Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:

I've said:

The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.

and


A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.

In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc

But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It would help if you just stopped avoiding my question and answer it. What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But I thought you were asserting that a proposition is a subject and predicate. I've been saying that a proposition is scribbles or the sound of spoken words, or braille, or the movement of hands in sign language. It's like we're arguing whether or not the table is made of atoms or molecules. What is the table made of - atoms or molecules? What is a proposition made of - scribbles and sounds or subjects and predicates?

I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.

In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You can contribute an answer to my question above that I've asked several times now and you've avoided it. It makes me think that you aren't interested in being intellectually honest.

Does a table take the form of an arrangement of atoms, or is the content of the table an arrangement of atoms? What state-of-affairs are you trying to show is the case? Is there a difference?

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think you're confusing the form the subject-predicate (proposition/statement) takes with the form the belief takes. Going back to what you said about beliefs being put into the form of a proposition, I explained that there is a temporal separation between the belief as it exists and the proposition as it exists, and that one is not the other. Instead one is the cause and one is the effect. Can you put into propositional form a belief that you don't have?

I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.

Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.

Nevermind the attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if belief and proposition are the same thing, the belief has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if you are agreeing that words are a particular type of image (scribbles), then the cat can believe the mouse is behind the tree using some other type of imagery and sensations. Therefore, propositions are not useful in describing beliefs because beliefs can be in the form of imagery that is not in the form of a proposition (scribbles).

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
— Harry Hindu

This seems to be you answering your question. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I was asking you to see if you agree. It appears that you do - that beliefs take the form of many types of sensations, not just sensations of scribbles and the sounds of spoken words. And that scribbles and sounds refer to those other images and sensations that are not scribbles and sounds, but are images of it raining outside and of a mouse running behind a tree.

I was really looking forward to an answer to this - the question that made Banno abandon our conversation and that you avoided:

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language?

As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so. — creativesoul

Then the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true, but you've only explained the truth value of the statement, not the belief.

Propositions are in the form of scribbles or sounds and are determined to be true if the scribbles represent what is the case.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. Like ZzzoneiroCosm, you are only describing how you can put beliefs into a propositional form after the fact of having a belief.

I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.

The fact that propositions are scribbles and sounds and obtained visually and audibly, how did the cat obtain the state-of-affairs of the mouse being behind the tree if not visually and audibly (saw it run behind the tree and it can hear it behind the tree)?

So i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.

What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language? If so, then you can hold beliefs as true prior to knowing how to create propositions.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. — creativesoul

I'm not sure that I see the difference. To hold a belief would be the same as the act of believing. I'm sure that we can agree that there are beliefs that we acknowledge as existing without holding them as true (believing). In these cases we would hold them as false (disbelief) or indifferent (we just don't know if the belief is true or false). The reason why we have debates is because we agree in the existence of many beliefs, but their truth value is what we are debating.

I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Redundant and not helpful. Then it appears that, like Banno, you have no idea what you're talking about either when you say that belief is an attitude towards some proposition or something that can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

I'm not sure what to do with that word 'attitude.' I know I don't like it. And it doesn't seem to be necessary. I think it's okay to just drop it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yup.

You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language). — ZzzoneiroCosm

So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. I'm just trying to reconcile what you are saying now with what you have said before.

I'm not sure if even this is helpful. Are there any thought, emotional and behavioral patterns that are not beliefs? If so, then what kind of thought, emotional and behavioral patterns are beliefs compared to ones that are not beliefs? How would I tell the difference between a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that is a belief and a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that isn't a belief?

Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate. — ZzzoneiroCosm

And what form do subject-predicates take, if not scribbles or sounds?

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds). — ZzzoneiroCosm

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? To say that they are held in the mind or reflected upon just means that you're talking to yourself in your head. You hear a voice saying the words and the sound is the form the proposition takes in your mind.

