How does it answer anything? Well, that was a response to this:It wasn't me who brought up the issue of "degree in cognitive psych". How does it answer the OP question or anything? — Apollodorus
...sounds pretty relevant to me. You speculated about fears people have that they don't admit, and appealed to psychologists. 180 proof has a degree in cognitive psychology.People do tend to be reluctant to admit their own fears but that doesn't mean that those fears don't exist. Ask psychologists and they'll tel you. — Apollodorus
Yes. I quoted the thing that's not quite right. Here it is again:Something isn't right there, don't you think? — Apollodorus
I quoted it in my first post.If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
I think you're missing the objection. It is theoretically possible that some atheist somewhere is scared of a being higher than his/her self.But it isn't a reason to deny the theoretical possibility that in some cases at least atheism may be motivated by fear of something higher than oneself. — Apollodorus
...that phrasing suggests something quite distinct from "in some cases at least"; it suggests that this is a representative pattern.If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
And this is where you get even more nefarious. Apparently, @180 Proof has a condition; he's got a hidden fear of a being higher than himself he does not himself recognize, that drove him to research cognitive psychology. And the proof for this is that questioning it has not yet been proven, and his reaction to your gaslighting is emotional.Could this be the case of 180? — Apollodorus
I'm not sure you're following this discussion.The most prudent thing an atheist could do is to say nothing. Otherwise, he has essentially endorsed another belief system. — 3017amen
Exactly.If you can't prove your own statements why would anyone take them seriously? — Apollodorus
Or possibly any other reason. I'm out of milk. Possibly it was stolen by a gremlin.Why would they hope that? Possibly because they're afraid of a higher power, so fear would be a possible motivation. — Apollodorus
Since when does not proving something isn't true justify that the thing is?And you haven't proved that this isn't the case. — Apollodorus
A suggestion based on what?Not at all. It wasn't a "conclusion", it was a suggestion that I thought was already implied in the question - as already indicated. — Apollodorus
You've got this backwards. My conclusion is that (A) is lacking proper justification.Just because you're labeling something (A), (B), (C), doesn't make your conclusion valid. — Apollodorus
(A) Atheists are afraid of the thought of there being anything higher than themselves hence they hope there isn't. — Apollodorus
(B) People do tend to be reluctant to admit their own fears but that doesn't mean that those fears don't exist. (C) Ask psychologists and they'll tel you. — Apollodorus
Actually, (A) is jumping to conclusions. (C) is just a weird appeal to authority in an attempt to back up (B); it's weird because (B) is more an excuse to believe (A) without evidence than legitimate evidence for (A).(D) I don't know why you're always jumping to conclusions. — Apollodorus
It's interesting that you would perceive a challenge to your jumping to the conclusion of (A) as threats and abusive language, especially in light that you offer emotional excuses to back (A) as opposed to legitimate reasons to believe it.Yeah, when you run out of arguments you start using threats and abusive language. — Apollodorus
Just to point out, (A) has mutated from fear of a higher power to fear of religion.If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
Emotional responses to gaslighting are easy to explain.Otherwise, I do find that your point about politics, and some athiest's emotional defensiveness as it were — 3017amen
You want to prove S. So you're going to "set about trying to prove it" by commencing a task P. Essentially, P is a search algorithm; you're searching for a black dog.Suppose I wanted to prove S = some dogs are black. I begin looking for black dogs and either I find one or I don't. — TheMadFool
In the table above, the min and max columns are metrics of difficulty. What drives both min and max to be n on rows 1 and 2 is the fact that # black is 0, not the fact that you're claiming S (row 1) or ~S (row 2). In fact, each pair of rows {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, and {7, 8} show the same min and max metric.In regard to difficulty in re existential claims that pertain to the physical, it goes without saying they're much easier to prove than their negations but, as your example shows, positive existential claims that are amenable deduction are sometimes harder to demonstrate than their negations. — TheMadFool
But the claim has nothing to do with the difficulty (e.g., row 1 is exactly as difficult as row 2). The difficulty (how many things you need to search) depends on the state of affairs (in this view, how many black dogs there are). You don't know that state of affairs until you finish the task P, and once you do that, you no longer need burden of proof... it's already been met.In other words, it's harder to prove S than ~S. — TheMadFool
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_contradiction#Irrationality_of_the_square_root_of_2The ordinary proof that the square root of 2 is irrational is not a proof by contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I think you're focused too much on proof by contradiction.Proof by contradiction/indirect proof works well for both positive and negative claims. It doesn't favor one or the other. — TheMadFool
Not really, because your argument is making a false comparison. You're kind of committing the epistemic equivalent of a base rate fallacy.Coming to direct proofs, firstly, my argument that positive claims are easier to prove than negative ones, especially existential ones, stands. — TheMadFool
There are no two integers p, q such that (p/q)^2=2.2. No As are Bs — TheMadFool
Sorry, you're just repeating yourself.If ExP is true, then that requires a task, call it TaskE.
