No one thinks that just because you can say "the third ream of paper" that there were three. — Srap Tasmaner

True, and that’s the thing; we aren’t actually referring to individual papers. The expression does refer to something, though, and that something must be abstract.

Or, let's say, considering the purpose of this thread: I don't think that, and you have given me no reason to do so. — Srap Tasmaner

I believe that you only think that I have given you no reason, but that I have in fact given you more than one reason:

• We can (at least I can, and I hypothesize other minds can, too) be directly aware of abstract things. By contrast, we can only infer the existence of concrete stuff like physical beondes and thoughts of others.
  
• Only abstract universals can make it even meaningful to say that two or more particulars have something in common – namley an abstract universal.
  
• Only properties allow sentences containing common nouns to make sense.
  
• The very fact that we can ask whether there are abstract things needs abstractness, which is an abstract property.

Now, I’ll give you further reasons:

• Quantum mechanical experiments have shown that (supposed) particles apparently don’t obey the Principle of the Identity of Indescernibles. However, that principle can be easily shown with nothing but basic witcraft (logic). This shows that there are no individual particles in the first place, but only the respective abstract fields, e.g. electronhood and photonhood instead of individual electrons or photons.
  
• The laws of witcraft and mathematics are rock-solid compared to most other laws, yet they clearly aren’t about concrete stuff. For instance, you can’t change the fact that 5 is odd even one bit, no matter how great the might of your muscles or the smartness of your mind or the strength of your will. Hence, they must be about real, abstract entities, and these must be at least as real as conrete stuff.

Well, I do admit that I’m not (hopefully only yet?) wise, not even remotely, and so my thoughts are still full of vagueness, so it comes as not surprise that the meanings of the terms I use are also not always crystal clear. In fact, to make them so, I’d have to already be able to mentally “see” all of beonde (that which is, Seiendes) as well as beon (the "state/property/deed" of being, Sein) itself, not-beon itself, the orprinciple above beon and not-beon which is the well of all, as well as what lies beyond, even beyond beyondness itself, in a crystal clear fashion.

Here’s a challenge: Please prove to me – and I mean prove – that you have a mind, that @Srap Tasmaner also has a mind, and that those two minds are not the same. In particular, please show me that the texts I see on this forum have been written by real people with minds rather than a random number generator.

I have already almost given up on giving you two (or anyone else other than me for that matter) a proof that I have a mind, so if you do have minds (which I strongly believe), I concede that I likely can’t show you that I have one, too, though I myself am 100% sure that I have.


:confused:

It is always neither what blueness is nor not so. — Gary M Washburn

:brow:?

Well, I could be dreaming up all those other people with whom I talk, couldn’t I? Or, to be less radically solipsistic, how would anything change for me if the behaviors of others, including the sound-waves that they make, were exactly as they are with them having minds, but everyone other than me lacked a mind?

If you learn anything at all this can only mean you are not alone. You cannot change your mind about what words mean alone, — Gary M Washburn

How so? Can’t I think stuff over and that way both learn new things and change my mind on what words mean?

Let's suppose you're right, and there are Properties and concrete particulars are instances of them. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s actually not my position. I hold that there is no such thing as a concrete object, and that all things are abstract. The only beondes ("things" that are) which can be concrete are pieces of information. According to my view, the illusion of a concrete thing is generated by mixing up a piece of concrete information with an abstract object related to the information in a certain way. For instance, there is the property of wrenchhood, a certain possible state of the quantum fields associated with wrenchhood in a cerain way, and the proposition A that the quantum fields are in that state. These three are all abstract. If and only if the proposition A is true, there exists a belonging piece of concrete info. The illusion of a concrete wrench is actually a chimera of that info-piece and the associated abstract things, importantly wrenchhood.

Indeed, modern physics suggests to me more and more that the fundamental substances of reality are information and abstract things. And I also have philosophical arguments for the abstractness of all things.

When I ask you to hand me that instance of Wrenchhood, am I asking you to hand me Wrenchhod? No. Am I "talking about" Wrenchhood? I am using the concept of Wrenchhood, and relying on you to understand it, but talking about Wrenchhood is when you analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions of being an instance of Wrenchhood. (Or whatever you like there.) Asking for 'that wrench there' is not that. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, that’s a narrow definition of “talk about”. What I mean by “talk about x” is to use a word which means x. Okay, then, let’s from now on use “talk involving” or something like that to mean what I originally meant by “talk about” if you like.

Anyway, how can you use a word which refers to something which isn’t there?

As I understand it, when you ask me to hand over the wrench, you’re asking me to bring about a certain change in the state of the quantum fields and thus to make true an abstract proposition, thereby creating a piece of associated information. That proposition has a special relationship with wrenchhood.

When we talk, hypothetically, about an instance of a concept that has no instances, what is the thing we are talking about? There is no such thing, so we are talking about nothing. — Srap Tasmaner

If that were so, then the statement “There are no odd even numbers” would be as meaningless as “Tdfgde fgdgd kkdfk, asdefwsek, erere heolgmd dkske”, wouldn’t it?

But you would have it that if there are no instances of Wubblehood, then when we talk about wubbles we're actually talking about Wubblehood. But the absence of wubbles doesn't change talk about wubbles into talk about Wubblehood the concept. — Srap Tasmaner

That’s true. I hold that what “talk about wubbles” means always is talk about wubblehood, regardless of whether the latter has instances or not. However, if wubblehood has no instances, then it’s particularly clear that what is meant by “talk about wubbles” must in truth be talk about wubblehood.

In the last paragraph, I used “wubblehood” as a variable that varies over all properties, and that paragraph is implicitly all-quantified.

This argument for Platonism, from vacuous predicates and vacuous singular terms, is widely accepted, I'll grant you, but not by anyone who has learned the difference between use and mention. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually, I think that I’m pretty clear on the distinction between the two. For example, I’m aware that the sentence “The word ‘rightwiseness’ refers to a property” mentions the word 'rightwiseness', the sentence “Rightwiseness has douthhood and is a very weighty douth (virtue)” uses the word ‘rightwiseness’, and the sentence “The words ’rightwiseness’ and ‘justice’ mean the douth of rightwiseness” both mentions and uses the word ‘rightwiseness’, but only mentions the word ‘justice’. Yet I obviously accept the argument for platonism and have even put it forth.

At least with these examples we don't judge people from a totally different era and World with the morals of the present, but see just what values have existed from centuries, if not a milennium. — ssu

It’s true that most (though not all) ancients very likely had less to far less moral knowledge than most (though by far not all) moderners do, just as they had much less mathematical or astronomical or medical knowledge. Accodingly, a moderner who breaks moral law might have to be judged more harshly than an ancient who breaks moral law might, just as twenty-first yearhundred CE flat-earthery is more laughable than twenty-fifth century BCE flat-earthery is. However, the truth is the truth. Just as the Earth was round back then as it is now, genocide, ethno-supremacism, and misogynism were just as wrong back then as they are now – unless, of course, there is no real moral law. But in that case, it wouldn’t be meaningful to make any moral judgements at all, so let’s focus on the other case. True moral law (as opposed to useful norms) cannot have evolved or been made, for then it would be the outcome of whims of nature or living beings and so have nothing to do with real rightwiseness (justice) or unrightwiseness. Thus, the old ethno-supremacism of most Greeks and Romans (and many other people, of course) was just as bad and against objective moral law as modern ethno-supremacism. The same goes for the other vices, e.g. the misogynistic nature of much of Greek culture. Hence, those who have those bad properties ought to be condemned for having them, regardless of when they live. The same goes for douths (virtues). For instance, Rome and to a greater extent Greece have to be condemned for their ethno-supremacism, for instance, though it must be said that Rome appears to have been far less ethno-supremacist than Greece, see e.g.:

Roman citizenship expanded rapidly in the imperial period. In 212 C.E. or A.D. it was granted to all free people in the Empire. — Ciceronianus the White

... which doesn’t mean that it wasn’t ethno-supremacist. After all, it did view so-called “barbarians” as inferior, didn’t it?

For philosphy, ethno-supremacism and sexism are also particularly bad, for a person might be a brilliant thinker, yet be denied the chance to unfold their potential due to false and very base ethnic or gender prejudices.

Also, there were ancients who did recognize quite a few modern values, so the crimes and other misdeeds of the ancients can’t just be excused with ignorance, can it?

Furthermore, not knowing that lions are dangerous won’t save you from getting eaten by them if you wander to close to them, so why should moral ignorance be a major excuse for vice?

The degree of condemnation rests on how much a state of ignorance can excuse badness, if at all.

Still, it was the Cato the Elder that ended his speeches Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam. — ssu

Yes, I’m very much aware of that, and that’s why my specific (for the good things mentioned) praise of Cato the Younger certainly doesn’t extend to the Elder.

Unfortunately saying something positive about historical empires seems today as denying the negative sides. — ssu

If that is so, then I believe it shouldn’t be. Just as the merits of an empire do not lessen its demerits, so its demerits shouldn’t be a reason for covering up its merits.

If I don't take predicates as Properties that have independent existence, I don't have to take vacuous predicates as Properties that themselves have the Property of having no instances. — Srap Tasmaner

But I believe to have shown that you do. How else could we do that which we call “talking about even odd numbers”? There are no even odd numbers, and since one cannot talk about what doesn’t exist (Parmenides already realized that), what we talk about must be the real and existing property of being an even odd number, musn’t it?

Vacuous singular terms (Santa Claus, the Bermuda Triangle, the present king of France) aren't going to do it either. — Srap Tasmaner

Then how are these terms even meaningful? For example, how is it meaningful to say that there’s no present king of France? Only because the properties of being a humanoid, jolly, magical, wonderful, goodness-rewarding, ..., being who lives at the North Pole, of being a region with certain properties (...), and of being the present king of France, exist.

those [natural numbers and sets] actually do represent some kind of trouble for me — Srap Tasmaner

Even though one can be directly aware of them, unlike concrete stuff?

Well, it's been fun! — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah!

Does "cloudhood" include what forms in a cloud chamber? — Gary M Washburn

I don’t know for sure*, but I’d say yes; what takes shape in a cloud chamber has the property meant by the word “cloudhood”, but it also depends on what you mean by that word.