It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, it is much easier to symbolize complex experiences for thinking and especially for communicating. We can think of democracy without words. It would be picturing in your mind people voting, candidates making promises for your vote, counting votes, etc.

This is also how using words can be redundant. If you and I are staring out the window at the rain, you can say, "It is raining." Because I can see that it is raining, hearing you say it would be redundant information. So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.

by "individual itself" do you mean the object of perception? How would you distinguish that from the willing subject? — KantDane21

I'm asking you what you meant by "individual" in your OP. You described an individual as being both the willing and knowing subjects. In what way does the subject know the individual as it is?

Another thing that gets me is this philosophical assertion of this unhinged skepticism of knowing how things are, while at the same time declaring how things are - like how we are somehow limited in our knowledge of how things are. In either case, you are always stating how things are. At some moments you are certain while in other moments you are uncertain. In those moments you are uncertain, are you not certain that you are uncertain. In other words, you are always certain of something.

You described the individual as being both something embodied and disembodied, both in the world and outside of it. This is nothing but world salad that creates a contradiction and isn't useful.

this is the problem, and the passage you cited. If thing-in-itself is totally demarcated from human experience (in the way Kant says-- and Schopenhauer repeatedly stated will is Kant's thing-in-itself, how can we get nearer to the thing-in-itself? is it not an all-or-nothing type existent? — KantDane21

Think of writing a type of function in a program called a loop where you start with some input (an observation) that is processed (observation integrated with stored responses) in the loop and the output (the outcome of some behavior) then becomes the input for the next iteration of the loop. Now think of another function that monitors the process and interjects before some behavior is executed to prevent an error or mistake.

In a sense, I have described your willing subject (the loop) and your knowing subject (the monitoring process). Now we have to explain how we know that we know. This could be explained by turning the monitoring function into a loop itself, where it is monitored by its own process, where the knowing subject turns itself back on itself. It's just a causal loop where you think of something, then you think about what your were thinking about. You must first think of something to then know you're thinking of something and to then think about thinking.

An individual is the pure knowing subject.- that is, a disembodied subject, not an object in the world, but perceives the world ‘from outside’; the world of spatio‐temporal objects that are totally distinct from itself.
BUT
An individual is also a willing subject.- an embodied subject, subject that wills (desires, needs, wants, etc.)

Schopenhauer thinks that willing subject and knowing subject are identical. The identity of the willing and knowing subject, Schopenhauer claims in this work, is “the knot of the world” and therefore “inexplicable”. — KantDane21

You've described what an individual is as being both a knowing and willing subject. If the individual is an object in the world then the knowing subject is also in the world and not outside it. How do you know that the knowing subject is perceiving the willing subject and not the individual itself?

Scholar Julian Young states that Schopenhauer thinks (1) willing subject is known by being an object for the knowing subject, and (2) nothing which is an object for the knowing subject can
be identical with it, the willing subject cannot, according to Schopenhauer, be identical with
knowing subject.

In his above quote Schopenhauer, Young states, is suggesting that essentially "logic can be suspended, and two distinct things can be identical."

However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21

Logic does not have to be suspended if you think of it as a causal feedback loop, where cause and effect create a loop of causation and cause and effect loose their identity as individuals because the effect becomes the cause and the cause becomes the effect.

We are similar and dissimilar from most animals. But do we have any qualities that make us special? We might argue it's our intelligence and at least some ability to defy any instincts we might have. But we assess our intelligence and abilities ourselves, and not against anything more objective. What makes us better? — TiredThinker

Special and dissimilar are two different things. All animals are dissimilar from one another. In that respect humans are not dissimilar or special compared to other animals. "Special" is a value term that has no objective reality outside of one' own head. Something is special based on some value that has been projected onto it - like humans' differences being valued more than other animals. I'm sure the elephant thinks it's trunk is more special than the internet or smart phones.

