But we currently do not have any observation that confirms their existence. — John Chlebek

There is life on this planet.

The eye has certain receptors on the retina that detect color, the "cones." These come with three different sensitivities. Hence the three "primary" colors. — javi2541997

Well, not quite. Three receptor types do not imply three primary colors.

This might be the case if each receptor were sensitive to different parts of the spectrum like this:

Wikipedia: Young-Helmholtz theory

...but not if they highly overlap, like this:

Wikipedia: photopsin

In fact, I'm pretty sure you've seen a CIE-1931 chromaticity diagram before:

Wikipedia: CIE 1931 color space

Colors combine linearly on this chart (which only shows hue, not shades); your RGB monitor has three colors that are varied in intensity (and thus this diagram is only an approximation). An example of this can be found in the wiki SRGB article. So with three primaries, you can produce a color gamut that is a triangle. But the chart itself isn't a triangle; it's basically the color closure of all spectral colors, which forms that outside curve (the spectral locus). So, yes, we're trichromatic, but no, there aren't three primary colors... unless you pull tricks like CIE-1931 color space does, and make your primaries abstract.

True purple, for which there seems to be no place in the physical spectrum, is something we see when the cones sensitive to blue and red are both stimulated, giving us something like an imaginary color. — javi2541997

Are we not part of the physical world?

Opponent process color theory seems to explain colors pretty well. Current thought is that color opponent processes are explained by retinal mechanisms; in particular, retinal ganglion cells tend to mix signals from cones. There are three opponent color channels: a red-green channel, a yellow-blue channel, and a brightness channel. This is enough to make an axis... e.g., yellow-blue top-bottom, and green-red left-right. About the origin on this axis, you will find an entire color wheel. Purple is just what you see in the quadrant on the red portion of the green-red axis and the blue portion of the yellow-blue axis.

Slightly warp the color space I just described, and you just get the CIE-1931 chart again (since there's debate on the exact colors of color opponent processes, maybe it's less or more warping needed). On this warped diagram, the spectral colors are still forming that curve. It's not too surprising that there are colors outside of the curve, including those on the "line of purples". Color, as in that stuff we see and label with color labels, is a property of the human visual system. "Color" as in that property photons have is really nothing more than wavelengths (or frequencies, depending on your chosen unit), that happen to fall into a narrow band that the human visual system picks up, thereby producing those things we give color labels to. Either way, color per se isn't so much about photons per se as it is about how human eyes measure them, so I wouldn't try to put too much stock into the "colors" (human-color-label-things) that aren't wavelengths.

Oh sorry. I actually thought "many worlds" had something to do with many worlds. — SolarWind

It does, but you're attacking a straw man. A "world" is not an entire decohered universe.

And in every book about MWI it says that they divide at a measurement.

That's correct, but that division is an entanglement.

Radioactive-lump system evolves into a superposition (ignoring amplitudes):

|decayed> + |undecayed>

Cat-system measures this; that entangles the cat with these states:

|decayed>|dead cat> + |undecayed>|living cat>

Schrodinger measures this; that entangles Schrodinger with these states:

|Schrodinger-sees-dead-cat>|decayed>|dead cat>
+ |Schrodinger-sees-living-cat>|undecayed>|living cat>

There are now two worlds. We do not have to wait until Alice, or Andromeda, are decohered... the "Schrodinger-sees-dead-cat" no longer interacts with that living cat. Nothing is being added to the equation here; no partitions that aren't there already... we simply do this instead of collapsing when Schrodinger measures the cat-radioactive material system.

What does not follow from what? — SolarWind

Everything you have after "Therefore" does not follow from what you have before "Therefore".

Can I guess? Are you perhaps suggesting MWI requires worlds be fully decohered? If that's the case, you just have a misconception of MWI. MWI isn't proposing that anything different happens with wavefunctions than that they evolve in accordance with Schrodinger's Equation. It's simply, more or less, the idea that measurement is entanglement; that when a device (or observer) measures something in superposition, the device (or observer) is entangling with those states.

There's just one world in most QM interpretations. — Olivier5

I don't think you grasp what a world is. If you have a wavefunction expressed as A+B, you have two worlds. If you have a superposition, you have multiple worlds.

It does assume an infinity of worlds. — Olivier5

You're still counting the wrong thing. Believing that France exists is not making 67 million assumptions. Also, if those worlds are a problem with MWI, you should have a problem with them in QM.

Interestingly, the conservation of mass and energy would seem gigumongously violated by this constant burgeoning of a gigumongous number of new universes. — Olivier5

Something is majorly broken with this argument. If your wavefunction has A+B in it, and you have applied a force to a mass in A, does A then move twice as fast? Assuming it did, if we entertain collapse into A, did we lose mass to B going away?

The MWI supporters claim the world divides when the states are decohered. But decoherence is an exponentially decreasing process that is theoretically never complete. Therefore already the basic assumption is wrong and the MWI can be thrown into the garbage can. — SolarWind

That does not follow.

I propose thinking of probability a bit more abstractly.

