Of course. Everybody wants his theory to be objectively true. Or be constantly falsified by observations. Or established in research programs. We observe the theory though. The theory is subjective. So what we observe is dependent on theory. There is no theory independent reality pulling the theory in the right direction. Well, there is, but only after the theoretical reality has been introduced in the first place. Where some see quark like point particles, I see triplets of geometrically extended structures. — Cornwell1

Where is the theory we observe? Where some see quark like particles and you see triples of geometrically extended structures, are you saying that what you are seeing is a theory, or objects? If what you see is different than what others are describing that they see, how do you know that you're both talking about the same thing? You'd run the risk of talking past each other.

I would say the the utterance of a sentence expresses a proposition. I don't know what the second question means exactly. We might use sentences to identify propositions, or it's the object of a that clause: "It's true that..." — frank

What form does a sentence take? What form does a proposition take? How can you tell the difference between a sentence and a proposition? Can propositions exist independently of sentences? If so, how? How do you know you're thinking of a sentence as opposed to a proposition?

No, I wanted folk here to explain and clarify what they mean by "content". — bongo fury

Scribbles and spoken sounds?

An all too common error; the conflation of meaning and causality.The former requires being meaningful to something or someone, whereas the latter does not. — creativesoul

Huh? Meaning requires being meaningful to something or someone? This is circular logic. What does it mean for something to be meaningful to someone?

The conflation is the basis for many who claim that clouds mean rain even when there is noone around to take notice... — creativesoul

You're conflating causal relationships between clouds and rain and someone taking notice that clouds mean rain. Are you saying the act of taking notice is meaning? Observations are meanings?

This weed isn't helping your philosophy skills. Change to a different strain. — frank

Committing logical fallacies isn't helping your argument. You should try a different argument.

Right. It doesn't refer anymore than the world refers to something else. Russell wanted to picture it as: a proposition is a state of affairs. The snag there is that there are false propositions. — frank

What would it mean for there to be false propositions if not that the proposition doesn't refer to some state-of-affairs that isn't just another proposition being stated?

The world refers to the state-of-affairs that existed prior to the world existing. Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. What is someone asking when they ask, "what is the meaning of my life?", if not how or why did I come to exist?

But what's the case depends on your theory. Or better, is your theory. Observations are not theory-laden, the observations are the theory. — Cornwell1

No. There is what is the case independent of theory (think of what was the case before humans evolved to make theories about what was the case before their existence) and then there is the case of me asserting my theory. Truth is the relationship between what my theory states and what is, or was, the case independent of my theory.

Observations coupled with logic and other observations is the theory. Theories are not made by observations alone. That is what a hypothesis is as opposed to a theory, or what a belief is as opposed to knowledge.

Do you agree with this, yes or no? If not, then why?

Do you both agree with this proposition: "In believing opposite propositions we both can't be right, but we can both be wrong." — Harry Hindu

I never claimed I was attempting to educate you about anything. — universeness

To me, you are simply ignoring the propositional logic state called paradox. — universeness

I didn't say that you claimed to be attempting to educate me, I'm saying that you just attempted to do so.

All I can say about the state 'paradox' is what you yourself know 'its not true or false.'
I know that does not satisfy. Trying to explain something by stating what it is not, often does not satisfy but I for one, currently, can't do any better. — universeness

Maybe you should take that as a sign that is a problem with your premise. Something that is not true or false is useless (just noises and scribbles). I'm waiting on you to provide and example of a proposition that is neither true nor false that is useful or meaningful.

I think we agree that evidence assists in declaring a posit right or wrong, I think most people do.
Some people, don't need evidence, some theists for example. — universeness

Oh, they use evidence, but only observational evidence that isn't integrated with logic. For instance they use the very existence of the universe and it's organized state as evidence of an intelligent designer. But they fail to acknowledge and/or commit logical fallacies when arguing against alternate explanations for why the universe exists and is the way it is. We all use evidence to support our beliefs, but how much and the integration of logic with observation (justifications) can be the difference between what is belief and what is knowledge.

Majority support as a democratic method is practical whether or not it's a logical fallacy. — universeness

You're confusing determining what is right in politics with what is right in metaphysics. Majority support still doesn't mean the minority is wrong, or doesn't matter, which is probably why the U.S. isn't a democracy, but a republic. Allowing new or dissenting ideas to be heard and compete in the arena of free ideas is how we progress.

What's your alternative?
I'm sure you would agree that a purely logical approach to every circumstance is, a flawed strategy.
Our exchange was based on the difference between 'accuracy' and 'truth.'
I maintain the position that there is some difference.
You have not changed my mind on that by what you have typed so far.
I'm sure my typings have not altered your position either.
We can both accept that without so much as a flutter. — universeness

For me, rationalism and empiricism shouldn't be at odds with each other. They are both necessary to obtain truths. If we all just followed the logic and used the same observations I don't see why we all wouldn't come to the same conclusions. There would be no need to persuade others.




.

