Actually, direct realism is part of the hard problem. In asserting that you see the world as it is - as static objects and physical brains, and comparing that to how the mind appears and is described as being non-physical and immaterial is how the hard problem arises.
— Harry Hindu

:roll: That's not direct realism. Why bother? — jkop

In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences; out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our conscious experience. — Wikipedia

If you're using direct realism in a different way then I would hope that you would explain.

I asked you what an observer is, and you didn't answer the question.
— Harry Hindu

For example, a bird observing its environment,, birdwatchers observing the bird, a prison guard observing prisoners, a solo musician observing his own playing, an audience observing the musician, scientists observing their experiments, a thinker observing his own thinking (e.g. indirectly via its effects). — jkop

All you are saying is that an observer observes. :confused:

Yeah, don't bother. :roll:

Computers operate according to the parameters, programming, and designs created by the scientists who build them. While it's true that large language models can generate unexpected insights based on their training data and algorithms, the key point is that these systems do not understand anything. They process and output information, but it's not until their output is interpreted by a human mind that true understanding occurs. — Wayfarer

Humans operate according to the parameters, programming, and designs created by natural selection. How does an unconscious process (natural selection) create consciousness, but a conscious process (human minds) can't?

What does it mean to understand something? Searle said the same thing using the Chinese Room thought experiment, but all he showed is that the man in the room understands something. He understands the language the rules are written in and he understands to write this scribble when he sees that scribble. But these are not how one learns a language. If he had instructions that show what the scribbles refer to in the world rather than what to write when he sees that scribble, he would understand Chinese in the same way that native speakers do.

Additionally, I dispute the idea that the brain is simply a 'physical object.' The brain might appear as a physical object when extracted from a body and examined by a pathologist or neuroscientist. But in its living context, the brain is part of an organism—embodied, encultured, and alive. In that sense, it's not just an object but part of a dynamic, living process that produces consciousness in ways that no computer can replicate. — Wayfarer

Sounds like you are agreeing with me by describing the brain as a process or a relationship. :up:

Likewise, when we experience seeing red, it's because that specific wavelength stands in contrast to other wavelengths of visible light. Therefore, within the neuronal circuits of the brain wherein we interpret the specific wavelength for red, there's nothing therein that's red because the relativistic effect that supports our experience of red exists within the context of the visual field of our eyes, not within the neuronal circuits of the visual cortex of our brain. — ucarr

But we can imagine and dream of red things. So it seems to me that the color red is the form visual information takes and stored as such for future use in making predictions about the world. For us to be able to apply what we predict to the world, our predictions need to be similar to what we attempting to realize in the world, or else how could we apply new ideas to the world?

Are Mathematics and Metaphysics "real" or "ideal"? — Gnomon

How about neither and we come up with a better word.

Is an electron a wave or particle? How about neither and we come up with a better word?

Yes. The "in here / out there" distinction is a product of dualistic thinking. Do we talk about a table being outside of the apple that is sitting on it in the same way we talk about this distinction between the mind and the world? What if we were to simply talk about the mind as a relationship, or a process, and acknowledge that everything else is a relationship, or a process. Talk about in here vs out there would become meaningless. We can only be ("access") what we are and our experience of things other than ourselves can only come in the form of relationships - of how these other things interact with our senses, in the same way that everything else is a relationship between it and its environment or its own parts, depending on which perspective we are taking.

Imaginings and dreams are amalgams of what we have experienced before. The mind isn't just colors and sounds. There is a logical process underlying it all in the way that it processes sensory information to produce valid responses. We often solve some of the biggest problems by blending together different ideas or experiences we have had prior into unique ideas that can be applied to how we function in the world.

We get most of our information visually so it is no wonder that most of what we imagine, dream and conceive of will take the form of visual models. If they didn't then how would we apply our imaginings and new ideas to what we actually see in the world? I think there are other underlying (unconscious) processes that our dreams "represent" in that dreams are relationships between the way our mind constructs reality using visual information and other unconscious processes.

Computers create models of the world. Does this mean that the computer can imagine things? What makes brains so special in that minds arise from them but cannot arise from a computer? Both are physical objects and both are doing similar things in processing (sensory) information. If a physical object like a brain can produce a mind, then why not a computer? That's the thing - neither a brain nor a computer are physical things. They are processes.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/

In my posts above I'm arguing against the property dualism that is implied in the so called hard problem of consciousness. The problem reappears also in epistemological forms of dualism, such as in indirect realism, or in any philosophy in which it is assumed that consciousness is inaccessible to our knowledge.

Those are not my problems. I'm a direct realist, and a monist, so there's no need for you to give me a lecture on the monist nature of the world. Likewise, when I'm talking of subjective and objective in their ontological and epistemological senses, I'm not trying to split the world in two. In a monist world, things can have different modes of existing, and some things are observer-dependent (e.g. money) while other things (e.g. mountains) exist regardless of observers. But thanks anyway — jkop

Actually, direct realism is part of the hard problem. In asserting that you see the world as it is - as static objects and physical brains, and comparing that to how the mind appears and is described as being non-physical and immaterial is how the hard problem arises because it does not account for causation and that causes are not their effects and vice versa. I have argued that the distinction between direct and indirect is incoherent. What does it even mean to directly or indirectly access something? I asked you what an observer is, and you didn't answer the question.

