It's a combination of free speech and questioning authority. It seems to me that a man that shoots his way into a Pizza Parlor to rescue nonexistent child victims of sex trafficking from a nonexistent basement didn't question the source of the information he received.

Whatever the man read probably just reinforced some idea he already had and a reason to engage in the violent tendencies he already had brewing within him.

Before I would take such drastic action, I would want to verify the source and legitimacy of the claims being made. How about you?

It seems that the obvious solution to the existence of misinformation is more free speech, not less of it.

Ideas should be exposed to criticism by default, not taken at face value by default. Question everything. It is those that don't question what they read and hear that end up causing more harm than those that do.

One thing with many aspects, or many things that combine and "fight" to result in one outcome at a particular time seem philosophically the same to me. I'm not sure how one would differentiate between to two empirically?

So it seems like maybe this is just quibling over how we would want to name and frame the same underlying thing.

And ultimately I think my kind of framing is closer to how I experience it. I really do sometimes seem to be torn between two minds. One simple example is, I want to stay fit as a longer term goal, but then I also like eating food that isn't the best for reaching that longer term goal. Is that one will with two aspects, or two wills that battle with eachother? Does it really matter how we frame it ultimately? — ChatteringMonkey

This works if you equate one mind to one goal. It seems to me that I have one mind with many goals and many options to achieve each. If you did have two minds then how do you distinguish yourself from someone with split personality disorder?

In your example, you have two goals, not two minds. One is to experience the feeling of eating sugary/salty food and the other is to be healthy. From this point you weigh your options mostly based on one thing - what will make you the happiest? You eliminate one or the other based on this ultimate goal. For some, continuing to eat sugary/salty food is what makes them happy. Maybe they decided that they are going to eventually die one day healthy or not, so why not enjoy the ride before you drop dead? For others being healthy is what makes them happy. I can certainly vouch for seeing your weight drop each day and sleeping better, etc. can be more immediate results that can keep you on the track of eating healthy. Seeing your weight drop makes you happy and keeps you going.

So the question is are you trying to keep multiple selves happy, or just one? I seems to me that the person that wanted to eat a lot of chocolate is the same person that wants to be healthy. I can change my mind and changing my mind does not change who I am. I am a decision-making entity who simply wants to be happy and I have many ways of achieving this.

In Steven Pinker's book, "How the Mind Works", he defines intelligence as
"...the ability to attain goals in the face of obstacles by means of decisions based on rational (truth-obeying) rules."

I don't see how language-use is necessary to be rational. I have yet to receive an answer to the question of how one learns a language without being a rational thinker prior. Being a rational thinker allows one to learn a language, not the other way around.

Acting on one's instincts is still a rational process. There is a reason why instinctive behaviors allow some animal to survive - because those behaviors have worked in the organism's ancestral past. Because they work means that there is some element of truth in the way the animal perceives their environment and reacts to it. Think of instincts as "memories" stored in the organism's DNA to use in similar circumstances in the future.

Learned behaviors evolved as a way to respond to more rapid changes in the environment - changes that instincts are too slow to evolve a solution for. Think of learned behaviors as memories stored in one's brain to use in similar circumstances in the future.

All organisms engage in goal-directed behavior whether it is based on instincts or learned in the face of obstacles either by evolving truth-obeying instincts or by learning with a sensory feedback loop (responding to a stimulus and then observing the effects and then try again, observing those effects, try again, etc.) (truth-obeying rules).

You are resolving tensions in what you want, not in what you can or could do. So you still have the choices, you just don't want it anymore... so I would say no it doesn't limit your choices, it just give you a more clear idea of what you really want so you don't get pulled in all direction getting nowhere ultimately. — ChatteringMonkey

It seems to me that part of resolving tensions in what you want is resolving what you can or could do.

With the idea of a strong will to eat chocolate there may be conflict between the conscious and subconscious aspects of will. A person may enjoy chocolate but realise a need to not do so, especially for health reasons. This may create a complex dynamic and subconscious aspects, such as comfort, may be a stumbling block.

The other part of this may be where an intention or aspects of will fit in within the larger system of one's motivation and gratification. If one is trying to make change in one area of life a certain amount of stability in various other aspects may be important. That is because to deal with too much conflict and change at once may be too difficult. — Jack Cummins

You speak as if everyone has split personality disorder where multiple personalities, or wills (subconscious and conscious) battle to control the decision-making process. There is one will that has many options at any given moment. I enjoy chocolate but I also like to be healthy. I have a decision to make. It doesn't necessarily have to be a black and white issue. I can eat chocolate in moderation thereby achieving both eating chocolate and being healthy. Notice how I was able to explain it using just one will - I.

Can we change our own thoughts and behavior? — Jack Cummins

It seems quite obvious that we can. You just need to look at the many people that have been able to break their dependence on drugs, change their lifestyle to be healthier, manage their anger, etc. You can change your behavior. You just need to want it more than eating chocolate or taking drugs. You have one will that is faced with multiple options, not multiple wills fighting over one option.

I find it shocking that in discussions of free will no one is willing to actually describe the decision-making process - what it is like for them to make a decision from the moment they are faced with some set of circumstances, how they become aware of the options available to them and how they filter out all options to arrive at one choice.