Probability fundamentally is a measure; when you assign a probability value, you're assigning a measure. The assignment of numerical probabilities is explicitly a claim that the measure of probability of events scales to the measure of the assigned numbers. To claim that A is twice as likely as B is to claim that P(A)=2P(B); to claim that you cannot say A is twice as likely as B is to claim that you cannot say P(A)=2P(B).

I mean, we assume that if an event has probability of 99,9% of happening, it means that if we simulate the conditions, each 1000 times the event would occur next to 999 times. But that's not a fact, since nothing really prohibits the complement of the event, with probability of 0,1% of keep continuously occurring through time, while the first event, with almost 100% of probability never happens. — denis yamunaque

I disagree with this assessment. To claim that P(A)=99.9% is to claim that you can assign a probability measure of A happening to the value 0.999. Since the numerical assignments presume the numerical scales map to the probabilities, and since 0.999 is 999 times greater than 0.001, the statement P(A)=99.9% is equivalent to the claim that A is 999 times as likely to occur as it is to not occur. That is what P(A)=99.9% means.

That does not imply that if you repeat the event 1000 times, then A should occur nearly 999 times (this being an application of the Law of Large Numbers). At best it implies that A is likely to occur nearly 999 times. Nor does this imply that if you repeat the event 1000 times, A would occur at least once; at best, it implies that it is likely to occur at least once. All P(A)=99.9% implies is that there exists a meaningful measure such that you can say things like A is 999 times more likely to occur than it is to not occur. In fact, as @Aryamoy Mitra did earlier, we can use probability to describe exactly how unlikely it is that A never occurs when the event happens 1000 times.

This may be true if the probability is 0.5 vs 0.5. What if we wait shorter for the radioactive element to decay and the ratio is 0.58 (living cat) vs 0.42 (dead cat)? How many SA2 and SB2 are there then? — SolarWind

Still two, or many. It depends on how you resolve the fact that the BR appears to work in MWI, and that's something I'm not sure how to do... possibly that's a good reason not to buy into it, or maybe it's just something beyond my scope.

I'm talking of Erwin Schrödinger's interpretation of QM. — Olivier5

Okay, I'll try this way. What about it?

I am actually talking of Schrödinger's own interpretation of QM, which he tried to argue for in his famous thought experiment about a cat in a box. In his view, the cat had to be either alive or dead, hence the Copenhagen interpretation was impossible to hold. Read about the history of the thought experiment. — Olivier5

Okay, history. Regarding the history of Schrodinger's cat per se, that was introduced in 1935 by Schrodinger's "Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik". I don't speak German, but there are translations of "The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics" in English. In this paper, Schrodinger introduced the cat thought experiment, and discussed his ideas on quantum mechanics. I have no idea what you're referring to here in particular that's any different from what I have said, but I have an English translation, so if you want to refer to parts of this paper go ahead.

But regarding the history of what I'm discussing, MWI was introduced in 1956 by Hugh Everett's thesis, "The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction". In this paper's introduction, Hugh discussed the two processes I'm talking about and discusses problems with the consistency of entertaining both processes. In that introduction, wavefunction collapse via the Born Rule is what Everett calls Process 1. The evolution of the wavefunction is what Everett calls Process 2. The particular inconsistency Everett points out is the inconsistency between Process 1 and Process 2; the way it's supposed to work, you use Process 2 until you observe, then you take out Process 1 and use that. Everett discusses in particular the inconsistency that is introduced when one observer (B) tries to describe an observer (A) as part of a quantum system (S); in that case, B is supposed to use process 2 to model A+S, but A uses Process 1 to model S. Everett then discusses five alternatives for how to resolve this: (1) A solipsist approach (e.g., B gets to apply Process 1, A is wrong to apply Process 2), (2) A "realms" (my term) approach, where QM is simply held invalid to any observer or macroscopic system, (3) An "isolationist" (my term) approach, where we suppose that B cannot posses a model A+S for some reason, (4) An incompleteness approach, where we surmise that there's some other hidden theory explaining QM, (5) A universal approach, where we simply discard Process 1. Everett's theory presumes alternative 5; he is discarding Process 1 as being real.

My use of Schrodinger's cat is as a device to talk about Everett's model... alternative 5. In this device, Schrodinger is B, the cat is A, and the quantum system S is the radioactive material.

So all of that is before you. Now, what different thing than I said are you talking about?

MWI says that there are infinite worlds, while Schrödinger assumes his cat can't be dead and alive at the same time. Can you spot which assumes less and which assumes more? — Olivier5

There's a problem with your phrasing. "Schrodinger's cat" isn't an interpretation of QM; it's a thought experiment in it. What you're comparing is something akin to MWI and a traditional interpretation.

The traditional interpretation assumes there are two fundamental processes; Schrodinger's equation and Born Rule. MWI sees the assumption of the Born Rule as a fundamental process as unnecessary, so doesn't assume it. Since one is less than two, MWI is making fewer assumptions. MWI is saying there are an infinite number of worlds because it makes less assumptions; getting rid of those worlds requires more assumptions than MWI makes (that BR is fundamental).

What determines in which of the many worlds I am? — SolarWind

I think that gets outside of MWI proper and into philosophy of identity. Personally, I think personal identity constructed anyway.