So it's not just an issue of perception. It's a problem of language-use. We don't need to use terms like, "direct", "indirect", "subjective" and "objective", even in a monist sense.

We agree that subjectivity could be a dualist illusion. (I don't think it is, but I'm happy to assume it for purposes of argument.) But if it is, we still need to know why. You say, rather cavalierly, "Abandon dualism." OK, I imagine a purple cow and I follow this up by saying to myself, "This experience of me-and-purple-cow-image is illusory. There is no separation." But this doesn't make the purple cow go away, or change into something else. I'm sure you don't believe this would happen either, but what do you believe? What changes, for you, in this sort of experience when you introduce the idea of monism? Is it that experience, as presented, becomes a sort of brute fact, about which it's no longer possible to ask questions? This isn't meant to be snarky, I'm genuinely interested. — J

How is it illusory? Are you imagining a purple cow or not? The fact that you can imagine things is not illusory. It is illusory when you project that purple cow into the world, as if it were not just an imagining. In asserting that the purple cow is an imagining, and not an organism, you dispel the illusion.

Monism solves the problem because your argument about how material objects like brains give rise to immaterial minds is a problem of dualism. In thinking that the world and mind are two different types of things creates the problem. Thinking of them as the same solves it.

Well, not entirely. You still have to also understand that the way the world appears is just a map and you are confusing the map's static symbols (perceptual objects) with the way the world is (not static objects), which is more like your mind than the way the world is represented by your mind. I do want to clarify that I am not arguing for idealism or panpsychism as that would be another type of subjectivity in projecting one's mind onto the world. Everything is process, relationships, or information. Take your pick. They all mean similar things. The mind is just a type of process, relationship, or information.

Well, there are GOP lawmakers who oppose morning after pills/url]. — Michael

And there are Democrat lawmakers quoted as saying that abortions should be allowed up to the moment of birth for any reason. I think we can both agree that there are extremists on both sides of the (any) issue. Fortunately it appears that more moderate minds are winning on this issue as many states are voting to keep a woman's right to choose, but with some restrictions.

The most common republican view, although not officially, is that abortion should be illegal except under certain grave circumstances. E.g., https://news.gallup.com/poll/246278/abortion-trends-party.aspx#:~:text=Views%20on%20Legality%20of%20Abortion%2C%20by%20Party%20ID .

Democrats commonly want it legal in all or most circumstances. You are making it sound like both republicans and democrats see eye-to-eye on abortion....not at all. — Bob Ross

I know many Republicans that believe that abortion should be allowed up to a certain point in the pregnancy for any reason. I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy.

To me, the issue becomes moral only when the fetus develops a nervous system and is capable of feeling pain. Zygotes do not have nervous systems. The brain and nervous system does not fully develop until the 2nd trimester. This is the grey area for me.

I think that abortions should be allowed for any reason through the first trimester. In the final trimester, the only reason to have an abortion would be because the life of the mother is at risk, and these cases are extremely rare and is stressful enough to not have the government deciding this for us.

If someone was raped or the birth control they were using failed, I would think that they wouldn't wait until the last moment to have an abortion. They have at least 12-16 weeks to make that decision because they already made the conscious choice to not get pregnant in the case of failed birth control. I personally do not know anyone that wanted an abortion waited until after 16 weeks to have one. I don't know if this even happens. So we could be making a mountain out of a mole hill here in this thread.

Ok, Husserl might not seem to be a dualist, but the assumption that consciousness is immaterial in the sense that it never appears as an object in a world of objects, implies an epistemological dualism, and the hard problem reappears. For if consciousness is immaterial, then it seems we have no way of knowing what it's like to be another observer, or how immaterial experiences arise in a material world.

A similar problem arises for indirect realists because of their assumption that we never see objects directly, only by way of seeing our own sense-data (or mental images) first.

For idealists for whom everything is consciousness, the hard problem does not arise from a metaphysical or epistemological wedge. Likewise, it doesn't arise for direct realists under the assumption that we see objects directly: e.g. what it feels like is what the object appears like. — jkop

Other minds do appear as objects in the world. Consciousness is a process. Consciousness models other minds as objects, as in other people's brains and bodies. The brain is not a physical, material object. It is a mental representation of other's minds.

The solution to your "indirect" realism problem is by understanding that effects carry information about their causes. You can get at the nature of other objects via the effect of your mind, just as you can get at the identity of a criminal by the effects they leave at the crime scene, or get at the age of the tree by how it grows throughout the year and the number of tree rings it has.

You can also get at your own state means of your mind. Your mind not only tells you about your environment, but also about the amount of light in your environment, and your own mental and body states. As I mentioned before, your mind is a relationship between you and your environment.

