Well, guys, I have found people who agree with me, and people who disagree with me in a way that it feels like we're living in different realities and talking past each other, so I rest my case :wink: — leo

I find that option no less plausible than believing the experiences we have in common stem from a world that exists independently of us. I am sure that I have experiences, I am confident that others have some experiences in common with me, I am less certain that these experiences stem from a world independent of us (as in a world that doesn't depend on minds).

I have evidence of mind (my own), I don't have evidence of something that doesn't depend on mind. — leo

What is the difference between truth and belief? Cambridge dictionary defines belief as "the feeling of being certain that something exists or is true". You're implicitly saying that there is a true way to differentiate between truth and belief. — leo

You're saying it is true that the Earth is a sphere, but many people say it is true that the Earth is an ellipsoid, and many other people say that it is true the Earth is neither a sphere nor an ellipsoid but something that approximates these shapes, and many other people say it is true that the Earth is flat. Who is right? Who is stating a truth and who is stating a belief? — leo

If I disagree with you, how is your truth objective? — leo

Your beliefs are such that they exist independent of what I think or believe about them. — Harry Hindu

Solipsists do not agree with that, so how are my beliefs objective? — leo

If there is no objective truth, then why do so many people on this forum feel the need to quote other philosophers as if those other philosophers hold some truth about others than just the philosopher being quoted? — Harry Hindu

Because they agree with these philosophers, they share the same point of view about something, or they believe they do. This is my view, my personal truth. If you disagree with me, then you have a different truth, and we're not sharing the same truth, so it isn't objective. — leo

But it seems an error to suppose that consciousness can be produced merely by winding enough of the right sort of "information processing" into an AI program. To wit, Searle's Chinese room. — Cabbage Farmer

Then the world we see is an appearance of a greater mind we all belong to, which includes the whole world. When we explore the world, we are indirectly exploring that mind. — leo

The concept of objective truth seems incoherent to me. If we say objective truth is something everyone agrees on, it seems that there is nothing everyone agrees on, and not everyone agrees that "there is nothing everyone agrees on", and so on and so forth.

If we say that objective truth exists out there but we can't access it or not all of us can access it, then how is that an objective truth? If no one can access it then it's an idea, not a thing, and if only some can access it then it is personal, not objective.

However if we say "There is only personal truth", then we are not stating an objective truth, we are stating a personal truth, and that way we can remain coherent. — leo

This sounds like the integrated information theory of consciousness. I'm unclear as to where that is a property dualism, strong emergentism or some form of identity theory. — Marchesk

Maybe I should press this definitional issue:

The p-zombies about which I've heard rumors are not just

i) any AI that passes the Turing test; nor just

ii) any AI automaton that passes the Turing test and outwardly resembles a human and is normally mistaken for a human under a wide range of ordinary circmstances; but rather are

iii) biological creatures physically and behaviorally indistinguishable from human beings (which thus of course pass the Turing test), which creatures -- by definition in these discourses, if yet somehow inexplicably -- lack the thing we here agree to call "subjective experience with phenomenal character".

Isn't it, specifically, the third sort of hypothetical construct we consider in the zombie discourses? — Cabbage Farmer

The two idioms you gesture at here, which I might distinguish as ordinary language and scientific language, are both cultural products of human animals, cumulatively informed by experience of the empirical world as it appears to us.

I see no reason to suppose that p-zombies -- which are by definition in these discourses, I take it, physically and behaviorally identical to human beings -- would prefer either one of these idioms any more than we do.

You seem to take for granted that the term "red" is primarily subjective. On what grounds would you support such a claim? Concepts like the concepts of red, loud, and painful all seem to have objective associations and criteria, so far as I can tell. They're less precise than the measurements made by those equipped to measure more precisely; but isn't that precision mainly a matter of the instrument employed, not of the distinction between subject and object? I mean, for instance in the first case, the naked eye, and in the second -- what do we use for that -- a spectrometer (the output of which is available to us via the naked eye or some other sense-receptor)? — Cabbage Farmer

I would argue that much traditional puzzling over "secondary qualities" consists in pseudoproblems and misconceptions, and should be cleared up through a rehabilitation of our concept of perception.

What "converts" red light into an experience of red light and an experience of objects that emit or reflect red light? Cognitive systems like ours with sense receptors like ours. — Cabbage Farmer

All of that for which one can strive for apprehension therewith; the sum of every form and each instance in which all are brought to fruition, of which the world is itself constituted, is bound by the condition wherein there is present a subject through whom is yielded its sight yet neither are to subsist in a wholesome state if it be the case that either be absent whilst the other remains. — Vessuvius

And that electromagnetic radiation is what we're calling color out in the world. — Terrapin Station

As if anyone thought that a perception of a tree might be, in fact, identical to the tree. I know that Dennett has made comments in that vein a number of times as if he's saying something insightful. — Terrapin Station

Here's an outright denial that credits Dennett and P. Churchland: — Marchesk

There are some interesting consequences for this argument. An identical p-zombie universe would still have all the same stories we have. But many stories have first person points of view. So how do p-zombies understand reading or watching someone's thoughts or dreams? How do they make sense of a character undergoing intense emotion not apparent to other characters? — Marchesk

Arguably the p-zombies, as well as some sorts of advanced AI, would each have a sort of first-person point of view. I mean, we can say they make reliable introspective reports analogous to ours. For instance about states of appetite and emotion, about goals and plans and intentions, pains, sense-perceptions, memories, daydreams....