So we don't have any qualities that make us special in an objective sense, only a subjective human perspective of our own qualities that we find necessary to live as humans compared to trying to live while possessing the qualities of other animals. So of course humans are going to think that they are special. Humans have thought that since they started existing (Earth is the center of the universe, created in the image of god, etc.)

What if we find other (intelligent) animals (aliens) on other planets. How special would humans be then?

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true. — Harry Hindu

Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.

The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.

*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined.

Youre saying the cat has a belief prior to it being put into the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is), which means beliefs are not the propositional attitude but are something that can be put into the form if one. The objective here is to define beliefs, not what form they can be put into after the fact. So youre not explaining what a belief is. You're explaining that beliefs can be referred to with propositional attitudes (whatever that is). I want to know what form the cats belief is in prior to some human putting it in the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is).

To say that it would be weird for a cat to put a belief in the form of a propositional attitude is a strange thing to say when it appears that the cat doesnt need to do so in order to have a belief per your own explanation.

What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which has been shown to not be helpful in the slightest.

Banno injected truth into the equation:

Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat". — Banno

If the attitude is certainty, as certainty is the attitude that some belief is true, then animals certainly behave as if they are certain of what is the case is - like a wolf is nearby - sometimes better than humans as they may have better hearing or smelling than we do.

Was "propositional", "proposition" and "attitude" ever defined in this discussion?

Are there attitudes that are not propositional?

Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which is to say that Banno doesnt know what he's talking about. Is his lack of consistency and clarity a characteristic of the propositions he makes or his attitude?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno

This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. What is the difference between mentioning and use? Is not mentioning a type of use? What is the difference between speaking about and with?

Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use. — Banno

Then describe the beginning of how a new word is used. If we run the risk of talking past each other because we are using names differently then that seems to show that there is a mental aspect of associating a name with what it is about and THEN sharing that relationship with others. Agreement comes after use.

Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles. — Banno

Thats what you would say if i was speaking a different language. What does Arabic and Russian look like to you, compared to English? What do they sound like to you compared to English?

Sign language is adopting hand movements instead of scribbles to refer to things. How can a hand movement mean the same thing as a scribble when their use is different?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true.

If you're saying "P" and P are the same thing, as in both are propositions, then you would be begging the question.

It seems to me that in saying "P" if P is somehow projecting the very words we are using out into the world, as if names exist independent of minds. The names are mental things that refer to things that are not names, and not mental.

Belief is a relation between an actor and a statement, such that the actor takes the statement to be true.
Knowledge might variously be understood as a justified true belief or a capacity to perform some action. — Banno

Then both beliefs and knowledge can be acted on. The only difference is that knowledge is justified. But then what attitude does one have of some proposition that is true if not justification, which leads to certainty given more justification (successful uses)? Seems to me that one needs a reason to believe in anything. The amount of reasons is what is the difference between beliefs and knowledge.

A justification would be a stored memory of some past event which warrants the belief. The memory of the past event coupled with the belief in causation - that similar causes lead to similar effects - is what makes a belief a belief. Beliefs would be useless if causation wasn't the case. There would be no beliefs without causation.

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille).
— Harry Hindu

No, they re not They are composed of predicates and subjects. — Banno

Which are composed of scribbles and sounds.

Beliefs do not have referents for they are not used to pick something out to the exclusion of all else. That's what names do. — creativesoul

Yet names are part of the belief. If your beliefs don't refer to anything in the world, then your beliefs aren't useful to anyone else. A false belief and a belief without a reference are one and the same. There is a difference between some proposition being understandable and being useful. We can put words together in such a way that follows the rules of some language, but if it doesn't agree with the facts, or state what is the case, then it is useless. Take for instance, "Joe Biden is the first president of the United States." The proposition follows the rules of English, but doesn't agree with the facts. So in what way is the proposition useful?

What kind if attitudes?
— Harry Hindu

The attitude that the proposition is true. That's been on the boards since day one.

True, not certain. — Banno

What is the difference between knowledge and belief?