If ~ExP is true, then that requires a task, call it TaskN.
TaskE and TaskN are different. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Sure, so say I write a program P to methodically check for counterexamples to the Goldbach conjecture (methodical in the sense that if there's a counterexample to be found it will check that counterexample in a finite amount of time). I'll grant that knowing whether P will halt or not is interesting. I'll grant that knowing if the GC is true or not is interesting. And I'll grant that the former is equivalent to the latter.And there's an analogy to it in mathematics [I'm simplifying somewhat]:
Let P be a computable property of natural numbers. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If they cannot both be true, then I'm not sure you're telling me anything interesting or meaningful when you say they are not the same task. There's a task that may or may not halt at (a), and may or may not halt at (b). About all you are telling me is that if we count the possible tasks as two tasks, we get two. But you seem to acknowledge that the task cannot both halt at (a) and halt at (b). So, sure, if we count what doesn't happen as a different thing, we get two, but why is that interesting?They cannot both be true. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I wouldn't think this would have to be said, but I'm making the assumption that ExP and ~ExP cannot both be true.Also, if discovery of proof proceeds by one-by-one examination of things, then yes, if ExP is true, then the sequence of proving by one-by-one examination for ExP is finite, while, if ~ExP is true, then the sequence of proving by one-by-one examination for ~ExP is indeterminate. And that holds with the example of "There is a black dog" vs. "There is not a black dog". They are not the same task. — TonesInDeepFreeze
It depends on how reasonable the claim is.On what exactly? — TheMadFool
The question is supposed to be about burden of proof.Which is easier or conversely which is harder? — TheMadFool
It would appear to me that these are the same task. You start looking at dogs. You stop when either: (a) you have found a black dog, or (b) you searched all of the dogs on the planet. The task is no more made easier by asserting there's a black dog than it is made more difficult by asserting there isn't one.To assert [PA?], all I need is a single specimen of an A that is also a B (a black dog).
To assert UN, I need to find and examine each and every dog on the planet and check if they're black/not. — TheMadFool
My answer would be, "it depends".I'm approaching the issue with an open mind without any preconceptions or prejudices. My aim was to discover for myself why the burden of proof has to be borne by those making a positive claim and not the one making a negative claim. — TheMadFool
I would hope that if X does not exist, it should be difficult to prove X does exist; otherwise, our proof method would be in question.By way of a possible reason, I found out that, insofar as existential claims are the issue, proving the positive is much, much easier than proving the negative. — TheMadFool
No, I didn't miss your point. I dismissed it. This was quite explicit in the last post... you explicitly asked if I meant that the positive claim was harder to prove than the negative claim. And I explicitly said no, that I meant that some negative claims can be reasonably held with less burden than other negative claims.You missed the point. — TheMadFool
But TMF, it's not that I deny how easy this is to prove, it's that I deny its relevance to burden of proof. If Joe says there's no horse running in his fridge, I would accept that claim without checking. If Frank says there's no molded butter in his fridge, I would not accept that claim without checking. Therefore I place different burdens on different negative claims. How easy it is to check the claim is irrelevant; in fact, it's easier to show there's no horse running in a fridge than it is to show there's no molded butter.To prove that a horse is fitting/running/anything at all, all that's required for me to do is to open the fridge. — TheMadFool
And who would that be?Someone denying this to be possible — TheMadFool
I don't base my burden of proof here on what's possible; rather, it's based on what's reasonable:That's still possible. — InPitzotl
Put it this way. Allow me to describe a game. We take 1,000,000 fridges (all nice and plugged in and operational, like mine is). Every time we find a fridge with molded butter in it, you pay me 20 bucks, but only on one condition. If we ever find a single of these 1,000,000 fridges with a horse running in it, you pay me nothing; instead, I pay you 5,000 bucks. I feel safe playing this game.It is hypothetically possible that there is a horse none of us know about, which is so small, that it can indeed actually run in my fridge. But for such a horse to actually be running in my fridge, hypothetical isn't good enough... it must be actual. — InPitzotl
No; I mean that some negative claims, like "there is no horse running in my fridge", can be reasonably held with less burden than other negative claims, like "there is no mold growing on butter in my fridge".So, you mean to say the positive statement, "a horse is in the fridge" is harder to prove than the negative statement, "a horse is not in the fridge"? — TheMadFool
