Those were the examples I threw out not to hide the differences between meanings of "think" but to highlight them: splitting at the preposition (what could easily be a prefix in a language like German) was deliberate. — Srap Tasmaner

So what did you mean by saying the following?:

Any of those look like things to you? — Srap Tasmaner

Andrew M has explained what he means by "abstract entity". What do you mean? — Srap Tasmaner

By “abstractness”, I mean the property of being not-spatial, not-tidesome (not-temporal), not-physical, not-mindly, and onefold (simple). Regarding the last point, I think and feel that the notion of parthood belongs in the physical realm.

Compare and contrast after a few posts, you may see what I mean. — Outlander

Right, but that’s not what I mean. In my case, the true counter (the one on my profile) showed only 97 comments and one discussion when it should have shown 98 comments and 1 discussion, and it stayed that way. Even now, it should show two more (for this case and the one in the fourties).

Other than that- unless you use this site the way I do- you should be coherent enough and your posts should have enough personal value for you to remember them and see if anythings missing by scrolling through your comment history. — Outlander

I actually save my comments to hard disk, but to check through a hundred comments isn’t that easy, I think, is it? Mind you, I’m talking about comments, not opening posts. Also, how should folks with thousands of comments do it?

Edit: Also, sometimes threads in which you commented on are deleted. I was quite dismayed after discovering a comment of mine I was quite proud of was no more. Could be that also? — Outlander

No, not in my case, for all threads in which I’ve commented (including those which I’ve started) still exist. It’s a pity what happened to your comment. Have you kept a copy of it?

Are you drawing a distinction between actual existence and concrete existence? — Luke

Of course I am. How could I otherwise claim that abstract things actually exist?

But don’t get me wrong: I certainly think that abstract and thus not-concrete being, which is always actual, is not inferior to concrete being. While I don’t follow Plato in regarding abstract being as superior – indeed, I’m spellbound by time and therefore the temporal and concrete world, leading me (in part) to develop a new logic and a new theory of time and chance –, I do hold that abstract being is purer than concrete being. Concrete being is being-at/in/..., whereas abstract being is just being. The info that sauropodhood manifests in flesh and blood on Earth in this world exists at time-points, in a possible world; the info that Alice thinks EID comes into being in her mind (again in a world at a time); but sauropodhood and EID simply are.

The possibility of an idea is tied to its actualised counterpart by an essential link. Therefore, the idea is actual? Because the essential link is actual since it is essential? — Luke

Yes to both, as long as you replace “actualised” with “actual”.

You may also recall my more recent observation that you only draw an artificial distinction between possible and actual existence. — Luke

For things, I’ve shown that possible existence necessarily lets actual existence follow. In the case of info, that’s not the case, but as I’ve said, thinking and talking about info is tricky.

A fact about x exists, therefore x is actual? Sorry, I still don't accept it. E.g.:

Facts about dinosaurs exist. Therefore, dinosaurs are actual.
Facts about the extinction of dinosaurs exist. Therefore, the extinction of dinosaurs is actual.

How can it be both? — Luke

Firstly, dinosaurs are still alive and kicking and can even be very smart, as can be seen in this video, for instance. What they would have to add to this discussion, I wonder ... :wink:

Therefore, let’s replace dinosaurs with sauropods in your example. I don’t see where the contradiction lies. Are you doubting the actualness of sauropods in earnest?

Here’s my account of the situation:

Sauropodhood is abstract (and thus eternal) and actual, as is the proposition than sauropodhood manifests in flesh and blood in this universe at some time. This proposition became true when sauropods first evolved, so at that time, the info-piece belonging to that proposition came into being (and would stay there forever). The existence of this info-piece is what most folks likely mean when they say that sauropods exist (in contrast to unicorns, for instance), probably including you and certainly me. All of this is in accordance with the fact that facts about sauropods exist. Likewise, the proposition that the sauropods go extinct, that is, that after some time-point, sauropodhood no longer manifests in this universe in flesh and blood, is abstract and actual. It’s even true, so the corresponding piece of info exists. All of this is in accordance with the fact that facts about the proposition that sauropods go extinct exist.

Quite easily: myth, fiction, make-believe, possibility. — Luke

Myth and fiction are both about soothfast (real) things. It’s just that those things don’t manifest in a certain way, th.i. certain propositions about the abstract things involved (such as unicorns) aren’t true (at least in our world) and often even false. We call myth, fiction, and the like “make-believe” only insofar as you treat them as asserting the truth of those not-true propositions (for example interpreting LOTR as assering that Frodohood manifests in flesh and blood on this Earth in our world). As I’ve discussed above, possible existence belongs in the realm of info, not the world of things.

I must admit that in what I’ve written so far, I’ve made a mistake. I’ve treated pieces of info as if they were things and thereby abstract when they are in fact another kind of beonde. That’s not my fault, though, for our speech is only well-suited for talking about (abstract) things and rather ill-suited for talking about beondes of another kind such as information. This is why I think that it’s better to talk about propositions and their truth-values rather than info-pieces and their existence or not-existence. Likewise, we’d better only talk about possibility in the context of truth-values of propositions rather than existence/non-existence of information. Even more: Our faculty of thought isn’t very well-suited for thinking about concrete beonde, I think. Think about it: what an abstract entity is is very clear, but when you deeply think about the notion of a concrete object, you’ll see the notion become ever fuzzier and less meaningful until it melts away and evaporates in the end.

If there can exist "a piece of info belonging to [a] proposition's negation", then "[t]he existence of a piece of information is ((not necessarily)) equivalent to the truth of a proposition". — Luke

What I mean is that for every proposition Þ, the proposition TRUE(Þ) that Þ is true is logically equivalent to the proposition that the info-piece belonging to Þ exists. Accordingly, the proposition FALSE(Þ) that Þ is untrue (“un-” ≠ “not-”) is logically equivalent to the proposition that the info-piece belonging to the negation ¬Þ of Þ exists, and the proposition UNDETERMINED(Þ) that Þ is undetermined is logically equivalent to the proposition that neither the info-piece belonging Þ exists nor the info-piece belonging to ¬Þ exists.

Sorry, I still don't follow. The possibility of an idea is tied to its actualised counterpart by an essential link. — Luke

Let me swuttle (explain) the main possibility argument I’ve put forth so far. Let EID be any thinkable idea. Consider the proposition IsThoughtAbout(EID) (that for some mind m and some time-point t, m manifests in the concrete world at t and thinks about EID at t). Now regard the proposition PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) (that IsThoughtAbout(EID) is possible at the start). This one is true from the start (as you have admitted). Like every proposition, including IsThoughtAbout(EID), PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) is (abstract and) actual anyway, but the fact that it’s true will hopefully show even the hardest-boiled skeptic that PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) is actual. Now, PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) is defined as the proposition that EID has property PossIsThoughtAbout; by its very wist, it says something about EID. So the actual entity PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) is tied by a wistly and thus actual link to EID. It neededly follows that EID must be actual, too.

I could have used a property other than PossIsThoughtAbout, such as the property ideahood of being an idea, the property of abstractness, the property of being the selfsame as onesself, or the property PossiblyExists of possibly existing. I just found using PossIsThoughtAbout to be particularly convincing. Note that PossIsThoughtAbout doesn’t work for an unthinkable idea EID, in the sense that PossIsThoughtAbout(EID) is false in that case, but that the other properties work even in that case.

Let’s now try to understand how things likely really stand:

Mindhood is eche (eternal), abstract, and actual (echeness follows from abstractness, of course). Every idea EID is eche, abstract, and actual. Every time-point is eternal, abstract, and actual. Every mind is eche, abstract, and actual. All properties, including IsThoughtAbout and PossIsThoughtAbout, are eche, abstract, and actual. All propositions, including – for every idea EID – IsThoughtAbout(EID) and PossIsThoughtAbout(EID), are eternal, abstract, and actual. However, IsThoughtAbout(EID) (for some idea EID) isn’t necessarily true at all time-points. In particular, it needn’t be true from the start. When it isn’t true (yet), but only undetermined, the belonging piece of info exists only possibly, but not actually (yet). As soon as IsThoughtAbout(EID) becomes true (and obviously stays true forever after), the corresponding piece of info gets actual existence (and holds on to it forever after). If IsThoughtAbout(EID) for some reason becomes false (e.g. because some demon permanently blocks minds from manifesting in the concrete world), its belonging piece of info loses even its merely possible existence. But Mindhood, all minds, all time-points, all ideas, all properties, and all propositions stay in actual existence, of course. The only beondes (see above for the meaning of “beonde”) which are actualized are pieces of information. All the others are things and so simply actual.