What is the difference between, "the attitude that some proposition is true", and "certain that some proposition is true"?

What is certainty if not the attitude that some proposition is true?

I think I've mentioned this before. That's as good as it gets for truth. "how one determines some proposition is true" depends on the proposition; something else I've said many times. It's absurd to suppose that there could be one way to determine if a proposition is true.

You seem to have changed topics. — Banno

True is a type of proposition, as opposed to false propositions. Certain would be a type of attitude of some proposition.

Is it also possible to have an attitude that some proposition is false that is also a belief?

It's not changing topics. It's integrating what you are saying with the rest of what we know.

Banno is excellent at engaging others
— creativesoul
My attitude toward this proposition: :rofl:
— Harry Hindu

And yet here you are. — Banno

Proposition 1: Banno is excellent at engaging others
Proposition 2: Banno is not excellent at engaging others
Proposition 3: And yet you are here.

If propositions are true depending on the proposition, then what use is your proposition (#3) in determining the truth of creativesoul's proposition (#1) and my proposition (#2)?

It seems to me that you are implying that P1 is true depending on if P3 true. If a proposition can only be true depending on some other proposition, then we get an infinite regress of needing an infinite amount of propositions for just one to be true.

If propositions are true depending only on the proposition itself, then P3 has no bearing on P1 or P2 being true, which means that your response is an example of us talking past each other. It would also mean that P1 and P2 have no implications on the other being true (which would mean that the LNC is false).

To resolve the infinite regress and abide by the LNC, we must theorize that propositions are true depending on some state-of-affairs that isn't just another proposition, or that propositions refer to some state-of-affairs that is not another proposition.

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief.
— creativesoul

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diprotodon? — Banno

Propositions are composed of the structured sensations of visual scribbles and sounds, or touch (braille). Humans first started with using sounds to create propositions, then visual scribbles, and eventually braille for the blind. Since different sensations can be co-opted to create propositions with, why can't any animal that has sensations form propositions, like this smell means that wolves are in the area and that sound means that they are to my left, which also means I should run to my right? The only difference would be the degree of complexity with which some proposition could be made and the state-of-affairs that it can refer to.

Does it matter what form some proposition takes (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.) as long as the sensation means (refers to, or has a causal relation with) something that isn't another sensation?

How can reality need an observer? It needs an observer to observe it, not to create it. — Raymond

Good question. If reality needs an observer then reality and observation are one and the same. If this is the case then where is the observer in relation to reality/observation? This idea that reality needs an observer ends up defining the observer and observation out of existence and what remains is only reality - wirhout an observer.

The orthodoxy is that beliefs can be best discussed as propositional attitudes. — Banno

Again, this isnt specific enough to be useful. What kind if attitudes? Attitudes of (degrees of) certainty. You keep throwing around, "truth" without properly defining what it is and how one determines some proposition is true or not except as the degree that some proposition referrs to some state-of-affairs or not. What if there are conflicting attitudes toward some proposition? How does truth resolve the conflict?

Banno is excellent at engaging others — creativesoul

My attitude toward this proposition: :rofl:

I'm not aware of any literature of language as the relationship between cause and effect, apart from your own comments.

Is there any? — Banno

Not language, meaning. Are you paying attention?

There wasn't any literature on the evolution of organisms by natural selection until Darwin wrote it. Why can't you address the argument instead continually committing these logical fallacies?

No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation. — Banno

Not necessarily. What if the other person doesn't respond and say, "Hello" back? "Hello" can't be the beginning of a conversation that never starts. This is why it is better think of "hello" as referring to the intent to start a conversation.

In a way, what we are both saying is true and not necessarily contradictory. Use refers to intent. This is why the theory that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect helps in describing the sound or scribble as the effect with the intent as the cause. The use would be the relationship between the intent and the scribble or sound. It's just that I'm also asserting that meaning also exists everywhere else causes (not just intentional causes) leave effects.