My point was that images are ambiguous in 2 senses: 1. they can match different descriptive sentences that do no share the same proposition. 2. Propositions - differently from sentences - are supposed to be unambiguous, however images can be not only ambiguous but also be ambiguous in ways that no descriptive sentence can render (image ambiguity does not match sentence ambiguity).
These observations are relevant b/c if we are supposed to take propositions as correlates that different sentences, different languages, different propositional attitude can share, we can wonder if propositions can be shared across different media (images vs linguistic expressions) — neomac

Here we are talking past each other again. In 1 and 2 you are talking about the some string of scribbles (descriptive sentences that do not share the same proposition). You're talking about words, not images. You're explaining how words, not images, are ambiguous. I want to know how a wordless image can be ambiguous without using language to describe it. I'm thinking the image is a description of something - either ambiguous or concrete - and words - either ambiguous or concrete - can describe the image (but that would only be useful to someone who can't see the image), or what the image is about (what someone who is just looking at some image believes it to be informing them of). I wish you would be more clear about which one you are talking about.

OK let’s start again. I remember you claiming “When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to”. Now, I understand your comment as implying the truth of the following conditional: if translation consists in replacing statements from at least 2 different languages co-referring the same state-of-affairs, then the French translations (I provided in my example) could translate the English sentences indifferently, because they all are referring to the same state of affaires (at least to me). But the consequent of that conditional is false, so it should be false also the conditional. — neomac

Huh? How is it false? I also said that you can translate different words in the same language (synonyms). What if I were to say that instead of translating the scribbles, we were translating the rules by which the scribbles are used.

My central claim is that semantic relations can not be reduced to sequences of mind-independent causal chains. You seem to do the same (due to the relevance of the notion of “mind” in your argument), but you are also developing your discourse over aspects that simply widen the scope of that central claim (e.g. with the reference to art works), which is fine but I'm more interested in arguments that support or question the claim: semantic correlations (between sign and referent) can not be reduced to causal chains. To support that central claim, one could for example argue that while art works are ambiguous in some sense, any causal chain involved in the intentional production/experience/understanding of a piece of art work can not be qualified as "ambiguous". While to question that main claim one could argue that indeed ambiguity can be reduced to some probabilistic feature of causal chains involving psychological states, etc.
In any case, I'm not interested to deal with this specific task in this thread. So I'll leave it at that. — neomac

You seem to be reading more into what I've been saying than what I've actually been saying. Semantic correlations are themselves effects of prior causes as correlating some symbol and what it refers to is dependent upon the experience and education that one has in establishing those correlations. We interpret what some visual or auditory experience means based upon prior experiences. Sometimes we get it wrong like in the case of seeing a mirage. When we understand that what we see isn't objects (like puddles of water), we see light, then we interpret the causal relationships more accurately - like there is a "middle-man" called light in the causal sequence that we call "seeing", and that we don't see objects directly, or else we could see objects in the dark - without any light.

In your past comment, you wrote “The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it”. This looks as an identity claim to me, and I don’t support such identity claim. For me belief exceeds both experience and episodic memory. Maybe you wanted to say that an act of memorizing a given experience always results from believing in that experience. Even if this was true, it would be just an empirical fact, namely something that doesn’t exclude the logical possibility of believing a given experience without memorizing it and memorizing a given experience without believing in that experience. Besides there are actual counter-examples: I remember a dream but I do not believe in that dream, I do not take whatever seemed to happen in that dream to be the case. Maybe you want to claim that while dreaming I was believing whatever was experiencing, and that resulted in me memorizing it. But that we believe in our dreams while dreaming can be acknowledged for all our most common dreams, yet we do not seem to remember all of them either.
The correlation between usefulness, memory, experience and belief you are pointing at, again looks empirical to me, not logical (which is the part I’m more interested in), and even more slippery because what counts as useful is no less controversial than what counts as memory, experience, and belief. — neomac

What else would belief include if not just experience and episodic memory? In the moment of your dream, you are remembering what is happening and therefore believing it is happening. What happened in the beginning of the dream is useful to remember in the middle of the dream, or else how would you know you're still in the same dream? After you wake up you still have the memories because they were stored when you were believing, not when you aren't. Because they aren't useful memories they will eventually be forgotten.
.
What is logic if not the manipulation, or the processing, of symbols?

I don't see why this should be the case. Every truth is both subjective and objective. There is objectivity in each truth, and there is an element of subjectivity in truth as well. — pfirefry

If every truth possesses the quality of subjectivity then you don't get to say that I'm wrong, or that what I'm saying isn't the case. You can and I can believe in completely opposite things and we would both be correct and no one would ever be wrong, or what we believe would always be the case, which is just nonsense. What part of this proposition, "Neil Armstrong is the first human to walk on the Moon.", is subjectively true and which part is objectively true?

But on their own they make little sense. It's more appropriate to combine them. Every subjective truth is seen as objectively true by the people believing in it. — Cornwell1

No. Combining the sentences isn't what makes them make sense, or meaningful. What makes them meaningful is whether or not what they refer to is the case or not.

You both would need to define how you are using, "objectively" and "subjectively" so that we aren't talking past each other and wasting each other's time.

Do you both agree with this proposition: "In believing opposite propositions we both can't be right, but we can both be wrong."