Where does invention come into play? Well, for every idea EID, every mind m, and every time-point t, regard the propsition IsThoughtAboutByAt(EID, m, t) that EID is being thought about by m at t. Now let EID be an arbitrary idea. If a mind m brings about the truth of IsThoughtAboutByAt(EID, m, t) for some time-point t by its own free will alone, it is the only maker of the info-piece belonging to IsThoughtAboutByAt(EID, m, t). In that sense, the mind m is a full inventor of that info-piece. If another mind n does the same (and therefore in particular does it independently of m), it is also a full inventor, but of another info-piece. The two minds are co-inventors of two different pieces of information involving one and the same idea EID in similar ways.

Unicorns certainly do actually exist, but also unicorns don't actually exist? — Luke

You accuse me of confusing PossiblyExists(EID) with EID, which I clearly don’t as the former is a proposition and the latter isn’t, when it is in fact you who seems to mix EID up with the (always existing) piece of info belonging to PossiblyExists(EID), or (much likelier) even the (not always existing) info-piece belonging to IsThoughtAbout(EID). You even seem not to be fully aware of EID itself, strengthening what I wrote here.

How does the "essential link" facilitate the leap from 'the idea is possible' to 'the idea is actual'. — Luke

An essential link is actual, and it links an actual thing to another thing. Hence, this other thing must be actual, too.

And how do you distinguish between possible ideas and actual ideas? — Luke

All ideas are actual (and possible too, of course). What you mean by “actual idea” seems to be a piece of info associated with a proposition about the idea (more on this above), or perhaps you mean an idea for which info belonging to a certain kind of proposition about it (namley propositions that say that a mind has thought about the idea) exists.

My attempted translations of your "wistlily" language into standard English — Luke

The word “wistlily” (“essentially”) is an adverb, while “wistly” (“essential”, German “wesentlich”) is the belonging adjective (how-word), and both belong to the nameword “wist” (“essence”, German “Wesen”). You might want to brush up your English grammar. Also, my speech is better and righter English, whereas your so-called “standard English” is sadly a pretty messed up language which

• has a broken case system (e.g. using the second-person plural accusative and dative pronoun “you” for the second-person singular nominative pronoun “thou”, the second-person singular accusative and dative pronoun “thee”, and the second-person plural nominative pronoun “ye”),
  
• doesn’t distinguish between present participles and gerunds (which is especially problematic in philosophy; for instance, “being” means both the state of being, called “Sein” in German and more properly “beon” in English, and that which is, called “Seiendes” in German and properlier “beonde” in English),
  
• uses “here” and “there” also in the sense of “hither” and “thither”, respectively,
  
• and more than half of whose wordstock has been brought by force by romanized Viking invaders

– to name some problems. Old English is such a fair tongue, like German (Theech), Arabic, and Gothic (Gotish). But I digress.

Your questions have forced me to reveal more of my theory, making some of my answers rather lengthy, but I think it’s worth it. I find this talk very interesting indeed.

Yes, they surely do.

But first, let’s make some speech aspects clear. The word “think” doesn’t have the same meaning in all three of your examples. In “Alice is thinking that the roof will never hold”, the word “thinking” means believing. The phrasal verbs “think about” and “think of” often mean roughly the same relationship or deed, sometimes perhaps even exactly the same one, and sometimes, as in your last two examples, “think of” means the same as “think about and plan to” (where the planning isn’t sure yet). The deedword “think” is not to be separated from the preposition. So “Alice is thinking of going to graduate school in the fall” should be broken up like this: “Alice | is thinking of | going to graduate school in the fall”, not like this : “Alice | is thinking | of going to graduate school in the fall”, as you have done. Here, “think of” means something like thinking about and planning to. Likewise, “Alice is thinking about her grandmother's house” should be broken up like this: “Alice | is thinking about | her grandmother's house”, not like this : “Alice | is thinking | about her grandmother's house”.

The objects of belief, as well as of knowledge-that, are propositions. These are abstract objects/entities/things that by their wist (essence) intrinsically mean states-of-affairs. The facts are the states-of-affairs that hold. If and only if a proposition is true, a belonging piece of information exists, which is often concrete. The phrase “that the roof will never hold” refers to a proposition, and this is the object of Alice’s belief.

The phrase “going to graduate school in the fall” either means the deed of going to graduate school in the fall, which is an abstract universal thing instantiated by individuals actually going to graduate school in the fall, or it means the (likewise abstract) proposition that the subject of the sentence of which the phrase is a part does said deed. In your example, it refers to the proposition that Alice goes to graduate school in the fall, and it is the object of Alice’s thinking-of, that is, of her thinking-about and planning.

Finally, the phrase “her grandmother's house” obviously means the house of Alice’s grandmother, which is the object of Alice’s thinking-about.

I think that the existential quantifier is basically just an infinite OR operator, just as the all-quantifier is basically an infinite AND operator. For every fixed function f which sends each thing þ (all things are actual and abstract and thus eternal btw.) to a proposition f(þ), ∃ sends f to the proposition that f(1) OR f(2) OR f(exponential function) OR f(evenness) OR f(f) OR ... . So when we say that odd even rimetales (numbers) don’t exist, we mean that it’s not the case that (1 is odd and even) OR (2 is odd and even) OR (3 is odd and even) OR ... . We don’t mean that there are things called “odd even rimetales” which don’t exist. The sentence “there are things called ‘odd even rimetales’ which don’t exist” already contains a contradiction. That which doesn’t exist wouldn’t have any properties on one hand (since it doesn’t exist), but would have the property of not-existence on the other. At least that’s when we use ∃ when talking about abstract things.

When we talk about concrete stuff (be it mindly or physical), we often use ∃ to mean the existence of a piece of information, which is equivalent to the truth of a proposition. See that comment of mine for more info.

You’ve brought up some interesting points, some of which I have already addressed in my rather lengthy answer last time, and some of which need me to explain more of my theory.

I take this to mean that the possibility of (inventing) the idea is defined in terms of the idea itself. Even if this were the case, — Luke

How could that not be the case? Likewise, how could the proposition that your leg is broken, as well as the proposition that your leg isn’t broken, be what they are and exist without your leg?

how this "essential link" relates to, or assists, your argument: that the possibility (of inventing the idea) has always existed, therefore the idea has always existed. How does this "essential link" of definition provide actual existence to what is merely possible? — Luke

Well, if something actual F is wistlily tied to something Þ through a wistly link U, then Þ must be actual too, for F is actual by premise, and U is actual since it is wistly. In my argument, Þ is a generic idea, and F is the possibility that someone might think of Þ (or any proposition about Þ for that matter). F and U are actual, so Þ is actual, too.

what is merely possible — Luke

There is no such thing as a merely possible thing. All things are eternal, abstract, actual, and soothfast. Moreover, my argument for the actual existence of all ideas doesn’t even need possibility. Let’s take any idea EID which is fully, completely, totally and absolutely unthinkable. Then it’s not possible for anyone to ever think of it. Still, the very fact that EID is unthinkable exists actually, so EID must exist actually, too. Indeed, not-actual existence leads to a contradiction: Assume that some thing x doesn’t have actual existence. Then that very (supposed) fact has actual existence (as does its negation). But this fact is defined in terms of x. Hence, x must be actual after all. Likewise, if any thing þ didn’t exist, it would have the property of not-existence, but since having properties needs existence, þ must exist after all.

It seems your argument must apply not only to ideas, but to anything, since the possibility of any thing's existence can be defined only in terms of that thing. — Luke

Well observed! Indeed, a broader shape of my argument is that all things are actual and eche, and its original purpose is to serve as part of an argument that all things are abstract, th.i. not-physical, not-mindly, not-spatial, not time-bound, and onefold (simple). In this thread, though, only its application to ideas is of relevance, which is why I’ve restricted myself to ideas here.

Does the possible existence of unicorns also imply their actual existence? — Luke

Certainly it does.

For one, unicornhood certainly exists. In fact, it must exist so that the very proposition that unicorns don’t exist even makes sense.

Moreover, each individual unicorn actually exists in the sense that the property of being a unicorn with a rainbow-colored horn and through-seeable wings exists, the property of being a unicorn with a 1-metre-long horn and a scorpion-tail exists, asf.