Their observations and reports about things outside them as mediated by sense-receptors will be as fine-grained and reliable as ours; and their observations and reports about things inside them as mediated by "introspective processes" will be as fine-grained and reliable as ours. I believe this comes by definition in these discourses; this is part of what it means to be a p-zombie, if there could be such a thing. — Cabbage Farmer

For several reasons, researchers have typically either postponed addressing this question [the hard question] or failed to recognize—and assert—that their research on the ‘easy problems’ can be seen as addressing and resolving aspects of the hard question, thereby indirectly dismantling the hard problem piece by piece, without need of any revolution in science.

..the widespread conviction that qualia, thus conceived, must obviously exist if we are to make sense of our introspective access to them, is an illusion, not an optical illusion or auditory illusion, but a theorist's illusion, an artefact of bad theory, not observation. Richard Power nicely captures the source of this illusion. — D Dennett

We know that our perceptions or imaginings of trees, faces, etc. are distinct from the objects themselves. They are internal representations, representations in our minds. — R Power

We understand the concept of representation from external representations, such as pictures, or verbal descriptions. For these representations we can have direct experience of both a representer (e.g. portrait painting) and a representee (e.g. the person painted). Call these the medium and the content. Thus for the Mona Lisa, the medium is a painting that hangs in the Louvre; the content is an Italian woman who modelled for the artist centuries ago. Medium and content may have attributes in common, if the representation is iconic (as they say in Semiotics). Oval partly-brown patches in the painting resemble the oval brown eyes of the Italian lady. But usually medium and content are of different stuff: oil on canvas, in the case of the Mona Lisa, as against human flesh. And in many cases the representation is symbolic, so that medium and content share no features. — R Power

There are no qualia, instead there is something akin to the idea of "virtual glue" that performs the functional and informational roles that qualia is supposed to be playing. — Marchesk

Yeah. The paradox is in valuing a world without values, of preferring a world without preferences. — Banno

Here's an odd thing: the introduction of the words objective and subjective freezes ethics.

So, don't. — Banno

Objectivity is a distinctively human trait, as only human beings have the capacity for objectivity. It involves the ability to shift perspective, and no one has ever attributed this to animals. Objectivity requires us to stand back from our perceptions, our beliefs and opinions, to reflect on them, and subject them to a particular kind of scrutiny and judgement. Above all, it requires a degree of indifference in judging that may conflict with our needs and desires — Matias

Truth and objectivity are not the same thing. One can arrive at true theories in a non-objective way. — Matias

Conversely, objective theories are not necessarily true. The history of science provides plenty of examples of the objective formulation and defence of theories that have turned out to be false and have been replaced by other theories. Objectivity is no guarantee of truth, any more than truth can only be the outcome of objectivity. — Matias

The problem with thinking of objectivity exclusively in general terms, as elimination of prejudice or bias, is that it encourages an absolutist view of objectivity. The prime example of such an absolutist conception is the view from nowhere.

There are two problems with this conception. First, the idea that we are being guided towards *the* truth is wholly misleading. — Matias

What we are being guided towards are the best answers to the questions that we pose. — Matias

They are all eventually solved by science, — Harry Hindu

You're a time traveller? — Marchesk

So philosophy should just be science? But philosophy asks broader questions and questions that science doesn't know how to address. Some questions like how to live are not scientific questions. — Marchesk

My guess would be those structures that handle sensory data and integrate them into a perception in addition to the ones for memory, imagination, dreams, thoughts and any kind of experience. There's likely a lot of overlap there. — Marchesk

Because we don't brain structures for sonar perception. — Marchesk

If science can solve such questions, sure. Until then, they remain philosophical. — Marchesk

I try to avoid qualia because it has controversial properties, and will be used by critics to dismiss the argument. — Marchesk

That it's subjective — Marchesk

Useful? Purpose?