I think I could add "the illusion of" in front of every reference to "subjectivity" and it wouldn't alter the problem. If I understand you, you believe that subjectivity only becomes a "problem" when it is labeled as subjective and claimed to be a mirror or a window or something that validly reflects an external reality. But if none of that is so, and what I was calling "subjectivity" is in fact a dualistic illusion, we still need to know how this comes about, and why. — J

But that is what I've been saying - that seeing this as a dualist illusion IS the problem. Abandon dualism and introduce the idea of monism and see if that helps you solve the problem.

Subjectivity is the category mistake of asserting that what you experience is part of the object you are experiencing.

For instance,

I'm not sure our ignorance is so fundamental. Moreover, the word 'experience', like perceptual verbs such as 'see', are ambiguous. By clarifying their ambiguity we can get rid of some of the problems.

For example, in talk of the experience of seeing a cat, the word 'experience' or 'seeing' can refer to what is constitutive for having the experience: the feeling. But they can also refer to what the experience is about: the cat.

The cat is the object that you see, which causes you to feel a certain way. The way it makes you feel is what the cat is like when it is seen under those conditions, and what the cat is like is not a creation of anyone's brain, nor are the conditions under which the cat is seen. — jkop

How you feel and the experience is not what the cat is like. It is what you are like when looking at a cat.

Saying things like, "Chocolate ice cream is good and is the best!" is a subjective misuse of language as "good" and "best" are subjective in the sense that they are projected onto the object being talked about when ice cream is not good or the best. "Good" and "best" refer to your feelings and beliefs, not anything about the ice cream. Instead we should clarify by saying, "I feel good when I eat chocolate cream" or "I believe that chocolate ice cream is the best." Here we are talking about our self, not the ice cream.

I think a lot of the confusion is the result of trying to separate our experiences from the object. Which part of our experience is about us and which parts are about the cat or the ice cream? What if the experience of a cat or ice cream is a relationship between ourselves and the object being perceived or talked about, not one or the other? What if our minds are the relationship between our self and our environment?

It should be clear by now, that it depends on whether we use those words in their ontological sense or their epistemic sense. — jkop

Which words? It all resolves down to the ontological sense as epistemology is really the ontology of knowledge.

The mind is special in the sense that its existence is observer-dependent, unlike the world. The world doesn't depend on an observer to exist. They have different modes of existing. — jkop

Not according to some interpretations of quantum mechanics (the observer effect). What does it mean to be an observer other than being are more complex process of interacting with one's environment, which everything does, including tables, apples, and volcanoes. So we're simply talking about a difference in degrees of complexity.

I know, the right language is hard to find. What I think we want to describe is the subjective event that occurs when, say, I think of a purple cow. The image of the cow is rather like something that "appears to a mind" but if that seems too Cartesian-theater, no matter. We can perhaps find better language, but I hope the target concept is clear enough: First the cow isn't there (for me), and then it is, not as a pattern of neurons but as a cowish purply image. What has happened? That's the event we're concerned about, which I'm suggesting we could call a "phenomenon". — J

But you are already assuming your conclusion by describing some event as subjective. You could have said the same thing without using the word and it wouldn't change the meaning of what you said.

To say that there is something there and then it isn't there can be said about anything in the world. A rotten apple's ripeness was there but now it is not, and an apple's ripeness or rottenness can be described as an event, or process. Everything changes. The mind is not special in this regard. I prefer the term, "process" instead of "phenomenon". I think of everything as process (Whitehead).

When someone uses the word, "subjective" I'm thinking about the form the information takes in the mind as relative to one's person located in space-time. Visually, the world appears located relative to the eyes, but we understand that the world is not located relative to the eyes. It is in assuming that the world is as it appears that is subjective. In changing your perspective in understanding the mind as a map instead of a window to reality do you see your mind as it really is and take on a more objective view of one's own mind. Does your mind exist as it really is? If so, can you say that you have an objective, or direct, view of your mind? It seems to me that we have to have direct access to our minds at the very least, and just as the distinction between subjective and objective is incoherent, so is the distinction between direct and indirect realism.

The problem here is that, in order to get from "brain measurements of wavelengths of light and sound" to "an appearance in the mind" and the idea that "we" interact with the world, we have to import some new concepts. Mind? We? Where did this subjectivity come from? Once again, the hard problem: How do we get from here to there? Why should there be anything like an appearance in the mind, if the brain seems ideally equipped to do the measuring on its own and respond accordingly? — J

The problem is in assuming that you see the world as it is, as if the mind were a window to reality instead of a map to reality. In assuming that the world is at it appears with solid, static objects, (in a similar way that a map uses static symbols to represent a dynamic environment) and trying to reconcile that with the way the mind appears, does one come up against the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, I think of the world as process, or information, and the mind is just another kind of process, or information. To me, the solution to the hard problem lies in abandoning dualistic thinking and adopting a type of monism where the world is not material, or physical. It is a process.