Each genome is a finite sequence of A’s, T’s, G’s, and C’s, so there’s an actual, fixed one-to-one mapping between the set of all genomes and the set IN of all natural rimetales (numbers). Hence, all genomes exist. This includes genomes that code for unicorns. Also always existing is the property of being a genome that codes for a unicorn, as well as its extension, the set of all genomes that code for unicorns. However, not for every genome g is the proposition E(g, Universe, 2020) / E(g, Earth, 2020) that at some time not after 2020, some physical nucleotides in this universe / on Earth are arranged according to g true. If we substitute a unicorn’s genome for the generic genome g, it happens that E(g, Earth, 2020) is (as far as we know) false in 2020 and ever after because no unicorns have yet (as of 2020) evolved on Earth. So there’s no piece of info belonging to E(g, Earth, 2020). That’s what we mean when we say that unicorns don’t exist on Earth. On the other hand, if we replace unicorns with elephants, the belonging piece of info does exist, which is what we mean when we say that elephants exist. See also my answer to “The meaning of the existential quantifier”.

In short, all things, including all ideas, exist and are abstract, actual, and eche (eternal), and only information might not exist or only possibly exist. The assumtpion that a thing doesn’t actually exist directly leads to contradictions, for how can the not-actual be actually thought about, and how can the not-actual actually be not-actual? The existence of a piece of information is equivalent to the truth of a proposition. The falsehood of that proposition is equivalent to the existence of a piece of info belonging to the proposition’s negation. If neither piece exists, the proposition and its negation have truth-value UNDETERMINED. Our speech isn’t well-suited to talk about info, though, so it’s better to only talk about (abstract) things and the truth-values of propositions. However, I can’t explain my whole theory here.

Also, are you arguing that my leg has always been broken? — Luke

No, as I’ve said here:

However, it does mean that the state-of-affairs and the proposition that you would break your leg has always existed, as has its negation. (Hint: it's not.) — Tristan L

It’s only the case that the corresponding piece of information, which would be concrete, thankfully doesn’t exist.

Now I get what you’re saying. Interesting thoughts!

I think that things stand as follows: All things are abstract and therefore eche and uncreatable, but information can be created (though not destroyed). When it becomes certain that an idea EID will be found, the proposition that EID would be found becomes true, which is equivalent to a corresponding piece of information’s coming into being. If the proposition is true from the start by deterministic must, or if it becomes true by chance, the piece of info doesn’t get its existence from a mind; in the former case, it exists by forced necessity, and in the latter case, it springs into existence from nothing, without any maker. If and only if the proposition’s truth is brought about by free will does the belonging piece of info get its existence from a mind, and this is thus a case of true creation.

In short, when someone finds an abstract idea by only his own free will, he (used gender-neutrally) only discovers that idea, but be makes, creates, invents a piece of information belonging to a (likewise abstract) proposition about the idea.

Now I know how the poor guy who goes back into the Cave must feel... :roll:

The following are just some thoughts of mine, and I’m not dogmatic about them at all.

I think that when the platonist talks with another person about the existence of wideas, he (used gender-neutrally) doesn’t try to prove the existence of wideas. Indeed, it is self-evident that wideas must exist, for if any widea W did not exist, then that very (supposed) fact NOTEXIST(W) would at least exist, but NOTEXIST(W) is defined in terms of W, so W must exist after all. Another way to see it is this: NOTEXIST(W) is the state-of-affairs that W-hood doesn’t have an instance, so NOTEXIST(W) needs at least W-hood. But the widea of W is the thing which underlies W, W-hood, W-hood-hood, aso. to infinity and beyond, so the widea of W must exist after all. Furthermore, the proposition that no ideas exist is the proposition that wideahood has no instances. So this proposition needs at least one widea, namely wideahood, if it is to be what it is. Hence, it defeats itself and is thus false.

So what is the platonist trying to do? I’d say that he’s trying to show the other guy the wideas. He isn’t trying to show him that they exist, mind you; he’s trying to show him the wideas themselves. He isn’t trying to help him get propositional knowledge (knowledge-that, German Wissen-dass), but rather knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge-of, German Kennen). You see, wideas are so fundamental that just as the Laws of Self-Identity (each thing is the selfsame as itself) and Self-Implication (each proposition follows from itself), we might not be very aware of them. Similarly, the self is so close to itself that self-knowledge is perhaps the most marvellous of all knowledge. It’s a bit like it’s easier to see your hands and feet that your own belly, which in turn is easier to see than the top of your own chest, because these things get progressively closer to your eyes!

At least regarding platonism of the kind I hold, when someone who espouses such platonism talks about wideas as ideal prototypes or as floating around in the above-heavenly world, they’re just trying to help the more concrete-minded become aware of the wideas by using concreter terms. But these terms are just metaphors, and even wrong ones in the end, leading to things like the Third Man Argument. Then, when the against-platonist seems to argue against platonism, what’s really happening is that he still isn’t consciously aware of the wideas and in particular wideahood and thus can’t even so much as negate platonism; rather, he misunderstands the platonist as claiming the existence of concrete-like objects whose existence really is dubious, such as a perfect chair hovering above the sky. In other words, he thinks that the platonist says that there exists an object which has chairhood in a perfect and ideal way (th.i. that 1 has chairhood perfectly, or 2 has chairhood perfectly, or Mt. Everest has chairhood perfectly, or ...), without being consciously aware of chairhood. But the platonist actually has that very Widea of Chairhood itself in mind, a fully abstract thing of which the against-platonist only has underconscious awareness.

I don't see how an idea exists before anybody thinks of it. I agree that "the fact that Alice might think about EID always actually exists". because what Alice might do or think is whatever it is possible to do or think. But that doesn't mean that she has actually thought of it, or that the idea already exists before she has actually thought of it. Let's not conflate possible ideas with actual ideas. — Luke

It may be that you call actual abstract wideas “possible ideas”, and actual concrete mental instances of wideas “actual ideas”. It might also be that you call not-yet-existing pieces of information about wideas “possible ideas”. In such a case, you’d be talking past my point all the time. (More on this in my next comment.)

Your "understander" seems to do a lot of the heavy lifting for your algorithm argument. — Luke

The understander neither needs nor uses any creativity at all. That’s the whole point. How is that heavy lifting?

How do they decide which string of symbols represents a new idea? — Luke

By knowing English syntax and semantics; by knowing the English meaning-mapping (the function which sends each meaningful English expression to what it means, e.g. the word “six” to the number 6); just like you can check that the LOTR-books are meaningful and understand them without creativity.

Do they require any specialised knowledge or do they learn it as they go? — Luke

The only knowledge the which the understander has at the start is knowledge of the English meaning-mapping and perhaps some very basic stuff like fundamental logical laws. By mapping strings to the abstract things that they mean (e.g. the expression “e^ix = cos x + i sin x”, Euler’s Formula, to the deep law about complex numbers, the exponential function, and trigonometric functions), he can, of course, learn, and then apply that knowledge later on in the text. (After each text, he can even forget all the new stuff he learned, because for any texts T1 and T2, there’s a further text made up of T1 followed by T2.) For example, he can use his knowledge of basic logic to check whether a text is a valid proof. He’ll thus find the proof of, say, the Feichtinger-Conjecture by just reading and understanding and thinking logically, but without any creative thinking.

Is a long string of 1's and 0's something that your "understander" understands? — Luke

Yes, because for any string of 1's and 0's, there’s a text containing that string along with a before-going English explanation and/or description of how to interpret that string, e.g. containing a definition of the mp4-format and the png-format.

Isn't it possible that an understander could overlook an idea and judge it as a random string of meaningless symbols? — Luke

Nope, in the same way that no English-speaker can mistake this forum discussion for a meaningless string of symbols.

How does the understander decide what is an idea and what isn't? — Luke

By knowing the English meaning-mapping, just as a compiler can judge whether a text is a valid compilable source-code or just a meaningless string. Tell me, in what way is your creativity needed for you to understand the LOTR-books? And more weightily, in what way is Tolkien’s creativity needed for you to understand the LOTR-books?

Your supposed argument assumes the conclusion. — Luke

Not without reason did I ask you whether

quote="Tristan L;453377"]you now see that the following part [...] of my argument is logically valid[/quote]

(the boldface is new). The crucial part of my argument is obviously not this trivial application of Clavius’ Law, but my proof that if wideas can be invented, then they cannot be invented. I clarified the point with Clavius’ Law only because you said:

If it is possible to invent an idea, then it is impossible to invent an idea? Hmm. — Luke

That’s as if you had said, “It’s impossible to invent an idea? Hmm.”, for (A => NOT A) is logically equivalent to (NOT A). However, even after I mentioned Clavius’ Law, you seem to still think that (A => NOT A) is a contradiction, as seen here:

I think this requires much further justification to avoid your clear contradiction. Does Clavius' Law save you from all contradictions? — Luke

My statement that if it’s possible to invent a widea, then it’s impossible to invent one, which I have shown to be true btw, is logically equivalent to the statement that it’s impossible to invent a widea. Hence, your claim that this my statement is a contradiction is logically equivalent to the claim that wideas can be invented, a claim for which you have yet to give a justification.