To me, you are simply ignoring the propositional logic state called paradox.
'Every truth is subjective as an objective truth' is a state of paradox, which demonstrates that the state 'true' and the state 'false' are not the only two logical states in existence. It's got nothing to do with truths that we don't know are true.

My point is that they aren't saying anything when they do. They're just making sounds with their mouths and drawing scribbles artfully.
— Harry Hindu

Merely your opinion — universeness

Really? Then please educate me on what the paradox says. Which state-of-affairs does a paradox describe? If what you say is true, then it is merely your opinion that it is merely my opinion of what is actually the case, which doesn't help either one of us, or anyone else.


I wasn't ignoring that paradoxes exist. I was explaining what a paradox is. You are free to disagree, but it would be helpful to know why

If I say the Earth is round and another says it's flat, then we will both have our supporters and dissenters. Who would you support? whichever choice you make, would mean that you are calling the other group wrong. Someone being declared wrong by majority vote is good enough for me. If new evidence comes to light then perhaps the vote will change. — universeness

Exactly. So evidence is what supports some proposition, not merely holding some idea to be true.

Using majority support as evidence is a logical fallacy (and you're educating me on logic? - go figure). It is commonly called, appealing to popularity or argumentum ad populum.

:up:

Two is a prime number.

The above is an utterance of a sentence. It expresses a proposition, specifically that two is a prime number.

Jim, pointing to a 2 written on a white board, said "It's a prime number."

Jim expressed the proposition that two is a prime number.

What this example (straight from a famous philosopher) shows is that discerning the proposition expressed by the utterance of a sentence is context dependent. — frank

A lot of famous people say stuff. It doesn't make it true, or useful, because they are famous.

All your example shows is that we can substitute hand motions (pointing) and scribbles (different symbols) in creating some proposition (symbols and what it refers to - in this case another scribble, 2). Your example still helps my case, not yours.

We know it isn't a sentence because multiple sentences can be used to express the same proposition.

It's not an utterance (sounds or marks) for the same reason. Distinct utterances, same proportion.

It's not a mental object because...same thing. You and I can think of the same proposition, but my mental state can't be identical to yours. — frank

It wouldn't be a specific sentence, or specific scribbles, or specific mental objects. It would be sentences in general, or scribbles in general, or mental objects in general. Just as the content of a computer's hard drive is data, even though you and I have different data on our hard drives.

Different propositions tell different truths depending on their contents (symbols) and what they refer to (what is the case).

In my judgement, the original SCM was not adequate to make the kind of decisions needed. — T Clark

More specifically, what decisions needed to be made? You're just moving the goal posts. You're saying that conceptual models are useful and accurate but then didn't explain what kind of decisions the concept is useful for, or which concept was even being used if not the concept of "a property's surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." You weren't clear about what concept was being used, nor what decisions it was being used for.

Your questions show that you haven't even tried to understand what I'm trying to describe. I don't expect agreement, but the ideas are not difficult.

Let's you and me not interact with each other from now on. — T Clark

Ok, Snowflake, it's actually the other way around. My post was an attempt to understand what you are trying to say and your response is thinly veiled ad hominen because you are unwilling to try and understand my questions to clarify your position.

This is a philosophy forum for crying out loud - where most OPS and posts in general need clarification because of all the wild ideas that are propagated and terms that are misused. If you dont understand that then maybe you should not interact with anyone at all.

Besides, my responses to you aren't necessarily for you, who is obviously scared of continuing the conversation when the questions get difficult, but for readers to see that your ideas aren't all they are cracked up be. Your lack of a response is quite telling in itself.

I was more brainstorming about Agent Smith’s question: “Are pictures/images propositions?”
The problem is that propositions are not supposed to be ambiguous, while images are.
Sentences can be ambiguous, but (not surprisingly) there are rules to systematically disambiguate them wrt to the propositions that they are supposed to represent (at least in the case of declarative sentences), that’s not the case for images. — neomac

In what way are images suppose to be ambiguous? The only images and words that are suppose to be ambiguous is art. By describing your images and words as "art" you are informing others that the images and words are intended to be ambiguous. If not, then it is assumed that the images and words you make refer to real states-of-affairs, or are meant to inform others of real states-of-affairs.

If what we need are rules for images to not be ambiguous, what rules would they be?

> So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thing.

Because B1 not only matches with what A1 says (about Alice’s love for Jim) but also with how it is said by A1 (passive form) — neomac

When I say "how it is said", I'm referring to the scribbles used. Using different scribbles to say the same thing is saying the same thing differently.

> So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent).

That is the point I’m making as well: what enables us to single out semantic relations between signs and referents out of a causal chain of events is “a mind” with intentionality. If we talked only in terms of causality and effects, we would end up having a situation where, in a causal chain, any subsequent effect be "a sign of” any preceding cause. — neomac

I'm not clear of where we are agreeing or disagreeing here. There are a probably an infinite number of causal relations any of which could be useful to single out depending on our goal. This is simply saying that not all meanings (causal relations) are useful in every given moment. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects and the time between some cause and effect is a product of our own minds, and what meanings are useful are also a product of our goals.