To be a living system is to maintain a normative pattern of interacting with an environment in the midst of changing conditions. Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself. — Joshs

So sense-making is (part of) reality as it really is?

The world is independent of a map as well so this does not really get at what it means to be objective vs subjective.
— Harry Hindu

Consider cities and landscapes and most of the environments that people live in. Large parts of our lived world depend on the maps and drawings after which they were built. Those are parts of the actual world, and it is in this sense that the world depends on maps for being such a world. Without maps it would be a different world. — jkop

And the world would be different without humans and their minds, so I don't see how you've made any sensible distinction between what it means to be subjective vs objective.

..as if humans have this special quality of the world being independent from us.
— Harry Hindu
I can't make sense of that. — jkop

You said,

The world is objective in the sense that it is independent of us, and available for all of us. Also maps of the world have this objective mode of existing. — jkop

I was pointing out that the mind is not special in having things independent of it, so you have failed to make any sensible distinction between what is objective and subjective.

That's not what I say. Many humans and other animals are conscious. Consider the events in your physiology when you are having the conscious awareness of a tickle. Others may have similar events, but not those that exist in your physiology. The tickle exists whenever you feel it, and when you no longer feel it, then it doesn't exist anymore. This mode of existing is radically different from the way the world exists or the map — jkop

This can be said of anything, not just human bodies and their minds. An apple that is rotten is no longer ripe, yet it is still an apple.

Not so sure about "logical ideas" (maybe just "ideas"?) but otherwise I agree. — J

I included "logical" because you mentioned "rules" where 22 people are following some rules. So minds follow rules that we call logic as 22 people follow rules that we call soccer.

At this point we need to make sure it's not just a dispute over terms. What do we want "phenomenon" to designate? I vote for something like "appearance to a mind," so that the 22 people and the soccer game are two different phenomena. On that understanding, I want to say that neurons and consciousness are also two different phenomena, appearing from two different perspectives. But notice that it doesn't really matter how we understand "phenomenon" here. We could go the other way and stipulate that "phenomenon" designates a single event in time, in which case the soccer game and consciousness are now redescriptions of "the same phenomenon." Either way, we're left with the hard problem. I know many people want to do some arm-waving here and say, "Well, it's two different descriptions, what more do you need to know?" but surely the answer is, "A lot. Why are these descriptions as they are? What allows the passage from one description to another? Are we right in believing that the mental-level description is grounded in, but not caused by, the physical-level description? Does the physical-level description have a "translation" into Mentalese? When we encounter something as extraordinary as subjective experience, what else do we need to say about it to fill out the experience? Yes, consciousness is, in a sense, "only" a description of how things look to a subject, but don't we feel it's a lot more than that too -- somehow constitutive of identity?" etc. etc. — J

I don't know what "appearance to a mind" means. It seems to imply that a mind can be independent from some appearance as if something appears to a homunculus in the brain. It seems to me that some appearance is part of a mind, or is a necessary constituent of a mind.

Any appearance in the mind is the result of some measurement in that the brain measures and interprets wavelengths of light and sound and these measurements are the means by which we interact with the world. An interpretation of quantum mechanics includes the observer problem where the act of observing changes what is being observed and the measurement problem where we don't directly see the collapse of a wave function and the idea that mutually incompatible quantum states result in the concrete nature of the world once observed or measured.

Personally, I believe that irreconcilable differences between quantum physics and classical physics will be resolved with a proper explanation of consciousness.

What is real is what is denoted by the symbol, and that is not something that exists in the sense of being real independently of any mind (as only a mind can grasp number.) — Wayfarer

So what? There are many attributes and properties of things that do not exist independently of the thing itself. We don't say that the ripeness of this apple isn't real because it can't exist independently of this apple. You seem to be making an unwarranted special case for minds.

Symbols are real. Symbols exist. They are the effects of prior causes and causes of subsequent events. In this sense they are real and exist.

The world is objective in the sense that it is independent of us, and available for all of us. Also maps of the world have this objective mode of existing. — jkop

The world is independent of a map as well so this does not really get at what it means to be objective vs subjective. You seem to be trying to make a special case for humans, as if humans have this special quality of the world being independent from us. We aren't special in this sense. Is the universe independent of Earth?

Consciousness, however, is subjective in the sense that it exists only for the one who has it. All conscious states have this subjective mode of existing. Some conscious states are not only subjective in this sense, as some beliefs can also be objective in an epistemic sense. Justified true beliefs are both ontologically subjective and epistemically objective. — jkop

Earth is the only planet that we know to have human life. In this sense, is the Earth subjective in that Earth is the only planet to have human life? We can say this for just about anything. Everything is unique. Earth is not Venus or any other planet. The Sun is not Vega or any other star. Again, you seem to be trying to make a special case for human consciousness in that it is the only thing that has uniqueness. Everything has some property that makes it distinct from everything else.

I agree. I took that to be part of asking how a "sense" of stimuli could take place.