I asked you earlier what "essentially linked" meant in your argument — Luke

Right, you did here:

What does "essentially linked" mean? — Luke

and I have also given you an answer:

That Poss(EID) and EID are essentially linked means that the wist (essence) of one involves the other, in this case the wist of Poss(EID). Poss(EID) is defined in terms of EID, so that (namely its wist) which makes Poss(EID) what it is has to do with EID. Hence, there’s a wistly link tying Poss(EID) to EID. — Tristan L

I didn't ask you this because I didn't understand it — Luke

I didn’t ask you whether you understand this point; I asked you whether you understand the point about Clavius’ Law.

I asked you this because I was trying to get you to see that it's problematic. — Luke

In what way is this problematic?

Take the (false) proposition that 3 is an even number, for example. This proposition, by its very essence (wist), involves the number 3, so if this proposition exists (which it obviously does as we’re thinking and talking about it right now, and as only existing things can have properties, like falsehood), then 3 must exist, too (which it obviously does, of course).

Your position is that ideas do (pre-)exist and people discover them. My position is that ideas do not (pre-)exist and people invent them. Your argument can't be that if it is possible to invent an idea then that idea must have always existed! That's the position you're meant to be arguing for, not simply assuming. — Luke

Well, as I said above, that isn’t my argument, but rather only a trivial application of Clavius’ Law which I wouldn’t even have bothered with hadn’t it been for your belief that the conclusion (widea-inventability => widea-notinventability) of my real argument is a contradiction. This real argument does show, conclude, that if it is possible to invent a widea, then that widea must have always existed.

Your argument can't be that if it is possible to invent an idea then that idea must have always existed! That's the position you're meant to be arguing for, not simply assuming. — Luke

My argument shows, rather than assumes, that if a widea can be invented, then it must have always existed.

I obviously don't agree that if it is possible to invent an idea then the idea must have always existed. That's absurd. — Luke

It is indeed absurd to assume that wideas can be invented. However, to assume (which I btw. don’t do; rather, I show it) that if it is possible to invent a widea then the widea must have always existed is logically equivalent to assuming that wideas cannot be invented. How is that absurd?

It is entirely your own assumption (i.e. "essentially linked") — Luke

How is this my assumption? Poss(EID) is defined in terms of EID. How could there not be a wistly (essential) link?

It is entirely your own assumption (i.e. "essentially linked") that leads you to the contradiction that if it is possible to invent an idea then it is not possible to invent an idea. — Luke

You seemingly still fail to see the simple logical fact that (A => NOT A) is not a contradiction, but rather logically equivalent to (NOT A), for every proposition A. How is it my assumption that Poss(EID) and EID are essentially linked when the former is directly defined in terms of the latter?

Again, I do not agree to the bracketed statement — Luke

You’ve made that evidently clear, meaning that you don’t think that this (trivial) part of my argument is sound, yet...

Therefore, I don't agree to the rest/whole. — Luke

...you have to concede that this trivial part of my argument is valid.

the bracketed statement, which is based on your own assumption. — Luke

That’s not the case, as I’ve explained.

Please spell out the part of your argument re: the "fixed bond" or "essential link" between EID and Poss(EID). — Luke

I’ve already spellt it out above, but I’ll do it again: The possibility is defined in terms of the widea, so it couldn’t be what it is without the widea any more than B could be what it is without your leg (or the widea of breaking).

I agree. But Poss(EID) is not EID. — Luke

In turn, I agree with that. In fact, there are many other possibilities beside Poss(EID) (the possibility that a thinking living thing would come up with EID) that do the job just as well, such as Poss(EID, human) (the possibility that a human being would come up with EID) and Poss(EID, Andromedan) (the possibility that a being from the Andromeda galaxy would come up with EID). Since each of these is different from all the others, at most one could be identical to EID, yet they all do the job equally well.

That is, you make no (or only an artificial) distinction between the existence of possible ideas and the existence of actual ideas. — Luke

I certainly do make real and substantial distinction between wideas and associated possibilities, for as I’ve explained above, there are several essentially different possibilities associated with the same widea EID which are all essentially linked to the widea (and to other things, too, e.g. Poss(EID, Alice) to Alice and Poss(EID, Bob) to Bob) and so do their job equally well. On the other hand, the existence of the possibilites is indeed equivalent to the existence of the wideas because the former are defined in terms of the latter.

Why must the idea have always actually existed? It was always possible to come up with the idea, but that doesn't mean the idea always existed prior to someone coming up with it. It is always possible that I could break my leg, but that doesn't mean that my leg was always broken prior to my breaking it. — Luke

However, it does mean that the state-of-affairs and the proposition that you would break your leg has always existed, as has its negation. Take e.g. the proposition B that you break your leg tomorrow (on 21/09/2020). That proposition is as of yet (today, on 20/09/2020) neither true nor false (at least for argument’s sake; whether the universe is deterministic or not is a different matter), but it will be either true or false after-tomorrow (on 22/09/2020) (and then stay so for ever after). Now I already hope today, on 20/09/2020, that B will be false on 22/09/2020. So B has the property today that I hope it to become false after-tomorrow. So B must already exist today. Indeed, how could I possibly hope anything about something not-existent? Also, the proposition that you break your leg yesterday (on 19/09/2020) is false today (on 20/09/2020) (I hope), yet to be false, it must exist in the first place. The only thing that would come into existence should B become true (which I strongly hope not to happen) would be a piece of information, which is what we might call “the breaking of your leg on 21/09/2020”. If B becomes false, then the opposite piece of info, which might be called “the not-breaking of your leg on 21/09/2020”, comes into being. Information and propositions are not the same thing. The proposition B is defined in terms of, among other things, your leg, as is the proposition MAYBE(B) that you may break your leg tomorrow. Therefore, since the former exists today and the latter not only exists today, but is (unluckily) even true today, your leg must also exist today.

It’s exactly analogous with the finding of ideas.

Let's not conflate possible ideas with actual ideas. — Luke

Indeed we shouldn’t conflate things, but that’s just what you’re doing here:

Ideas both can and cannot be invented? That's very confusing. — Luke

You’re mixing abstract ideas (called “wideas” henceforth) up with concrete instances thereof.

Is the thought of the number 3 the same as the idea of the number 3? — Luke

Of course not! That’s just what I say in the paragraph to which you’ve given the above answer. A thought of the numbers 3 is (in a way) a mental and therefore concrete instance of the widea of threehood.

When you think about the number 3, you consider this an instance of inventing the idea of the number 3? — Luke

No. When I choose to think about 3 today (on 20/09/2020), I bring about the truth of the proposition that I think about 3 on 20/09/2020. The piece of info which I thus create is not that impressive, though. To discover 3 by myself is to bring about the truth of the much more impressive proposition that I think about 3 at some time in my life (and thereby create and invent the belonging impressive piece of information). This proposition has already been true since at least my early childhood, and I don’t really know what brought about my first thought about 3. Maybe I brought it about with my own free will, in which case I’d really be an independent discoverer of 3, or perhaps my parents did, or maybe knowledge of numbers is “hardwired” into my (and others’) mind(s) so deeply that the proposition that I would think of 3 at some point was always true by the nature (wist) of my mind.

I disagree btw with the notion that ideas pre-exist their discovery — Kenosha Kid

If ideas exist after their discovery, but they can’t be created, then they must also exist before the discovery. Otherwise, the discovery would actually be an act of creation.

In the context of creativity, which this must be, my issue is that this is a philosopher's idea of "idea" being conflated with a creative person's idea of "idea". You are free to define your terms as you see fit, of course, but when I "have an idea" in a creative context, it is not some abstract thing, nor is it the output of a creative act. — Kenosha Kid

You’ve got a point, so from now on, let’s try to use “widea” (from the Or-Indo-European root “*weid-” (“to see”), which “idea” and “eidos” are drawn from) for the philosophical and especially the Platonish concept and “idea” for the artistic one.