I like the 2nd amendment too. I think it's not useful though if people don't have discernment about when to use it. IMO, the first red line that was crossed that was worth rebelling over was the creation of the federal reserve in 1913, and there have been many more red lines crossed since then. So, I tend to think of the US Republic as being in the past tense. — Brendan Golledge

Well, my point was that a lone wolf or farmer is less of a threat to a lone sheep with fangs and claws. It is only when the wolves or farmers organize into groups that the lone sheep with its fangs and claws would be in trouble. This is why it would be better for the lone sheep to join a group of like-minded sheep for protection. The 2nd amendment is only valid when you are in a group that respects your right to arm yourself for self-defense (like-minded). I thought I lived in such a group in the U.S. but it appears that wolves and farmers have taken over leadership positions in our group and are in the process are disarming us and limiting our freedom to speak out by using the "threat of misinformation" as a reason to silence opposing viewpoints.

It seems to me that if extremist Democrats had their way the U.S. would be a communist country. If the extreme Republicans had their way the U.S. would be a Fascist Christian theocracy. Both extremes are authoritarian. Moderate Democrats and Republicans have some authoritarian positions and some liberal positions. In the center of the line between the two extremes you have Libertarians who have no authoritarian positions and all liberal positions. Libertarians are the true liberals not these self-proclaimed "liberals" that are really authoritarian socialists when you look at their positions.

For a Libertarian, everyone should be able to live their lives without imposing their will on others. Once you feel the need to tell others how to live their lives or limit their choices you have crossed over into authoritarianism. Libertarians only need to group together when they are threatened by a group of authoritarians. If there were no groups of authoritarians, Libertarians would be happy to live their own lives and have the freedom to choose when to participate in a collective for the purpose of trading and accomplishing tasks that one individual could not accomplish and is beneficial to the individual and the group.

Personally, I think we should abolish political parties. That should blur the lines of division a bit where individuals are no longer looking for their partisan marching orders from their political party but would need to educate themselves on the positions of candidates running for office. Moderate candidates would be able to stick to their principles instead of being threatened by the extremists in on of the political parties to go along with their extremist agenda to receive support from the party in their next elections cycle. There would be less bias in the media as there wouldn't be a team to be the mouth-piece for.

What does one mean by "free will"?

As I think truely 'free will' is a logical impossibility as it leads to a kind of infinite regress (previous posts), what we really are pointing to is a will that isn't overly constrained by outside social forces, and/or a will that resolved some of its own inner tensions (strong will) and a will that is more influenced by outside social forces, and/or weakened or consumed by its own contradictions (weak will). — ChatteringMonkey

Does not "resolving its own inner tensions" involve limiting the amount of choices one has going forward vs being "consumed by contradictions" which would be having more choices, some of which are contradictory but are still options one could choose? Most people are equating freedom with choices. So the more choices, contradictory or not, is really just more freeom you can jave. Should I buy a new computer or not buy a new computer? I can't do both but both are options I can choose. By limiting contradictory options are you not limiting your options, and therefore your freedom?

There is probably a continuum of strong and weak wills. This is likely based on the degree of strength which a person has learned. Also, it is possible to be weak in some areas but strong in other aspects. For example, a person may be strong in resisting violent impulses, but be weak in bingeing on chocolate. — Jack Cummins

One might say that the person has a strong will to eat chocolate.

The solution is realizing that we are not sheep, or at least not just sheep. We are sheep with sharp teeth and claws (2nd amendment), or maybe just cats. The ultimate solution would be lab-grown meat for the wolf and farmer. :nerd:

As this thread has shown, it's complicated. A great deal depends on whether the statement "There are a hundred thalers on the table" occurs in a context where it's reasonable to assume it's also being asserted. — J

...like in everyday language-use because we typically use language to inform others of some state of affairs in the world whether it be what is on the table or what is on this page.

Lying is not the only thing that could call this into question. I might be genuinely mistaken about the thalers, though of course I'd still be asserting it. — J

...which you would be lying to yourself.

Or I could be merely mentioning the statement, or pointing out something about it, or asking for a discussion of its semantic content. — J

...which you would be referring to the scribbles on the page or the sounds coming from your mouth and not actually thalers on the table and would be just as redundant to say that "It is true that I am mentioning the statement" or pointing our something about it (like the statement exists on this page). In other words, it is redundant to make statements about things that we can already see for ourselves.

In such a case, the information/predicate that the statement is also true can be provided outside the context of an assertion, so that it isn't redundant. This all goes back to the basic Fregean question of whether we can "say" a proposition, or at least understand it, without asserting it, that is, separate semantics and truth-value from assertoric force. So I think my statement from the OP that you quote was too hasty. I should have written, "I can say 'It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table' but this adds nothing to the semantic content of the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’.

As to how we ascertain the truth of a statement, that's another story, and usually involves some combination of observation, as you say, and correct use of a language. The exact combination has been disputable and I'm sure will continue to be. — J

In other words, the semantic content involves what you are actually talking about that others can observe for themselves to verify the truth, whether it be thalers on the table or scribbles on the screen. I would say that the difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledge is supported by both logic and observation while beliefs are only supported by one or the other.

That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

It seems to me that it adds nothing because it would be redundant. In making statements about things, you are implying that the things you talk about exist and that your statement is true. If not, then you are lying. When lying you don't say, "It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table." as it is already implied that what you are saying is true and that thalers and the table exists. This is why people are fooled by false statements because they assume that the statement is true without the liar having to actually declare it is true as part of the statement. To show whether or not your statement is true, we need to make an observation.