I suggest that rather than starting from such fuzzy concepts as that of cloudhood, it might be better, at least from a theoretical perspective, to start from quite clear concepts – that is, quite clear mental pointings at abstract things which can be easily “seen” with the mind’s eye, such a numbers, certain properties like numberhood, propertihood, and relationshiphood, and certain relationships such as the selfsameness-relation. We can then work ourselves forwards from there, but as philosophers, we shouldn’t forget to also work ourselves backwards to the unsayable unhypothetical orprinciple above being and not-being and even that very transcendence, which is the well of being itself, not-being itself, and all that is or is not.

if you arrogate all terms to your own, peculiar, understanding. — Gary M Washburn

The thing is that I don’t do this willingly; rather, it’s the only thing that I can do as far as I can tell. That’s because likely the only mind of which I am directly aware is my own. The existence of all other minds, including yours, is only my hypothesis. I can mentally point at the number 3 and then tell myself, “from now on, I’ll use the word ‘three’ to mean that thing over there”. However, I can only hypothesize that there is a mind m such that m interacts with a human body (especially its) and m has used said body to make a Philosophy Forum account called “Gary M Washburn” and m can see 3 just as I can and m also uses the word “three” to mean 3 and m and other minds take part in an interesting discussion along with me. A possible reason for my hypothesis that you mean 3 by “three” (not the actual reason, of course) would be that you point your finger at a group of three sheep, then three pine-cones, then at someone who shouts thrice, and each time say “three”.

*Of course, I think, though I likely don’t know, that I don’t know anything for sure.

More broadly, imperialism is by its very wist (nature, essence) very wrong and unrightwise (unjust) – in most cases –, for it involves one folk stealing another folk’s freedom and land. The mightier an empire, the more crimes it can commit... and the Roman Empire was very mighty. Still, empires differ from each other in goodness. For instance, while the Achaemenid Empire is guilty of stealing the land of other folks, its state religion of Zarathustrism was (and is) very athel, and e.g. the Cyrus Cylinder shows that the Achaemenids respected human rights.

But why did I only say that imperialism is wrong in most cases? Well, because in some cases, imperialism is legitimate, perhaps most importantly in the following case: If a country has possession over a treasure of great importance to humanity or the planet as a whole, but it has a base and short-sighted goverment which lacks moral principles and threatens to harm or even destroy the great treasure in question, it is the right and the duty of rightwise countries to get the treasure-possessing country to protect the treasure, first by diplomatic, political, and economic means. However, if the country with the bad government obstinately refuses to protect the treasure, the righteous states can and should rightfully conquer the violating country and take over the treasure to keep it safe. But wouldn’t they thus steal the treasure? No, for such a great treasure never was the property of an individual country in the first place.

Another important thing is that there aren’t simply “the Romans”, but different individuals with different merits and demerits among them. For instance, Caesar was very good at genocide, e.g. when he almost annihilated the Eburones, destroyed their houses, and drove away their cattle, or when he murdered up to 200,000 of the Tencteri and Usipetes including women and children even though they wanted a truce. Contrast this with Cato the Younger’s conduct, who had the moral integrity to realize that Caesar was the true culprit and should be delivered to the tribes to purge away the violation of truce. Just as the Roman Caesar is to be condemned for his atrocities, so the Roman Cato is to be praised for his insight into who the true evil-doer was and for his fighting for democracy against the dictatorship of Caesar. From what has been said, it should be clear that Gaius Cassius Longinus and Marcus Iunius Brutus actually did the world a good service, and that what is usually called “brutal” should much more accurately be called “Caesarian”.

Yet in the end, the good deeds and the misdeeds of its citizens are also those of the Roman state if it did not cleanse itself of them in the case of the misdeeds. For example, if Cato’s good advice had been followed and the criminal handed over to the tribes, his crimes would have been his alone, but as things have happened, the crimes of Caesar are the crimes of Rome just as much as the good deeds of some Roman citizens, like Roman Stoics’ realizing that slavery is against natural law (though they unfortunately didn’t reject it altogether), are merits of Rome.

It is important to see both the merits and the demerits of an entity, be it an individual, a state, or an institution, and to realize that merits are merits and demerits are demerits. Ciceronianus the White brought up some good aspects of Rome, as have I, and these aspects should be honored as such. Likewise, however, the many demerits, misdeeds, and crimes of Rome are what they are and should thus be recognized and condemned as such. For instance, good things like the presumption of innocence and the right to confront your accuser in Roman law, which Ciceronianus the White mentioned, should be lauded for what they are. Likewise, bad things such as Roman law’s acceptance of slavery should be condemned for what they are.

Rome’s merits are its merits, but that doesn’t change the fact that Rome committed many, many crimes, including massive genocide, depraved debauchery, and treading on human wirthe. Some of these crimes I have listed above.

Regarding the good achievements of Roman culture, we shouldn’t forget that were it not for Roman invasion and destruction, other cultures, such as those of Carthage and Gaul, might have had similar achievements, as is insightfully talked about e.g. here (see the quotation of historian Philip Matyszak).

From the beginning I've said that translating everything I say or anyone else says into Platonish proves nothing at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I agree with you. However, I haven’t just shown that we can translate everything into Platonish; I’ve shown that we must do so, for example here:

Odd even numbers [...] no instances. — Tristan L

Since odd even numbers don’t exist, and what doesn’t exist can’t have properties, such as being thought about or being divisible and indivisible by 2, we can’t mean odd even numbers when we appear to talk about them. Rather, what we mean must be the property of being an odd even number, which very much exists and is soothfast (real) and so can be thought and talked about. The sentence “Odd even numbers are divisible and indivisible by 2” cannot predicate divisibility and indivisibleness by 2 of something non-existent like odd even numbers, so it must instead say of the property of being an odd even number that is has the property of being a property p such that for all x, if x has p, then p is divisible and indivisible by 2.

So I believe that I have actually given compelling arguments for platonism, contrary to what you say here:

You provided no [...] of talking. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you have anything that might persuade me? — Srap Tasmaner

I hope that I have given it to you.

You to have no qualms about speaking for all of them, it seems. — Ciceronianus the White

Yes, my bad; I forgot a second “free” before “dwellers” to indicate that I mean those who are free from, among other things, being spellbound by the glamour of greatness.

As to slavery, for example, the jurist Ulpian maintained that everyone is born free according to natural law, regardless of the civil law; the jurist Florentinus stated that slavery is an institution against nature. — Ciceronianus the White

That is indeed good and admirable. Of course, it would have been better had they totally rejected slavery, but for the ancient world, their realizations are remarkable. In fact,

The ideal Roman douths (virtues) were also rather admirable, and if most Romans had actually had them and the other douths, Rome would likely have have been a good state — Tristan L

Regarding natural law, I don’t think (though I don’t know) that anyone has actual knowledge of it, though many claim to. For example, Ulpian and Florentinus believed that all men (used gender-neutrally) are free according to natural law, but Aristotle held that some people are slaves by nature. Now I strongly believe that the two Romans are right and the Greek is wrong, but can we prove it? Can we even prove that natural law exists? I firmly believe that it does, but I also think that almost everyone only has opinions about it. My opinion on slavery is clear. Maybe all those opinions are just due to natural or nurtural properties of the brain, such as natural selection favoring certain social behavior, which thus leads to the evolution of a “moral drive” that encourages such behavior. In that case, let’s hope that what’s evolutionarily beneficial is in accordance with objective moral law (if the latter exists).

deaths of gladiators have been wildly exaggerated [...] by Hollywood and other manufacturers of titillating fantasies enjoyed by too many. — Ciceronianus the White

There possibly is quite a bit of exaggeration on their part, but I’m not drawing on them as my source. Rather, take e.g. Seneca's seventh letter to Lucilius, in which he describes brutal and murderous games.

we don't have much basis on which to condemn them, given that there are many of us who it seems enjoy seeing others beaten senseless in ultimate fighting and cage matches, or concussed to the point of disability or death in American football and other modern "sports." — Ciceronianus the White

I certainly do not enjoy such modern sports, and I condemn both the modern and ancient (though the moderner should be wiser, of course, which quite a few sadly aren’t). However, we should keep in mind that modern fighters aren’t forced to fight, whereas most gladiators were forced to do so. In that respect, as well in that death was officially acceptable back then but not today, the ancient is to be condemned much more severely. The basic base love of violence is likely similar, however.

Then of course there's the peculiarly Spanish ritualistic and ceremonial torture and killing of bulls. Until fairly recently, bear-baiting had its fans. Dog fights are popular among some. — Ciceronianus the White

I fully and totally forewyrd; such blood-“sports” are truly barbaric.

Seneca, of course, wasn't the only ancient Romans who loathed gladiatorial contests. Marcus Aurelius hated them as well. — Ciceronianus the White

Did they really hate them per se, or just the overly bloody ones? Either way, though, it is an improvement.

I have no idea what is meant by them. — Ciceronianus the White

The One is the orprinciple (German: Ɂurprinzip) of oneness which gives each thing oneness and thus makes its being possible. Since the One wouldn’t be truly one if it had being – for then it would be one and a being – it must be beyond being. After all, it’s the source of being itself. As for the Godhead, it is a level of the godly above (the Christian) God. It is impersonal, beyond being a mere creator, and lacks all properties. Like the One, it is fully beyond. That’s a short summary of my understanding of the matter.

You seem [...] and sway. — Ciceronianus the White

Of course the Roman Empire contained many folks, not just ethnic Romans from Rome, and many of these were Roman citizens. Yet they weren’t truly Romans. An Egyptian need not always remain just that, true; if he (used gender-neutrally) becomes fully romanized, speaks mostly Latin, and sees himself as mainly a Roman, then I would regard him as Roman, yes. But citizenship is too little. The same goes for the Mongol Empire: If a Tatar becomes fully integrated into Mongol society and he sees himself and is seen as nothing but a Mongol, he is basically a Mongol, yes. But just being under Mongolian rule doesn’t make you Mongolian.

As Rome wasn't alone and didn't just face "barbaric" tribes and the celts in the north, it would be interesting to learn how much the Persian Empire (Sassanid Empire etc.) of the same age left it's mark on the later era. — ssu

Yes, exactly. The Iranian religion of Zarathustrism likely influenced Christianity in weighty ways, and the latter would go on to take over as Western Eurasia’s ruling religion. That’s one way in which Iran has influenced the “Western” world.