> Imaginary concepts have causal power.

That is a very problematic statement to me: we should clarify the notions of “concept” and “causality” before investigating their relationship. But it’s a heavy task on its own, so I will not engage it in this thread. — neomac

I can only say that would there not be books about Hobbits (effect) if someone did not imagine them (the cause) prior.

> Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).

Not sure about that: e.g. we may remember things without believing in them (e.g. dreams). To my understanding, belief can interact with experience and memory in many ways, yet the latter cognitive skills come ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior to any doxastic attitude. — neomac

We're clearly talking past each other. It's not useful to remember/believe that you dream, or to remember/believe you know the difference between dream and reality?

agreed. So you agree, Level of truth(accuracy) and TRUE can be different, in concept. — universeness

An example - I go to work on a property where surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations. A previous investigation collected and analyzed three samples from the effected area. I create a SCM showing the area where soil is contaminated based on that data. Looking at the distribution and the number of samples, I decide that I don't have enough data. I find historic maps and aerial photographs that show where lead was used on site. Based on that, I revise the SCM and decide that 10 additional samples should be collected. I collect and analyze the samples and then revise the SCM again.

In my judgement, the original SCM was not adequate to make the kind of decisions needed. Based on additional data, I revise it. The final SCM is more accurate than the original one. The original SCM wasn't false. The new one isn't true. One is more accurate than the other. — T Clark

If "a property's surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." was the conclusion after the original SCM and is the same conclusion reached after the additional samples were taken, then the conclusion is no more or less accurate. You just have more justification for that conclusion. You're confusing accuracy with justifications. The conclusion is either accurate/true or inaccurate/false regardless of how many samples are taken. More samples are taken to satisfy your skepticism of the conclusion.

If the original conclusion wasn't enough for the decisions needed, then the additional samples were necessary to reach a different conclusion for the decisions needed, not that the original conclusion was less accurate.

Either "a property's surface soil has been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." or "a property's surface soil has NOT been contaminated by lead at above concentrations defined by regulations." One is not more or less accurate than the other statement. One is either completely true or completely false.

Someone else might not think that 10 samples would be enough and would rather see 20 to be more accurate. Someone else may want 100 to be even more accurate. If we can only attain degrees of accuracy, then how is that any different from saying that we have degrees of truth, or degrees of certainty of whether some statement is true or not?

Yes. But everyone thinks their truth is objectively true. — Cornwell1

No its not because 'every truth is subjective' may not be true. Paradox is neither true or false.
To me, this just means that in propositional logic there are three states, true, false and paradox.
Nothing more exciting than that, at least for now. — universeness

You're confusing what is true and what we know to be true. Propositions can be true and we don't know it. It is either true that "Every truth is subjective." or it is true that "Every truth is not subjective". One of those statements must be true and one must be false. Both cannot be true.

It is objectively true precisely because what is objective is separated from our own personal feelings and knowledge of what is the case (subjective). What is objectively true is true regardless of what we know or feel about it.

playing with words,
— Harry Hindu
Agreed, but it's something humans do regularly. The fact that such activity annoys some people, will not prevent it from happening. — universeness

The point wasn't to prevent people from playing with words. My point is that they aren't saying anything when they do. They're just making sounds with their mouths and drawing scribbles artfully.

Well if we all did that then conversation/debate would reduce. I don't think that would help.
The fact you might find something useless to you does not make it useful to all unless you are electing yourself a speaker for all in the same way you suggest I include you, due my deliberations. — universeness

No, that's what I'm saying the one that is making any claim about the world in which we live is doing. Sure, I'm doing it to, and you too. Every time you make an assertion about the world we live in you are implying that what you are saying is the case regardless of what I, or anyone else perceives or knows about it. In other words, you would be saying that I was wrong. How can anyone be wrong if every truth is subjective?

Right and wrong only make sense in a realist world where there are states-of-affairs that are the case and what we say about those states-of-affairs is something else and they either represent what is the case or don't, regardless of whether we know it or not.

The only distinction I can think of is in measurement. 'I can measure some things.'
That statement is true and is accurate but.
A measurement can never be true, it can only ever have a level of accuracy.
I think this is probably just the same as asking is there an objective truth or is every truth subjective? and I think there have been many threads on that.
I like all the fun paradox's in this area.

"The only true fact is there are no true facts!".... yeah.....that's a true fact....that there are no true facts!
Fun stuff! — universeness

Making contradictions is playing with words, not stating facts. Is it objectively true that every truth is subjective? In describing the world you're describing a shared world - one in which I exist as well, so what you are defining is what I am part of and would be describing not just you but me too. So if every truth were subjective then keep your truth to yourself because it wouldn't be useful to me in any way.

If a measurement can have a level of accuracy then that is the same as saying a measurement has a level of truth, which I would agree with. There are degrees by which some concept or proposition can be accurate/true based on how well it represents what is the case or not.

Conceptual models are not true or false, they are accurate or inaccurate. — T Clark

But in saying that conceptual models are accurate TClark is saying they are true. "Accurate" is a synonym for "true".