If we can explain the workings of the universe if a logical way and logic permits us to acquire some truth about the universe, does that mean that all the processes in the universe are logical or rational? Let me just say that I am not implying some type of intelligence or goal-directed behavior (ie god) is at work here. In a deterministic universe would it be safe to say that all processes are rational, and as such we are able to determine causes from observed effects and predict effects from observed causes?

But we still don't know how animals make choices. And, it's doubtful that selections made by other animals can even qualify as decisions. To choose, and to decide, have very different meanings. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a weird assertion considering that the definition of "choose" is to decide, according to Merriam-Webster:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/choose
So the ball is in your court again to explain YOUR distinction between what it means to choose as opposed to decide because I have no idea what you're talking about.

I answered this. It's the capacity to make choices. Some say it's free will, others do not. That there is not agreement on this indicates that we do not understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

MOST people do not say that is free will. Most people define free will as "The capacity to make choices that are neither determined by natural causality nor predestined by fate or divine will." So "free will" isn't just making choices as there are choices that are forced and those that are not. You seem to be saying that "free will" entails both forced and unforced choices.

Computers do not make decisions. To decide is to come to a resolution as the result of consideration. Computers are incapable of consideration. Computers do not even choose, they simply follow algorithms. To choose is to select from a multitude of options. There are no options for a computer, it must follow its rules. Even a so-called random number generator is a case of following a set of rules, and not a true choice

It appears like you just like to throw words around willy nilly, pretending that you can argue logically by giving the same word different meanings. That's known as equivocation. You can say that a computer "decides" if you want, and we say that a human being "decides", but obviously what is referred to by that word in each of these two cases, is completely different. So to say that the computer's activity is relevant to what we are discussing, would be equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You also said,

We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if we do not understand the capacity to choose how can you say whether or not a computer makes choices or not? I asked you to define what you mean by "choose". If I can learn to predict what you will choose does that no imply that you are following some predictable pattern (algorithm) in making your decisions? Give me an example of one instance where you made a decision and tell me what it was like for you. Explain the process that you used in making your decision.

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans.

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not willfully ignoring anything. It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court.

Let me just add that if you want to say that a computer doesn't actually have choices or make decisions then I would expect you to then define what you mean by "choices".

Question: Is an animal's response the result of rationally thinking through a communication or something else? — Athena

To think rationally is to use (valid) reasons for your actions. If an animal can learn new information that it was not born with (instincts) and use that information in a way that provides some advantage to its survival then we could say that it is capable of rationally thinking. For instance, my cat has learned some English words like, "treat" and "outside", and has even learned to communicate to me her needs to receive treats and to go outside even though she does not have the ability to say those words. Rational thinking provides the ability for the animal to make predictions using the patterns it has experienced in its environment.

It's a long road between that non-explicit competences type of intelligence and human intelligence. Difficult to know when/where rational thinking begins. — Patterner

Is natural selection a rational process?

What you believe about "free will" is irrelevant. We do have the capacity to choose, and we all know and accept this. Some call this 'free will", if you want to just call it "the capacity to choose", that's fine. Whatever, way that you describe it, or try to understand it, it's part of the human condition which we need to understand in order to adequately understand the human condition. The fact that some people say we have free will, and others do not, is very strong evidence that the human condition is not understood, and we need to know the truth about this matter before it will be understood.

The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact.
— Harry Hindu

That is exactly the point I am making. We need to know the truth about these things before we can claim to have an understanding of the human condition. If we knew the truth about free will, then we'd have a much better basis for a claim about understanding the human condition. Since we do not know the truth about this, we cannot claim to have an understanding of the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. Computers make choices by running software with IF-THEN-ELSE statements which are options given some set of circumstances. When you make choices, you do the same thing. You measure your options against the current circumstances and ultimately choose the one that best fits the circumstances. Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable.

So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me.

No, that doesn't make any sense. Obviously, having a true understanding of the human condition requires knowing about free will, as a part of the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't.

What is meant by it, is irrelevant to this point. Since it is commonly said that human beings have free will, then we need to know what is being referred to in order to understand the human condition, of which free will is said to be a part of. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is commonly said that God exists too, but I'm sure you are aware that there some contention on this issue. It was once commonly said the Earth was flat. The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. This is an argumentum ad populum.

That’s been one theory favoured by cognitivists. As a biosemiotician, I would instead stress the simpler story that language proper arose when Homo sapiens evolved the modern articulate vocal tract.

Drawing scribbles and making sounds with your mouth are just more complex forms of communicating your intentions and reading into others intentions.
— Harry Hindu

A capacity to generate syntactical speech is a difference in kind and not just degree. All apes are social and so have an ability to anticipate and coordinate actions in their social setting. But no ape can learn fluent grammar. — apokrisis

This seems too anthropomorphic to me. The difference you are talking about is one between the rules of representation humans have selected in the scribbles they use for efficient communication vs. the rules natural selection has selected for efficient communicating. One could argue that natural selection had a role in the former as well.

Then there's this:
https://phys.org/news/2024-08-uncovering-secret-communication-marmoset-monkeys.html

There's still a lot we do not know about animal communication. It appears to me that what you have shown is that the level of complexity in communication is based on the degree the brain has evolved to distinguish between certain symbols. It's like comparing how hominids started cooking food by throwing it on a fire and the diversity of recipes we have in the modern era. It's still cooking food.