This is a philosophical discussion about the nature of conscious experience. It's not about whether being able to know sonar experiences would be useful. — Marchesk

But what the bat experiences something else that isnt color or sound when using sonar?
— Harry Hindu

That's the point. — Marchesk

What's it feel like to have 8 tentacles with suckers? — Marchesk

Because we don't brain structures for sonar perception. — Marchesk

Qualia is first person, but I prefer to talk in terms of color, sound, etc. — Marchesk

Qualia is first person, but I prefer to talk in terms of color, sound, etc. — Marchesk

We don’t have a description for sonar experiences, nor do we have a way of gaining them from science. That’s Nagels point. — Marchesk

No, not unless panpsychism is true. The things we can't perceive that we learn about through science are described in objective terms. — Marchesk

He's asking what the experience of using sonar is. Is it accompanied with something like color or sound? The reason for choosing a bat is because it has a sensory modality we lack. It's akin to being born blind and then learning that other people see color, whatever that means for a person blind from birth. — Marchesk

The thing is we know that we experience. — Janus

The difference is that those atoms aren't part of a material system that amounts to mental phenomena. — Terrapin Station

As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus

He's asking what the subjective experience of a bat is like; which obviously cannot be answered since we are not bats. But really the question is "is it like anything to be a bat?". Of course, we know what the question means, but I never liked the "what's it like" part, because being a bat cannot be like anything but being a bat, if it is like anything at all. Perhaps the question should be simpler, perhaps "is there any subjective 'feel' to being a bat?". Of course the answer is that we don't and cannot know; we can only guess. — Janus

Because you can't experience my imagination, dreams, inner dialog and have to settle for language and behavior to know about them. And if I don't tell you, there will be experiences I have you won't ever know about, nor will you have any means of finding out, because they can't always be inferred from behavior. — Marchesk

It's not like we can hook someone's brain up to a machine and have it read out their thoughts or display their dreams on a tv. — Marchesk

This why Nagel asked what it's like to be a bat and used that as an example of how there is a gap between objective explanation and subjective experience. — Marchesk

Such an understanding of ethics is at odds with the prevailing schools of thought - deontology and consequentialism. Nussbaum's views are not original, but are worth being heard given what for many are the default positions, deontology and consequentialism, that frame moral and ethical issues. — Fooloso4

And how does this work with imagination, dreams, inner dialog? Subjective experience isn't exclusive to perception. — Marchesk

The capabilities approach locks us in to considering our own feelings and those of others in a way that I find appealing. If one is not taking others into account one is not acting ethically. Flourishing at the expense of others is not acting ethically. Acting ethically is maintaining human dignity, and hence a life worthy of that dignity. — Banno

Dennett, like Chalmers, Searle, etc. thinks that consciousness can't be fit into a physicalist explanation of the world. But unlike them, he takes the position that this means consciousness must be an illusion, because why would consciousness be the one thing that's an exception in the universe? — Marchesk

I've read and heard enough of Dennett to be convinced that he thinks there is no consciousness and we are philosophical zombies. Except that he likes to keep using the word with a different definition. Which would be consciousness in the functional or behavioral sense only, because those can be fit into a materialist explanation. — Marchesk

I haven't been angered but I have been frustrated by some neuroscientists who say we do not have free will and in some cases this position has implications in law and morality. They argue your mind is your brain, the brain is programmed, so there's no free will. I think science needs to be more circumspect and more creative. An economist might say, dollars don't exist, it's just a collective illusion, I think this is very bad advice and I also think it is bad, greedy reductionist advice to say free will is an illusion. — D. Dennett

CJ How important is self-reflection to consciousness?

DD Very. — The Guardian.com

If it is a mistake, nobody has succeeded in showing how you can explain the subjective in terms of the objective, which is what the hard problem is about. See Nagel. — Marchesk

Here's a brief article about it:

https://curiosity.com/topics/theres-no-such-thing-as-consciousness-according-to-philosopher-daniel-dennett-curiosity/ — Terrapin Station

Dennet's next metaphor: If our brain is a smartphone, then consciousness is the screen. In other words, consciousness is not how our brain works, it's only how we interface with it. — curiosity.com

Dennett and Frankish use the metaphor of a magic show with slight of hand being used to fool our brains. — Marchesk

Consciousness is compared to a magic show, where the brain fools us using some slight of cognition we're not aware of. — Marchesk

The goal is to dissolve the hard problem without just handwaving it away or giving into some form of dualism. — Marchesk

When I perceive an apple, I'm not just aware of the apple's color or its taste, I'm also aware of it's shape and weight. Some qualities of human experience are the basis for science. But if color and taste are illusions, what reason would we have for supposing that shape and weight are not? — Marchesk

Preferences are brain states. Mental phenomena are identical to particular brain states.

Brain states/mental phenomena are not identical to genetics and environmental factors, though those things are important factors in why brains develop as they do. — Terrapin Station

That would only be the case if you're defining "based on" as being about contributing factors that aren't identical to what we're talking about. But of course, one wouldn't have to use "based on" that way. — Terrapin Station

For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno

Again the mental is "merely biological." It's a term for a subset of properties of brain function. Brains are biological, obviously. Why anyone has the preferences then due to brain states, which are the way they are via a combo of genetics and environmental factors. — Terrapin Station

They're certainly not based on something that's not one's preferences. — Terrapin Station

We went through this dance before, if you recall, but the special thing about it, which I mentioned above, is that people keep saying confused things about the properties and relationships of mental to non-mental things. It's one of the more popular confusions when approaching anything like philosophical talk. — Terrapin Station