I think that when you say “I’ve got an idea”, you mean a mental and thereby concrete instance of an abstract widea. This instance is what the artist calls “idea”. However, I think that the idea, unlike the widea, actually is the output of a creative act, which at the same time is an act of discovery of a widea – unless that discovery is deterministic, in which case the idea exists from the start, but only becomes directly seeable later on. Take two dice for example. Alice throws her die and gets a 5. The number 5 itself is abstract and eternal, as is the state-of-affairs that Alice’s throw would lead to a five. However, the piece of information corresponding to the making-true (“actualization”) of that state-of-affairs is created by Alice’s throw. Now if Bob throws his die and also gets a 5, then his piece of info, what we call his “instance”, is different from Alice’s, although both involve one and the same abstract entity 5. By contrast, if he puts his die on the table with “5” on the upper face on account of Alice’s die showing a “5”, then his instance is basically the same as Alice’s, and his activity doesn’t make any new info. Rather, it only copies existing info.

I think Pfhorrest's description of it as a configuration space is accurate. — Kenosha Kid

As do I. The possibilities in the space are real, abstract entities, as are the wideas to which they are linked. I don’t understand why Pfhorrest and you unneededly seem to back down from full-fledged platonism, though. This is one point where I likely agree with Luke; he seems to understand Pfhorrest’s position as platonist, and I don’t see any way in which Pfhorrest cannot be interpreted as such.

There is no means of assessing the success of the search. — Kenosha Kid

In the case of my algorithm (= my program + understander), there is, namely the understander.

So an idea, in a creative sense, means to me a highly guided, highly constrained search through a configuration subspace. — Kenosha Kid

According to this definition, the widea also fore-exists, for just as the original possibility-space just exists, so does the space of all possible searches through it. However, instantiating one such possible search by free will creates mental information, and in this way, the process is creative. But again, we can make an algorithm which brute-forces all possible searches (and thus conducts a brute-force meta-search), another one which brute-forces all possible over-searches (meta-searches), and so on to infinity (and beyond?).

Computer algorithms are very good at the searching, but they need to be told what success looks like, something entirely absent from the infinite monkeys approach, and something difficult to conceive a computer figuring out by itself. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, and that’s what the understander is there for. The crucial point is that the understander only needs to have the mindly ability to understand, but no creativeness whatsoever. For example, if you take the role of the understander, you’ll get the same feelings, emotions, and thoughts when you hear "Winterstürme" and "Du bist der Lenz" regardless of whether the information stems from Wagner’s mind or from my deterministic program AllEndlyStrings.

On the whole, I like your and Pfhorrest’s ideas, but
1. I don’t see why you unneededly hold back from platonism,
and
2. I think that there is a clearly definable discovery-aspect and a clearly definable creative aspect to finding ideas.

Unless your algorithm can discover ideas via actual practice, then it adds nothing to the argument that ideas are discovered rather than invented. — Luke

But it can discover them through actual practice, at least as much as quantum field theory can in actual practice be used to describe cell division. However, just as describing cell division with QFT is extremely difficult, complex, cumbersome, and resource-intensive, so is finding ideas with my algorithm. (Note, however, that some simple ideas will be discovered by my algorithm in reasonable time.) This is what is meant by “impractical”. Another good example is Karl Fritiof Sundman’s solution of almost all instances of the general three-body-probem, which, though exact, would likely need more years when used in astronomy than there are particles in the observable universe. In fact, applying Sundman’s solution would take much more time than using my algorithm to find LOTR, for instance.

You appear to assume that any given idea is expressible in the ASCII characters that your algorithm produces. An inventor of ideas must likewise be able to express an (invented) idea using the same characters. — Luke

I do not make that assumption, as I’ve already said. However, any idea of any practical significance can be expressed in the ASCII-characters: all novels, all movies, all technological inventions, all theories, all pictures, and all pieces of music. In fact, they can even be expressed in nothing but 1’s and 0’s. For example, this talk that we’re having right now is represented by a long string of 1’s and 0’s. Only unspeakable ideas, like ones related to personal mystical and gasty experiences, cannot be expressed in ASCII, but these are hardly what most folks (including you, judging from your right claim that ideas should be somehow useful) have in mind when they talk about ideas. Also, my possibility-argument even applies to these unsayable ideas. And what about only endlessly expressible ideas? I strongly doubt that any such ideas have ever been found, for our brains are finite, and our minds use our brains as reckoning-machines. And the possibility-argument, as well as the independent-finding-argument, apply also to them anyway.

What your algorithm does is simply produce or actualise every possible combination of characters. — Luke

...and map each such string to the corresponding idea. Don’t forget the understander!

Therefore - along with an [...] all possible expressions. — Luke

Thus showing that the space of all possibilites is actual.

However, not every string of characters is an idea. — Luke

Even more: no string of characteres is an idea (actually, it technically is an idea, but usually not the same as the idea which it represents); rather, it represents, stands for, an idea.
However, conversely, as I’ve explained above, every idea of practical relevance can be expressed/represented/stood for by a finite string of symbols. The very history of all brain states of all humans that have ever lived can be expressed by a (albeit very long) finite string of symbols over a finite alphabet and therefore ultimately a number. (Here, I recall that guy Pythagoras’ doctrine that all is Number. Just a little food for thought...)

So...

Whether or not all possibilities are actualised — Luke

No worries, rest assured that all useful possibilites are really actualized.

what this overlooks is that ideas - in the sense we are discussing - have some usefulness or interest to humanity. The important part is finding the useful or interesting ideas within the range of possibilities. — Luke

True, except for the “overlooks”-part (see below).

Any example of an idea that you will give is one that humanity has found to be useful or interesting. Deciding what counts as an interesting or useful idea is easily done for all past ideas which have already been found to be so. How does your algorithm decide which as-yet undiscovered or uninvented ideas will be useful and/or interesting for humanity? That is, how does your algorithm decide which expressions are ideas and which are not? — Luke

With the help of its understander, of course. He will read all the texts, and once he finds a meaningful one whose content is useful, he’ll recognize it as such. For example, just as I recognized that the descriptions of the high-voltage VdG-generator which I read online mean a useful idea (and a very interesting one at that), the understander will see that a description of the VDGG output by the program refers to a useful and interesting idea.

All of the possibilities already exist whether your algorithm actualises them or not, — Luke

Of course they do; that’s my point! The deterministic nature of the algorithm just drives it home.

but the possibilities are not the ideas. — Luke

How often are you going to reiterate this point which I’ve been agreeing with all along?

All possibilities exist whether ideas are discovered or invented. — Luke

True (namely that each of idea-discoverableness and idea-inventability lets existence of all possibilities follow). At the same time, the existence of all possibilities is incompatible with the inventableness of ideas. What does that mean? That ideas cannot be invented.

It begs the question to assume that the existence of all possibilities (or all possible expressions) implies the pre-existence of all ideas. — Luke

No, it doesn’t, for the possibilities are essentially defined in terms of the ideas, so if the possibilities exist, so must the ideas.

First things first: Do you now see that the following part

0. If ideas can be invented, then they cannot be invented. (premise)
1. If it’s not the case that ideas cannot be invented, then ideas cannot be invented. (from (0.) by Double Negation)
2. Ideas cannot be invented. (from (1.) by Clavius’ Law / consequentia mirabilis)

of my argument is logically valid?

If yes, then let’s check the truth of the primise (0.). I’ve shown it e.g. here:

Let EID be an arbitrary idea that someone has found. Since someone has found EID, it must always have been actually possible that someone could someday find EID. So the possibility Poss(EID) that someone might someday come up with EID must have always actually existed. But Poss(EID) is actually defined in terms of EID – it’s the possibility of finding EID after all –, and so, there is an actual, essential, fixed bond between EID and Poss(EID). Hence, EID must also have always actually existed. — Tristan L

In risk of repeating myself, you can substitute “invent” (or “discover”, but that’s unrelevant here) for “find”/”come up with”.

I think this requires much further justification to avoid your clear contradiction. Does Clavius' Law save you from all contradictions? — Luke

My contradiction? Your contradiction! I have shown that your assumption that ideas can be invented lets its own negation follow and thereby beats itself. Pfhorrest has already explained Clavius’ Law to you. I honestly ask: Do you understand the basic logical structure of my arguments?

What I take issue with is the suggestion or assertion that all of those possibilities have (already) been actualised. — Luke

An assertion that no one but you has made, so by taking issue with it, you’re attacking a straw-man.

To repeat the gist of my argument pertaining to that again: The mere existence from the start of the possibility that Alice could find (remember that I use both “find” and “come up with” neutrally as over-terms for both “invent” and “discover”) an idea EID means that EID itself must actually exist from the start. However, it doesn’t mean that any mental or physical instance (what you might call “actualization”) of EID has to exist from the start. Such an instance has to be created, invented, made.

