding how all information interrelates. To ‘unentangle’ is to ignore, isolate or exclude the relations that give the information its structure, tipping the bias. The more ‘unentangled’ the information appears, the more biased/affected. — Possibility
I don’t believe emotion-information is limited by logical possibility. — Possibility
Well, I dispute that all self-organisation is self-interested — Possibility
This doesn’t conflict with Denton’s interpretation, that I can see, except that what he refers to as a ‘force’ is, in Barrett’s theory, inseparable from information, as you say. — Possibility
Either everything is information (in which case qualia IS information), — Possibility
The binary I’m referring to, by the way, is your ‘bias to be’. You’re suggesting it is fundamentally a bias (towards one bit of information rather than another), which suddenly and without explanation becomes a set of instructions in DNA to construct an emotion gradient within a four-dimensional system. I have suggested an elegant structure of evolution in complexity from quantum physics to consciousness that enables this, but it seems you won’t consider it either because it, too, appears biased towards a materialist argument, and challenges idealist assumptions. — Possibility
‘it’s relations all the way down’, relational structure is ontologically subsistent, and individual ‘objects’ are merely heuristic devices used by agents to orient themselves in regions of spacetime, and to construct approximate representations of the world. — Possibility
Fornicating is still the most pleasurable activity... not idea creation. Hence the overpopulating of the planet. Which in turn causes all our global ecological troubles. — god must be atheist
An idea that fits well into a mind induces senses of pleasure in the organism, and thus the idea is accepted and incorporated into existing ideas, and thus it combines with other ideas and becomes part of the a chain of reasoning that propogates. — Roy Davies
The brain is, if you recall your high school biology, the organ that coordinates all the other organs - far removed from a chaotic system. — TheMadFool
No different I must admit but so what? I chose conjoined twins to make my case because they're the closest we can get to two brains being physically identical and having similar experiences which, according to the physicalism and nature-nurture theory, should've caused conjoined twins to have similar, if not identical, minds. — TheMadFool
So, is this “attraction to life” an impetus to consolidate - to ignore, isolate and exclude - or is it to increase awareness, connection and collaboration, despite the risks? — Possibility
I’m certainly no Guru myself. I’ve found that there are many ways to approach the same meaning from a limited and flawed perspective. I think discussions such as these help both of us reach a broader understanding, even if we never see eye to eye. — Possibility
The base consistency of reality is in its relational structure: All living systems consist of a four-dimensional integrated system of information, and evolve according to the sustainability of their self-organization process to transform information/energy from their interaction with the world into a fulfilment of ongoing effort and attention requirements for the integrated system. — Possibility
I was thinking more of a 2D structure rather then linear, such that similar degrees of pain could be differentiated laterally. It is a gradient, but I don't know its structure absolutely.
— Pop
Differentiated how? Would the 2D structure of affect - as valence (pleasant-unpleasant) and arousal (high-low) - suffice? — Possibility
- my bad, sorry.Here’s the interesting thing: I never suggested that a forest could be contained or described — Possibility
Your first explanation is circular. You’ve been arguing that the pain-pleasure spectrum is the impetus for behaviour, and yet here you’re saying that our behaviour determines the position of such an experience on the spectrum. So which is it? — Possibility
What you’re referring to is a linear structure, with positive values on one side, negative values on the other, and an infinite value (zero) in the centre. But that ignores the complexity of the relation between pain and pleasure, doesn’t it? — Possibility
Most humans would agree with the logic of your theory, but it has no practical value. You can’t apply it to improve your interactions with reality. — Possibility
My difficulty with you using the term ‘emotion’ is that it generally refers to a particular feeling, whereas the term ‘affect’ refers to feeling in general, whether or not it is apperceived as ‘emotion’. We don’t always identify affect as emotion, but emotion is always identified from affect, whether in self-reflection, or in rationalising behaviour — Possibility
This becomes our best approximation of reality. Am I close? — Possibility
But it’s because the information we receive is limited and skewed by the structure of the information system that receives and processes it, not because something different exists in reality. — Possibility
The base consistency of reality is in its relational structure: All living systems consist of a four-dimensional integrated system of information, and evolve according to the sustainability of their self-organisation process to transform information/energy in order to transform themselves from their current emotional state to a more pleasurable one. :razz: . — Possibility
Are you suggesting that we have an infinite capacity for both pleasure and pain? Or that consciousness exists beyond pleasure? You’ve said before that nothing dies in the universe, it just falls to a lower level of consciousness - I imagine that’s what you believe occurs when pain is unavoidably maximised? So, would that mean maximal pleasure may lead to a higher level of consciousness? — Possibility
you cannot account for experiences that are simultaneously both painful and pleasurable in your methodology. — Possibility
Looking at what is common to every tree will not give you an understanding of the forest — Possibility
How do you figure that? Firstly, Barrett never aimed to answer the hard problem, but to provide a more accurate theory of emotion that reconciles psychology with current neuroscience. Secondly, if according to idealism, everything exists in mind, then surely there can be no hard problem to begin with? — Possibility
My point is, Pop cannot make a statement to the effect that all things experience consciousness and assume it to be self evident. They either must state that they take it as an assumption/opinion (and thus make it explicit that they will not attempt to prove it), or they must offer some rationale. — Malcolm Lett
Steady on - my point is that our affective state is NOT reducible to ‘a feeling’ or resolved to a point on a pain-pleasure spectrum, except through ignorance, isolation or exclusion of information. Subsuming an affective state under a singular value-concept of ‘pleasure-pain’ ignores the complexity of that state, and ultimately the complexity of consciousness itself. — Possibility
If every instance of consciousness is unique, then why get caught up in the inaccuracy of defining consciousness from our own limited experience? Our understanding of consciousness will come not from the content, but from the structure. Not from the trees, but from the forest. Not from quanta or qualia, but from a tested and refined relational structure that renders this complexity of information reliable for every interaction. — Possibility
While I agree that we rely for the most part on a personal construction of the world (inside and out), I disagree that we have no access to reality at all. Rather, our access is limited by the construction of the system and by its available energy - the attention and effort we can spare in the moment - and our efficiency in this has been developing at a rapid rate. How do you think we constructed our view of reality in the first place?