I don't read "arises" as a type of causation. We need a verb to describe what happens when two phenomena occur at the same time, and yet one appears to ground the other. That's what I think "arises" is supposed to mean here. Causation should be reserved for things that occur sequentially in time. Wolfgang's two levels of description are a good example. Does the presence of 22 people on a soccer field, following certain rules, "cause" a soccer game? This would be a very awkward and counter-intuitive way of putting it. Rather, we'd say that the soccer game simply is the 22 people following the rules, under a different description.

(Note, BTW, that speaking of "two phenomena" somewhat begs the question, but it's hard to find a non-question-begging way of putting it.) — J

In this sense, consciousness is the presence of colors, sounds, smells, and feelings and the thoughts that categorize these sensations into logical ideas the same way a soccer game is the presence of 22 people on a field following rules. How do we get from that to consciousness being the interaction of neurons? Is it two separate phenomenon, or the same phenomenon being described from two different perspectives?

Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant? — Banno

None of this explains what it means to be real. What property of counterfeit money, mirages and arguments are we are comparing exactly if not the causes or circumstances that are necessary for them to exist?

I disagree. Counterfeit money is counterfeit from the get go, having not been manufactured in a way that grants it legitimacy. — Banno

Exactly. Counterfeit has a determinate existence prior to being measured and it is in measuring (comparing the appearance of real money to counterfeit money) that one knows it is really counterfeit money.

Counterfeit money is real/exists in that there are prior causes that are necessary for it's existence and causes different things to happen when someone knows it is counterfeit. There is real counterfeit money and real money. You can hold up a counterfeit bill and say, "This is a real counterfeit bill".

Counterfeit bills and money are made of electrons.

Frodo and Mordor have a determinate existence as ideas. So there is no problem in saying that "Frodo is real" because Frodo is real, as an idea. The issue isn't when someone says "Frodo is real". It is when someone says "Frodo is a person", just as if someone to hold up a counterfeit bill and say, "This is money". It seems to me we can dispense with term "real" altogether and just use "exist".

There's a reason why Chalmers says "arises from" rather than "is caused by." — J

What's the difference? If you are saying that something comes from the actions of something else, or from some other process that is in a different spatial-temporal location than what is arising, and is dependent upon the existence of that process, then you're talking about causality. "Arise" is a type of causal process.

But that's precisely the hard problem: Whence this "ability to sense stimuli"? Why couldn't the stimuli simply do their thing (including whatever self-correction you want to build into it) without being sensed? — J

Consciousness obviously provides survival benefits to the organisms that have it. It allows organisms to adapt to more dynamic environments rather than relying on instinctual behaviors to evolve which could take generations. The hard problem is more more about trying to explain how color "arises" from non-colored things, like neurons and wavelengths.

They [electrons] only have a tendency to exist. We know they don't have any determinate existence until they're measured. That is an implication of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. We also know that sub-atomic phenomena can behave as both waves and particles, and so are not really either one or the other, as those two forms of existence are incommensurable. — Wayfarer

I am not familiar enough with quantum physics to comment back: I don't understand how to reconcile qp with practical life---it seems incoherent. — Bob Ross

Exactly. What does that even mean to not have determinate existence until they are measured? It sounds like confusing the map with the territory. They are confusing the measurement with the electron. To say that something doesn't have a determinate existence is to say that it hasn't been measured yet. If what we are measuring does not have a determinate existence, then what is being measured and what property of the electron is the measurement pointing to? If it isn't pointing to anything then how can we say we actually measured an electron?

Something exists if it is in the domain of discourse. Frodo walked into Mordor, therefore there is something that walked into Mordor.

Something is real in contrast to things that are not real - is it real money, or counterfeit? Is that really water, or a mirage? Is that a real argument, or just a vague rant?

Other uses are parasitic. — Banno

All you are describing here is a category error, where some information is a product of our brain (Frodo and Mordor), and assumed to point to something outside of our brain as opposed to a product of some other process (how money is made). Counterfeit money is real money when you buy things with it. It is only when someone is able to make the distinction (measured) and no longer accepts it does it become counterfeit (if we are to apply the same line of thinking Wayfarer described about electrons).

They both have causal power. The idea of Frodo and Mordor can cause you to talk about them and draw pictures of them and movies being made about them. Counterfeit money can cause other things to happen in the world. They are both real and exist in that sense. To be real, or to exist, simply means that thing has causal power. It is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

Frodo and Mordor are real ideas. They exist as ideas. The category error comes about by asserting that Frodo and Mordor are not just ideas.

In truth, it is not a causal relationship, but a correlation between two different levels of description of the same phenomenon. By falsely establishing a causal relationship, we artificially create the seemingly insoluble question of how neuronal activity can give rise to conscious experience. — Wolfgang

I don't think the issue is causation. The issue is in thinking in dualistic ways, as in material vs immaterial, physical vs non-physical and objective vs subjective. When you think of the world as composed of two opposing things then you have a problem of explaining how those two things can interact causally.