There are also other countries which the “West” has much to thank for, such as Egygt for inventing the hieroglyphs, from which most European alphabets are ultimately drawn, including the Greek one, the Latin one, and the Fūþark, the Phoenicians for inventing alphabetic writing and perhaps also philosophy (for Thales of Miletus may have been a Phoenician), and Mesopotamia for inventing writing and many other things, such as law codes. Also, let’s not forget the great Arab and other Islamic thinkers, scientists, and mathematicians like Omar Khayyam and Al-Khwarizmi, who greatly contributed to the modern world with their fruits of the mind (such as the discovery of algebra), or the Indians, who discovered the number zero, or the Chinese, who invented paper, the compass, gunpowder, and printing.

Unfortunately the Mongols devastated the area of modern Iran and Iraq later — ssu

Yes, what a shame!

Later Chinese culture and society obviously got similar influence from the age of Antiquity. — ssu

Yes, and ancient China has also influenced the western regions to a great extent.

That’s mainly true, of course, and I have never disputed it. However, Atawulf did actually want to erase the Roman Empire at first if his declaration is true, didn’t he?

I see. The difference is that you know more about cloudhood than meteorologists do, even if they know more about clouds than you do. — Srap Tasmaner

Not really, I think. According to my understanding, meteorologists mostly know more about cloudhood than the platonic philosopher does, but what sets him or her apart from them is that he/she is aware of cloudhood as a Shape, whereas they are not (at least nor consciously). Take Wikipedia’s definition, for example: “[A] cloud is an aerosol consisting of a visible mass of minute liquid droplets, frozen crystals, or other particles suspended in the atmosphere of a planetary body or similar space.” This is more properly formulated as “Cloudhood is the property of being an aerosol consisting of a visible mass of minute liquid droplets, frozen crystals, or other particles suspended in the atmosphere of a planetary body or similar space.” So the meteorologists are actually talking about cloudhood, not individual clouds.

Odd even numbers don’t exist, right? Well, then, how can we be talking about something not-existing right now? How can something non-existent have the property of being talked about? The aswer seems to be that these questions are loaded. In reality, we aren’t talking about odd even numbers at all. We’re talking about the property of being an odd even number, and that property exists, so there’s nothing unusual about it being talked about. The sentence “Odd even numbers don’t exist” is a rather clumsy and misleading (leading to the paradox just discussed) way of saying that the property of being and odd even number has no instances.

If meteorologists discovered that cloud formation actually occurs in a way quite different from what they thought, that in a sense clouds aren't quite the sort of thing we thought they were, would your knowledge of cloudhood also change? Would you need to know they had made this discovery for your knowledge to change? — Srap Tasmaner

I don’t claim to have much knowledge of cloudhood. The meteorologists know much more about it than I do, so if they found out that it is something different from what they and I thought, I will naturally follow them.

What if the discovery was that several sorts of things previously just called "clouds" were actually very different, so that the world "cloud" was now considered old-fashioned and misleading by meteorologists? What then? — Srap Tasmaner

That’s a good point. I’d say that in that case, there are two options:
1. Many of the things regarded as clouds before turned out not to have cloudhood after all.
2. Cloudhood is not a very natural property for things to have. All the things traditionally thought of as having cloudhood do actually have cloudhood, but they’re so different that sharing cloudhood is not a very important shared feature. Perhaps there’s a particular, well-defined kind of naturalness involved, as is the case in taxonomy. For instance, it was found that the class Reptilia is paraphyletic, th.i. it contains exactly one forebear of all its other members, but not all that forebear’s descendents, because mammals and birds are descended from reptiles but aren’t reptiles themselves. Reptilia’s existence isn’t under threat, though; it’s only been found that it isn’t natural in the phylogenetic sense (phylogenetic naturalness = monophyly = the property of being a group of organisms with exactly one founding forebear and all of its descendents).

There’s one more thing: How is the meaning of the word “cloudhood” defined?

Is it chosen to mean the property given by Wikipedia? In that case, the Wikipedia-definition would be analytically true, and statements about individual cloud-candidates or the property of being a thing which people normally call ‘cloud’ would be synthetic. Also, the meaning of the word “cloudhood” would be trivial.

Or is the word “cloudhood” chosen to mean the property of which I think right now, a property which I predicate of those fluffy things in the sky? In that case, the Wikipedia-definition would be synthetic. Also, the meaning of the word “cloudhood” wouldn’t be trivial, and the fuzzier my mental pointing at the property in question is, the less trivial the meaning of “cloudhood” would be.

That’s at least how I see things, and I’m happy to hone it.

The fact remains that people were trying to reconstruct the Western empire long after it was gone, that there was quite some nostalgia for it during the centuries that came after its fall. — Olivier5

Yes, and it’s a deplorable fact showing a manifestation of the slavish element in many humans.

Another fact that was raised here is that none of the Goths who raided Rome wanted the end of the empire. They wanted to boss the empire, or sometimes to get gold out of it it, but not to destroy it. — Olivier5

Actually, Atawulf did originally try to erase the Roman Empire, but later found the task to hard for him to achieve.

its riches — Olivier5

... stolen from other folks.

its sciences — Olivier5

... which were mostly Egyptian, Babylonian, and Greek.

the pregnancy that this empire has had on people's minds even beyond its borders and beyond its time. — Olivier5

True, many people are easily awed by anything, no matter how bad (or good), so long as it is great.

"I doubt we of the West will ever get over the Roman Empire" doesn't mean "We of the West will never get over the Roman Empire." Nor does "I think you're being pedantic and fractious" mean "You are being pedantic and fractious." — Ciceronianus the White

To which someone might answer, “Those very distinctions are pedantic”. However, the witcrafta (flitecrafter, logician) would say that we do have to make fine distinctions even if they seem pedantic. They might say that, for instance, “There may be time-anomalies trapping people” means a weaker proposition than “The are time-anomalies trapping people”, and the proposition meant by “Some people, perhaps due to such time-anomalies or for some other reason, have missed quite a few developments because they dwell in the past and are awed by long-dead cultures” does not say of any particular individual that they do those things. The witcrafta would also point out, though, that a particular individual having the aforementioned qualities lets follow the proposition involving the existential quantification.

Coming back to the topic at hand, I have to set something right: Your doubt that we’ll ever get over the Roman Empire is reckoned right. That is so because we have already long gotten over it. We have universal human rights, environmentalism, animal-wellfare, wellfare-states, we fly to the Moon and send probes beyond the rim of the Solar System, and many have already realized that Rome set up a tyrrany. Among those who see that the end of the Western Roman Empire was a good thing are not only moderners, but also many-yearhundreds-old humanists like Beatus Rhenanus, who celebrates the wins of the Germanics over the Romans during the Great Migration, Ulrich von Hutten, and Hugo Grotius. Johann Gottfried Herder rightly realizes the ephemerality of imperialism, of which Roman imperialism is a prime example. The historical materialist Friedrich Engels correctly found slavery to be a dead-end, and that unlike the Romans, the soulishly healthly Germanics could make civilization young again. By the way, let’s not forget that the Roman historian Tacitus praised Germanic douth (virtue).

Who's this "we"? — Ciceronianus the White

The dwellers of the modern free Western Eurasia and their forebears and descendents.

Legal rights, you mean? In fact, Roman citizens had quite a few of what we'd now call legal rights. — Ciceronianus the White

Of course they had those. In fact, they are one reason why the Romans, those great administrators, were so successful. But that need not have anything to do with rightwiseness (justice), but only with rules that give a specific state (in this case the Roman Empire) an evolutionary boot (advantage). For example, the Mongol armies also had very effective discipline and laws, just as hornet colonies do. But does that make those slayers of millions of people and destroyers of Bagdad or those efficient killers of bees, respectively, rightwise?

I don’t mean legal rights that work for an individual state; rather, I mean laws that reflect objective moral law in respecting the wirthe (dignity) of all human beings (the only humans that lack it are those who have forfeited it by freely choosing to do very evil deeds).

As for animal rights, what animal rights do you maintain we have? — Ciceronianus the White

I'm sure you have heard of things like animal wellfare and laws forbidding doing cruelty to animals, hunting endangered species, or the like?

You must enjoy Hollywood movies. — Ciceronianus the White

Well, you’re actually right; it just depends on which movie. You see, they have a lot of very fine films and of course also many not so fine ones. You might want to read about something called gladiator fights, and the disgusted report that Seneca wrote about the brutality and perversion of gladiatorial games and the raw bloodthirst of the spectators.

I'm not very fond of mystics generally, nor of German mystics in particular, sorry. — Ciceronianus the White

Of couse you're entitled to your opinion. You need not apologize, for we’re living in free countries. However, it might interest you that the guy to whom the Western philosophical tradition is a series of footnotes according to Whitehead was basically a mystic; above his written Theory of Shapes is his unwritten Theory of Principles, and grounding that is not a doctrine, but an unsayable experience of the god Apollo as eche (eternal) andwardness (presence). This highest, deeply religious and unsayable level of Platonism was discovered by Christnia Schefer. I’ve written more about this matter here.

Also, note that you seemed to imply that we only have secular achievements over the Romans, and I believe I’ve shown you wrong if that is the case. Another point is this: With what can the Romans match the beyond-being of Plato’s One or the Godhead of Meister Eckhart?

Philo and Plotinus just for the hell of it (I speak of Rome and its Empire, which included quite a few different people, you know). — Ciceronianus the White

When last I looked, Philo was Jewish and Plotinus likely Egyptian. By your reasoning, it seems, all the peoples who lived under Mongol rule should be regarded as Mongols, making a big part of all Eurasians Mongols.

Cloudhood need not be added to the discussion, for the meteorologist has already brought it in when defining what a cloud is. The only difference between him or her and the philosopher is that the latter is highly aware of cloudhood itself whereas the former only has a diffuse and subconscious awareness of it (unless she or he is also a philosopher).

No states are morally legitimate; all any state ever has is its effective control over a territory. — Pfhorrest

:up:

I also believe that the state has no right to command me, and that I have no obligation whatsoever to obey the state. No man, no extraterrestrial, no daimon, and no god has authority over me. The only law that I want to follow is the beyondly absolute objective moral law. I am not subject to the slave-mentality that lets some people acknowledge fictitious authority gained by other people or institutions by not-legitimate means.