An advanced alien species that communicates telepathically might consider our mode of communication not a language. There are many different ways to communicate, most of which we probably don't even know about.

The moral principles and facts being stipulated are that:

1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is in-itself bad;
2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something bad—even for the sake of something good;
3. Harming someone is, in-itself, bad. — Bob Ross

Seems to me that 2. is a contradiction. If your act is for the sake of the good how can it be something bad?

If not, then intending something bad for the sake of the good cancels each other out and the act is neither bad nor good.

It seems to me, under these stipulations, that one could never justify self-defense—e.g., harming someone that is about to kill you—because it will always be the case in such examples that one directly intends to harm that person for the sake of saving themselves. — Bob Ross

I don't know about that. If someone is trying to kill you, then does that not qualify as them doing something bad? In defending yourself are you not trying to prevent something bad from happening, or something worse as they may continue killing if they are not stopped?

What use is discussing what is good or bad and what is permissible if you're not willing to do something about it, ie stopping bad acts? Saying some act is bad doesn't stop people from engaging in bad acts.

To have a true understanding of the human condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Having a true understanding of the human condition would come first and from that extrapolate whether our actions are free or determined. I don't want to steer to far off-topic but what is meant by "free" in "free will"? It seems to me that the more options you have the more free your will appears to be, but it would be illogical to believe that you would have made a different choice given the options (information) you had at that moment - as if the same causes (options and circumstances) would produce a different effect (decision).

A true understanding does not simply consist of "things are as they are". — Metaphysician Undercover

What else would a true understanding consist of if not an understanding of how things actually are?

I could argue that the display of the peacock's tail says something about the Big Bang, as there would not be a peacocks if there wasn't a Big Bang.
— Harry Hindu

You could read that into a peacock tail. But two peacocks just have their one instinctual understanding.

You have actual language and that makes a huge difference. Peacocks only have their genes and neurology informing their behaviour. No virtual social level of communication.

It's really just a difference in degrees. More complex brains can use more complex representations and get at more complex causal relations.
— Harry Hindu

Your own argument says it isn’t if humans have language and a virtual mentality that comes with that. — apokrisis

Language evolved from a theory of other minds. Animals have learned to anticipate other animals intentions by observing their behavior and learned to communicate their intentions by behaving in certain ways. Drawing scribbles and making sounds with your mouth are just more complex forms of communicating your intentions and reading into others intentions.

Words refer to things that are not words. It would be better to show you what I'm talking about than to just tell you. If words only referred to things in our heads, how would we ever be able to communicate that to others? Words refer to things that we can see and feel in the world and are only necessary to communicate to others what they were not present for.

We see colours "directly", just as we feel pain "directly".
— Michael

:lol:

We see our color percepts? — creativesoul

It all reeks of a misuse of language. Where is the "we" relative to our colors? What use is the word, "directly" here? How does it help us understand the process?

There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1). The distinction between these two different neural representations advances our understanding of visual neural coding.

Why do you enjoy running into the hard wall of the hard problem?

You keep posting scientific studies while ignoring the science of quantum physics with the observer effect and state "collapse". Maybe neurobiologists and quantum physicists should start sharing notes.

:grin: I wasn't offended - just asking for your reasoning for saying what you did. I don't understand why we would need to escape determinism, or why free will is necessary. In a deterministic universe, we all do what we naturally do. All acts feel natural and intended.

I said that the tomato does not have the property that it appears to have. The property that it appears to have is in fact a subjective quality, and so is a percept, not a mind-independent property of material surfaces. — Michael

What if I said that the tomato appears ripe? Do we really need to make it clear whether we are talking about the appearance or the tomato when talking about the tomato to others?

The next step, I believe, after freeing oneself from naive realism, is to free oneself from materialism altogether, and understand that the so-called "effects of the stone upon himself" are not properly called "effects" at all. The percept is a freely constructed creation of the living being, rather than the effects of a causal chain. This understanding enables the reality of the concept of free will. The living being's motivational aspects, which are very much involved in all neurological activity, and appear to allow the being to act with a view toward the future, (understood in its most simple form as the will to survive), cannot be understood as the product of causal chains. This is what science reveals to us, through its inability to understand such aspects in determinist terms. — Metaphysician Undercover

What makes causality and determinism necessarily materialistic? My thoughts naturally lead to other thoughts. Certain experiences are prerequisites for certain thoughts. It seems to me that my thoughts can "bump into" other thoughts and create novel thoughts. New thoughts are an amalgam of prior thoughts and experiences. It seems to me that causality and determinism could be just as immaterial as material.

And hallucinations are what? A type of mental phenomenon, not a mind-independent property of tomatoes. Therefore colours are a type of mental phenomenon, not a mind-independent property of tomatoes. — Michael

So now provide the link to the study in which some neurobiologist looked at someone's mental phenomenon while the subject was looking at a ripe tomato as observed red mental phenomenon.

If red cannot be a property of tomatoes the how are they the property of neurons?

Yes, the hard problem has not been solved yet your explanations assume that it has. That's the issue.

Colors are a type of information.