Yes, Harry, words can be used to talk about things. But they can do much more than just refer. The problem with a purely referential theory of language such as yours is that there is so much it cannot explain. — Banno

Thats all fine, but if meaning is not simply use, but the relationship between cause and effect, then words can be used to do other things, but as an effect of ones ideas and the intent to communicate them, words can always be used to refer to, or get at, one's intent, just like any one of their behaviors. Its just that "actions speak louder than words" in that its easier to hide the reference to ones intent with words than it is with actions that dont involve words.

Repeating it, even three or more times, does not make it so.

Is there anyone who agrees with you on this, Harry? — Banno

Neither does pleading to popularity or orthodoxy that doesnt exist.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#Repr

Most involve referring to things in order to do stuff with them — Banno

Right, using words to refer to things that arent words in order to do stuff with those things that are not words. In other words, words are used to refer to the intent of the user to get some others to behave in a particular way.

No, Harry. It does not refer to anything; it does something. It begins the conversation. — Banno

Like i have said numerous times, meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Effects are about their causes. Use requires intent. Intent is the cause of use, therefore use is about one's intent.

Speaking is a type of behavior and we attempt to get at the intent of other behaviors so that we form beliefs, or predictions about future behaviors.

i dont have to try that hard if "hello" is your one and only example. We can disagree on one example, but it take more than one example to prove your point.

Yeah, I noticed the leaning on possible worlds arguments in your replies regarding unspoken statements and propositions. — creativesoul

Not sure what use the idea of possible worlds is unless were talking about beliefs as predictions.

No, Harry - it doesn't refer to the begging of a conversation; it is the begining of a conversation. — Banno

Or a reference to the intent to communicate.

Yep. It's not referential. That's what you asked for. — Banno

Like i said, it refers to the beginning of a conversation, or the intent to communicate with you.

If its not referential, then what is its use?

Hello. — Banno

We've already been over this. No new examples?

"Hello" is the acknowledgement of two or more people to begin an exchange of information (have a conversation). "Good-bye" is the acknowledge of the parties' that the exchange of information has ended.

When a computer targets another to exchange information, they must acknowledge each other and the beginning of the exchange of information with what we call a "hand-shake" and then acknowledge the termination of the exchange with another acknowledgement from both nodes.

You seem to have entirely missed the point. Realist or idealist, one sentence is about the cat, the other about Harry. — Banno

No, it is you who missed the point. It wasnt a comparison of realism vs idealism, but between two different versions a realism - direct vs indirect. Idealism would also have two versions: direct vs. indirect.

Whatever you choose. — Banno

Not useful. Any examples of use other than representation would be helpful.

To the best of my knowledge, current convention denies that language less creatures can even have belief, to remain consistent with holding that all belief has propositional content(an attitude towards a proposition). — creativesoul

A Man Without Words is a story about a deaf man that grew up without language and only discovered language after becoming an adult.

Idelfonso obviously held beliefs before learning a language, or else how did he find food? He had to have beliefs about where food could be found that were not propositions, or else he would have starved, just like cats that learn and then hold beliefs that the sound of a can opener precedes the smell and taste of tuna.

What are language-less creatures' beliefs composed of? The same thing that words are composed of - shapes, colors, sounds, tastes, smells and the feelings that go along with them.

Try this: What is the subject of "the cat is on the mat"? I would say it is the cat. But what is the subject fo "Harry believes the cat is on the mat"? It's about Harry. They are quite different. — Banno

In the first, the naive realist believes that they can talk about how things are independent of some belief or observation. The first statement could be caused by an illusion, hallucination or a lie.

For the indirect realist, both are the same because you can only talk about your ideas or observations, and your ideas or observations would be about the way things are. So words can be about the way things are, but not without some observation, which is what some proposition is about, not about the way things are independent of some observation. We can only ever speak about our knowledge and hope that our knowledge is accurate.