However, I don’t hold the state to be unlegitimate either. It’s simply not legitimate. States, as well as the human species as a whole, arose out of natural processes. It turned out that states work for humans, just as they work for ants and some other hymenopterans, and just as prides work for lions, for example. Just as there’s no objective moral authority of a lion over his lionesses, there’s no objective moral authority of a king or an emperor or a state in general over its inhabitants. After all, the very existence of almost every state in the world, I dare say, is based on not-moral events. For instance, most Western Eurasian (“European”) states from antiquity to modernity are Indo-European, yet the Indo-Europeans are invasive in Europe, so how can any of those states be legitimate?

Things just happen, and states are a part of the natural evolution of things just like everything else. Many of Earth’s living things, including humans, are predatory, that is, they eat other living things. Wouln’t that, a part of the basis of the whole human race, already be illegitimate?

Human states is just as legitimate or as illegitimate as wolf packs, ant colonies, volcanic eruptions, the Sun, black holes, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, or the number 6. Then why do many humans seem to have (or at least to have had for much of history) this tendency to ascribe to natural things like states fictitious “legitimacy”? Likely because of evolution. You can easily see that humans who have a tendency to obey and fulfill certain duties can form bigger and stronger groups than humans who don’t. That’s likely why this “obedience-gene” (it’s likely not a single gene, though) has been selected for by natural selection, giving us humans a sense of fictitious legitimacy. It’s exactly the same as with ants, who also have some sense that they must, have to, are obliged to, serve their queen. But objectively, there is no such obligation. It’s just an outcome of Darwinian evolution that gives the ants this feeling of a fictitious obligation.

Thankfully, I’ve been able to free myself of the evolutionarily-caused drive to obey and serve. Innerly, I do not bow to the state, and I do not even bow to the highest gods. However, I do generally obey many laws willingly because I think that they’re (maybe by chance or by good guessing on part of the lawmaker) in accordance with transcendent moral law (which I don’t claim to have knowledge of) or because I think that they’re useful. The latter is just like the fact that I willingly drink; not because I feel a moral obligation to do so, but because I want to go on living. Laws which I regard as wrong I don’t willingly obey, but I usually obey them nontheless because I don’t want to get punished, just as I don’t go into a forest infested with rabies because I don’t want to die a horrible death, not because I ascribe some “sovereignty” to the rabies-virus over the forest.

The drive of some humans to serve and obey may have been evolutionarily beneficial, but it is and remains a slavishness-inducing drive, and since I am free, I’ve gotten rid of it. I understand that almost all of those things that claim moral authority lack it in reality, and that sometimes, they are egregiously unmoral. An evil extraterrestrial might kidnap me and regard me as a slave, but that doesn’t mean that I actually am a slave. I only become a slave once I ascribe moral legitimacy to the alien’s claim and in my mind accept that I’m a slave. However, I’m well aware that the alien has no authority over me and no authority to make me a slave.

Unluckily, many people let themselves be enslaved, at least in the past, which allowed despots to rise to power and tyrannize the rest of a folk, and also allowed empires like the Roman Empire to grow by might because the citizens accepted the fictitious right that was only enforced by might.

Although no state is legitimate, there are some states that I like more than others, just as I like our Sun more than a hypothetical black hole that would gobble up the Earth, or like I like bees more than hornets. In particular, I forechoose a nation state which respects human rights over an empire that treads on them. I would happily follow (without any moral obligation, mind you) most laws in many modern civilized states, but I would only grudgingly follow the unrightwise (unjust) laws of an empire like the Roman one, and maybe even try to overthrow said empire and laws in the end. However, since I can live pretty well in human-rights-respecting nation-states, why should I seek to cut off the branch on which I sit?

Works like War of the Worlds nicely illustrate that all the supposed legitimacy of states would be revealed as null and void by an invasion by technologically superior extraterrestrials.

I do believe in an objective moral law, but I think that it is above nature, and that hardly anyone to no one has ever seen the true objective moral law, though many have claimed to have done so.

Another deprobable slavish aspect of many humans is that they are easily awed by great deeds, regardless of whether they are good or bad. For instance, many people over the ages have admired the Roman Empire even though it was evil in many respects. Why? Because it was great, just as Alexander of Macedon, Charles the Great, and Genghis Khan were great. Yet this trait is just as argr as the feeling of having a duty to obey something or someone who doesn’t have objective moral authority, such as an emperor. Both traits are also dangerous because they allow the illegitimate and ruthless to gain power even over the minds of the slaves and the awed, who can then help them physically oppress the free folks who remain. It is indeed an argr aspect of some humans (and perhaps many other sapient living things) that they might well worship such evil and perverse aliens as the Goa’uld or the Yautja as gods if they existed (which they thankfully hopefully don’t), as is portrayed in the movies.

This deplorable tendency to view the great with awe, regardless of whether it’s good or bad, is beautifully expressed as the end of the video which I’ve linked to above.

One great vice of the Romans and even more so the Greeks was their ethno-supremacism. They thought that they were better than every other folk on Earth, for which they used the word “barbarian” in a derogatory way. However, most of them knew neither that all humans are of equal worth except when it comes to moral goodness, nor that knowledge of human wirthe (dignity) and honoring it – in particular by realizing the fact that all humans are equal – is a part of moral goodness. So they were actually lower than other folks in so far they regarded themselves as better than them.

Both Greeks and Romans were slave-holder societies, which goes directly against absolute objective moral law. Compare this to the declaration of human rights on the Cyrus Cylinder. This shows us that olden Iran is much closer to modern “Western” civilization in this repsect than are ancient Greece or Rome. Therefore, the modern “West” shouldn’t regard the latter two as part of “Western” civilization, for their values were quite different from ours and in many ways monstrous.

Another way in which olden Iran is vastly superior to olden Greece and Rome is Zarathustrism, whose all-good god Ahura Mazda is a true god while the gods of the barbarian religions of Greece and Rome were little more than supercharged humans. Zarathustrism even urges us to care for the environment, and isn’t its heart maxim good thoughts, good words, good deeds truly wonderful and deeply ethical? Compare that to the serial rapist Zeus, for example.

Here, I’d mainly like to give a not-exhaustive list of crimes that the Romans and their evil Empire commited over the yearhundreds of their despotism:

• The Romans conquered all the other folks of Italy including Etruscans, Italics, Ligurians, and Celts. Furthermore, they stole so much Greek mythology and Hellenized Italy that not very much of old Italian culture remains. We have a rich body of Greek and of Norse mythology. Do we have anything comparable for the olden peoples of Italy?
  
• The Romans made peace with the Lusitanians only to perfidiously slaughter tens of thousands of them afterwards.
  
• The Romans massacred hundreds of thousands of Carthaginians and enslaved tens of thousands of them when they brutally destroyed the great Carthage. Showing mercy to women and children? Nada.
  
• The Romans thoroughly annihilated the blooming Greek city-state of Corinth, slaying most of the men and selling the women and children into slavery, and plundering all the art and hoards.
  
• The Romans under a certain Gaius Iulius Caesar massacred millions of Celts in the Gallic wars for the sake of conquest.
  
• As a result of this war and the ensuing romanization of the Gauls, much of Gaulish culture was destroyed. It’s really a shame that so much Italo-Celtic culture has been lost forever (or at least until we invent time-machines).
  
• The Romans mistreated and murdered the Gaulish hero Vercingetorix for trying to save his folk from Roman oppression.
  
• The Roman emperor Octavian (Augustus) launched unjustifiable wars of conquest into Germania. Thankfully, the heroic deeds of the Cherusci’s chieftain Arminius, most notably his full annihilation of three Roman legions under the command of Varus, but also his and his warriors’ stubborn withstanding of Rome’s follow-up expeditions, kept much of Germania free in the end.
  
• In the aftermath of the crushing defeat of Varus at the hands of the Germanics, the Romans led a campaign of “revenge” (which doesn’t make much sense since only a victim can take true revenge, not a perpetrator and criminal) against Arminius and his Germanic troops. Germanicus led many of those campaigns. In one instance, he and his troops broke upon the unsuspecting Germanic Marsi and murdered them including women, children, and old people. Where is the ar (honor) or moral integrity in such an abominable crime of genocide?
  
• During that campaign, the Romans under Germanicus destroyed the temple of the Theedish goddess Tamfana. So much for respecting other religions...
  
• In that campaign, Germanicus literally sought to “exterminate the whole folk”, meaning that he was bent on genocide. The likes of Hitler would be proud. As a sidenote, he was the father of Caligula.
  
• Tiberius and many other Roman emperors and other powerful Roman people were serial child rapists and serial rapists in general, sometimes even involving babies. But Tiberius’ perversion doesn’t stop there, for he was outright sadistic (in which respect he wasn’t alone among Roman emperors, either). Octavian likewise was a serial rapist and perhaps argr too (key-phrase: Aulus Hirtius), though the latter is no crime, but only debases him. If you want to know more about Roman sexual perversions, see e.g. https://historycollection.com/scandalous-love-lives-early-roman-emperors/3/ and https://io9.gizmodo.com/the-11-most-depraved-things-the-roman-emperors-ever-di-1479671517.
  
• The Romans enjoyed to egg people (gladiators) and animals on each other and watch them slaughter one another, sometimes even copulating while doing so.
  
• Roman law allowed slavery and regarded slaves as not being human beings, thereby going straight against the eche (eternal) beyondly (transcendent) absolute objective moral right and law.
  
• In the Jewish-Roman wars, the Romans murdered over a million Jews, including civilians. Why? Because the Jews heroically tried to get back their land, which the Romans had robbed them of, and their freedom. This time, Hitler himself would be very proud.
  
• The Romans oppressed the Jewish, the Christian, and the Gaulish religion. Thus, they were not tolerant.
  
• The Romans launched campaigns into Caledonia, meaning to exterminate the tribes living there and destroying or looting everything. Now Hitler’s getting envious. :wink:
  
• The Romans launched many other wars of conquest and enslaved many more folks.
  
• The Romans brutally mistreated the Goths although the latter were just refugees fleeing from the ferocious steppe warriors called Huns. For instance, the Romans forced the Goths to sell their children into slavery to get some meat – dog meat. This led to the death of Roman emperor Valens at the hands of the Goths and Alans under the hero Fritigern in the Battle of Adrianople – a just punishment for such terrible treatment of refugees.
  
• Out of xenophobia and racism, the Romans slaughtered thousands of allied Germanic soldiers and didn’t even spare their kin. This deed was also duly punished, namely by the (quite civilized!) Sack of Rome by Alaric I.
  
• The Roman general Aetius had his Hunnish troops exterminate most of the tribe of the Burgundians, including their king Gundahar.
  