Consciousness is information. Information is a relationship between effects and their causes. We don't seem to have a problem with causation in describing all the other processes of the world. It's only when we get to consciousness that we seem to have the problem. But this is an issue that stems from thinking of the world in dualistic terms, not an issue of causation.

Consciousness and the rest of the world is not subjective or objective. It is something that is both an effect and a cause of change in the world. Consciousness is no different than a map of the world. Maps are information about the environment relative to a certain location (a bird's eye view). Consciousness is the same thing from a different location of your senses. So what makes a map objective and consciousness subjective when they are both an arrangement of information about the environment, but just from different locations? The way the information is structured, whether it be a map or consciousness, depends upon the relative location within the environment one is describing. When you are flying in a plane and look down, does your perspective suddenly become objective because the structure of the information is similar to a map?

We infer that they see things differently on the basis of observation and analysis of their different sensory setups. We can infer that they see different ranges of colour, or even only in black and white for example.

It's true that we can get the same or similar information from different sensory modalities, but the sensations themselves are different. All of that information falls inot the category of 'how things appear or present themselves to us'. — Janus

Then what is missing exactly if we know the way they see the world?

It seems natural to think that there must be more to things than just how they appear or seem to be. Of course we can never know more than that, but the fact that we are compelled to think of the 'in itself' has many ramifications for human life. Not in terms of something we know, but in terms of what we can never know. The knowledge here is just self-knowledge. — Janus

But I asked what a "thing in itself" even means. It sounds like a misuse of language. Does it mean to BE the thing in itself? If so, is there a BEING to a chair, table, house, car, or rock? If not then there is nothing missing.

As to our experience of mind I think this is a real minefield. If mind consists only in our experience and judgements would it follow that we know all there is to know about it? Psychedelics and altered states in general show that we have the potential for very different experiences, so it would seem presumptuous to imagine that we have explored all there is to know about what it is possible to experience. — Janus

So the thing in itself includes all states of the thing in the past, present or future? We don't see an apple on the table in the future. We see it in the present. We are talking about the thing in itself at this moment. I'm talking about the right here and now. Do you have direct access to your mind in it's current state? Are you experiencing your mind as "the thing in itself" at this moment?

Even with that said, we can make predictions and get at past causes by our present observations. If we get at the past causes and make accurate predictions, again - what is missing?

As much as the marketing department where I work might wish that were so, that isn't how things work as far as I can tell. There seem to be hard limits to what can be done in a great many ways regardless of goals. — wonderer1

I don't understand the point you're making here. Providing real-world examples would be helpful here. The hard limits would be the limited relevant information to achieving some goal. Most information is irrelevant to achieving some goal. You don't need to know how fast your lawn grows to get a spacecraft to Mars. We don't need an infinite number of significant figures after a decimal point to successfully land a spacecraft on Mars.

There are all sorts of metrological limits, in addition to the ones which affect measurement of voltage.

Modern logic ICs are running up against quantum limits which pose problems for shrinking transistor size.

Then to look at things from a different angle, you can buy a quantum random number generator to plug into your computer. — wonderer1

Events appear random when we don't have a proper explanation of the event. Once we do, the event is no longer random but predictable. What roles does the observer effect play here, ie consciousness? Our senses are macro sized objects trying to get at quantum sized objects. There's bound to be some kind of preliminary misinterpretation of the behavior of quantum sized objects. There are many different interpretations of quantum mechanics to say one way or the other.

Regarding Edgar shooting up the Pizzaria: you agreed the disinformation he received was a necessary condition to his action, but then you (bizarrely) claimed the disinformation did no "contribute" to his bad act. I asked, and you did not answer: "So how can you say the disinformation didn't contribute to this bad thing occurring?" — Relativist

This has been addressed already. Do you believe that playing violent video games leads one to shoot up schools? Should we ban violent video games, or sue the developers? Not everyone that plays violent video games goes and shoots up a school. Why?

Regarding my proposal to require watermarks on deepfaked videos, I asked (and you did not answer): who's harmed by such a requirement?
In what ways would we be better off by having these unequivocal lies compete with actual truth?" — Relativist

I've personally been discussing DISinformation: lies. Disinformation that is repeated becomes misinformation - a tougher problem to deal with. But knowingly spouting falsehoods isn't so fuzzy. Fox knew they were telling falsehoods, and were appropriately held to account.

The person who creates a deepfake video knows he's faking it - lying. That's not a matter of alternative opinions, it's an unequivical fact. That's worth addressing, and entails no ambiguity. — Relativist

So are you saying that we should depend on the person who knows he is faking it to add watermarks to their own video? If not, who decides what is a deep face video and what isn't if not logic and reason? Doesn't the deep fake video need to be released so that it is exposed to public criticism - to logic and reason. If it isn't released and circulates among a private group, how are we suppose to stop that? Your proposals to solve the problem do not seem to fit with the way these things work.