Language was developed in such a way that it implies that we see the world as it is. When we speak of colors and sounds, we imply that those colors and sounds exist independent of our observations and that we see colors and hear sounds that are actually there. But science has shown that indirect realism is the case where colors only exist in the mind and are representations of wavelengths of EM energy, and sounds are representations of vibrating air molecules. As a result of modern scientific knowledge, it is understood that our words can only be about the way things are indirectly - meaning that our words refer to our ideas and our ideas refer to states-of-affairs. Our words only accurately refer to state-of-affairs when our ideas do the same.

Given that color is a component of the perception and not of the perceived, what is the subject of the statement, "The apple is red."?

Exactly; the attitude of taking the proposition to be true. — Banno

Having the attitude that some proposition is true doesn't make the proposition true. What makes some proposition true or not, and how would you know?

I don't see any benefit in that. I can see no clear way in which "We believe that Augustus was a Roman Emperor" is just a prediction. However treating belief as a propositional attitude has spawned very many further developments. Again it seems worth pointing out that it is, for better or worse, orthodoxy. — Banno

You predict both future and past state-of-affairs based on observations of current conditions. You can predict past events based on the effects they have left, like a criminal investigator investigating the evidence at the crime scene to predict the identity of the criminal and their motive. While the crime happened in the past, the knowledge of who did it is in the future and is only proved once the evidence is properly interpreted. Your continued reference to orthodoxy and popularity is a logical fallacy and not useful.

Not certainty, but truth. — Banno

We can know that we can be certain about some proposition, but not that some proposition is true. What does it mean for some proposition to be true?

And yet we do things with them. There's no point in going over the problems with your referential theory of meaning again. — Banno

What do we do with them, Banno? Use them to accomplish what goal? Intent precedes use and use is dependent upon intent. What is the intent of using words? Your "going over the problems of referential theory" were debunked and you abandoned the conversation, like you are doing now. There's no point in going over the problems of meaning is use again when you make the same arguments and keep appealing to popularity.

Meaning is use is not specific enough as words can be used for representation.

Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat". — Banno

I don't see the difference in the meaning. Why would you say the cat is on the mat if you weren't implying that it was true that the cat is on the mat?

"Attitudes" doesn't really fit, or leaves one wanting to know: what kind of attitude, if not the attitude that the proposition, or idea, is true?

Beliefs are better described as predictions. We are prediction machines and predictions are attitudes of probability towards some idea or proposition. We often use the phrases, "I think", "I believe", and "I know" to refer to the level of certainty we have of a given idea, with the latter being the most certain you can be.

Saying, "The sun will rise tomorrow." is the same as making a prediction and we make predictions based on prior experiences in similar circumstances. The more experience we have in a certain circumstance, the more certain we become that similar future circumstances will be the same. A belief is no different. Beliefs eventually become knowledge with more justification.

But in addition the model you use of talking as if things in your head were translated into language that is then transmitted and translated in things in your listener's head has been thoroughly critiqued, and found wanting. It's clear that it is much better to deal with the use to which one's utterance are put rather than to invent an enigmatic, disembodied entity called "the meaning of a word" that somehow floats from mind to mind.

If you are interested in formal representations of beliefs, the Stanford article on that topic is quite good.

As per all philosophical considerations, it takes for granted that beliefs are propositional attitudes. — Banno

Your use of "attitudes" and "use" is found wanting. What kind of attitudes, if not attitudes of certainty? Used for what if not representing things that aren't words?

I have found that defining meaning as the relationship between cause and effect very useful. Meaning is everywhere causes leave effects. Words are the effects of one's intent to communicate ideas that are not just other words. Some idea and the intent to communicate them is what causes words to appear on this page, and it is now the reader's job to get at the cause of the words - the idea the writer intends to communicate. Sometimes the reader may require re-phrasing or ask questions to better understand the idea.

There's a way of thinking that supposes, given that we talk about this being red and that being red, that there must be a thing which is named by "red". Of course, there isn't. The red in the sunset has nothing in common with the red in the sports car; apart from the name.