• The Romans introduced worshipping their emperor, which is an instance of hybris that goes against the fact that only true gods might deserve worship.

Now how can you top that? (I just got a call from a guy who told me how to top at least some points. He called himself Tom...Tamj..Temj... I think Temudjin or something of the like.

Temudjin learns of the Roman perversions (sadism, gladiatorial fights).

Temudjin (raising his hands in despair): “How can Tengri let such monsters defile this good Earth?!” :wink:)

Now that I have laid out quite a few crimes committed by the Romans, but by no means all of them (the severs on which this forum is hosted have a big but finite storage capacity, you know :wink:), I must admit that not everything coming from Rome was bad. While Roman law was very unjust in some central respects, such as allowing slavery and not regarding slaves as human beings, it did have some good aspects, too, giving many people protection and order. The ideal Roman douths (virtues) were also rather admirable, and if most Romans had actually had them and the other douths, Rome would likely have have been a good state, rather than one of the evilest empires in history due to the crimes it commited. Also, the Romans abolished human sacrifice, though they themselves did sometimes sacrifice humans. Furthermore, they seem to have been somewhat less ethno-supremacist than the Greeks, I think. Another thing which the Romans have left us with is a lot of historical and ethnological texts. For example, we’d know less about the olden Germanics were it not for Tacitus’ Germania. In addition, the Romans were very good at construction, further developing concrete and domes. There may have been some other good achievements of the Romans, too. Finally, I think that some Roman philosophers such as Seneca had some truly admirable views. For instance, Seneca rightly saw that slaves are human beings just like everyone else and should thus be treated accordingly if I understand him right, and that everyone could end up a slave. He even said that all humans are slaves to higher powers. Now Seneca wasn’t perfect, but I find at least some of his views quite advanced and good.

But we shouldn’t get carried away by and only concentrate on these good aspects of an empire that had in its capital no Academy, no Al-Azhar University, no Madrasa, and no Bayt Al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom) for learning, but all the more amphitheatres like the Colosseum for bloody games.

I doubt we of the West will ever get over the Roman Empire. We've always looked back to it, and I think we always will. — Ciceronianus the White

Firstly, how can you speak for all “Westerners”?

Secondly, there is no such thing as “the West” other than the direction which the Earth is spinning away from, that is, there’s no such thing as “the Occident”. For example, Rome and Britain are traditionally counted as “Occidental”, whereas Iran, India, Arabia, and China are regarded as “Oriental”. However, Iran and India are ethno-linguistically and culturally much closer to Rome and Britain than to Arabia or China. This is seen e.g. in the Arab worshipping the ɂáalihata and the Chinese the shén where the Indian, the Roman, and the Englishman/-woman all worship the devā́n/deōs/t́īwanz and the Iranian and the Englishman worship the ahuras/ɂ́ansunz, and in the Arab calling that “ɂa7’” or “ŝaqíiq” which the Englishman/-woman calls “brother” and the Iranian “barâdar”, whereas the Chinese calls it “xiōngdì”.

Thirdly, yearning for the Roman Empire is indeed something you would likely do if you’re into things like slavery, war-crimes, murdering people en masse, making them slay each other, or almost any other kind of barbarism. In my next comment, I’ll give a long but still not at all exhaustive list of Roman crimes. Here, I want to focus mostly on broader aspects.

Let’s start with one of the two original questions:

What was, or rather, what is the Roman Empire? — Gus Lamarch

The Roman Empire was the state founded by the olden dwellers of Rome, which they created through unjustifiable wars of conquest and which they based on slavery. Yes, the Roman Empire was a slave society, in which human beings were totally dehumanized and not respected at all. It could become so powerful thanks to its strong military, with which it subjugated other previously free folks. So to answer the other original question:

what makes a concept of state legitimate so that it has influence over territories that it does not control — Gus Lamarch

No territory was truly Roman other than the city of Rome; everything else (with very few exceptions) was just robbed by the Romans from other peoples by force. Hence, the Roman Empire didn’t have legitimacy even in those territories in which it had brute power, let alone territories which its long arm couldn’t reach.

In the end, the thought that may arise in the mind is that we did not develop anything, nor did we build anything, we just destroyed a great civilization that was the world, and now we try to reconstruct it through the little pieces that remain... — Gus Lamarch

What?! We have developed modern medicine, human rights, calculus, the theory of evolution, modern technology, relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and fantasy and sci-fi ideas which the ancients couldn’t even dream of, to name just a few things. By contrast, what did the Romans develop? Ingenious war-machines, gladiatorial fights, ways to dehumanize, abuse and torture slaves, ways to exploit the environment and so destroy it, ways to conquer, subjugate and rule other nations, and many other bad things, but little science, mostly philosophy just taken over from the Greeks, and no mathematics.

Also, by ending the Roman Empire, we ended slavery.

But I think we can claim to have surpassed the ancients in some ways, at least, since the development of the sciences. Technologically, certainly. But those achievements are secular. — Ciceronianus the White

Just in some ways? Tell me one way in which we have not surpassed them by far (other than the one which I’m going to talk about soon). Did the Romans have human rights? Did they have animal rights? Didn’t their bloodthirsty masses love to watch humans and animals butcher each other? Did they care for the environment? Did they contribute to mathematics in any way?

No, they didn’t contribute to mathematics. Sorry, my bad – they did influence the development of maths, as is swuttled (explained) in the following text by mathematician Harro Heuser on page 645 of the second part Lehrbuch der Analysis Teil 2 of his classic textbook on mathematical analysis (the boldening and italics are mine):

When the Roman erne/earn (eagle) cast its shadow over the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, Greek thought began to wilt. The imperial clods of dirt took pride in, unlike the quirky “Greeklets”, doing the sciences only as far as bidden by immediate need (and that means not doing them at all). Cicero reports that among the Greeks, nothing was more renowned than mathematics, “but we have cared for this art only so far as it is handy in measuring and reckoning (calculating)” (Tusc. 1, 5). Thus, the Romans indeed only interfere once with the development of mathematics: through murdering Archimedes. In the year 47 BC, Caesar set the Egyptian fleet in the harbour of Alexandria alight; the fire spread to the city and annihilated the most important bookhouse in the ancient world. — Harro Heuser, translated from German into English by me, ᛏᚱᛁᛊᛏᚨᚾᚨᛁ᛫ᛚ

We certainly have long surpassed the Romans not only in science, technology, and art, but also and perhaps most weightily in ethics and morality. Regarding religious matters, which Roman can hold a candle to Theech (German) mystics like Meister Eckhart?

The only way that comes to my mind in which we haven’t yet surpassed the “ancients” is this: One group of ancients has stubbornly withstood being surpassed in the field of theoretical philosophy and mysticism. These are the Platonists, including the first Academy-leader Plato, and the last one Damascius. The latter is a truly awe-inspiring thinker of beyondliness, perhaps the greatest one so far in the history of the Western philosophical tradition.

Later empires, Spanish, French and British, imitated it — Ciceronianus the White

Yes, they did indeed, and they do not stand far behind Rome in criminality – sometimes maybe even exceeding it, perhaps like in the case of the Spanish conquests in the Americas which left millions dead. And for what? Out of lust for power and greed for wealth.

The Alaric sack of Rome is only some 40 years after a Christian emperor (Gratian) removed the victory statue and altar in the senate, and a mere 13 years after the cult of idols was forbidden. This is the thesis of Edward Gibbon, and I think he is right. Religious division and internecine hatreds between pagans and christians is what brought them down. — Olivier5

The Romans brought Alaric’s sack of Rome on themselves. How? Well, there were many Germanic soldiers in the Roman military. These soldiers actually helped Rome and kept it safe and stable. A prime example of a Germanic (Theedishman) who kept Rome from dying is the half-Vandal general Stilicho. However, out of xenophobia and racism that can only be called fascistic – indeed, fascism is fittingly named after the Roman fascis – and nazistic, the Romans murdered Stilicho and massacred thousands to tens of thousands of Germanic soldiers and their families – the very soldiers who had protected Rome. Of course, the survivors of this monstrous deed joined the heroic king Alaric the First (Ɂ́alar̀eik þ́ana F́ruman) and punished the Romans for their abominable crimes. And yet, their sack of Rome was quite civilized, showing the atheldom (nobleness) of the Goths and the other Germanic fighters.

So, for that matter, did the barbarian nations which took its place in the West, through Charlemagne to the rather absurdly named Holy Roman Empire. — Ciceronianus the White

It’s indeed absurd, and also deplorable, that the Germanic folks who replaced the Roman Empire with their free nations looked up to that evil Empire so much. But at least they, together with other folks like the Huns, and other factors, have brought down Rome and with it all the slavery, debasement, and huge-scale conquest. Just like Hannibal Barkas, Viriathus, Vercingetorix, Simon bar Kokhba, and many others, Arminius, Kniva, Fritigern, and Alraric are heroes who stood against the tyranny of Rome and helped in the end bring about the final fall of that unlegitimate state.

Also, those who are barbarians is the modern sense are none other than the Romans themselves, for they did not respect human wirthe (dignity) and, indeed, the wirthe of all living beings, had mostly rather base interests and motives (hunger for power, lust, and greed), and weren’t very intellectually-minded. They were a full-blooded warrior-folk, basically Huns living in cities. They were (for their time) materially sophisticated and advanced, but hygelily (intellectually) (mostly) rather poor, luxury-loving barbarians.

By the way, they were also barbarians in the ancient sense, for “barbarian” simply meant not-Greek.

Speaking of barbarians, the Greeks and Romans were pretty racist and came to use (brook) the word “barbarian” prejoratively for foreigners. But what were they really? Just like the Celts, the Germanics, the Persians, and many others, they were ultimately invasive barbarians from the Pontic-Caspian steppe who took over many regions, including Western Eurasia (a.k.a. “Europe”), and almost extinguished the (more) inborn speech and culture there.

Its success and lasting influence can be attributed to several things. Roads, an unmatched military for many years — Ciceronianus the White

Yes, the Romans were very fit evolutionarily speaking, and since nature knows no rightwiseness (justice) and the law of the jungle is the ultimate law, they were very successful not in spite of their ruthlessness, but because of it.