Well, whether the product "works" can be a matter of degree as well. Suppose the gadget is a voltmeter. Whether it works to measure voltage with the accuracy and precision desired can be an important question, and at some level the accuracy can only be a guess because for practical reasons what a volt is, is going to be defined by some metrological body (in the US NIST) which will only provide a limited level of uncertainty. Furthermore, the uncertainty provided by leading national metrology institutes is very much a function of the NMI's ability to account for quantum factors. — wonderer1

Again, the goal will determine the level of accuracy (information) that is needed to accomplish the goal. All other information is irrelevant, not missing or not known. If it weren't known we wouldn't even be able to talk about it and use it as an example of missing something in the thing in itself.

You might be surprised at the extent to which practical matters bump into quantum limitations in today's world. — wonderer1

Examples?

It seems to me that any merging between the macro and quantum worlds is going to happen with a good explanation of consciousness.

I don't know if this was meant to be addressed to me since I didn't say we have incomplete knowledge of things in themselves. That said I agree with the idea. Just as an example we have good reason to think other animals see things differently than we do. We can't see things as they do so there way of seeing things is a different kind of knowledge of things than ours. There for we can say that our knowledge of things is incomplete. We also seem to necessarily think that things must have an inherent existence that is not (fully, at least) apprehended in their appearances to us, or even the totality of all their appearances to all the creatures they appear to. — Janus

To say that animals see things differently than we do implies that we know something about how they see things. We sense things differently using different senses. Seeing a surface and feeling a surface provides us the same information in different forms. If we can be informed of the same thing via different methods then it seems to me that there isn't much more, if any, to the thing in itself. If there is then we'd never know it and wouldn't even be able to use it as evidence that we don't experience things as they are.

Do we experience our mind as the thing in itself? Is that what one means by the thing in itself is that you have to BE the thing?

The Axios article linked to a Pew survey that showed Republicans are more likely than Democrats to mistrust scientists. — Relativist

This is probably true because the Republicans are more religious and have a history of rejecting evolution. Scientists (and doctors) don't do themselves any favors when they become political as some have. And we should not forget that a defining aspect of science is that current theories are meant to be questioned and challenged. It's how progress is made (think of Galileo and Darwin) in challenging the status quo. You can only get there with free speech and exposing your theories to falsification. Some scientists seem to forget this.

I've never seen anyone denying the biological facts regarding sex. Are you perhaps referring to the trend to treat gender as a social role that can sometimes be inconsistent with biological sex? — Relativist

Everyone that I've asked to define gender just ends up giving me traits of biological sex (why change your biology if gender is a social role?) or sexist tropes (being a woman is wearing high heels and make-up).

Yes, that's unfortunate and it's exacerbated by the political parties. GOP leaders have to cater to their base by appealing to their anti-science trends and the embrace of conspiracy theories. In the process, they draw in more of the lunatic fringe - to which they will them endeavor to continue to court. The only remotely similar thing I see the Dems doing is to tiptoe around policies and attitudes toward transgenders. — Relativist

and systemic racism, identity politics, victimization (Republicans play the victimization game to), etc. I am Independent because I see extremists on both sides taking over the parties. It doesn't matter who wins because each one has authoritarian tendencies and we keep losing our freedoms slowly over time. I think Joe Dementia Biden has shown that it really doesn't matter who is president as they are not in control. Joe the Plumber could be the president and it wouldn't make a difference. But think about what would happen if you ran for office and made statements that you wanted to end corruption, and actually follow through with that threat. You would make enemies on both sides. They don't like outsiders coming in and upsetting their gravy train.

Everyone gets one term? I'd support that, but it won't happen - it would take a constitutional amendment. I'd like to see critical thinking skills taught in schools- but I anticipate Christian groups would oppose it. — Relativist

Not necessarily. If people wised up and voted for alternate candidates instead of Democrats or Republicans we could impose term limits ourselves. Critical thinking - That is why I am for school choice so that I have the option to send my kids to STEM schools (which I have).

Free speech has never meant the freedom to say whatever you want wherever you want. Are laws against fraud and libel to be dispensed with because they infringe free speech?

Fox News lost a big lawsuit to Dominion Voting Systems for spreading lies that hurt their businss. Was that inappropriate? — Relativist

But that is not what we are talking about. We are talking about misinformation. Who gets to define what misinformation is, if not logic and reason?

People here don't seem to realize that censorship and free speech are a double-edge sword. Start censoring one political side that you are not on sounds like a great idea but then what happens when the other side starts censoring your side? In a free-speech society, everyone has the same right. One's right to speak freely does not cancel another's right to speak freely. The solution comes about by debating the issues in an environment where everyone can speak their mind and logic and reason are the only determining factors in which idea wins out. Censorship just limits competitive ideas from being spoken. Power corrupts one into thinking that anyone that disagrees with them should be censored for the "greater good". All that does is stifle progress. So it is strange to see the ones that call themselves progressives are the ones advocating for censorship.