That is the problem of putting visual content into propositional form. Images can be ambiguous in a way that is not captured by any related descriptions.
Besides one and the same image can correspond to many possible descriptions, whose number is arguably higher than any limited mind can conceive of. — neomac

Were you asking me to describe the image, or what the image is about? The image isn't about anything because it is ambiguous. The image is ambiguous, therefore it's not about anything, but the words, "this image is ambiguous" is about the image. One might say that art is intentionally ambiguous - meaning that art isn't about anything itself, rather it is meant to play games with images, or words in the way of poems or music. Also the image isn't about tigers and bears, only rabbits and ducks. So it's limited in its ambiguity.

When we translate, we take into account precisely how things are said, otherwise it wouldn’t be a translation.
So you can not use an active form in your native language to translate a foreign sentence in passive form, if you want to translate literally the foreign sentence of course.
That is why, in the examples I listed, B2 is a correct translation of A2, and not of A1, despite the fact that all 3 statements are about the same state of affaires. — neomac

But using a different language is itself a difference in how things are said from how it is said in another language. Different symbols and rules are used to refer to the same thing. This is what I meant when I said that symbol use is arbitrary. I can use different symbols, even in the same language, to mean the same thing.

A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice — neomac

So A1 is said differently than B1, but you say that they are translatable and mean the same thig. How is that so?

Still I disagree on this. My conviction is that linguistic meaning presupposes intentionality and intentionality can not be understood in causal terms for several reasons.
Here I limit myself to 3 and will leave it at that:
1. Causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events, so in this chain of events start and end of a meaningful correlation (say between a sign and its referent) are identifiable only by presupposing the constitutive correlates of intentional states: namely subject (who would produce linguistic signs ) and object (which would be the referent of the linguistic sign).
2. “reference” between signs and referents is grounded on rule-based behavior that presupposes intentionality with its direction of fit, while causality has no direction of fit at all.
3. a sign can refer to things that do not exist, and things that do not exist can not cause anything — neomac

I agree that causes and effects form an indefinitely long sequence of events. All of these prior events can be discovered by correctly interpreting the effect. Your use of words not only informs me that you have an idea and the intent to communicate it, but also your level of education in English and what part of the world you are from based on your accent and dialect. So, it all depends on what the goal of the mind is at any moment (intent). Is it to know where you are from, or to know what you intend to say? If I really wanted to I could use the effect of your scribbles to even show that it is evidence of the Big Bang, as you would not be here putting scribbles on a screen if the Big Bang did not occur, nor if stars did not fuse heavier elements together and then scatter them across the galaxy in a supernova.

A sign never refers to things that do not exist. The question is where it exists - out in the world, or in your head. Imaginary concepts have causal power. Just go visit the Sci-Fi / Fantasy section of your favorite book store and think about some of the movies made from some if those books and you will see what I'm talking about.

In reading the book, The Lord of the Rings and watching the film trilogy, The Lord of the Rings, both are different ways of telling the same story. The narrator's words in the book has been replaced by images of non-verbal behaviors and events in the movie, and the latter is what you think about, or picture in your mind, when reading the narrator's words in the book.

Unlike Banno, I believe that language use is not a game, but games can be played with words, which is what art typically does in the form of poems and musical lyrics. Language was initially used for relaying information in the same way as observing others' behaviors relays information, but once humans had enough time on their hands from not having to worry about where the next meal is coming from, they began to play games with their words (write poems and do philosophy).

Belief can be based on one or multiple observations, agreed. But this seems to contradict instead of supporting the idea that belief can be taken “in the form of their visual experiences”. Perceptual beliefs exceed the related visual experience: they are attitudes, but visual experiences are not attitudes. This should be true for both men and animals, to my understanding. — neomac

I think I understand what you are saying is that the justification (observation) is not the belief. The attitude seems to occur with the initial observation as useful observations are remembered. Why remember something that isn't useful? The act of memorizing an experience is the act of believing it so that you may recall it later (use the belief).

Like I said:

I had a compassionate feeling for creative
— ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question
— Harry Hindu

I told you I was muddling through and following along. I considered that a confession of ignorance. Yet you continued your imperious questioning.

I don't have clear answers to the bulk of the questions that came to light in this thread. Your off-putting tone made it easy (and likely wise) to ignore you.


At any rate, I'm ready to move on if you are. — ZzzoneiroCosm

My tone hasn't changed yet here you are not ignoring me.

It was a simple question, much simpler than the other questions in this thread that you attempted to muddle through in answering. The only way to move on is for you to muddle through answering my question, if you can stop contradicting yourself long enough so that I might actually take you seriously.

I don't remember writing that I had already addressed your question. Please remind me. — T Clark

I think you've missed the point of my part in this discussion. How much of this thread have you read? — T Clark

I asked you to remind me of your part of the discussion that answered my question you couldn't do so.

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" . — Eskander

Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game. — Joshs

Or in which "God" has not been properly defined by those that are using the term. If the users of the term don't know the rules then how do they expect to teach others how to play the game?

It's not just the term,"god", but also "exists", of which both the religious and non-religious know the rule for using the term. All conclusions reached by all domains of knowledge (religious, science, philosophy) must be integrated. So the rules for playing the religious game must not contradict the rules in the science game if we're talking about the same reality.