The negative claim is about a horse running, not fitting, in my fridge. But we can bypass this. It is hypothetically possible that there is a horse none of us know about, which is so small, that it can indeed actually run in my fridge. But for such a horse to actually be running in my fridge, hypothetical isn't good enough... it must be actual. That's still possible. But lest you forget, I'm not talking about what's possible or what burden any particular claim has... I'm talking about the equivalence of burden between negative claims. It would be quite surprising, for good reason, to find a horse running in my fridge. It would not be nearly as surprising to find molded butter.The latter seems to follow in an immediate sense from the fact that a horse can't fit in a fridge. Thumbelina (2001 - 2018) — TheMadFool
I don't need to check the fridge... there isn't enough room in my fridge for a horse to run in it.Why? — TheMadFool
I don't understand the question (quite frankly, I have problems even parsing it). Are you asking why I think claims of the non-existence of something are negative claims, or are you asking why I think not all negative claims have equivalent burdens?On what basis do you claim that is? — TheMadFool
It is indeed! They are equivalent in that they are all negative claims. But I don't think they have equivalent levels of burden. I don't see the self-contradiction. 4 and 7 are equivalent modulo 3, but you'd better believe I'd prefer 7 red velvet cup cakes to 4!Note you say "all of these are negative claims." That's an equivalence if ever there was one! — TheMadFool
You explicitly did exactly that:I didn't mention any equivalences between negative statements — TheMadFool
...that's the same quote in the post you replied to.4. The bear = god — TheMadFool
You're oversimplifying this. Ignore the negative part and focus on burden. Compare the following claims:To assert p is true.
If so, you need to justify p. — TheMadFool
That's a bad analogy. You're trying to prime the pump by using an agreed upon extant entity (bear) in an unlikely place (house), but that's precisely what makes the analogy bad. Bears are demonstrably extant entities that would fit in a house... they are more like squirrels in a fridge.4. The bear = god — TheMadFool
Wrong.It can only mean that out of 6 times rolling the dice, the 6 will occur one time, right? — spirit-salamander
If it is impossible to get a 6 on the second throw, then the probability of getting 6 on the second throw is 0, not 1/6. And if the probability of getting a 6 on the second throw is 0, you're not really tossing a fair die. The probability of getting a 6 on any throw of a fair die toss is 1/6... so your angels aren't tossing a die.The only surprise for the angels, which there must be if it is to be a game of chance, would be that on the second roll they absolutely cannot tell whether the second roll will be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. — spirit-salamander
Your theory is flawed though. If this is a fair die, the probability of it landing on each number is 1/6 on every throw.In a merely practical or pragmatic sense it would be a fallacy, but not in a theoretical one. — spirit-salamander
That would almost never happen with fair die. But it could happen. But you're confusing the theoretical probability with frequentist probability here.It could be here that for all eternity only the 6 is always rolled or that it never appears for all times. In the former case the probability for 6 would be 100%, in the latter 0%. — spirit-salamander
"Bits" assumes classical computers, simulating classical universes. Try instead to imagine a quantum computer simulating classical universes. As mentioned, it's not a huge stretch to say that MWI is at least a natural version of this very thing... and MWI is at least a mainstream interpretation. This is probably close enough to consider viable and close enough to the simulation hypothesis to at least be relevant.All references to the external world in a simulation are just labels for bits of computer code. If simulations are even metaphysically possible, which I doubt. — RogueAI
To me, the word "water" is a label that I attach to a particular kind of thing in my environment. The stuff that comes out of my taps when I open them that I can hold with a cup... that comes clear and has a particular familiar taste, qualifies as water. The part of the question where I presume this is a simulation bears no relevance to the answer.If this is a simulation, what would you define water as? A combination of things or computer code? — RogueAI
Under the MWI, it's not really made of particles either. Under MWI, it's not so much that it's an idea as it is that it's a portion of the universal wavefunction oriented in such a way as to interact with certain other portions of the wavefunction consistent to simulate something like classical physics. So in a roundabout way, MWI is kind of a simulation hypothesis itself.It means reality is such that water is not made of particles, but is an idea. — RogueAI
Any description of the physical world by any person is simply a model. This includes the description "water is H2O".I have no problem with water appears to be H2O. I have a problem with water is (=) H2O. — RogueAI
I have a deeper problem that starts when I unpack "combination of things".When you unpack "water is H2O" you immediately run into a problem: "water is H2O" means, among other things, that water is a combination of things. I don't agree that water is a combination of things. — RogueAI
No, that's not what I mean.The materialist, of course, will not accept that as an answer. That's the mechanics of the issue (which I take you to mean "how things really are"). — RogueAI
Of course it doesn't! But if the fact that this is a dream doesn't commit you to think you'll be able to fly by wishing it, why do you think the fact that this is a dream commits you to think mixing baking soda with vinegar won't form bubbles, or that the resulting thing cannot be poured over a candle and put it out? I am reading you as saying that thinking this is a dream absolutely commits you to deny chemistry (aka that H2O is a thing).The fact that this is a dream doesn't entail that I think I'll be able to fly. — RogueAI