Unless your algorithm has completed producing every possible combination of characters, then those alleged invention ideas (possibilities) have not yet been actualised and do not yet have any substantive existence. — Luke

Yep, of course they do! The fact that Alice thinks about EID exists only from the first moment at which it is certain that Alice would think about EID, but the fact that Alice might think about EID always actually exists. Regarding my algorithm, it is completely deterministic, and so any idea that it finds is found without any creativity. This shows that creativity is not needed when coming up with ideas.

Until your algorithm produces a new idea (and someone finds it), — Luke

That someone is already part of the algorithm, for he is the understander. Recall that my algorithm = my program + understander.

Until your algorithm produces a new idea (and someone finds it), then that idea/invention remains only possible and not actual. — Luke

The possibiliy itself, th.i. the fact that the idea might be come up with, is actual from the start. The finding of the idea, on the other hand, only comes into actual existence once it is foredetermined that the idea will be found, which is the case from the point at which my algorithm is started. My possibility-argument uses the former truth, namely the actual existence of the might-fact, and my algorithm-argument uses the latter truth, namely that from the time at which my algorithm is started, for every finitely expressible idea EID, the fact that EID will be found exists.

As a Platonist, you probably take the view that there is no distinction between possible and actual existence of those ideas. However, this precludes the possibility of human invention from the outset: If all ideas already exist (substantively), then nobody can actualise them. — Luke

Again a great example that you haven’t gotten basic points that I’ve said over and over again, and that even now, you misunderstand my position. Making reference to ’s remark, drinking is needed for living, and likewise, understanding the other’s position is needed to keep a philosophical talk meaningful and working. But of course, to drink or not to drink is each one’s own decision...

The gist of my position is this: Ideas are abstract things, and as such, they have eternal, absolute and pure being. In particular, they cannot be invented or otherwise created, for their existence isn’t time-bound. However, like many abstract entities, ideas have concrete mental and physical instances. Since these exist in time, they can be invented or otherwise created. What we call “actualization” of an idea is the instantiation of that idea, th.i. the making of a mental of physical instance of it. For example, the number 3 is eternal, but the thought I’m having about the number 3 right now is temporal, concrete, and mental. Furthermore, it is my creation, since I could have thought about something else, but freely chose to think about 3. In turn, don’t conflate this with the state-of-affairs that Tristan thinks about 3 on 18/09/2020, which is abstract and eternal, just as every state-of-affairs of the shape “Tristan thinks about n on 18/09/2020$”. Note that some of these states-of-affairs hold and others don’t, and by bringing about the holding of one of them, I create mental information. This concrete info is what we call “instance”.

Remark: I don’t use all terms here in the way I should use them. For instance, the talk of instances is metaphorically powerful but unaccurate in the end, and I use the word “fact” differently here from my right usage. In my philosophical theory, these issues are addressed and the terms used in the right way, but of course, this thread is hardly the place to discuss this not-so-small theory.

:up: (an over-thumbs-up, th.i. a meta-thumbs-up)

:up:

:up:

Yes, I agree with you. So there are quite a few folks who think like that!

I don't know if someone already posted it, but this seems relevant:

https://youtu.be/sfXn_ecH5Rw — Kenosha Kid

This video is really great and very relevant. (I’ve already given it a like. Please also do so!) I’ve done the same thing for texts: Here, you can find the source-code of a PASCAL-program written by me, called “AllEndlyStrings”, which outputs each finite-length text written in the alphabet of 2 times 26-bookstaffs (upper- and lowercase), 10-digits, spaces, and the main punctuation marks, after a finite (endly) time. This includes, among so much more, Pherecydes’ lost work, the Iliad, Plato’s dialogues, the Eddas, Twelfth Night, the whole text and music score of Richard Wagner’s monumental The Ring of the Nibelung (including Winterstürme wichen dem Wonnemond and the well-known Ride of the Valkyries), a proof of the Feichtinger-Conjecture, and a text detailing all human dialogues that ever happened from the dawn of Man till today. Together with a person or group of people who understand(s) English, this program makes up a system which will find every finitely expressible idea after a finite time without any need for creativity. Btw., whether an how can I upload the belonging executable .exe file to this forum?

I'm encouraged to see that others think similarly. — Kenosha Kid

I’m also happy that others think that way.

I raised this on a writing forum once. It was a very unpopular opinion haha! — Kenosha Kid

Could you please tell me the forum and the discussion? I’d like to add my two cents there, including my program. I don’t get how it could be an unpopular opinion. I’ll give proofs that it is true, and hopefully, it’ll become more popular then. Even if it’s old, I wouldn’t mind that.

I agree that an object may have several features. Given a set of objects each having several properties, I could define a particular object as being yellow, ie, having yellowness, if it emits a wavelength of between 570 and 590 nm, regardless of what other properties it had. — RussellA

Yes, and that property simply exists, as do the other abtract things which it’s closely linked with, like wavelengthhood, lighthood, nanometrehood, 570, and 590.

The observer abstracts what is beneficial to themselves and ignores what isn't. — RussellA

Exactly; the fact about what’s good for you contains additional info which isn’t contained in the group of objects which you abstract a concept (the mindly image of an abstract idea) from. The fact about what’s good for you is arguably more basic than the concept you abstract, for the latter is created based on the former. But the fact involves the idea of which the concept is an image, so the idea must be more fundamental that the creation of the concept as well.

A bee abstracts the colours and scents in a flower indicative of nectar whilst ignoring the number of petals which isn't. — RussellA

Yes, and the very existence of this fact depends on the existence of colorhood, smellhood, and numberhood, for it involves these things. How could it be the case that being able to abstract color and scent is beneficial to bees without colorhood and scenthood themselves?

Though a study by the University of Queensland has shown that bees can count up to a certain number in order to communicate between themselves using the "waggle dance", showing that animals can abstract when of some evolutionary advantage. — RussellA

What I’ve said before also applies here. Furthermore, the bees deal with the same numbers as we do. The “bee-numbers” don’t obey any different laws to “human-numbers”, do they? If bees and humans had invented their numbers, they should be able to craft them as they wish, yet they obviously can’t do so. The reason is that both the human mind and the bee mind “see” the selfsame numbers, and in discovering them, each invents a mental image thereof.

And of course: Wonderful and amazing little creatures!

If it is possible to invent an idea, then it is impossible to invent an idea? Hmm. — Luke

Now apply Clavius's Law (consequentia mirabilis). — Tristan L

A version of Frege's account is what Stanford calls the Way of Negation, where an object is abstract if and only if it is both non-mental and non-physical. — RussellA

When I say “abstract”, I mean not physical, not mindly, not spatial, not temporal, and onefold (simple).

For example, the abstract idea of yellowness could be invented by considering several yellow objects and finding what feature they had in common — RussellA

That doesn’t work, for no group of objects only share a single feature. For example, any group of yellow objects is also a group of things, of seeable things, and of colored things. How could you abstract yellowness instead of thinghood, seableness, or coloredness from the group?

In summary, I know that I can invent abstract ideas such as yellowness in my mind by observing the physical world, — RussellA

We’ve just seen that this can’t be done, and there are other reasons, see below and my earlier comments.

but I know that I can never discover whether or not yellowness is a non-physical and non-mental abstract idea. — RussellA

Actually, you can even show that: Every physical yellow thing and every thought of yellowness is what it is in douth (virtue) of instantiating Yellowness itself. Hence, the latter must be abstract. Also, how can a property, such as yellowness, not be abstract? By the way, yellowness itself isn’t a yellow entity, I think, for abstract things don’t have color afaik.

Following Occam's Razor in choosing the simplest explanation, I can therefore ignore non-physical and non-mental abstract ideas, because even if they exist I don't need them. — RussellA

You can’t Occam’s Razor to things that must necessarily exist. For evey abstract idea EID, if EID did not exist, then at least that (supposed) very fact (that EID doesn’t exist) would exist. But that fact is defined in terms of EID and thus is wistlily (essentially) linked to it. Therefore, if EID didn’t exist, then that fact couldn’t exist either, leading to a contradiction. Hence, EID must exist after all.

Also, that there are no abstract ideas means that abstract ideahood has no instances, again leading to a contradiction if the not-existence of abstract ideas is assumed.