Let's say S1 is Schrodinger before opening the box, SA2 is Schrodinger who opens the box seeing a living cat; SB2 is Schrodinger who opens the box seeing a dead cat. Then neither SA2 or SB2 are the "genuine" Schrodinger; they both have equal claims of being the same as S1. But SA2 and SB2 do not affect each other; those "terms" in the wavefunction are now decohered. So SA2 and SB2 are different from each other.

What determines in which of the many worlds I am? It makes a difference to me whether I win the jackpot or one of my many copies. — SolarWind

Given the model above, there's no genuine version of Schrodinger to ask about.

QM is science. I am pro science, always. The MWI is an attempt to stick to the metaphysics of Galileo and Newton, i.e. to strict determinism, in an era where this idea is obsolete precisely because of QM. — Olivier5

The MWI is just an interpretation. It embraces quantum realism, giving up classical realism. It hasn't been demonstrated true.

All I'm arguing is that it's naive to argue that MWI is making more assumptions; the core of MWI, explained in terms of Schrodinger's cat, is that there's nothing privileged about Schrodinger opening the box versus the cat.

ETA:

My interpretation is that interactions with stuff collapse or at least restrict the wave function, allowing stable, predictable macrostructures to emerge from highly unstable and unpredictable micro elements. — Olivier5

MWI just gets rid of that collapse (at least ontically, in the sense that the other terms disappear from the universal wavefunction and "become unreal"). The apparent collapse is explained by observers themselves entangling with quantum systems. That explanation isn't new; it's how Schrodinger would explain the cat. MWI is just saying as with the cat, so with Schrodinger.

can't it be more detailed — SolarWind

See edit.

You can't understand something in this one world, so you need to assume gazillions of worlds. — Olivier5

So you're not against MWI, but QM?

Why are we classic? Isn't that a contradiction to MWI, where everything is quantum mechanical? — SolarWind

No, it's in the wavefunction. When Schrodinger models the state of the box, he would model a superposition between two classical states. There's a cat that died, because the vial broke, because a detector detected decay, because there was decay. And there's a cat that didn't die, because the vial didn't break, because the detector didn't detect decay, because there wasn't any. The cat's states are entangled with the state of radioactive decay. And when Schrodinger opens the box, Schrodinger's states become entangled with the radioactive decay.

The multiverse is obscenely anti-ockhamist, it assumes a awful lot and for no good reason. — Olivier5

I think this is misguided. The MWI doesn't add any assumptions; in fact, its appeal is that it takes assumptions away.

The apparent premise here is that MWI is adding an unnecessary premise that there are many worlds. The problem with this is that MWI doesn't add this assumption; QM realism does. In the double slit experiment, the particle somehow goes through both slits... that's where the many worlds come from, and it's already there. What MWI does, versus the traditional interpretation, is remove an assumption... namely, it removes the assumption that there's a privileged viewpoint where collapse is "real"; we can loosely call this classical realism.

Take Schrodinger's cat experiment as an example. Before Schrodinger opens the box, Schrodinger is already compelled to model its contents as a superposition between two worlds. In one world, a cat observed a lump of material decay; that's the dead cat. In that world, the decay was detected, the detector broke a vial of poison, and the poison is what killed the cat. In the other world, a cat observed a lump of material not decay; that the living cat. In that world, no decay was detected, the vial contained the poison, and the cat just lived. From the point of view of the dead cat, the radioactive material is not in a superposition between decaying and not decaying; it has already collapsed into decaying. Similarly, from the point of view of the living cat, the radioactive material has already collapsed into not decaying. But Schrodinger's model has both of these terms in it; so the cats' points-of-view collapses are not "real" collapses. They are instead just entanglements; the cat's state is entangled with the state of decay of the material. So if the living cat's sees apparent collapse, what makes Schrodinger special when he opens the box? How come Schrodinger's collapse is ontic when the cat's collapse is just perspective?

So to emphasize, MWI doesn't add the assumption of multiple worlds; the assumption leading to multiple worlds is already there. The traditional interpretation has a world with a dead cat and a living cat in it; those are worlds. MWI instead removes the assumption that some collapses are ontic whereas others are just apparent.

When they describe many-worlds they always talk about binary choices. The car turns left or the car turns right, the cat is dead or alive. — fishfry

Same response to fishfry... answering this question from an MWI point of view is easy. Don't look at the many worlds, because that's not the assumption; the worlds are just perspectives. They're descriptions to classical beings like us. The worlds are emergent; it's the wavefunction that's real.

So just look at the wavefunction. Is there continuity there? If so, since the universal wavefunction is ontic (under MWI; that is the assumption), then they must be real. If you're looking at a human choosing to steer, it's not entirely clear that correlates to a wavefunction continuous along all paths... the math leading up to that could get insanely complicated. But there are continuities in the wavefunction; if you start with the double slit, but you cut "infinite slits" into the barrier, then the photon goes everywhere. In that case, that wavefunction being ontic (under an MWI perspective), all of those are real (so long as you can come up with "worlds" based on each of those, each such world would be real).