In a society "governed by the people" and a Constitution designed to be amended, it is just a case of the will of the people to make such a change. The question is are we already to late? Is society still a society governed by the people, or by elitists that hold on to their power using any tactics necessary (spreading misinformation)? So your answer is just give the elitists more power to control the people? It should be the other way around - give the people more power to control their representatives. My answer is to use our free speech to debate the issues with others that think it is a good idea to keep going the way we are going or to just give up which is what you seem to be saying.

Censorship is not the only way to deal with disinformation.
— Relativist — Paine

Censoring politicians, not everyone else. Politicians should just run on their records.

Yet the gadget works 99% of the time, and when it doesn't we find out the problem and issue a recall or release an updated product. The macro world and quantum world have not been sufficiently merged into a consistent whole. This indicates that there is a problem with one or the other (or maybe both), but then we can only use our senses to get at and solve the problem.

Axios is a left-leaning source of information. It seems to me that both sides engage in misinformation equally and reject science when it is politically expedient. Many Democrats have rejected biological facts regarding sex.

What really sucks is the level of politicization that has infiltrated society today. It's as if most people view every aspect of life through a political lens. I haven't seen any politician from either side as something to get excited for, or to revolve my life around. It's as if the powers that be are instigating a civil war by shoving politics down our throats every chance they get.

Here's an idea: how about we take campaigning for a position of power out of the equation? Impose term limits on Congress. Since politicians and liars are synonymous then why even put a microphone in front of a politician's face? Politicians should just run on their records not their words.

Human language is countably infinite because:

its alphabet is finite
every string in human language is of finite length — Tarskian

You seem to be forgetting that languages can evolve and it's use can be arbitrary. We can always add more letters to the alphabet and we only communicate what is relevant. Why would we need a word for every natural number if we never end up finding a use for those numbers? If the universe is finite then there is no problem here. If it isn't then the universe at least appears to be consistent in that the physical laws are the same no matter where you go in the universe. Novelty would be the only aspects of the universe needing new terms to describe them.

You speak as if you are getting at things as they truly are, or are you saying your statement is only true to a degree? If the latter, then how do you know the degree of truth in your statement if you didn't know what was missing from your statement to say that it is only true to a degree?

I don't think it's a black and white matter either. It is dependent upon our current goal and what information is irrelevant, not missing, to our goal.

and recognize that we can have some degree of incomplete knowledge of things-in-themselves? — wonderer1

I don't see any puzzle. It comes down to what is meant by saying we don't know things in themselves. Insofar as they are thought as what gives rise to our experience of a world of things, then of course we can say we do know them. But it can also obviously be said that we only know them as they appear to us. — Janus

How do we know that we have incomplete knowledge if we didn't already know what was missing? If we come to the conclusion that something is missing then how did we do that, and does that really mean that we have incomplete knowledge if we know what is missing?

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

Yet we use words to represent things that are not words and don't have much trouble understanding each other. I don't see how representations prevent us from getting at things in themselves in a deterministic universe where causes leave effects and we can communicate and solve crimes by using the effects to get at the causes.

I haven't suggested any actions (yet). I was just pointing out that more free speech doesn't address the problem...and also that the problem is very real. — Relativist

The right to question authority is a type of free speech.

So, in the case of fascists posing a real threat to the government, we should allow news outlets and public figures to propagate dangerous, subversive lies - and they would be dangerous - because you think people ought to question everything they hear? Do you think you imploring us on a philosophy forum to not take things at face value could actually have an effect on the people predisposed via conditioning to acting violently on the lies they hear? Do you think they would apply even the miniscule amount of rigor you mustered up to formulate your vapid responses to engaging with the truth of why they should do what they are told to do by their dear leader?

Do you think many Nazis asked for citations when Hitler claimed Jews were parasites on the German people in the 1939 Reichstag Speech? Did they critically examine the reasoning for his prediction that another world war would see the elimination of the Jewish race in Europe? — ToothyMaw

It seems to me that the ability to question authority would limit news organizations from propagating lies because they would be shown time and again to be reporting falsehoods and they would eventually go out of business.

It is when we lose the right to question authority that authoritarians take over.

Are there people that are unable to think critically? Sure. Just look at this forum. If we were to make critical thinking a bigger part of society's education then that could help in limiting how many are enthralled by propaganda.

It also seems to me that abolishing political parties would eliminate the group-think that individuals are exposed to. When people find it hard to think for themselves they look to the group to think for them and then regurgitate what the group authority espouses. Take that away and people will be forced to think more for themselves, and the news organizations wouldn't have a team to play on.

So giving people the power to think critically, to question authority and speak freely would defeat any effort to propagandize individuals.

Regarding the statement about philosophy being the bewitchment of our intelligence by the means of language, then why is that so? I mean to say, why does language behave this way or what makes this true that language going on holiday is all that some philosophy amounts to? — Shawn

It's when we forget that language is used to communicate something factual about reality to others that we become bewitched. Just because some sentence follows some rules of some language does not make the sentence true or false. It is true or false when it refers to some aspect of reality or it doesn't. Not only do sentences need to be logically consistent, they have to be consistent with observations as well.