It seems to me that the distinction between direct and indirect realism is useless. Would you say that you have direct or indirect access to your mental phenomenon?
— Harry Hindu

Direct - there is nothing between my mind and itself. That's the nature of the distinction. I have direct access to my experiences. Not their causes.
It might not 'mean much' out there in the world, but in terms of the discussion we're having its the central, crucial thing to be understood. So, I reject your opener on those grounds. But i acknowledge that for a certain kind of philosopher, this is going to look like a couple of guys around a pub table arguing over the blue/white black/gold dress. I disagree is all :) — AmadeusD

I would assume that you know your mind to be real. Then which is the case - direct realism, indirect realism, both, or neither? If you can talk about the contents of your mind like you can talk about the contents of your pants pocket, then what is the difference if you're telling me the truth in both cases?

Not quite, no. I've addressed this apparent hypocrisy recently and wont rehash because I'll make a pigs ear of it. — AmadeusD

You couldn't at least link it in your reply considering that we are 38 pages into this discussion?

Yes, correct. This, despite not having any direct access, or certitude about our sensory apprehensions. Its a best-guess, and if that's the best we have, it's the best we have. — AmadeusD

If you were able to accomplish your task using your senses then was it really a best guess or an accurate perception?

If these problems only arise in philosophical discussions and not in everyday life, then maybe there's an issue with philosophy. Most philosophical problems are the result of a misuse of language. Our survival in a hostile environment is evidence enough that we have more than a best guess about the state of our environment. I would argue that instinctive behaviors that evolved as general responses to a static environment are best guesses whereas humans have evolved to allow us to be more adaptable to changing environments to the point where we no longer need to adapt to our environment. We mold the environment for ourselves.

I am arguing that despite the "indirect" nature of perception we can get a "direct" sense of what the case is by understanding that determinism is the case (which is why time can seem to have no direction as effects are as much about their causes as causes are about their effects) and that effects carry information about their causes. "Direct" and "Indirect" are in quotes because I find that they unnecessarily complicate the discussion. I find it very difficult to believe that humans have been able to shape their environment to such a degree simply based on "best guessing". Are we having an effect on our environment or not?

Where is the pain? If it is in the limb, you can show me.
But you cannot show me pain.
You can show me potential stimulus for pain.
That's all. I need not take this much further to be quite comfortable that your position is not right (yet..) — AmadeusD

What would be the point in showing you pain? The pain is for me, not for you. I am the one injured, not you. The pain is about the state of my body, not yours. If I hit my thumb with a hammer, I could bash your same thumb with the same hammer and you'd have a good idea of what I was feeling, but that would not be the point of me informing you that I am in pain. The point would be to seek assistance. This is what I mean that philosophical language use tends to muddy the waters here.

Besides, if pain is only in the mind, then the stimulus is only in the mind. When I ask you to show me the stimulus, you are referencing your own visual experience - the visual location of the injury, which is in your mind. As we already discussed a while back visual depth is in your mind so you run into the same problem with any sensory experience you have. Based on what you have said in that we cannot show you pain it does not follow that we can show you the stimulus.

Let's say I have a severe injury on my back. I cannot see the injury but I can feel it. Adrenaline may be masking the severity of the injury by masking the pain. You, however, have a clear view of the injury. Who has more accurate information about my injury? If you can have more information about my injury because of the level of detail human vision provides over the sensation of pain, then what does that say about the direct vs. indirect distinction when it comes to knowing what is the case?

To be clear, yes of course information storage as genes or words has some entropic cost. To scratch a mark on a rock is an effort. Heat is produced. Making DNA bases or pushing out the air to say a word are all physical acts.

But the trick of a code is that it zeroes this physical cost to make it always the same and as least costly as possible. I can say raven or I can say cosmos or god. The vocal act is physical. But the degree of meaning involved is not tied to that. I can speak nonsense or wisdom and from an entropic point of view it amounts to the same thing,

As they say, infinite variety from finite means. A virtual reality can be conjured up that physical reality can no longer get at with its constraints. But then of course, whether the encoded information is nonsense or wisdom starts to matter when it is used to regulate the physics of the world. It has to cover its small running cost by its effectiveness in keeping the organism alive and intact. — apokrisis

The entropic cost in creating the sound or scribble isn't the only part of the equation. Don't forget about the mind that is observing the mark or hearing the sound and the mental effort involved with decoding the message. It takes more mental power to get at the meaning of "philosophy" than "photograph" even though both words contain the same amount of letters. The question then becomes does the discussion about philosophy provide any survival or reproductive benefit (wisdom), or are we just playing symbol games (speaking nonsense)? For humans at least it could be argued that entering a virtual reality world can relieve stress and provide unique social interactions with others sharing the same virtual reality that strengthen social bonds in the physical world.

The speaker or writer must have some sense of empathy for the listener and reader. They have to put things in a way that they know they will understand with the least amount of mental effort (efficiently) if they actually want to be understood without having to re-phrase or repeat themselves.

This is why, for me at least, I get irritated at people that waste my time with word salad, mental gymnastics and intellectual dishonesty, which ends with me not putting much weight into what they write or say in the future.

There are grades of semiosis. Indexes, icons and then symbols. So I was talking about symbols when I talk about codes. Marks that bear no physical resemblance to what they are meant to represent.

Animals communicate with signs that are genetically fixed. A peacock has a tail it can raise. But that one sign doesn’t become a complex language for talking about anything a peacock wants.