You didn't know that you can turn any inductive argument into a deductively valid one until approx. 5 minutes ago, after you hurriedly looked it up on the internet, yes? — Bartricks

Sorry it took so long to reply; I had to go on the internet and hurriedly look this up:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKQOk5UlQSc — InPitzotl

I don't click on links, but good luck with your continuing youtube education programme. Everyone knows that professional philosophers spend most of their days making youtube videos. — Bartricks

I just had to pause with this one.

Okay, if you don't click on the video, maybe I'll quote you some relevant snippets.

Watson: Good Lord! That's... remarkable... and completely wrong!
Sherlock: [pause].... what?
Watson: Everything you said was wrong.
Sherlock: You're saying that I'm... that, I was... was wrong?
Watson: Nothing you said was correct.
Sherlock: Everything I said was correct.
Watson: No, this is my dad's phone. — Pete Holmes (link to his official channel)

Bartricks, you're biased. You've started to fantasize about what is on my side of the keyboard. You took it a step further and started to fantasize about the video. Then you started refuting the video... one that you claimed you didn't watch, but I can absolutely assure you that you didn't watch, because that alleged professional philosopher you were trying to attack in that video? He doesn't exist. He's your fantasy.

But that's not the reality. The reality is, you have 10 bad arguments in this thread, and all you're doing is rationalizing them. This thread isn't about properly reasoning about the nature of the mind:

Lay it out for all to see, and then I'll take you to the cleaners. — Bartricks

...it's about your fantasies of taking the opposition to the cleaners. Your fantasies are getting in the way of your making good arguments.

Your fantasies about me are as accurate as Sherlock's fantasies about Watson. Your response to the video is kind of self mocking. I am choosing to let you in on the joke, because at this point it's just cruel.

1. Brain events cause mental events
2. Therefore brain events are mental events — Bartricks

I'm curious. What is the inductive argument that "deductive" argument is a rephrasing of? And who made it?

Bartricks! Is this another fantasy?

You didn't know that you can turn any inductive argument into a deductively valid one until approx. 5 minutes ago, after you hurriedly looked it up on the internet, yes? — Bartricks

Sorry it took so long to reply; I had to go on the internet and hurriedly look this up:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKQOk5UlQSc

Now, once more: what's your argument? Lay it out for all to see, and then I'll take you to the cleaners. — Bartricks

You seem to be a bit confused. I'm not arguing for the mind being material. I'm arguing that you're rationalizing instead of reasoning.

You could turn it into a deductively valid argument if you knew how. — Bartricks

Sure. Add a premise near the claim you want to make and presume it. But that exercise is pointless unless you're rationalizing. The point of induction is to try to let the evidence guide you, not to try to derive what you already want to claim.

You really do. But as I say at points like this, Dunning and Kruger. Dunning. And. Kruger. — Bartricks

Again, you're just nay-saying. The Dunning Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where a person's meta-cognitive awareness of an area is low, and as a result they overestimate their knowledge in the subject.

That does not apply here. What you're doing is building straw men out of valid inductive arguments.

Present an argument -a deductively valid argument - that has 'therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion. — Bartricks

But Bartricks... the mind-is-a-function-of-the-brain argument is inductive. Your attempts to conflate the inductive argument with a deductive one is a straw man.

Like I say, you're beyond my help. — Bartricks

I don't need you to think for me. Let me answer since you're avoiding it.

Those two allegedly are the same argument because you've done a substitution.

Here's what you need to do. Present an argument -a deductively valid argument — Bartricks

Wrong tool. This isn't about deduction. This is about evidence.

We're going in circles. You phrase a perfectly valid inductive argument as a deductive argument, and argue that it's stupid on the basis that it doesn't follow.

That's sophistry.

Why the hell are you talking about knives and bananas? — Bartricks

Why are these the same argument?

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind
1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind — Bartricks

is stupid, yes? The conclusion doesn't follow. — Bartricks

No, it's not stupid. Yes, it doesn't follow.

I see a body. Blood everywhere. There's a bloody knife next to the body. There's a bloody banana next to the body.

1. It does not follow that the banana is the murder weapon.
2. It does not follow that the knife is the murder weapon.
3. It is stupid to suspect the banana to be the murder weapon.
4. It is not stupid to suspect the knife to be the murder weapon.

Given me an argument in support of the thesis that mental events are brain events (and thus that the mind is the brain) and I'll tell you if it is stupid or not. — Bartricks

But you're biased. Any reasonable person would agree with the statements above.

But if we agree with these statements, that means we have to disagree on the equivalence of the arguments. So it's no wonder you avoid explicitly talking about bloody bananas.

No matter. I've made the bloody banana the elephant in the room.

And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another. — Bartricks

So educate me.

Tell me how it works with the body, next to the bloody knife and the bloody banana.

ETA: Are the knife-murder weapon and banana-murder weapon theories on equal ground? If not, why not? According to you, it should be the same argument, so if it's stupid to think a banana is a murder weapon, it should be stupid to think a knife is.