You do very much need abstract ideas. As we’ve just seen, if they exist, you need Abstract Ideahood itself, and if they don’t exist, you also need Abstract Ideahood itself. Moreover, you can be sure of the existence of your mind. But to be a mind is to instantiate the Shape of Mindhood. Without Mindhood itself, your mind wouldn’t be a mind – it would make no sense to regard it as a mind. You need mindhood even more if you assume the existence of other minds, for what is is that they all share which justifies us in calling them minds?

I think that I have convincingly shown now and before that abstract ideas must exist. That’s why I can be sure of their realness and existence; after all, I can prove that with logic. On the other hand, I cannot prove that a physical external world or minds other than my own exist. Because of that, I’m much surer that abstract ideas exist and are fully real than that the external physical world or other minds or even both exist.

Furthermore, you can directly “see” abstract entities with your "mind’s eye", unlike physical objects and others’ minds and thoughts.

Thinking about the quote on abstract entities, how can abstract entities exist but neither in the mind nor the world external to the mind ? — RussellA

Well, that’s the definition of abstractness, see e.g. the third section of the SEP's entry on abstract things

if there was absolute nothingness, neither mind nor world external to the mind, — RussellA

That assumes that everything must be either in the mind or the external world.

Because, if there was absolute nothingness, neither mind nor world external to the mind, there would be nothing for an abstract entity to be expressed in, and in absolute nothing nothing can exist.
Therefore, abstract entities need their existence to either the mind, the world external to the mind, or both, — RussellA

Here, you assume that abstract objects must be expressed in something. However, that isn’t the case as far as I can tell. For example, if all yellow objects are destroyed and all thoughts about yellowness are no more, the Shape of Yellowness would still exist. In fact, it must exist even in that case, for then, the (hypothetical) very fact that there are no yellow things and no thoughts about yellowness needs yellowness itself to even make sense.

Unless, however, there is a god that exists outside of both the mind and the world external to the mind, and it is in the mind of god that abstract entities exist. — RussellA

That is likely the godly Hyge (Nous), the first emanation of Oneness.



While the abstract things don’t need any mind (except perhaps for the godly Hyge), every mind needs abstract things. Why? Well, to be a mind is to instantiate the Shape of Mindhood, and the latter is an abstract entity.

Likewise, everything physical needs the Shape of Physicalness.

I agree , I should have written "I". But it was more of a "royal we", as, at the back of my mind, I suppose that I believe that the external world exists, although I can never prove it, in which case I sense that my uncertainty about the existence of the external world is also shared by another person's uncertainty about the existence of the external world. — RussellA

That’s also what I think, except that it is your (RussellA’s) mind’s existence of which I’m unsure, not that of mine (Tristan’s) :wink:.

Abstract entities, including (Platonish) Shapes (Forms, Ideas), do not exist in the mind or the external physical spacetimely realm. Rather, they exist in an abstract world which lays the ground for both the mindly and the physical. The self can have direct, inwitly (intuitive) knowledge of those Shapes and the other abstract things through its hyge (nous).

You raise good points about whether the external world exists, but why do you say “we”? Just as I don’t know whether the external world exists independently of me or is just invented by my mind, I also don’t know whether your mind exists independently of me or is just my mind’s invention.

Basic relational theory states that something can exist only in relation to something else. — Pop

Did I say otherwise?



I still cannot make out coherent arguments in your posts, and you also don’t give justifications for your claims.

You’re welcome and good luck with that kind of philosophizing.

It does not follow. That is your assumption. What does "essentially linked" mean? — Luke

Why do you first say that it supposedly doesn’t follow, but then ask what it even means? How can you judge a my statement without knowing what it even means?

That Poss(EID) and EID are essentially linked means that the wist (essence) of one involves the other, in this case the wist of Poss(EID). Poss(EID) is defined in terms of EID, so that (namely its wist) which makes Poss(EID) what it is has to do with EID. Hence, there’s a wistly link tying Poss(EID) to EID.

It means that for every finitely expressible idea EID, there’s a time-point t(EID) finitely far into the future such that my algorithm has found EID by the time t(EID).

In your previous post you indicated that "Poss(EID)" refers to the possibility of coming up with the idea. Now you are indicating that "Poss(EID)" refers to the possibility of finding the idea. I don't know why you even talk of possibilities since it your position that all ideas already exist. Why beat around the bush with talk of the possibilities of finding or coming up with ideas? — Luke

I mean to use the words “come up” and “find” in a neutral way, that is, as over-terms for “invent” and “discover”. Note that in German, the word “erfinden” means to invent, so “find” doesn’t imply discovery. By the way, it’s interesting to note that the German word hints at the right intuition that invention of instances of ideas involves the discovery (finding in the strict sense) of ideas themselves.

No, not necessarily, — Luke

I don’t quite understand; you could understand the Harry Potter books on their own, but not when you read a book of junk before or after them?

such as a 12th century person being unable to recognise the idea of a computer algorithm, etc. Your understander wouldn't be able to recognise other futuristic ideas by analogy. — Luke

Actually, the twelfth century person would be able to recognize the idea of a computer algorithm, for among the texts that my program outputs, there is a detailed account of all technological development from the twelfth yearhundred till 2020, so the middle-ager only needs to read through that account. My program will also output a text telling in perfect detail all conversations that ever happened from the dawn of Man to the fifteenth yearthousand and beyond, including, for example, all talk that happened in Plato’s Academy about his unwritten Doctrine of Principles, all conversations between computer pioneers and scientists and their before-comers, and all conversations that lead up to futuristic ideas.

I didn't say your algorithm would find them; I said it might eventually output a representation of every idea. — Luke

What’s the difference? To find an idea is to get/make a representation of it, except in the case of the seldom achievement of hygely (noetic) knowledge of the Shapes, which also doesn’t involve any invention whatsoever (indeed, it’s as least inventional as possible afaik).

What I meant was, even if we assume that your algorithm does output every idea (by brute force), it still doesn't help us to find those ideas. It would probably be easier for someone to invent the idea themself than to wade through the mountainous pile of junk produced by your algorithm, and this is even assuming that your algorithm has - at the relevant time - output the idea that might have otherwise been invented, [...] — Luke

My algorithm is not there to be put into actual practice anymore than quantum field theory is meant to be used to predict car accidents. It’s existence and principle abilities, rather than its practical usefulness, are what count.

since your algorithm could take an infinite amount of time to produce all the ideas. — Luke

Bear in mind that the there-is-quantifier ∃ doesn’t commute with the for-all-quantifier ∀, so the proposition that there is a time at which the algorithm has output all finite strings is strictly stronger than the proposition that for each finite string, there is a time at which the algorithm will have output that string. As a matter of fact, the former is untrue while the latter is true. I’ve only ever claimed the latter. — Tristan L

That's my point: it doesn't find ideas. It just endelssly spits out combinations of symbols, which is irrelevant to the question of whether ideas are invented or discovered. — Luke

No, for since the understander is part of the whole algorithm (as opposed to just its string-finding part), it does actually find ideas.

My proof also works when starting from the assumption that ideas can be invented (in my text that you quoted, I should have used a neutral word, like “come up”, instead of “discover”): If inventing an idea EID is possible, then that possibility Poss(invent EID) must have always existed. Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed. Hence, if it is possible to invent an idea, then the idea must have always existed, and can therefore not be invented. Now apply Clavius's Law (consequentia mirabilis).

I wouldn't say that Alice discovered it. I would say she reinvented it. — Magnus Anderson

You’re right, of course. I must’ve gotten something mixed up. I wanted to say that if Alice finds the idea based on Bob’s coming-up, then she only discovers the mental instance created by Bob (as well as the idea itself, which is always only discovered). But if she finds the idea independently of Bob, she “reinvents” it, that is, she invents another mental instance of it, thereby rediscovering the idea itself.

The possibility of coming up with the idea might have always existed. — Luke

... and has therefore always existed, for what may be possible is possible. See my answer to @Janus.

But that does not mean that the idea has always existed; someone needs to come up with it first. The possibility of coming up with the idea is not equivalent to actually coming up with the idea. Your attempted collapse of the distinction between possible and actual here is fatalistic. — Luke

You seem to still not understand what I’m saying and therefore ascribe claims to me which are not mine, hindering you from actually talking about my true points. It’s the other way round to what you claim it to be, for it is I who very clearly distinguishes between abstract ideas and their concrete instances, while you seem to still fail to make that crucial distinction.

The idea EID itself is essentially linked to the possibility Poss(EID) of finding that idea. However, a particular mental instance eid(Alice) of the idea has to be invented, created. So far, so good? But since Poss(EID) has always actually existed, so has EID (not eid(Alice) mind you).