I would like to focus on the premises that the brave officer on the one hand was conscious of his having been flogged, when he took the standard, and on the other hand he had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging, when made a general. And I would like also to focus on the part of Mr. Reid's conclusion "that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general". — Stoycho

It is also possible that while not being conscious of being flogged while made general, he may be conscious of being flogged at some later time.

We shouldn't forget that we forget things and knowledge of that entitles us to believe that while we may not be conscious of every moment of our past, we have enough memories of our past to build an identity.

I wasn't being defensive, I was being dismissive. — T Clark

Then you weren't accurate when telling me that you had already addressed the question I asked. Being dishonest and dismissive is the result of you feeling defensive.

this thread is not about behavior, it's about knowledge. How we know things. — T Clark

Yet this is what you wrote in your OP:

As a pragmatic epistemologist I assert that the primary value of truth and knowledge is for use in decision making to help identify, plan, and implement needed human action. — T Clark

What is decision making and human action if not behaviors? What is use if not a type of behavior? It appears that this thread is just the behavior of moving goalposts.

Not sure about that. Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

I agree that all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs so we are agreeing that all four statements are translatable with the other. In saying that all 4 statements are about the same state-of-affairs you are saying that they are all translatable with each other. You can even have two different sentences in the same language that mean the same thing (A1 and A2), meaning that translating isn't necessarily between two or more languages. It is between two or more symbols (scribbles).

Synonyms are different words that mean the same thing. So you can create two different sentences in one language that mean the same thing and when translated to another language that also has synonyms that mean the same thing as the other two sentences. You can say the same thing different ways. The point is what you are saying, not how you are saying it. In other words none of these statements used is an example of people talking past each other.

The idea that “a mind” is causing “scribble means” doesn’t sound right to me.
“Scribbles” may be the kind of entities that can be caused, but “means” are not caused, nor can be rendered in causal terms. — neomac

I didn't say means are caused. I said meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Causes leave effects and when we look for the meaning of the effect, we are looking for the cause. Examples would be a criminal investigator using the crime scene (effect) to find the identity of the criminal (cause) so this fingerprint means Crooked Joe Smith committed this crime, or tree rings in a tree stump where the rings (effect) are caused by how the tree grows throughout the year (cause) so tree rings means the number of years the tree has existed.

Scribbles are the effect. What they mean is the relationship between the scribbles existing and what caused them, which is an idea and the intent to communicate them and then the act of typing them and clicking Post Comment. If none of those things happened, scribbles would not appear on this screen.

What are you asking for when you ask what does X mean?

I’m inclined to agree with you in general, but the devil is in the details. So, I agree that animal cognitive skills and consequent behavior are much more constrained by their experience than human cognitive skills are. Yet it doesn’t sound right to me to claim that animals’ beliefs are “in the form of their visual experiences”. The problem is that experience (visual or other) doesn’t seem to be enough to grant belief (see the case of optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion [1]: the 2 arrows keep looking different in length even if one correctly believes that they have the same size), therefore animals’ beliefs too are not necessarily nor tightly coupled with their experiences.
Besides the claim that human’s beliefs are “in the form of propositions” does sound right, at least in part. However I would complement it by saying that a belief in propositional form is just a belief that is expressed through a declarative sentence, i.e. through a specific linguistic behavior, that doesn’t imply that humans are equipped only of propositional beliefs. — neomac

Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site.

Beliefs are not necessarily true. Someone that holds a belief may have some degree of certainty in maintaining their belief, which is to say that they have some reason or justification, but usually isn't logically justified, only justified by observation. A bent straw in a glass of water is a good example. When observing a bent straw in a glass of water one might believe the straw is bent with their reasoning being their own observation for believing it. But when you integrate it with other observations (like taking the straw out of the water and integrating the knowledge that we see light and not objects) and logic then beliefs can be disbelieved or justified even further into knowledge. The straw is not bent. The light is bent.

In the example of your lines, one may believe that one line is longer until you get out the ruler.

So beliefs would be an idea that something is true based on one observation, while knowledge would be something is true based on multiple observations that are integrated with logic.

Animals, since they lack human-like languages, may think in pictures/images. Picture theory of meaning?

If so,

1. Are pictures/images propositions?

or

2. Are (some) beliefs nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

Good question. Here is another one: if all propositions can be rendered in linguistic form, then what proposition would correspond to the following image? — neomac

What are propositions if not images of scribbles? So to think in propositions is to think in visual images, or sounds if you're talking to yourself in your head.

What form does a language you don't know take if not visual scribbles and sounds? In hearing a language you don't know are you able to distinguish subjects from predicates, or even just the ending of one word from the beginning of the next?

"This is a picture of a duck or a rabbit, depending on how you look at it." The picture would be an example of "ambiguity".

This is why I don't engage. You have no sense of charity and your posts are unpleasant. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yet look at all of the posts you have created since my last post. You're willing to engage but only if you dictate the topic, which is off the topic of this thread that you want to avoid so that you don't have to address my points.