And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another. — Bartricks

1. "The knife is the murder weapon" becomes "the banana is the murder weapon" by variable substitution.
2. "The knife is the murder weapon" is a viable theory.
3. "The banana is the murder weapon" is not a viable theory.
4. Therefore, viability of inductive theories is not preserved by substitution.

Alcohol causes mind to feel happy, therefore mind is alcohol. That's stupid, yes? That's the same argument. — Bartricks

It's not the same argument.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind — Bartricks

Again, you're just nay-saying. You're phrasing this in terms of deduction; but we're applying evidence and induction. Variable substitution doesn't work in evidence. If I find a bloody knife on the floor next to the victim, there's a good chance it was the murder weapon. By contrast, if I find a bloody banana on the floor next to the victim, there's no chance it was the murder weapon.

The brain is the bloody knife. Alcohol is just a bloody banana.

Er, that's not remotely the same argument. — Bartricks

That's irrelevant. It doesn't logically follow. You were ranting about how things not logically following means it's stupid, and how you can't see how anyone would think it would logically follow. It never occurred to you that this was proper induction.

Now you're just covering yourself, and comparing bloody knives to bloody bananas.

You're making that stupid argument. — Bartricks

I don't buy that the argument is stupid. You're just nay-saying it. Let's look at why it's allegedly stupid:

Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does. — Bartricks

Well, it doesn't follow. But that doesn't imply it's stupid to conclude it. I see something outside my window that looks like my car parked in my driveway. It doesn't logically follow that my car is parked in my driveway; but that's still a good reason to believe my car is parked in my driveway.

If the mind is a product of the brain, I would expect brain impairment to correspond with mind impairment. If it's not a product of the brain, I simply have no such expectations. But it appears that brain impairment correlates to mind impairment; so it "looks like" our mind is a product of our brain. That the mind is a product of the brain doesn't logically follow, but that it looks like the mind is a product of the brain is a perfectly fine reason to suspect that it is.

No it isn't. Obviously. What did I just say? — Bartricks

Well I read this:

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? — Bartricks

I just said that 'even if' two objects of different kinds are incapable of causal interaction, that does 'not' show that the mind is material. — Bartricks

But "material" has to mean something, and it has to mean something sensible, else all statements you make about what is and what isn't material are either meaningless or irrelevant. Let's phrase it this way... suppose I invoke Laplace's "I had no need for that hypothesis" idiom here. Well, all of the interactions between the mind and the physical are consistent with the mind being a function of what a brain is doing. Yes, that doesn't mean the mind isn't immaterial, but the bigger question here is, what is the need for that hypothesis?

That's not what I said. I said not having an explanation of how something is occurring is not evidence it is not occurring. — Bartricks

I don't see what you're correcting here.

It's a distinct point. I don't know how this computer is working. Is that evidence it is not working. No.
So, 'if' I don't know how the mind and body interact, that is not evidence that they do not interact. — Bartricks

The computer scenario isn't analogous; nobody is arguing minds don't work, and nobody is arguing the mind and body doesn't interact. You're claiming the mind is immaterial. But we know the mind interacts physically in multiple ways. So if it's immaterial, that immaterial thing is interacting in quite a lot of ways similar to how a material thing interacts with the physical. It's a fair question, then, what it even means to presume said mind is immaterial. Again, what is the need for that hypothesis?

Yes, I provided 10 arguments. Each argument has premises that are far more plausible than their negations. — Bartricks

You've mentioned this multiple times, as if it's making a point, but I'm not convinced that this should be all that surprising. Suppose I had a giant hat; I passed it to everyone in this forum, and I asked them to write one argument either for the mind being material, or for it being immaterial, and slip it into the hat. Once I've collected the arguments, I draw 10 arguments from the hat. What do you suppose the probability is that all 10 of those arguments would be for the mind being immaterial? I would gather that probability would be incredibly low.

Now contrast that with what you keep claiming you accomplished. In this case, you yourself are writing all 10 arguments. Then we draw those only-10 arguments out of that hat. So what is the probability that out of those 10 arguments, all of them would both (a) be for the mind being immaterial, (b) be convincing to you? I would gather the probability of that happening would be somewhere near 100%.

Now, I note that you stand by all ten of your arguments. But I've specifically chosen to talk about four of them; the four I have chosen have a single thing in common. They can all be applied to absurdly argue that the Linux kernel is immaterialistic. But I note you're standing by all ten of your arguments as being more believable than not, and those four I've shown lead to this absurdity are certainly parts of that set of 10. So I think that suffices to show there's a problem here somewhere.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? — Bartricks

Well it's consistent with this:

By all means prove me wrong, — Bartricks

...but I think my problem here goes a bit deeper. You're entirely correct... not having an explanation for how the immaterial interacts with the material isn't proof that the mind isn't material. But if you're going to advance the burden "prove I'm wrong" on the material theory of mind, you should be held to the same standard in your proofs of its immateriality. By that light, we have this:

Argument 1: That our minds have no color, smell, texture, or taste is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 2: That our minds have particular properties of thought is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 3: That our minds are indubitable is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 9: That our minds can be imagined without bodies is evidence that our minds are immaterial.