That you refer to ‘an outside physical world with real people’ is telling. The reality of the world beyond the ‘self’ does not really consist of ‘things’ and ‘people’, but of interrelated possibility or existence-information, which we organise into ideas, subsume under concepts, render as objects and reduce to physics for our various purposes. And it’s the same inside our skin - we are inseparable from this existence-information, except in our own ‘mind’ or socio-cultural construction through ignorance, isolation and exclusion. — Possibility
I see no reason why consciousness should be exclusive to organic lifeforms — Merkwurdichliebe
Hi Pop, I've read through your full article. — Malcolm Lett
I was very interested as you suggested in your OP that it tackles the hard problem of consciousness. However, I don't think you actually touch on that question. — Malcolm Lett
You don't offer any basis for this claim. It sounds like you are assuming panpsychism, which is not generally accepted. Perhaps you could offer a more detailed account of why you think everything living is conscious.
Thanks for pointing that out. I would have thought this was self evident - .All living creatures are self learning and programming. All living creatures are involved in a process of self organisation - always!
But several people have mentioned this, so perhaps I will have to strengthen my case in this regard.
Overall, I'd say that you've conflated self-organisation and consciousness without providing an explanation. — Malcolm Lett
Also, take a look at the Free Energy Principle (from Karl Friston), I think you'll find it's very similar to your theory of the Emotional Gradient, but is more general. I'd also suggest it's a better characterisation than using the word 'emotion'. — Malcolm Lett
Sort of. Our self-organisation process from intentionality to action will always be subject to affect: every thought, word and movement contains at least some reference to our affective state, no matter how ‘rational’ we think we are. As far as I can see it’s only a ‘bias’ if it’s excluding or unfairly dismissive of information, though. — Possibility
The way I see it, reductionism seeks accurate methodologies to render the world into more efficient forms of information. The problem is that the methodologies we currently rely on and have built into our language and logic are based on old assumptions and anthropocentrism that no longer stand up to scrutiny. — Possibility
As a reductionist-idealist, it appears that you view consciousness as the base existence, with the ‘pleasure/pain spectrum’ and ‘zero point energy’ as upper and lower limitations in relation to an assumption of ‘mind’. Your notion of ‘emotion-information’ seems to me just another form of anthropocentric logic - albeit one with a bias towards qualitative information, dismissing quantitative information as ‘irrelevant’. That’s how I understand it, at this stage, anyway. — Possibility
At some point, like every other theory of consciousness, you’re going to have to reconcile your theory with quantum physics (the home of reductionist-materialists) - just like any quantum physics interpretation is going to have to reconcile with general relativity, gravity, the measurement problem and, of course, qualia. — Possibility
Sorry, this got a little heavy. — Possibility
a negative value affect perceived in the organism, attributed to the affecting area/object/event, that gives impetus to repellent action. — Possibility
So we call it ‘painful’ because the behavior response is generally repellent. I’m not suggesting it’s something other than pain, I’m just making sure you understand that there is no awareness that something particular is ‘painful’ as such. — Possibility
So the separation of qualitative and quantitative information is an arbitrary differentiation of possible map alignment instructions (ie. reductionist methodology), that is incompatible with the way we actually interact with reality. — Possibility
So, how can we ensure a fitness function that evolves ideas in a positive direction? — Roy Davies
A good idea also has to be refutable in its design. — Roy Davies
Reality exist only as we perceive it, surely? — Roy Davies
I’m curious about this statement. Does a simple cellular organism experience pain or pleasure? It certainly would try to avoid existential threats - which seems to match your idea of what consciousness is for. So, is that organism conscious? — Roy Davies
I think that "or" should be an "and". — dussias
What do you mean by "self-interest?" — dussias
Unfortunately, your website does not lend itself to being studied at length. Breaking your theory up into bite-size chunks addressing particular questions or areas of inquiry would be my suggestion (from a strictly marketing/communication standpoint). — Possibility
From the perspectives that you have characterized, the hard problem of consciousness can not be solved. For this reason the paradigm is likely false.
— Pop
That’s a rapid jump to a dismissive conclusion. There’s much more to my position than what I’ve outlined here in response to your theory. The hard problem of consciousness assumes that inanimate matter is unable to ‘experience’. — Possibility
but you have to recognise the anthropocentric lens this interpretation has, and account for it in relation to physics — Possibility
So, my heatpump can sense and control its environment (temperature) and appears to be trying to communicate with me through beeps and the remote control. — Roy Davies