It's the tone of your insistence. It's off-putting. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You engaged me up to the point where I asked my question then abandoned it and would now rather waste thread space with your ranting. Your behavior is off-putting by not being intellectually honest.

His heart is in it. He feels he's created or uncovered something devastating or catalytic to the history of philosophy. That foments a profound experience of life-meaning: wakefulness, inspiration, excitement, a superior feeling,* a sense of domination - of philosophical material and of philosophical opponents. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Sounds like you're describing an emotional attachment to me. My only goal in being here is to learn from others by asking them questions and to subject some of my own ideas to criticism. You aren't willing to do either and only seem to be willing in entertaining the ideas of someone with delusions of grandeur. Good luck.

Many philosophers take the technical notion “abstract entity” to mean something that is not the result of some mental operation (“abstraction”). According to them “abstract entities” are to be contrasted to “concrete entities”: indeed both of them are real (i.e. mind-independent) entities , the difference (at least according to many) is that abstract entities are not located in space and time, and they are causally inert, while concrete entities are located in space and time (or at least, in time) and are not causally inert. Propositions, numbers, sets are often taken to be some common cases of abstract entities by those who believe in their existence. So for example, while a sentence is a concrete entity, the proposition that the sentence is meant to represent would be an abstract entity of the sort I’ve just described. Frege seems to have proposed this view. — neomac

Thank you for the example.

So in the example, the sentence would be the written scribbles or spoken sounds and the proposition would be the state-of-affairs the scribbles/sounds are meant to represent? To me, the proposition and sentence are one and the same.

A sentence/proposition is a string of scribbles that refers to some state-of-affairs that is not just another string of scribbles. The reference, or the mental act of referencing, scribble with state-of-affairs would be abstract in the sense that we could use any scribble to refer to the same state-of-affairs as you showed when using three different languages to mean the same thing. When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to. The scribbles/sounds we use are arbitrary, which is why there must be an agreement to the rules on what scribbles and sounds to use and how to use them.

This is also what it means for some proposition/sentence to be true in that the string of scribbles is true if what it refers to is the case.

Meaning, however, is not arbitrary. It is the relationship between cause and effect. What some scribble means is what caused it to exist on the paper or on the screen. It is caused by a mind that possesses an idea and the will to communicate it, or else the scribbles would not exist. "Hello" refers to the idea and intent of someone to begin a conversation with someone else.

Since propositions are the arbitrary scribbles we use to refer to what is the case and scribbles are experienced visually just like most other things, like houses, hammers, grass and fish, then learning a language is not much different than learning how to use houses, hammers, grass and fish, which is done without language and done simply by observing the behavior of others around such items. This is no different than animals, just a different degree.

So non-language creatures have beliefs in that they learn by making observations and what they learn is what they believe to be the case in other similar states-of-affairs. Their beliefs are not in the form of propositions, but the visual experiences they had. The same goes for scribble-using humans, and is how they learned a language in the first place by believing that scribbles can be used to refer to what is the case or not. You have to believe that before you can begin using scribbles.

I engaged them up to a point. Until further engagement seemed futile and there was no fun puzzle to solve.

I didn't see a fun, interesting puzzle in your post. Just your insistence and insistence is no fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:lol: What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself.

Sure, difficult questions that, when answered, point out your contradictions can't be much fun. That's why you don't answer the question. And not being fun isn't an argument against anything that I've said. It's just a thinly veiled ad hominem.

All this time you've spent with me now could have been more constructive if you just answer the question.

Yes it does. — neomac

Thank you, neomac for answering my question.

Asking a question is not biased or emotionalized. Avoiding them is.

That's why I don't engage with them fully. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So you'd rather engage them half-assed? Sounds like a waste of time to me.

You're view here is odd to me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS was even more odd as you even admitted that he was wasting his time, yet you spent more time addressing his waste of time than my "odd" view. :roll:

I would refer you to the recent thread on 'doing good.' — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why when there is no objective morality or ethics? What good would your notion of good do for me?

No. The point of my post was to avoid a polarized position on either end of the Real - Ideal spectrum.
I'm not a true anything. As noted in the post, my personal philosophy is BothAnd. As a relative Realist, I accept the evidence of my eyes as plausible facts, upon which to build my personal model of Reality. But as an amateur philosopher, I also accept that vetted ideas are also useful bricks for my model. Your mental model of Reality may be different from mine, but on this forum, we can share our biased views, in order to see our differences and our agreements. That is not likely to result in a "true" view of the world. But it's better than being blind in one eye. :cool: — Gnomon

You seemed to have overlooked this part of my post:

Any time you attempt to explain how reality is not just for yourself, but for others, then you are a realist that is making the case that you have an objective view of the world - of how it is not just for yourself, but for everyone, even if they aren't aware of it or disagree. — Harry Hindu

So again, here you are explaining how things are for everyone, not just yourself. So again, you are projecting your ideas about how things are independent of yourself, and how things are even if I were to disagree or not be aware of these "facts" that you are asserting.