A language is a system of symbolic gestures. Articulate and syntactically structured. A machinery for producing an unlimited variety of mark combinations. Quite different in its ability to generate endless novelty. — apokrisis

I would argue that when a peacock raises its tail it wants to mate. It also communicates to female peacocks the fitness of the male. There is complexity there in the causes that lead to some effect, like a male peacock showing off its tail. I could argue that the display of the peacock's tail says something about the Big Bang, as there would not be a peacocks if there wasn't a Big Bang. Of course the immediate effects say more about their immediate causes than some effect billions of years later, but my point is that all effects carry information about their causes.

In reading your words I can get at what you intended to say, the idea you intend to convey, but can get at your level of understanding of English as well. The information is there whether we look or not. Where we look, or what information we attend to, at any given moment is dependent upon the goal in the mind.

It's really just a difference in degrees. More complex brains can use more complex representations and get at more complex causal relations. The question then becomes at what point does the complexity cease to be useful? Are we overcomplicating things with our language, especially in philosophical discussions?

I was addressing the quoted text from Perl. I haven't read his work but have received the impression that "apprehending form via the rational intellect" was the thought in play there. I guess it depends on whether you think "apprehending form" means recognizing it or reflecting on it. I would agree with you that the latter requires symbolic language and I don't think that is at all controversial. — Janus

How does one even learn a language without apprehending the scribbles and sounds in the present and reflecting on how those same scribbles and sounds were used before? I could argue that language use is just more complex learned behavior. Animals communicate with each other using sounds, smells and visual markings. Animals understand that there is more to the markings than just the form the marking takes. It informs them of some state of affairs, like this is another's territory, not mine and in essence has some form of self-model.

I often link this story in discussions like this:
https://vimeo.com/72072873

This man made it to an adult without having learned a language. How he eventually learned language was by reflecting on what others were doing over time to come to understand that those scribbles mean things or are about things?

We did not evolve in an environment full of mad scientists that directly stimulate our brain. We evolved in an environment filled with electromagnetic energy, an atmosphere as a medium in which sound waves can travel and carry odors, etc. Our brains evolved to interpret the stimuli coming from our environment in ways that give us a very good idea of the state of the environment. So good in fact that humans are no longer just a "figure in the landscape but a shaper of the landscape (Jacob Bronowski, The Ascent of Man)".

If we were to evolve in an environment full of mad scientists that directly stimulate our brains, over millions of years our brains would have evolved to use the scientists as a means of knowing about the rest of the environment in the way that we currently use light in the environment to inform us about things that are not light, like pens and brains.

:up:

I agree, but you are the confused one. Hanover is exactly right. This is how the body/brain works. — AmadeusD

Yet you keep falling into the same trap of asserting you know how the body/brain works while at the same time asserting that we cannot trust our senses. How do I know that you read what you read about the body/brain accurately when you depend on your eyes to see the words? How do we know that some mad scientist didn't plant these ideas in your head, or that you didn't hallucinate the experience of reading "facts" about bodies and brains?

Just because someone can change the time on the clock to report the wrong time does not mean that clocks are useless in telling time. We eventually come to know that the clock is wrong by observing other clocks. In other words, we can determine the validity of what one sense is informing us by using other senses, observing over time and using reason.

So reality is like this. There are always further distinctions to be had. Even two electrons might be identical in every way, except they are in different places. But equally, the differences can cease to matter from a higher level that sees instead the sameness of a statistical regularity. Sameness and difference are connected by the third thing of where in scale we choose to stand in measuring the properties of a system. — apokrisis

Sure. Information is everywhere causes leave effects. What information is relevant, or attended to, depends on the goal in the mind.

So numbers and information are part of a new way of speaking about the world that is very useful in proportion to the degree that it is also unreal. It is a language of atomised reductionism that places itself outside even space, time and energy as those are the physical generalities it now aspires to take algorithmic control over. — apokrisis

I don't know if I agree with what you're saying here. What does it mean for something to be useful but not real? What does it mean for something to be useful if not having some element of being real? It seems to me that survival is the best incentive for getting things right. The environment selects traits that benefit the survival and reproductive fitness of organisms. Our highly evolved brain must have been selected for a reason and there must be a reason why humans have been so successful in spreading across the planet and out into space. Are those reasons unreal? Do your many words point to real states of reality? Am I to gain some advantage by reading your words? If not, then why read them?

It seems to me that a rational process takes time and mental space.

If I were to talk about marijuana legalization in this thread, would that be a real state of affairs of being off-topic? It seems to me that the way we perceive the world has a real effect on the world by means of our behaviors. Is Santa Claus real? As an idea Santa Claus is very real as you merely need to look at the effect the idea has had on the world.

In your example of the variety of birds we currently observe, we can point to evolution as the cause. Their differences evolved to fill different environmental niches. The variety of birds informs us of how they evolved and what their common ancestor would be like. The differences and similarities in birds indicate that they started with one common ancestor and evolved over time in different environments. We could potentially point to one common ancestor for all life with space and time being the medium in which the differences accumulate to the current state of affairs with the variety of life that we observe today.

So a string of bits or the numberline exist in the happy world where we can just take this paradoxical division between the continuous and the discrete for granted. Continuums are constructible. Don't ask further questions. Get on with counting your numbers and bits. — apokrisis

This makes me think about the distinction, particularly in quantum mechanics, between the unmeasured and the measured.