But I don't think the influence of a state beyond its borders is a question of legitimacy. Legitimacy maybe denied or disputed. Maybe the Latin word imperium best describes what creates it. Authority, or perceived authority, in the creation and imposition of standards governing various aspects of our lives. — Ciceronianus the White

I can say for certain (save for the ground skepticism that every philosopher should likely have) that the Roman Empire was not legitimate in any way at all. But what does the world care for legitimacy? Sadly, jungle law rules supreme, as is wonderfully expressed in this fable:

If you created those ideas, then how come you can’t change them at will? Can’t a creator do with his or her creations what he likes? Why can’t you make your supposed creation horsehood be such that you can blow horses away like dandelions? Why can’t you make the number 8 odd?

The idea of a horse is an abstract entity as it resides in my head. — Roy Davies

That can’t really be the case, for abstractness lets not-mentalness follow by definition: to be abstract is to be not-physical, not-mental, not-spatial, not-tidesome (non-temporal), and onefold (simple).

But I left off the first part of your point:

if there is no causal connection between Alice’s thinking and Bob’s thinking — Tristan L


You claim that there is a causal connection between them, and that this is because they are both causally connected to something, a proposition, that is "not-spatial, not-tidesome (not-temporal), not-physical, not-mindly, and onefold (simple)"?

If that's the case, I don't know what you mean by "causal". — Srap Tasmaner

What I mean is that Alice’s thinking does not directly or indirectly bring about Bob’s thinking or vice versa. So if there’s no abstract entity which both think about independently of each other, the two thoughts would have nothing in common, being created by two different minds independently of each other. Because of the lack of an efficient causal link, Bob cannot think about Alice’s thought or its contents. So on what ground can they be said to be thinking the same thing? On the ground that both independently of each other think about one and the same abstract proposition.

Question begging. — Srap Tasmaner

How is that question begging?

The very meaningfulness of the claim that (that there are no propositions) is a proposition, and of the claim that propertihood is a property, requires not just the existence of propositionhood, the particular propositions involved, and propertihood, but those very things themselves. It’s just that two clouds being clouds requires the existence of couldhood – it needs cloudhood itself, first the Shape’s wist (essence), and then its existence.

Actually, I’m trying to show you that abstract things exist only secondarily. Firstly, I’m trying to show you the abstract things themselves, as well as (abstract thing)-hood (itself an abstract entity). For instance, my statement that propertihood is a property is mainly there to draw people’s attention to propertihood itself and help them see it itself and the fact that it’s needed for the very meaningfulness of said statement.

When a platonist of my flavour says that for every property S, the is a Shape of S-ness, he (used gender-neutrally) doesn’t primarily mean what he says – namely claim the existence of some thing. S itself is basically the Shape of S-ness already. The very act of thinking or talking about S already presupposes S. His wording is only there to draw attention to S itself, to help folks become aware of S in and of itself. I find and feel that the existence of abstract things is so self-evident that it’s hard to show it, just like you probably can’t prove that the Law of Self-Identity holds true, yet just like the latter, it’s needed for this very talk to even make sense. The metaphors of my brand of platonism are there only to help folks become aware of the shapes. One of the things that I think the Parmenides is trying to do – and that’s just my take on the matter, for I’m no historian of philosophy who mainly seeks to judge what the historical Platonist Plato was trying to do – is tell the advanced platonist to get rid of the metaphors that helped him get into platonism when he was still a beginner.

The very fact that we’re having thoughts, which makes this discussion possible, is thanks in part to the Shape of Thought. To me, it looks like that is so basic a fact that we’re not automatically aware of it, just as many animals aren’t very self-aware (and I don’t even claim full self-awareness for myself, but that’s another matter).

See also this comment of mine. Regarding the chest-seeing metaphor there, the platonist’s metaphorical wording is like an exercise to stretch the upper part of your neck, which will allow you to see more of your chest and help you against forward head posture.

Yeah, it’s not a big deal after all.

Whatever you type, whether it is published or not, it's only a matter of time until we blow up modern civilization and you and whatever you've said will be lost forever. — Hippyhead

You’ve got a point, and even if that doesn’t happen, the heat-death is coming anyhow.

It’s just happened again: First, I wrote a new comment, and the counter accordingly went up by one to 118. However, then I added another comment, and the counter stayed at 118 although it should have gone up by one to 119. Then, I wrote a further comment, and the counter went up by one again as it should, namely to 119 (though it should have been 120 by then due to the missed comment before). Then, I wrote this comment.

Could someone please tell me what’s going on?

it is not clear to me that if Sally thinks it's going to rain then there is an object Sally thinks. — Srap Tasmaner


Isn’t it perfectly clear that the proposition that it’s going to rain is the object of Alice’s belief? — Tristan L

Now why did I turn Sally into Alice... :chin: I only just realized that I did.

If Bob is also thinking it's going to rain, we can say anaphorically that Bob is thinking the same thing as Alice — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly, and if there is no causal connection between Alice’s thinking and Bob’s thinking – e.g. because the two thought-events are separated by a space-like spacetime-interval (whether there is an absolute clock after all, for example one defined by instantaneous sending through quantum entanglement á la Antony Valentini (p. 4 last paragraph and note 8), is another matter) – with what right can we anaphorically say that Bob is thinking the same thing as Alice? Only by accepting that both are thinking about one and the same abstract entity, right?

thinking it's going to rain is a reason to take an umbrella. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, the truth of the (abstract) state-of-affairs that it’s going to rain brings about the truth of the state-of-affairs that one should take an umbrella. Note that the about-bringing-relation is abstract as well.

But what do you say to convince us that there are Propositions? That there are Relations? Where does Andrew M's way of talking or mine come up short? — Srap Tasmaner

Just like the very fact that I can ask whether I have awareness shows for certain that I have awareness, so the very fact that we can talk about the existence or not-existence of propositions proves that there are propositions. After all, that there are no propositions is a proposition, so for there to be no propositions, there has to be at least one proposition. The hypothetical non-existence of propositions would need it’s own negation and so beats itself. Have I now shown you that there are propositions?

Since propositions intrinsically mean states-of-affairs, the same goes for the latter (for convenience, I’ll often not distinguish between the two).

Propertyhood is a property. That there are no properties means that propertihood has no instances. So the very claim that there are no properties needs at least one property, namely propertihood, in order to even make sense. Have I now proven to you that there are properties?

There is an obvious one-to-one-correspondence between relationships and properties of tuples. Moreover, the selfsameness-relationship is needed by the Law of Self-Identity, without which thought, speech, being, and reality would all come crashing down. Have I now convinced you that there are relationships?

So by negating the existence of these abstract things, one pulls the meaning-giving ground out from under that very claim. Isn’t this where Aristotelianism and nominalism go wrong?

Now let the platonist give another proof of the realness of abstract entities and mount a counter-attack: I can directly “see” abstract things like the number 7, the property of numberhood, the exponential function, and the proposition that all things are abstract with “my mind’s eye” right now. But I cannot directly “see” anything concrete. Why, then, should I believe that there is anything concrete at all?

:up: I think that you might have the same general understanding of the matter as I. In short, mine goes like this: For every idea EID, EID itself exists as an abstract entity, and so can only be discovered. However, if someone S discovers EID by his or her own free will, he or she invents a piece of information belonging to a certain proposition about EID, which he or she thus causes to be true, namely the proposition that S thinks about EID at some point in his or her life.

Simply look up the word "idea" in the dictionary. — Luke

See here (1.), for instance. This gives you the original meaning of the word “idea” and its philosophical definition, and it’s therefore the one we’re interested in.

All of the above implies that my broken leg actually exists. My leg isn't broken! I don't have a broken leg that could exist anywhere. — Luke

I don’t know how much crystal clearer I can be in order to help you understand this very simple matter. The proposition that your leg is broken has actual existence, but it doesn’t have truth. Truth is not the same as existence. Has it become clear now?

"What we call existence isn't existence at all"? If you don't see a problem with this, then there's not much left to say. — Luke

There would not be much left to say indeed, but not here, but rather in the point before if you still can’t see the gaping difference between existence and truth.

Regarding this point, let’s look at another example. When we say “The number 3 exists in that room”, we mean that there is a group of three items, such as three humans, three balls, or three ants, in the room. What we mean, of course, in not really the existence of the number 3, but a particular way of manifesting in the room. The same goes for “existence on Earth”. For example, when we say “Such and such genome exists on Earth”, we mean that it manifests as a physically articulated sequence of physical base-pairs. But the genome itself obviously exists regardless of that – it’s an abstract string and therefore corresponds one-to-one with a natural number.

You seem to have suddenly changed your definition of the phrase “actual existence”... or did you really think that I was arguing for the manifestation of unicorns on Earth in flesh and blood?

No. Is a unicorn? Or a dinosaur? — Luke

No, they aren’t, either.

Merely possible existence is concrete and not abstract? — Luke

What I mean is that everything abstract exists actually, and the only stuff that could have merely possible existence is concrete.

What is abstract then? — Luke

Whatever is not-physical, not-mindly, not-spatial, not-tidesome (not-temporal), and onefold (simple).

ideas don't exist if nobody ever thinks of them. — Luke

I have repeatedly asked you to provide justification for that unsubstantiated claim, and you have repeatedly repeated it without giving any justification whatsoever.

Except you are arguing that if facts about x (or if the possibility of x) actually exists, then x actually exists. Therefore, how can you maintain any distinction between propositions and info-pieces, or between possible existence and actual existence? — Luke

Yes, if a fact about x actually exists (which it does), or if a false or undetermined proposition about x actually exists (which it also does), then x actually exists. I don’t see where the problem lies. I can perfectly maintain a distinction between info and propo. Can you?

By your logic, if my broken leg possibly exists, then my broken leg actually exists — Luke

No; “Luke’s broken leg” in not a technically right noun-phrase. On the other hand, “that Luke’s leg is broken” is a right name-phrase, and it refers to the proposition that Luke’s leg is broken. This proposition actually exists, though it is false. Its negation, the proposition that Luke’s leg isn’t broken, also exists, but is true. Aren’t you mixing truth up with actual existence again?

and if unicorns possibly exist, then unicorns actually exist. — Luke

Unlike “Luke’s broken leg” and like “that Luke’s leg is broken”, for all features F1, F2, F3, ... , “being a unicorn with features F1, F2, F3, ...” is a proper name phrase which means a property.

If the possibile existence of x implies the actual existence of x, then whatever possibly exists actually exists. — Luke

True, if “whatever” refers only to things. With info, things stand differently, but as I said before, I think that our minds aren’t very well suited for thinking about info, and in the very workings of our speech seems to be hidden the assumtion that we’re only talking about things.