Is it true that there is such a thing as a forum where we share ideas, or that we have ideas to share, or that you and I are separate entities that share ideas? If not, then your whole post is just a lot of scribbles. If it's not a true view of the world then how can it be more useful than being blind in one eye? Are you saying that the information received through your eyes is true, accurate, or what?

I'm not wasting my time. I'm trying to help creative see he's wasting his time. And also enjoying the puzzle. This kind of philosophy is just a popcorn exercise to me. Great exercise, though. — ZzzoneiroCosm

My point was that it is a waste of your time when it's obvious CS doesn't care about wasting his. That was obvious several pages ago. Yet you avoided the the tough exercises and the tastiest popcorn.

Seems to me that for something to be useful there needs to be some element of truth. Have you provided an example where a falsehood was useful? — Harry Hindu

I think you've missed the point of my part in this discussion. How much of this thread have you read? — T Clark

The whole thread up to the point where I made my first post and all you've done is repeat yourself saying:

Conceptual models are not true or false, they are accurate or inaccurate. — T Clark

How does that answer my question? Seems to me that your level of conviction woukd indicate that you'd be able to easily come up with an example instead of becoming defensive.

Just to restate my rebuttal concisely: — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS is obviously being purposely obtuse regarding your rebuttal (and mine), yet you continue with wasting your time trying to restate it, when there are more pertinent points in this thread to address. :roll:

creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), — neomac

As well as Banno's and ZZz's because they've have an emotional attachment to their beliefs about beliefs.

The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. — neomac

Agreed. But that is difficult to do when people maintain their grip on their understanding of propositions with their emotions and don't respond to questions about what propositions are when the questions get tough.

1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German) — neomac

Yes, how can three different strings of scribbles mean the same thing?

As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. — neomac

Mind independent abstract entities seems to be a contradiction. Abstractions are defined as existing as an idea and not as physical or concrete. So how can something that is abstract be mind independent?

My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think. — neomac

This sounds like what I was hinting at here:

What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

In what form do the rules present themselves if not the visual and auditory experiences you have when learning how others use language? This is no different than learning the rules of anything else, like object permanence - the realistic notion that entities continue to exist even when they do not exist in the mind - like the mouse that ran behind the tree.

Uncompromising Realists are assuming that they can observe the world from an objective perspective, which eliminates the subjective biases of the observer. Although, objectivity is the ideal goal of Science, it's an unattainable perfection. Objective purity would require decontaminating the body of its "selfish genes" and the mind of "acquired beliefs". And the same goes for inflexible Idealists.

However, even polarized Realism vs Idealism or Objectivism vs Subjectivism philosophical positions are peculiar personalized belief systems. They are not obtained from a privileged universal all-seeing point of view. That's why we have to occasionally purge our erroneous beliefs by comparing them to other partial perspectives, as on this forum. The result will not be Purity, but it may be de-polarized and homogenized. From that broadened perspective, we may be able to see both Matter and Mind. :smile: — Gnomon

Spoken like a true realist.

Any time you attempt to explain how reality is not just for yourself, but for others, then you are a realist that is making the case that you have an objective view of the world - of how it is not just for yourself, but for everyone, even if they aren't aware of it or disagree.

This thread has not been about pragmatic behavior, it's about pragmatic approaches to knowledge. As I noted, in pragmatism "the primary value of truth and knowledge is for use in decision making to help identify, plan, and implement needed human action." — T Clark

Seems to me that for something to be useful there needs to be some element of truth. Have you provided an example where a falsehood was useful?

I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true
— Harry Hindu

Read the opening and second posts in the debate. — creativesoul

There is no part in the entire debate that explains the difference between holding something to be true and holding a belief.

Who decided that it would be a good idea for you and Banno to debate this topic? There is no debate when the debaters constantly talk past each other.

The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.

The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true. — creativesoul

:roll: Look up the definition of "believe", creative, and you will find that it means to hold something to be true which means that propsitions are not necessary to hold something as true.

What use is holding a belief?

Do we agree that scribbles are images? If you can hold some images to be true, why not other images - like a mouse behind the tree? You're making a special case for certain images as holding truth. Why?

They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. — creativesoul

Which contradicts what you said above. If it is impossible believe in a falshood then believing is always holding something to be true.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?
— Harry Hindu

Correlations. — creativesoul

What form do correlations take? Correlations between what?

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words?
— Harry Hindu

Yes. — creativesoul

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.

What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true. — creativesoul

You're confusing the belief with the report/statement of the belief. Are we checking if the belief is true, or the report of the belief is true? Do we believe a belief is true, or do we believe a report of a belief is true?

What does it mean to believe something if not to have some degree of certainty (that something is true as opposed to false)? What does it mean to hold a belief - that you acknowledge that the belief exists, is true, have it in your hands, or what?

Saying that there is a difference is different than showing the difference. I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true? Can you hold things to be true that are not beliefs? If so, then describe the difference between holding beliefs to be true and holding other things to be true.

All I'm getting from you and Banno is a lot of words but no examples to show what you mean.

No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.

A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true. — creativesoul

Thinking does not require language. It requires images, sounds, feelings, etc., of which language is a part of (scribbles and voices). You need language to report a belief, not check a belief. You need observations to check a belief.