...versus this:

Argument A: That our minds react to physical entities through our senses is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument B: That our minds can cause physical actions to occur is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument C: That chemical interactions with the brain appear to modulate mental states is evidence that our minds are material

...then the second set looks a bit better than the former set, unless we build some straw version of materialism where the Linux kernel, not having a weight, taste, or color, is immaterial (or any of other variants applied to args 2, 3, 4).

The reason you need an explanation for how the immaterial mind interacts with the material is because the entire first set seems to be too easily dismissed. All of your arguments have the same issues; no materialist would have a problem with the mind not having a taste, for example, so it's hard to see these arguments as anything but a straw man. But we all agree that you shouldn't drive under the influence of sleeping pills, for some reason.

It's not that a lack of explanation here somehow proves you're wrong. It's that there's a lack of things seriously suggesting you're right. If a belief in the material mind requires valid justification, shouldn't a belief in the immaterial mind as well?

But he's not asking for evidence of interaction, he's asking 'how' it can happen, which is quite different. — Bartricks

Sure, but we're facing a claim that the mind is immaterial. And we know of multiple kinds of interactions between the physical and the mind... it's not just that I can lift my arm; I can also see things based on the light entering my eyes; not to mention the modulation of mental states by drugs. It's enough in the face of a claim of immateriality to ask what it even means to claim that the mind is immaterial in the first place.

To be capable of understanding the answer you'd first have to be recognize why that's a confused question to ask. — Bartricks

What's confused about it? I somehow decide to raise my arm, then I act of my volition to raise it. Then, the arm moves. The arm is definitely material. If the decision and will are mind, and the mind is immaterial, then the immaterial would be affecting the material.

You're parachuting this word 'abstract' in - what do you mean? — Bartricks

But this is thread is not about abstract objects. — Bartricks

It is about whether the mind is a material object or an immaterial one. — Bartricks

Stop the presses. Back up. We have three kinds of objects that have been described:

• abstract objects
• material objects
• immaterial objects

Per the above, the mind counts as an object. Material objects, like olives, have effects. Minds have effects. By extension of your arguing that minds are immaterial objects, immaterial objects have effects. But by proxy:

It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects. — Bartricks

I now completely reject your definition of an abstract object as special pleading. (You wouldn't accept an argument that the mind cannot be an immaterial object, because it is not an object because it has effects, I would imagine?)

There's a real problem here having to do with what you're arguing. And if you're genuinely concerned with category errors, you should be interested in exploring it. You have proposed a dichotomy... material objects versus immaterial objects. But all you're arguing is that the mind isn't what you classify as a sensible object.

How would you argue against the notion that a mind, whereas it can be imagined without having a body, can nevertheless not exist without a body?

I have presented 10 arguments - 10! - in support of the view that they are immaterial objects. Do you doubt the soundness of any of them? — Bartricks

Yes, but I'm only dealing with these four.

ETA:

Now a 'game' is not a thing, but an activity. I can imagine activities, though when I do so it is by means of imagining things engaged in the activities. — Bartricks

In Conway's Game of Life, the activity is performed on a grid. Each square in the grid is either "alive" or "dead"; those being just states. Those things are abstract; alive has no meaning except metaphorically. There are rules for how the game evolves, but there aren't any players that interact with it... it's just the rules. A live cell with exactly 2 or 3 neighbors is alive in the next step; a dead cell with exactly 3 neighbors is alive in the next step. Those "things", living and dead cells on a grid, are abstractions.

I frankly don't care if you call these "things" abstract objects or not, but your system of attaching arbitrary words to concepts is just a meaningless labeling exercise... the concepts are still there. It most definitely does not make sense to talk about what a living cell in GOL tastes like, or how much it weighs. But likewise, it's kind of meaningless to say that just because a living cell in GOL is not a sensible object, it must be an immaterial one.

No, I have literally no idea how to do that. — Bartricks

Can you imagine an abstract Game of Life, as in Conway's Game of Life?

Er, yes. Olives aren't abstract objects. It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects. — Bartricks

I think we have different conceptions of abstract objects then.

I suggest it is not an object at all, but a system - a network of relationships between things. — Bartricks

Can you name an abstract object? Is a number an abstract object?

ETA: 1 is prior to 2; 2 is prior to 3; 3 succeeds 2, 2 succeeds 1. So are numbers systems? Is there an example of an abstract object?

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object. — Bartricks

I have no idea what you mean by object then. An olive has effects.

As I understand it, the Linux kernal is a 'system', not an object (it will involve sensible objects, but isn't itself one anymore than, say, a 'friendship' is an object). — Bartricks

You could call it a system if you like, but I wouldn't call it one. The kernel is an abstraction; it's kind of an abstract object. In principle people with minds can "operate" the Linux kernel; abstractly, we could evaluate potential runs of the Linux kernel through a sort of mathematical framework, but in practice that's quite difficult to do, and the purpose of the thing is more in lines with running it on physical machines that implement the abstraction of computers.