Okay, but if the mind wants me, an idealist, to see chemical mechanics, why should I deny chemical mechanics? If the mind wants me to see that the bubbles from baking soda/vinegar puts out candles, why would I deny that doing so can put out candles? If it wants me to see twice as much gas as the negative end as the positive end, why should I deny that?An idealist in chemistry, when asked "why are you observing what you're observing", will ultimately claim, "I observe whatever the mind(s) creating this reality want me to see." The materialist chemistry teacher will not agree with that. — RogueAI
Pretty much. You have exactly the same mechanics here as you do with materialism. The only difference is that you posit those things to be composed of ideas.How on Earth would this work under idealism? The ideas of hydrogen and oxygen somehow combine to form a new idea (water) that is still composed of two distinct ideas (hydrogen and oxygen)? And this works only if they can share other ideas (electrons) that orbit around it? — RogueAI
I don't think this works in practice. We don't have idealists trying to fly by wishing they can fly. They still live in the same world self proclaimed materialists do, and still buy the same airplane tickets.As an idealist, I would say water is just part of the dream, and it will do whatever the dreamer wants it to do. ... We've all had dreams of snow and rain and clouds. Why not dreams where water appears to be a collection of tiny particles? In idealism, there really isn't "water" just like there's no "water" in our dreams. — RogueAI
If I grant this, then the explanation is wrong. H2O can be an idealistic substance.Idealism doesn't have to be substanceless. — frank
But for this to be an explanation we need to fit some relevance criteria. So long as we're world building, let's grant "this" universe is materialistic. And let's just imagine a universe B the same as this one, except "water" in universe B refers to what we would call a cow. So now in universe B, water is not H2O. But that doesn't quite sound like it should be relevant to the nature of meaning in "this" universe; it sounds, rather, that universe-B-water is simply a different kind of thing than this-universe-water.We could conjure a kind of idealism that allows water, but not H20. — frank
I have a feeling you're not even having a conversation with me. Why then do you reply?That's going overboard to find a wedge to drive between the terms.
It's much easier than that. — frank
I quoted this in my post:I don't know what you're talking about. — frank
Again, RogueAI is explaining why H2O and water mean different things. But his explanation is that, under idealism, H2O doesn't exist, since H2O has to be a substance.H2O only refers to a physical substance. — RogueAI
You're talking about something completely different. I'm responding to @RogueAI talking about idealism-water, which is not in fact H2O, because H2O must be a substance.I think the difference mainly shows up when we're talking about what people know or believe. — frank
I don't understand. Surely under idealism, if I open up my tap and let that stuff go into a cup, that's called water, right? Surely then, under idealism, if I run a DC current through the water and collect the bubbles off of the positive side, that's called oxygen, right? And if I do that on the negative side, that's called hydrogen? Then why can't H2O be an "idea"?H2O only refers to a physical substance. — RogueAI
I am just a member of this forum.Who are you — Corvus
By whose authority? You're just another member of this forum.No you don't speak in minor sentence or a word in philosophical discussion. — Corvus
Well technically he's right. It's a minor sentence. Whether or not it's a "proper sentence" sounds like something we shouldn't really care about.He was insisting "And" was a sentence. I told him that it is not. — Corvus
You seem to be missing a foundational point. Were it not for a "bandwagon of native speakers of English", there would be no such thing as English. Real linguists study how native language speakers speak; real lexicographers document how native language speakers use words; and so on. The definition of the language is in the commonality established by this bandwagon. (And just so there's no confusion, the context of "correct" here is simply "correct English").You seemed to have joined this "bandwagon of native speakers of English, and if one is not, then he must be wrong". — Corvus
Good. In the future, you should not care about this stuff at the start. There's literally no point in telling someone about "proper sentences" having nouns and verbs. We're all speaking English; if something clear is being communicated, there's not really anything left to say. Just focus on content.Anyway, it is not my interest debating about this with you anymore. — Corvus
So? "Okay" isn't a sentence. "Aha" isn't a sentence. "Yes" isn't a sentence. "Yes, sir" isn't a sentence. But "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a sentence. Apparently, though, "So?", "And?", "Okay", "Aha", "Yes", and "Yes, sir" all communicate something meaningful in English, yet "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" does not.A sentence requires at least a subject and verb to be qualified as one. — Corvus
Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gire and gimble in the wabe.Being a native English speaker doesn't mean that how he communicates with English is always correct or right. — Corvus
Huh?A proper sentence has a subject and verb for minimum. — Corvus