Numbers are just scribbles (2 and two refer to the same thing. it's just easier to do math with the condensed version using numbers instead of words) that refer to certain quantities. They are causally connected - the scribble and the quantity of objects within a category, whether it be cows or photons.

Information is the relationship between the scribble (the effect) and the quantity (the cause).

It is easy to assume things are just what they are. But that depends on them being in fact not what they are not. — apokrisis

Maybe I'm misunderstanding but this seems counter-intuitive considering that we must categorize objects by their similarities, not their differences or what they are not. Objects that are similar fall into some category and it is only then that we can assert that there is a quantity of similar objects. If everything was unique and there are no categories of similar objects then what use are quantities? If there is only one of everything what use is math?

Why does 2+2=4? Some may say that this is logically sound statement, but why? What makes some string of scribbles true? It seems to me that you have to have made some observation, and categorizing your observations, prior to making this statement. Are they just scribbles on this page or are they about something that I can experience and make predictions from?

Similarly, numbers in themselves are not information, because they do not encode any message - they are just there. — SophistiCat

Where are the numbers and how did they get there?

I'm finding it hard to tell whether you're partial to an indirect, or a direct conception of perception. But, given my own position i'll respond to what I see:

The first part: Fully agree. Understanding that C fibres fire, travel to the brain, and hte brain creates an illusion of "pain in the toe" rather than "signals from the toe being translated to pain to ensure I address the injured toe" has nothing to do with whether there is pain "in the toe". There plainly is not.

However, these are scientific explanations: The way pain works shuts down the option of direct perception of it. Hanover has made a similar point, and also noted that it just goes ignored - hand-waved away instead of confronted.

The science of perception, optical physiology, psychology and (in this context) the mechanics of pain fly in the face of a 'direct perception' account. It isn't even coherent, which has been shown several times. I personally find it helpful to continue the discussion, because it helps to streamline and economize responses to clearly inapt descriptions of experience. Intuitive, yes, but as helpful as folk psychology in understanding what's 'really' going on.

BUT, even with ALL of that said, if the point is that perception is necessarily indirect, then science can only get us so far. Observations are all we have - and I think Michael and I hit a bit of a curvy dead end with this issue. But, personally, I'm happy to just say science is the best use of our perception in understanding regularities of nature. Not much more could be said, unless we're just going to take the socially-apt chats about it at face value for practical reasons. In that case "science is objective" makes sense - but is just not true. — AmadeusD

It seems to me that the distinction between direct and indirect realism is useless. Would you say that you have direct or indirect access to your mental phenomenon?

How did scientists come to realize how pain works and that our experience of it is incorrect if all they have to go by is their own observations which you are calling into question? Somehow we were able to still get at how pain works for you to make these assertions so confidently.

The location of the pain in my foot is brute. I interpret the pain as being located in my foot because most, if not all, of the other times the pain was located in my foot I had an injury on my foot. Now, there could be a time that I am mistaken that my foot hurts with no injury. Instead the injury is in my lower back where inflamed tissue, or a herniated disk is pressing on a nerve and causing sciatica. So, by using more than one sense, and logic, I can still get at the truth. As I said before, we have more than one sense for fault tolerance - to check what one sense is telling us, and we have the ability to reason, to compare past experiences with current ones, and to predict what experiences we can have.

If you're conceding our perceptions might just be a pragmatic stimulus to navigate the world, which may or may not bear any resemblance to the object, then we're agreeing. If the pen is not red, but just appears red, then you're not asserting a direct realism. — Hanover

I never was asserting direct realism. What I was asserting is that we can still get at what objects are by using only our experiences of them. Indirect realism coupled with determinism is how you do it. Causes necessarily determine their effects. Effect carry information about their causes. Only by interpreting the correct causal pattern can we get at the way things are.

Asking how things are independent of looking at them is a silly question. You are assuming that there is something lost in translation when there it is just as likely that there isn't anything lost. How do you know that anything is lost in translation if you can't experience it? It's only an assumption. You have to know the truth to be able to lie. You have to know that something is missing to say that something is missing. How do you know that something is lost in translation?

Everything that is real has a causal power. We can get at the existence things we can't see by observing the things they interact with and the effects they leave behind. If the information you get allows you to solve some problem, or accomplish some goal, then that is all you need. Nothing was lost in translation.

Just think of all the trivial things you do throughout the day that you accomplish and never wonder about what was "lost in translation". Are you able to drink a glass of water. Does the water make it from the pitcher to the glass and then from the glass to your mouth? Do you get to and from work without any issues? Are you able to recognize your loved ones? Are you able to use your smart phone to accomplish tasks? How is it that you are able to make it to this website every day? All of these things you do and do them successfully day in and day out. So how can you say that there is something lost in translation?

Information is everywhere causes leave effects. Most information is irrelevant to what your current goal is, but relevant to some other goal. It's not that something is lost in translation. It's that something is lost in misinterpretation. When we misinterpret what we are experiencing, we are not getting at the true causes. It is more likely that we will fail. Maybe not the first or second time, but eventually we will realize that our interpretation does not work all the time and we will try to come up with a better interpretation. This is basically what science does. There is nothing lost in translation because every cause leaves some effects that we can experience. It is only the interpretation that can be wrong and make it appear that what our senses tell us is wrong. But by making more observations and incorporating logic do we overcome what we believe to be an illusion produced by one of our senses. The distinction between empiricism and rationalism is a false dichotomy. Both are used in together to get at the truth, or to acquire knowledge.