But anyway, I take it you accept that the Linux kernal argument is sound? So, it does establish or provides prima facie evidence that it is not a sensible object, yes? — Bartricks

Sure. It's sound. But it also demonstrates something is a bit off with what is being argued. The fact that I can imagine the Linux kernel running on a completely abstract machine with no physicality doesn't really seem like it has any bite to it. It doesn't demonstrate, for example, that there can actually be such a running Linux kernel somewhere, nor does it demonstrate that a machine running the Linux kernel has another kind of "substance" in it.

Premise 2 in that argument is clearly false. It is true when you substitute 'our minds' for Linux kernal. — Bartricks

"Mind" and "Linux kernel" are two abstract objects-of-thought with referents, neither of which I can hold in my mind at a moment but both of which I can reason with. I see no reason to hold one premise without the other.

Again, this argument is clearly unsound in a way that it would not be if 'mind' were used instead. Premise 1 is obviously false. — Bartricks

You cannot imagine an abstract computer?

Confusing systems with things is a category error, akin to confusing friendship with a thing. — Bartricks

Perhaps confusing abstractions with substances is a category error.

No they couldn't. — Bartricks

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound the Linux kernel has.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object

Argument 2:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a the Linux kernel process-schedules like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it schedules).
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible object, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like.
3. Therefore, the Linux kernel is not a sensible object.

Argument 3:

1. If our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
2. Our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object

Argument 9:

1. My reason represents it to be possible for the Linux kernel to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing the Linux kernel not to be a sensible object

I'm not sure why this is even difficult. But, there it is. Given I have made the same argument about the Linux kernel, then by demonstration it can be made. Any real objections to this then?

Arguments 1, 2, 3, and 9 can equally apply to the Linux kernel.

(JIC you're having a problem with argument 2: It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like).

To my reckoning, the point of contention between us is the meaning/definition of a person. — TheMadFool

Your reckoning is wrong. Our disagreement should be about personal identity, not what the definition of a person is. This is the point of contention:

In the OP's gedanken experiment, the 3D printer produces a faithful copy of the original i.e. if I print Mr. X, what I'll get is another Mr. X. The two Mr. X's will be identical, mentally and physically. In other words the two are the same person. — TheMadFool

Somehow, you're counting two Mr. X's, but you're getting "the same" out of it.

as far as I can tell, having to do with mind and body while yours is rather "unorthodox", revolving around a "...causally interconnected network..." — TheMadFool

You do understand, TheMadFool, that it's patronizing to suggest that I, a native English speaker and an explicit example myself of what a person is, do not understand the meaning of the 531st most popular English word, right? If you disagree that my slicing your head into 50 pieces might make it a bit difficult for you to remember what name your mother gave you, then please make your point. Otherwise, let's drop this gaslighting act.

Secondly, what exactly do you mean by "reference" as opposed to definition. — TheMadFool

Reference is the act of referring. A definition traditionally is a statement that attempts to describe what you mean. A reference by contrast just points to what you mean.

I, for one, don't mind engaging in speculation every once in a while but your take on personhood runs so against the grain that it has the, fortunate or unfortunate, effect of sending us all back to square one, forcing us to start from scratch as it were. — TheMadFool

Square one is perfectly justified: you're counting two Mr. X's then immediately saying there's one of something. Two Mr. X's means there are two bodies; two heads and four feet; to dress them up fancy, I need two top hats, two suits, four socks, and two pairs of shoes (two cummerbunds, two pairs of cufflinks, etc).

But you said (essentially) there's one person. I note that you never actually gave your own definition of the 531st most popular word, but you did loosely say it had to do with bodies and minds. Well there's definitely more than one body here. And you're definitely saying there's just one person. So obviously you're not really serious about that "body" nonsense. So let's throw that away. You think there's one mind. Right?

So you tell me. You already have Mr. X 1 and Mr. X 2, with two distinct bodies, that you're claiming are one person. So apparently body count and mind count can differ, and despite saying the word "body" you really don't care how many there are. So let's talk about "Subject A", the smoker/non-smoker (the corpus callosotomy patient with AHS whose left hand tosses cigarettes her right hand is about to light). That is one body. How many minds do you think is there? And why?

What is a person? What defines a person? This, I believe, is where we should begin in order to resolve the problem that has you and me in its grips. — TheMadFool

I disagree. John defines water as a substance composed of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. Julius defines water as the fundamental element that is cold and wet. John and Julius's definitions are incompatible and wholly different, but they are talking about the same thing. They're talking about that stuff that comes out of your taps... that thing you find in lakes and rivers, that falls from the sky in drops a lot. John and Julius aren't starting with their definitions; they're starting with a reference. The definitions are where they wind up. This case is similar... we aren't starting with definitions, we're starting with a reference.

If we start with definitions, you're likely to say something consistent with state-identity, and I'm likely to say something consistent with instance-identity. Neither is really where we start... the definitions are where we wind up. So if you'd like to start at the beginning, I recommend starting with the reference. You and I agree that you and I are examples of different people. There's a particular fundamental reason why we do... that's what the principles I discussed describe.

You need to flesh that out for me. It's rather vague in its formulation and liable to be misunderstood especially considering the complexity of the matter at hand. — TheMadFool

Well let's look at an anomaly. This is sort of old news, so if you have heard it before pardons, but I'll present it as if you haven't.