The temptation is to reify the red into existence. But all we actually have is a way of talking that has proved useful. — Banno

Words are just colored shapes on a background of a contrasting color, or particular sounds in the air. Given that we can talk about words and how they are shaped and how they sound, like we can talk about apples and the way the are colored and shaped and how they taste and smell, and compare them to other words, even from different languages, seems to show that we are talking about something when we use words like, "red", "black letters on white paper", and the way "where" sounds like "wear", as opposed to just "using" them (again, used for what if not to refer to something that isn't a word).

If there are beliefs that cannot be presented in propositional form, give us an example.
It's that simple. — Banno

I use whatever symbol-system I've learned and that I believe my reader knows so that I might translate my beliefs into a form perceivable to them. My beliefs are not only propositions, but can be symbolized using words.

If beliefs were only propositions then are you saying that your beliefs are only composed of visual scribbles and spoken sounds? What color are the words that form your belief, and the corresponding background that provides the contrast for you to be able to easily discern the scribbles that are imposed upon it? What font is used to form your belief? Is the type of font and color of the scribbles and background part of the belief? Just so I can better understand the composition of your beliefs, but I don't think that is going to get me anywhere in understanding your belief. What will help me understand your stated belief is what the scribbles on this page refer to, which can't be just scribbles in your head.

Do propositions exhaust the entirety of your beliefs? In reading your propositions, do I have direct access to your beliefs without missing anything in the translation?

These functions are experience in itself. — Hermeticus

This doesn't explain why I don't see the experience itself when looking at your brain. Instead I can only have the experience itself of looking at your brain. Your brain is not my experience of it (I hope, or else solipsism is the case and your brain doesn't exist when I don't think about it), nor is my brain my experience. My experience is a point of view.

How do non-colored neurons create the experience of color? How do neurons create the experience of visual depth?

How do you know there is no fundamental level? — Raymond

Because everytime himans declare theyve discovered the fundamental level of reality we find there are even smaller things, like atoms to protons to quarks.

Besides, how do you reconcile the concept of particles with the concept of the mind (the hard problem)‽ We can refer to the mind with words. Is the mind a thing or particle?

That's a property of particles in cooperation. — Raymond

I can use whatever term you like. Property is a type of information. When you use the terms property, interaction, relationship or process, you are referring to a type if information.

That definition is wanting in many respects. It doesn't, for example, say anything useful i.e. it merely states what's obvious. As for your request to tell you what you'r missing, I regret to inform you that I can't comply, for obvious reasons. — Agent Smith

It's not obvious, or else I wouldn't have asked in the first place. What use are you hoping to get from a definition other than the way some word is used to refer to some (obvious) state-of-affairs?

Is there experience without awareness? Can a rock, for instance, experience anything? Also,is there awareness sans experience? Is this sentence :point: "Tell me you experiences in Paris?" appropriate for a block of wood or does it seem like one that should be asked of a being capable of awareness, like yourself for example? — Agent Smith

I don't see how any of this answers my questions in my previous post. I asked you a question and now you're answering it with questions. Remember, I'm asking you to clarify what you have said about your position, not mine.

The process stops at a fundamental level. The fundamentals are massless. They interact and form the massive structures of quarks and leptons. They interact because they contain a charge, which is not a material like we see around us. Not a thing. So the word "charge", in relation to elementary particles, is an example of a word not referring to a thing. It's a non-thing in a thing. — Raymond

How do you know that there is a "fundamental level" of the universe? Any "level" is just a view from somewhere in the universe, so levels of the universe, including the "fundamental" one would just be different imaginary views of the universe from imaginary vantage points in the universe.

A charge is often described as an attribute, or defining quality, of some thing, which is just another way of saying that it is information.