However, not all propositions are true. Some are true, in which case the belonging info-piece actually exists; some are false, in which case the belonging info-piece doesn’t exist at all; and some are undetermined, in which case the belonging info-piece exists possibly, but not actually.

Given your affirmation that the possible existence of unicorns implies the actual existence of unicorns, then how can you also maintain that "no unicorns have yet (as of 2020) evolved on Earth" and "That’s what we mean when we say that unicorns don’t exist on Earth"? — Luke

Because the property of actual existence is something very different from the property of having evolved on Earth by 2020. Similarly, the actual existence of the number 2 is very different from the truth of the proposition that a certain die-throw reasulted in a 2. The sentence “That’s what we mean when we say that unicorns don’t exist on Earth” uses the word “exist” wrongly, for its means something very different from existence.

If unicorns don't exist on Earth, then they don't actually exist, right? — Luke

No, that’s not true at all. Unicorns themselves exist actually as abstract entities, but certain propositions involving them aren’t true, such as the proposition that unicorns have evolved on Earth by 2020. Therefore, your next sentence

And if they don't actually exist, then you can't affirm (without contradiction) that their actual existence is implied by their possible existence. — Luke

starts from a false premise.

Please tell me, if unicorns don't exist on Earth, then what type of existence do they lack if it is not actual existence? Alternatively (or additionally), what do you mean by "the actual existence of unicorns" if not that unicorns exist on Earth? — Luke

Unicorns don’t lack any kind of existence. What we call “existence on Earth” isn’t existence at all; rather, it’s the property of manifesting on Earth in flesh and blood. And as it happens, the proposition that unicorns have that property isn’t true. Like all things, unicorns have possible and actual existence as abstract objects. By “the actual existence of unicorns”, I mean the fact that unicorns are fully existent and just as actual as numbers, properties, functions, souls, and all the other actual beondes (which includes all things).

it is not clear to me that if Sally thinks it's going to rain then there is an object Sally thinks. — Srap Tasmaner

Isn’t it perfectly clear that the proposition that it’s going to rain is the object of Alice’s belief?

"Sally kicks Steve" is in fact strongly analogous to

"Sally thinks-that it's going to rain."
"Sally thinks-of buying a guitar."
"Sally thinks-about how much easier it used to be." — Srap Tasmaner

With the first one I agree, but with the second and the third ones, I don’t.

1. Why does "thinks" have to be part of a phrasal verb when "kicks" doesn't? Why isn't there a "kicks-that", a "kicks-of", or a "kicks-about"? — Srap Tasmaner

Because that’s how the English speech has evolved. There are different mental activities, such as believing, thinking-about, and thinking-about-and-planning, but since all these narrowkinds (species) of mental activity are narrowkinds of the same broadkind (genus), namely mindly activity, the same basic deedword is used to refer to them.

There may not be a “kicks-around”, but there is a “flies-over”, for example. In “The bird flies over the berg”, the berg is the object of the deed of overflying.

If I'm thinking about Steve, it seems I'm thinking about the object Steve; therefore, if I'm thinking about how much easier it used to be, I must be thinking about the object how much easier it used to be. How convincing is that "therefore"? — Srap Tasmaner

It really is very convincing. There is a three-slotted relationship called “being-easier-than-by-that-much”; for every thing x, every thing y, and every easierness-measuring quantity e, the sentence “x is easier than y by w” means the proposition that being-easier-than-by-that-much relates x, y, and e to each other. “How much easier it used to be” refers to the easierness-measuring quantity e for which it’s the case that being-easier-than-by-that-much relates the present state of the world, the past state of the world, and e to each other. It does this in the same way that “the ball that Alice kicked” refers to the ball b for which it’s the case that Alice kicked b.

when I think about Steve, am I doing the same sort of thing as when I think about how much easier it used to be? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you would be, because both are actually abstract. But you can’t really think about Steve unless you’re a thoughtcaster (telepath). Allow me to explain. Steve himself is a soul, and the only souls that can see souls other than themselves are thoughtcasters. Perhaps all disembodied souls are telepaths, but experience tells me that when a soul is embodied, it usually isn’t (I have yet to find a true thoughtcaster). When you apparently think about Steve, you’re actually thinking about the property (call it “Steveness”) of being a soul which inhabits a body such that this soul-body-combination sent such and such soundwaves into your ears and reflected such and such photons into your eyes to cause such and such sensations and ... . When you apparently believe that Steve has some property E, you actually believe the proposition that there is exactly one soul S such that S has Steveness and that for every soul S, if S has Steveness, then S has property E. Given that there really is exactly one soul that has Steveness, the only embodied soul that can see it is that soul itself (unless there are embodied telepaths). When your appear to kick Steve, you’re actually kicking a body which you hypothesize is inhabited by a soul. You can’t kick how much easier it used to be because easierness-measuring quantities don’t inhabit bodies. Something similar is true of other actions like marrying.

That’s at least my take on the matter.

In response to your comment, though, if EID is not itself a proposition contained within 'PossiblyExists(EID)', then what proposition does 'PossiblyExists(EID)' express? — Luke

The proposition that EID possibly exists, just as “PossiblyExists(6)” refers to the proposition that the rimetale 6 has possible existence, and as “PossiblyExists(Luke’s leg)” means the proposition that your leg has possible existence. Is your leg the same as the proposition that it exists?

Are you suggesting that actual existence does not belong in the "realm of info"? — Luke

Not at all. I hold that actual existence belongs into both the world of the abstract and the realm of the concrete, whereas merely possible existence only belongs in the latter.

They "simply are" now -- after they have happened or someone has thought them up. — Luke

That’s a contradiction. If something simply is, it just is, without having to merely be-at or be-in or be-after.

Many ideas are possible, and many may go without being thought up (actualised), just as many physical arrangements are possible and many may go without being actualised. You expect me to believe that all possible ideas and physical arrangements are already actual even though many may never be actualised? — Luke

Yes. However, mind you that you’re conflating two things here by your use of the words “actual” and “actualized”. All those ideas are actual, yes. Of course they are! However, what you mean by “actualize” isn’t really actualization of the thing of which you predicate actualization; after all, what’s actual cannot be actualized. Rather, for every idea EID, you likely mean by “EID is actualized” the proposition IsThoughtAbout(EID) that the proposition that someone thinks about EID at some time is true. This truth constitutes the actualization not of EID, though, but of the info-piece belonging to the proposition IsThoughtAbout(EID). Likewise, for every physical arrangement PhAr, you probably mean by “PhAr is actualized” the proposition that the proposition that the Universe takes on arrangement PhAr at some time is true. In truth, this truth constitutes the actualization of the info-piece corresponding to that proposition. It may very well be that you aren’t fully aware of the ideas or the states themselves, leading to your misunderstanding.

I'm sure many people have survived life without breaking a leg. — Luke

Can you still not see the difference between a proposition and a belonging info-piece? For every person, the proposition that that person breaks a leg always exists. However, not for every person does the corresponding proposition ever become true (and in such a case, it becomes false when the person dies).

By your logic, the possibility that all possibilities will not be actualised is itself actual (and therefore, all possibilities will not be actualised). But the possibility that all possibilities will be actualised is also actual (and therefore, all possibilities will be actualised). Just like the actual existence and non-existence of unicorns, how can both be true? — Luke

And... the misunderstanding goes on... :roll:

Your use of the word “actualize” is unaccurate, see above.

Here, it’s very obvious that you conflate propositions with info-pieces.

the possibility that all possibilities will not be actualised is itself actual (and therefore, all possibilities will not be actualised). — Luke

That’s wrong. If it’s actual that some proposition A might be the case (th.i. if we have TRUE(MAYBE(A))), it doesn’t automatically follow at all that A is actually the case (th.i. TRUE(A) doesn’t follow). You incorrectly inferred TRUE(A) from TRUE(MAYBE(A)). When I say that some possibility is actual, I mean that it’s actual that the thing in question is possible. It isn’t essential that the proposition MAYBE(A) has truth-value T. What counts is that MAYBE(A) is an actually existing entity, which it is regardless of whether it has truth-value T, F, or U. However, that it has truth-value T shows in a particularly convincing way that it actually exists.

What you call “the possibility that all possibilities will not be actualised” is the propposition that no proposition is true, and while it actually exists, it’s not only not true, but outright false. You’re confusing actual existence with truth. This confusion underlies the rest of what you said and leads you to absurd and contradictory conclusions.

When I say "actual idea", I mean an idea that someone has actually thought about or thought up (invented). — Luke

Does the same apply to what you mean my “actual rimetale”? If yes, does that mean that you regard all the endlessly many numbers which no one has (yet) thought about as merely possible and not actual?

If that’s what you mean by “actual”, then it’s something quite different from what I mean by “actual”. What is abstract is at least as actual as the concrete, using my meaning of “actual”.

But also something that is transferrable and that anyone (any mind) can think of/about. For example, E=mc^2. — Luke

But the fact about the physical realm expressed by “E = mc2” has always existed, regardless of whether anyone would ever think of it. Also, how can Alice independently of Bob think about something that Bob invented?

What you mean by an actual idea seems to be particular to one mind at a given time, and so indistinguishable from an actual thought. — Luke

No; since I’ve shown that all ideas are actual, what I mean by “actual idea” is the same as what I mean by “idea”. I’m just trying to find out what exactly you mean by “actual idea”. It seems to be a chimera of information and (abstract) things. Some pieces of info are indeed particular to one mind at a given time, such as the info belonging to the proposition that Tristan thinks about the rimetale 2 in 2020 CE. Other pieces of info are not, however, such as the piece of info belonging to the proposition that for some time-point t and some mind m, m thinks about 2 at t. What you mean by “actual idea” seems to mostly be an info-piece of the latter kind.

I'm sure if I broke my leg it wouldn't be so fuzzy or meaningless. — Luke

As am I. However, I haven’t said that the notion of concrete beonde is meaningless, but rather only that the notion of concrete thing is meaningless. The notion of concrete information, on the other hand, is very meaningful, though still hard to grasp. If you broke your leg, the easiest way to think about it is in fully abstract terms: The proposition that you break your leg now is true now.

I'm not doubting. I'm noting the widely accepted fact that dinosaurs (or sauropods if you prefer) are extinct and no longer actually exist. — Luke

Firstly: So you do doubt the actual existence of sauropods after all.