You seem to misunderstand my point. Dreams can be about things but dreams are still mental phenomena, caused by neural activity in the brain.

So your claim that distal objects are the intentional objects of waking experience and so therefore colours are mind-independent properties of these distal objects is a non sequitur.

Intentionality simply has no relevance to the dispute between colour eliminativism and colour realism. — Michael

Well, we still have the hard problem to contend with here. If colors are not parts of pens, then how can they be parts of neurons, or neural processes?

How were you able to determine that your dreams are dreams and not the same as your waking experiences? How did you determine that a mirage is not a pool of water but bent wavelengths of light? The same goes for a bent stick in a glass of water. How were you able to determine what is what and what is not? Was it using ONLY one sense? Did it involve ONLY using your senses?

I don't understand the reasoning behind this question. You're asking why speak at all if our speech isn't 100% accurate and complete in terms of what it conveys? My response would be because knowing something is better than knowing nothing. Why did we have black and white photography before color photography came out? Because something is better than nothing. And, I'd say, I don't labor with the belief that current color photography is 100% accurate in what it depicts. It's 2 dimensional, for example.

As in my example earlier of the air traffic controller looking at blips on his radar screen. No one believes that airplanes are blips, but we can all see the value in having him look at those blips. — Hanover

Which accomplishes the task of having planes land and take-off in a safer way. The blips accomplished the task they were designed for - nothing lost in translation.

In saying that no one believes the airplanes are blips, you are implying that we aren't expecting more than what the blips are telling us to accomplish some goal. We don't need to know the color of the plane to prevent it from crashing into another one while landing.

Will the real Genesis 1:2 please stand up? That is, the one where nothing gets lost in translation. — Hanover

How about they all stand up together?

The same way you don't confuse the car on your left from the car on your right: the direction of stimulation is extremely influential on how we perceive the stimulus. Throwing one's voice is a good example of where this is writ large - despite there being no voice coming from the direction one perceives (when on the receiving end!) - that is what one perceives. We can even be tricked about hte direction stimulus is coming from. Not being able to locate an itch is another perfect example. "I can't put my finger on it" has developed out of this experiential norm.

On-point to your comment, your internal depth perception is what creates the experience of distance - not the distance itself. It is your mind interpreting it which is why perspective can get really fucked up really quickly in the right physical circumstances. The mind does what it thinks it should be doing. It is not veridical in the philosophical sense.

I should say, if your argument is in line with Banno's hand-waving idea that we can somehow magically see things veridically, despite that being in direct contradiction of hte science of perception, I'm unsure we'll get far - which si fine, just want to avoid you wasting your time here if so. — AmadeusD

That's a cool trick the nervous system does. Pain is handled by a special neuron called a nociceptor. People who have chronic pain develop nervous superhighways so that any pain stimulus in the area jumps onto the same path. In other words, they lose the ability to correctly locate the pain. That problem can eventually progress until they have what's call "generalization" where they can't locate pain at all. It's just everywhere. — frank

I don't see how any of this contradicts or contrast with what I have been saying, including the part where I mentioned the distinctions between direct and indirect realism.

You feel the pain in your mind. — AmadeusD

Which is to say that the mind interprets the pain (information) as located in your toe. Information has to be interpreted. When we get at the actual cause is when we have interpreted something correctly. We still experience mirages even though we know the actual cause of the experience. Understanding the correct cause doesn't dispel the illusion. It becomes predictable. We can now predict when we will experience a mirage based on certain environmental conditions.

What I find so odd is when someone makes these scientific explanations, like frank did above, as if that somehow makes what we experience questionable, when science is based on empirical observations. Why should I trust frank's explanation to be veridical? Why should I trust your post as possessing any type of veridicality? Either what you and frank said is true, or it isn't. Which is it? You only pull the rug out from under your own statements when you call into question what your statements are based on. It's like the silly saying, "We don't know anything" when that is a statement of knowledge. It sounds like you are the one on Banno's side with your word games.

I'm not sure what "aboutness" has to do with anything being discussed here. This history textbook is about Hitler, but it isn't Hitler; it's bound pieces of paper with ink writing. — Michael

So you've never heard of Franz Brentano and intentionality of mental states? If you don't want to continue the conversation just say so. It's much more becoming than playing dumb.

What does that mean for some bound pieces of paper to be about something else? If all humans disappeared but our books were left behind, would the bound pieces of paper still be about Hitler? In other words, is aboutness mind-dependent?

I would argue that aboutness is everywhere causes leave effects. The book is about Hitler because of the existence of Hitler and someone's intent to write a book about him. The book would not exist if neither of those events happened. The crime scene is about the criminal because of the evidence the criminal left behind. The tree rings are about the age of the tree as a result of how the tree grows throughout the year. The color red is about the wavelength of light entering your eye. Of course I've simplified the causal processes significantly, but my point is that effects carry information about their causes. As such, information is everywhere. The world is not physical or mental. It is informational. Relational.

May I suggest the following book: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691144955/aboutness

Then how do you not confuse a stubbed toe with a headache? There is an feeling of a location that the pain resides. What I am saying is that the relative location is information the same way that your visual depth is information that informs you of the distance of objects relative to your eyes. Our senses even provide a level of fault tolerance where I can feel the pen where I see it.