Information is a material notion. It describes the spatial relationships between particles. — Raymond

What are particles? Isn't any particle really just an interaction of smaller "particles", which are in turn composed of the interaction of even smaller "particles", ad infinitum? So you never get at any particles, only interactions between smaller interactions, or information/processes all the way down. Particles would be the process of mental modeling of other information, or processes, relative to your own.

Not all words in English language refer to things though. — Raymond

Have any examples?
If some word doesnt refer to something, then what would you be talking about?

Sometimes it's not really a dog, but a bush shaking in the wind that you momentarily mistaken for a dog. Your experience was real, and it matched the experience that you would have if there was a dog, but there wasn't a dog.

I think there is always an element of illusion in everything we perceive. E.g. does the dog have a color in your experience? We know that the color perception in humans is somewhat arbitrary. It only ties to a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. The things in the universe are not inherently colorful, but it's the human brain that perceives them as such. Is it not reasonable to say that color is kind of an illusion? Would this necessarily undermine our experience and knowledge about colors? — pfirefry

Right. So preliminary perceptions can lead to a misinterpretation of those perceptions. Only after you do a double-take and look more closely do you see that it's a shaking bush, and not a tail-wagging dog and the illusion is dispelled, yet you still experience something. So it seems to me that consciousness and its contents (qualia) are not illusions. As you said, the experience is real. It is the misinterpretation of the experience that is the illusion.

Take mirages and a "bent" straw in a glass of water. There isn't really water on the ground and the straw isn't bent. It is the light that is being bent and that is what you are experiencing. Once you interpret the sensory data correctly the illusion disappears. Even though I still experience the appearance of water on the ground and straws being bent, the interpretation is what either makes it an illusion or not. Once I interpret the data correctly, I am seeing it as it truly is. Pools of water on the ground and bent straws are what bent light looks like. Even though what things look like isn't the way those things truly are (that would be confusing the map with the territory), I can still get at how it truly is. How can I still get at things as they truly are indirectly? Because causes leave effects and effects are about their causes. So by seeing the effect (qualia) as it truly is I can get at what the qualia is about by correctly interpreting the causes.

Is your experience joyful when you're seeing a dog wagging its tail? Perhaps a person next to you experiences fear because they're afraid of dogs. Don't we call it an illusion when things appear differently in our experience from what they actually are? Do we ever perceive things exactly the way they are? Can an experience exist without containing at least some illusion in it? — pfirefry

That's if you are incorrectly projecting joy and fear onto the dog. In this case it would be an illusion if you interpreted your joy or fear as being part of the dog and not part of your self, just as we create an illusion by interpreting the bentness as part of the straw in the water and not to the light that reflects off it and into our eyes.

You came to that conclusion. You tell me. — Agent Smith

No. It is what you implied. Let's recap.

You said:

neither single neurons nor neural networks see themselves as they truly are, neurons or neural networks — Agent Smith

and

my neural network (brain) is not aware that it is a neural network (brain). — Agent Smith

So you implied that being aware of something is seeing it as it truly is.

I asked you how you know the mind as it truly is - as a neural network - if you're not aware of it:

Then how is it that you can say that you have a neural network if youre not aware of it? — Harry Hindu

You replied:

I learnt it later on, from biology books. — Agent Smith

So I attempted point out that you can be aware of something and not see it as it truly is:

So you can become aware of something by reading a book and not necessarily by experiencing "directly". — Harry Hindu

A book is not a brain or a mind, yet you said that you can be aware of a brain or mind as it truly is by reading a book.

You then said:

Therein lies the rub. We don't experience ourselves directly as brains - we're told we're brains. — Agent Smith

You switched from using the term, "aware" to "experience". So what you seemed to have implied is that you can be aware of things as they truly are by reading a book, but not experience things as they truly are. So I'm asking you what the difference is.

How are you using "experience" as opposed to "awareness" if you can be aware of things as they truly are even if you experience them not as they truly are. Are you experiencing the book as it truly is, that you then become aware of how brains truly are by reading it?