Secondly: You must be severely misinformed if you think that dinosaurs are extinct in 2020, or that this false proposition is widely accepted.

Thirdly: Do you really think that sauropods don’t exist in 2020? Do you really think that Arminius doesn’t exist in 2020? I’m afraid that if you do, you subscribe to an absurd belief. Since facts about sauropods and Arminius exist in 2020, so must sauropods and Arminius themselves. The matter is quite simple: Saurpods and Arminius simply and always exist. Sauropods live from about 215 mya to about 66 mya, while they don’t live from 13.7 bya to 215 mya, and they also don’t live from 66 mya to 0 mya. Likewise, Arminius lives from 18 BCE to 21 CE, while he doesn’t live from 13,700,000,000 BCE to 18 BCE, and he also doesn’t live from 21 CE to 2020 CE.

They don't "go" extinct at some point. They are extinct. — Luke

They are extinct in 2020 CE, and they aren’t extinct in 100,000,000 BCE. That they go extinct 66,000,000 BCE means that before 66,000,000 BCE, they aren’t extinct, and afterwards, they are.

I'm not talking about dinosaur-hood or sauropod-hood. That's something you've introduced. — Luke

Actually, you’ve introduced them. The moment that you even think about dinosaurs or sauropods (which you clearly did), you introduce dinosaurhood and sauropodhood, though you may be (and apparently are) not aware of it.

Shown? Where have you shown that the possible existence of unicorns lets their actual existence follow? — Luke

Here:

For one, unicornhood certainly exists. In fact, it must exist so that the very proposition that unicorns don’t exist even makes sense.

Moreover, each individual unicorn actually exists in the sense that the property of being a unicorn with a rainbow-colored horn and through-seeable wings exists, the property of being a unicorn with a 1-metre-long horn and a scorpion-tail exists, asf. — Tristan L

I could have used a property other than PossIsThoughtAbout, such as [...] the property PossiblyExists of possibly existing. — Tristan L

Let me elaborate on the latter point further: Let OH be an arbitrary unicorn. OH possibly exists. That very fact MaybeExists(OH) that OH may exist actually exists (the same goes for its negation, the state-of-affairs that OH certainly doesn’t exist). Obviously, MaybeExists(OH) is essentially connected to OH, so this link is actual. Since MaybeExists(OH) and the link between MaybeExists(OH) and OH is actual, OH must be actual, too. This doesn’t just work for unicorns, but for all possibly existing things, and shows all of them to be actual. The same goes for NOT(MaybeExists(OH)).

Regarding unicornhood, it must actually exist in order for the proposition that unicorns exist, as well as the proposition that unicorns don’t exist, to even make actual sense.

I'm not disputing that facts about x exists. I'm disputing your assertion that facts about x exists implies that x exists. — Luke

How can you dispute such a fundamental and obvious fact? Since the fact exists, and the connection between the fact and a thing which the fact is concerned with exists by the very wist of the fact, the thing must also exist.

I doubt it. Ask most folks and I'm sure they will tell you that dinosaurs (or sauropods if you prefer) don't exist, unlike the "info-piece". — Luke

Firstly, those people who tell you that dinosaurs are extinct in 2020 might want to have a biologist or paleontologist correct their false opinion. Secondly, most of us aren’t highly aware of what we mean when we say things, and in everyday life, we very often use technically wrong speech. I myself am no exception, and in a paleontology forum, for example, I’d have no reservation about saying, “It’s a shame that T. rex no longer exists” even though the statement that this magnificent animal no longer exists is technically fully false.

I noted the apparent contradiction in your statements that unicorns both do and do not actually exist. — Luke

The problem is that you seem to obstinately refuse to understand the quite simple matter of distinguishing unicorns themselves from pieces of information involving them. Let me try to help you understand it better: The number 5 always actually exists, but when a die is thrown and shows a 5 on its upper face, the piece of info belonging to the (also eternal, abstract, and actual) proposition that the die-throw would result in 5 being shown comes into being, which is equivalent to the proposition becoming true. On the other hand, if 5 doesn’t show up on the die, the piece of info loses the possible existence that it originally had, which is equivalent to the proposition becoming false. Yet even then, the number 5 goes on to happily and actually exist. Has the matter now gotten a bit clearer to you?

I suppose by Clavius' Law, you could deduce that if black is white, then white is black, therefore white is black. — Luke

That argument is indeed valid, but it is not sound, because the premise is false. Why are you still talking about Clavius’ Law? I only brought it up to explain a trivial logical matter to you which you seemingly didn’t (and still don’t?) understand.

And btw how do you explain your contradictory statements that unicorns both do and do not actually exist? — Luke

The supposed contradiction is not mine, but yours, and results from your failing to distinguish two quite distinct “things”, making you misinterpret me. See above.

In fact, you've stated that unicorns both do and do not actually exist. — Luke

I’ve really understood that you don’t understand what I mean, believe me. How many more times do you mean to show your failure to see my meaning?

Clear as mud. — Luke

Although what one has shown may be brightly seen and crystal clear,
it’s useless if the other did his eyes with mud besmear...

That’s really an interesting idea. When I first learned of the Pythagorean saying All is Rimetale (Number) as a child, I was spellbound by it at once. Even before that, I was sure of the soothness (realness) of numbers and other mathematical things. Of course, my philosophy has greatly evolved since then.

I like your basic idea, as you can likely see from what I said in the discussion about the not-inventableness of ideas, such as:

I think that things stand as follows: All things are abstract and therefore eche and uncreatable, but information can be created (though not destroyed). — Tristan L

There is no such thing as a merely possible thing. All things are eternal, abstract, actual, and soothfast. — Tristan L

and maybe this comment of mine.

However, I do find issues with some of your points:

The second of the usual two positions is called nominalism, which holds that [...]. I am much more amenable to that position generally — Pfhorrest

I, on the other hand, am strongly against nominalism and find it self-refuting, for the proposition that there are no Shapes (Forms, Ideas, wideas) means that Shapehood has no instances, for which at least the Shape of Shapehood itself is needed.

I am not very amenable to this position [platonism] at all, holding it to fall heavily afoul of the principles I've laid out extensively before against the position I call "transcendentalism". — Pfhorrest

What’s the problem with beyondness? Both, the Shape of Mindhood, as well as each and every mind, belongs to the beyondly abstract realm. Moreover, the mind can directly “see” many of the abstract things directly with “the mind’s eye”, giving it true knowledge of the abstract, as opposed to mere opinions about the concrete. I, for one, can “see” the abstract widea of mindhood, my own mind, and the rimetale 4, but I cannot directly see any concrete ‘entity’. Thoughtcasters (telepaths) can even directly see other minds, but I doubt that there are any true thoughtcasters in our world.

Also, the upspring (orspring, origin) of beon itself (see this comment of mine to resolve the problem of the two meanings of “being”), not-beon itself, as well as all beondes, must itself be above both beon and not-beon. This is quite simple to see, which is why I don’t understand why the debate between the (in my opinion) equally meaningless positions of theism and atheism is still raging. To back up my claim that it is simple to see:

• Only a few hundred years after the birth of Western philosophy, Plato already realised than Goodness-Oneness-Fairness(Beauty) is beyond being.
• When I was not even eleven-and-a-half years old, I reasoned that since God made everything, he made existence itself and not-existence itself, so God can neither exist nor not exist, but must stand above both. Also, God cannot be a being. God is simply God. That was long before I knew anything of Plato's thoughts on the matter.

Therefore, you can’t go around truly radical beyondness if you want to go to the or-ground. By the way, Damascius is a great philosopher of beyondness.

There necessarily must be some rigorous formal (i.e. mathematical) system or another that would be a perfect description of reality. — Pfhorrest

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems show that not even the reality of the natural numbers can be fully described by a formal theory, let alone the whole of reality.

This view of the relation between the concrete and abstract bears a similarity to what Immanuel Kant called the phenomenal and the noumenal, where on his account we cannot ever have direct experiential contact with noumena, but instead only project our ideas about them behind the world of phenomena that we experience — Pfhorrest

Oh, but we can have direct hygely (noetic) knowledge of the abstract world. In fact, I’m mentally looking at the very Shape of Abstractness right now. On the other hand, I cannot directly see your thoughts or the text written in this forum.

on my account the truly abstract has no direct influence on the concrete world we experience, and we can only project our ideas of abstract objects behind that concrete world in an attempt to understand and explain it. — Pfhorrest

But the abstract does have a direct bearing on the concrete. The very thoughts you’re having right now owe their being in part to the widea of thoughthood, without which they could not exist, and the very meaningfulness of the discussion of platonism against nominalism against mathematicism needs the Shape of Shapehood. See also the second-last paragraph of this comment of mine about the cynodonts.

the platonist affirms the reality of two kinds of existence — Pfhorrest

I do that, too, but I hold that all things have abstract beon, and that only information, which is another kind of beonde, can have concrete beon. Pieces of info belonging to eternally true propositions, and only those pieces of info, have both abstract and concrete being.

That does sound similar to what I think.

There’s just one problem with regarding all-quantification and there-is-quantification as mere infinitary AND and OR operators, respectively. I’ll quote myself but make certain important words italic:

For every fixed function f which sends each thing þ [...] to a proposition f(þ), ∃ sends f to the proposition that f(1) OR f(2) OR f(exponential function) OR f(evenness) OR f(f) OR ... . — Tristan L

Also, note that for every property E, “∃x:E(x)” means the disjunction of all propositions of the shape E(x), and “∀x:E(x)” means the conjunction of all propositions of the shape E(x), where “x” is a variable that varies over all things.

We see that the very definitions of the two quantifiers need allness, and the latter cannot be reduced to AND alone. Moreover, there has to be at least one existing thing, for otherwise, the variable couldn’t vary over anything, and there wouldn’t even be a variable to vary (for it is a thing, too). So, we can’t reduce allness and existence to anything else, but we only need to invoke them once (in the definition of the quantifiers or the definition of families indexed by all things), after which we need only deal with infinite AND (or infinite OR; the two can be defined in terms of each other and negation).

That’s at least my take on this thing.

But why should any of my comments get deleted? I’ve never even remotely used hateful, disrespectful, sexually suggestive, offensive, or otherwise bad language. Moreover, all of the topics which I have discussed so far are rather theoretical (though some, especially the one about ideas, do have much practical weight), so there’s even less chance of unphilosophically heated debate, making abusive conduct even less plausible.