Alien Hand Syndrome (AHS) is a common side effect of a corpus callosotomy, a last resort surgery where the corpus callosum (the bundle of nerves connecting your left and right brain hemispheres) is severed. AHS is a condition where some of one's limbs appear to have a "mind of their own". From the wiki article:

For example, one patient was observed putting a cigarette into her mouth with her intact, "controlled" hand (her right, dominant hand), following which her alien, non-dominant, left hand came up to grasp the cigarette, pull the cigarette out of her mouth, and toss it away before it could be lit by the controlled, dominant, right hand. — Alien hand syndrome

...and this can get extreme... here's Ramachandran recounting a case where one hemisphere is a believer and the other an atheist:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFJPtVRlI64

In comparison to these examples, I am of a singular mind, and you are of a singular mind, and our two minds are distinct in these kinds of ways. You don't experience AHS; your left hand isn't tossing cigarettes that your right hand is about to light, and you generally have singular sets of beliefs. Likewise, there is not a corpus callosum connecting our two brains. But each of us have two brain hemispheres which aren't even close to identical, in each connected with a corpus callosum. In contrast, these "two" subjects (the smoker/non-smoker, the atheist/believer) appear to be of two minds each, and we can blame this on the severing of the corpus callosum, which is a manifest example of a break in the appropriate form of causal interconnectedness. I would describe these subjects as being two persons each; the number of identities in their heads doubled as a result of the corpus callosotomy.

Up to the point when the copy is created, since both mind and body are identical, both the original and the copy are the same. — TheMadFool

This statement confuses me. I'm thinking at time T=1, there is A1. Then there's a copying process, and by time T=2, there is A2 and B2. "Up to the point when the copy is created" sounds exclusive, like it's describing T<=1. "The original and the copy" is inclusive, as if it describes T=2. Could you clarify?

Beyond that, because the expereiences of the original and the copy will differ - the physical environment and mental contents will vary - the two will not be the same person. — TheMadFool

This sounds a little clearer... T>=2. But it sounds like you're focused on states. So it goes something like, A2 is in state S2, and B2 is in state S2 as well. Then time passes, and by T=3 A2 evolved to A3 and B2 to B3. At that time, A3 is in state SA3 and B3 is in state SB3. So you're saying that since A2 and B2 are both in S2, then they are the same person; but at T=3, they diverge into SA3 and SB3, at which point they are a different person.

I think this is erroneous. Even if A2 and B2 are in the same state, they are nevertheless two instances of the state. A2 is simply one incarnation of the state S2, B2 is a distinct incarnation of S2. A2 and B2, being causally disconnected in the right way (neurally), are already two individuals; what happens to A2 is distinct from what happens to B2. The causally interconnected workings of a brain is what generates a singular personal identity; and here we have two distinct causal frameworks.

Think of it this way. We put A2 into a closed room, and you can observe A2, and his room. B2 we put into another closed room. Some evil genius guy is doing something with that room, who knows. Possibly, of all of the things this evil genius might do, one of them could very well be to perfectly simulate the room A2 is in, so much so that by T=3, B3's state would be the same as A3's state. That's something this evil genius guy just might do... it's so like him to toy with us like that. But who knows.

So now time plays on to T=3. There you are... you have seen A2 evolve to A3. You saw the room's states evolve. So here's the question... did our evil genius, in fact, perfectly simulate the room? And the obvious answer is, you haven't a clue. And frankly, neither does A3 have a clue. That A3 does not know if B3's in the same state is more significant than whether or not it happened that the evil genius did in fact perfectly simulate the room. This lack of knowledge ipso facto demonstrates that A3 is not the same person as B3; the causal disconnectedness that leads to this utter lack of knowledge is enough grounding to say A3 is a different person. I have the same lack of knowledge of what you are seeing that A3 has of what B3 saw.

An analogy might help: — TheMadFool

It doesn't. Again you're focused on state and not instances. The ball over here is a different ball than the ball over there, even if their molecules were exact translations of each other. If I did something to one ball, and the other ball was in the evil genius's room, I cannot conclude the state of the other ball based on the state of the one. They are distinct lumps of matter.

if I print Mr. X, what I'll get is another Mr. X. The two Mr. X's will be identical, mentally and physically. In other words the two are the same person. — TheMadFool

I disagree.

If you disagree, you need to be both clear and specific as to why? — TheMadFool

Clearly and specifically, the degree to which those bodies are identical is a red herring. Each body has a distinct point of view; one cannot see through the other's eyes and vice versa. Same with internal "senses"... there's no direct line between the two bodies' thoughts (though if we're talking arbitrary technology, there could be; but that tech is not in play... only the brains being identical is). If what one person sees triggers a thought, the only way the other one can know about it is through the typical communication route.

ETA: I've discussed the principles I'm applying here earlier in this thread; I believe they underline the core of personal identity. There are two principles correlating to two distinct processes; the one I'm applying to the bodies applies to the "approximate now"... roughly, the period of time where active perception operates. The second principle connects the identity to and defines "past selves" (aka identity through time); it's similar, but invokes memory-of-points-of-view instead of points of view.