Also, you’re just repeating your not-backed-up claim that “someone needs to come up with it [the idea] first”.

In our talk of ideas, I presume we are talking about useful ideas or ideas of some sort of value or interest to humanity. — Luke

All of which are finitely expressible (save for ones restricted to e.g. private gasty (spiritual) experiences).

You may recall I initially asked what algorithm exists that can help us to discover every idea that supposedly pre-exists. I find it questionable whether your algorithm actually helps us to discover any pre-existing ideas - particularly those which have not yet been discovered. Your algorithm produces only every possible combination of "the printable ASCII-characters". In our talk of ideas, I presume we are talking about useful ideas or ideas of some sort of value or interest to humanity. This is why I question your "understander" and their ability to detect ideas amidst junk strings of symbols, particularly ideas that nobody has previously known. — Luke

I trust that you can distinguish junk from the Harry Potter books without any knowledge about HP before, right? Well, the understander does the same thing.

Perhaps your algorithm might eventually output a representation of every idea that humankind will ever come up with (together with 99.99% junk), but I doubt that it would actually help in finding any of them. — Luke

You seem to contradict yourself. On the one hand, you rightly say that my algorithm will in the end find every idea that humans will ever express, but on the other hand, you (falsely) claim that it supposedly won’t help finding them. Which one do you choose?

This is not to say that those ideas all exist now, either, since I am speaking hypothetically from a perspective at the end of humankind's existence. Anyhow and ultimately, I don't see that this helps to resolve the question of whether ideas are invented or discovered. — Luke

Since it is already fixed and fore-determined now that the algorithm will find the ideas, they must exist now.

Actually, what is actually possible can change, but only in one direction: possibilites can at most get fewer with time. That is so because it is a logical fact that for every proposition Þ and all time-points t1, t2, t3 with t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3: if it’s actually possible at t2 that Þ is true at t3, then it’s actually possible at t1 that it’s actually possible at t2 that Þ is true at t3, so (since if something may be possible, then it is possible) it’s actually possible at t1 that Þ is true at t3.

Why is something possible if it may be possible? Well, if something may be possible, then there is a chance that it will be possible, in which case there is a chance that it will happen.

So, what I say still stands: What is actually possible now has always been actually possible. For instance, it is actually possible (and even actual) in the year 2020 CE that Janus and Tristan discuss the nature of ideas in the year 2020 CE, and it has always been actually possible, e.g. in the year 2009 CE, that Janus and Tristan would discuss the nature of ideas in the year 2020 CE.

Exactly.Tristan's mental instances of ideas are grounded in Tristan's consciousness, and nowhere else.If they were not they could not exist. Where did they exist before there was Tristan, or 10,000 years ago? - Nowhere! — Pop

The mental instances were indeed nowhere and didn’t even exist at all, but the ideas of which they are instances have always existed.

Only nothing can exist on its own. Everything else exists relative to something - including ideas.

So your assertion for ideas :"They don’t need any substrate at all; they just exist." is incorrect, as they cannot exist on their own - only nothing can exist on its own! — Pop

You have still not given any justification of this assumption. Moreover, while I also think that everything, including ideas and the other abstract objects, needs something to explain its existence, that something isn’t any individual mind, but likely the all-encompassing godly Hyge (Nous, Mind) and ultimately Oneness, the or-principle (first principle) which gives each abstract entity its wist (essence).

Numbers and abstract concepts exist relative to human consciousness.They are expressions of human consciousness. They are inextricably linked, and evolve together. Before there were people they did not exist!
When Human consciousness was little different to primate consciousness, they did not exist - there was no substrate for them to exist on! — Pop

That claim is showably false. Let’s look at three Triassic cynodonts who want to equally share two burrows between them so that each cynodont has the same number of cynodonts living together with it. It won’t work, for the number 3 is eternally undividable by the number 2. This shows that numbers and facts about them have always existed. Likewise, seven before-human primates wouln’t have been able to equally share 15 fruits, for 15 isn’t divisible by 7 – then as now.

The same goes for abstract concepts: the possibility of finding ... but I’m repeating myself:

Let EID be an arbitrary idea [e.g. abstract concept] that someone has found. Since someone has found EID, it must always have been actually possible that someone could someday find EID. So the possibility Poss(EID) that someone might someday come up with EID must have always actually existed. But Poss(EID) is actually defined in terms of EID – it’s the possibility of finding EID after all –, and so, there is an actual, essential, fixed bond between EID and Poss(EID). Hence, EID must also have always actually existed. — Tristan L

I broadly agree with you.

Creativity is simply the ability to discover previously undisocvered solutions to problems. — Magnus Anderson

Or ideas generally, not necessarily solutions to problems, I think. Yes, that’s true.

How you're going to discover such solutions is completely irrelevant. In other words, you can use a deterministic process but you can also use a random process. It does not matter. — Magnus Anderson

Actually, I think that it does matter. If the discovery-process is deterministic, the concrete instance of the solution exists from the start, although it only becomes “seeable” at the time that it manifests in a direct shape. Therefore, this is only creation in the broad sense, not in the strict sense. For example, the concrete software solutions that my algorithm will find already exist now, although not in a recognizable shape, so they can’t yet be used right now. They only become usable once the algorithm actually finds them, and that is the moment at which they are created (in the not-strict way). By contrast, if the concrete instance of the solution is found by a not-deterministic process, that instance is created in the strict sense. For instance, if I replace my deterministic program with a monkey banging on a keyboard (with the understander, including compiler, staying in place, of course), then the software solutions are created at about the time that the monkey writes them, and they’re created in the strict sense.

[Pfhorrest said:] “I hold that there really isn't a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas[...]”

I disagree with the bolded.

I will repeat what Luke said.

"Discovery" implies that the thing that is discovered existed before discovery whereas "invention" implies that the thing that is invented did not exist before. — Magnus Anderson

Yes, I also think that.

If you are talking about the set of all possible ideas, these can't be invented, since they already exist; they can only be discovered.

But that's because we're talking about the set of all possible ideas. The set contains all ideas that are possible -- there is absolutely no room for new ideas. If we're talking about the set of all actual ideas, however, one can introduce new ideas to it so as long it does not contain all possible ideas. An actual idea, that one that either existed within someone's brain at some point in time or did not, can be invented, provided there was no brain within which it existed previously. — Magnus Anderson

That is also what I think if what you call “possible idea” is what I call “idea” and what you call “actual idea” is what I call “concrete mental instance of an idea”. In any case, though, I think (though I’m not sure) that your position is not too far from mine.

An actual idea [...] can be invented, provided there was no brain within which it existed previously. — Magnus Anderson

I agree with you if you mean the following: A mental instance of an idea in Alice’s mind has been invented by Alice, unless it was first invented by Bob’s mind, in which case Alice’s mind only discovers that instance of the idea.

However, I’d like to add that two minds can create different mental instances of one and the same idea. This is what we call “independently coming up with the same idea”.

Why is it certain that all existing things will be discovered? — Luke

All the ideas that my algoritm may discover, it will discover.

I don't understand what "possibilities are defined in terms of their belonging ideas" means, or how it follows that "ideas must always be actual as well". — Luke

Let EID be an arbitrary idea that someone has found. Since someone has found EID, it must always have been actually possible that someone could someday find EID. So the possibility Poss(EID) that someone might someday come up with EID must have always actually existed. But Poss(EID) is actually defined in terms of EID – it’s the possibility of finding EID after all –, and so, there is an actual, essential, fixed bond between EID and Poss(EID). Hence, EID must also have always actually existed.

You previously defined an "understander" as "the person or group of people who reads/read every finite-length string put out by the string-outputter". Do you know of anyone who has such perfect knowledge? You seem to be talking about a theoretically ideal "person or group", not an actual "person or group". — Luke

Firstly, I never meant my algorithm to be used in practice, so scientists, artists, mathematicians, and philosophers don’t have to worry that they’ll be out of work soon. The existence of my algorithm and its ability in principle to find all ideas finitely expressible in the Modern English speech is what counts.

Secondly, even if the understander isn’t perfect, he’ll still deterministically find a great many ideas which you claim to be have to be made creatively. However, bear in mind that any real-life shortcoming of the understander is also a shortcoming of other traditional idea-finders, so there’s nothing that a creative person can do which my algorithm can’t do (although the algorithm needs a very long time). But yep, my understander is idealized nonetheless, though certainly not all-knowing or anything of the like at all.

Perhaps, but your algorithm could take thousands or millions of years to output many of the symbol-strings, by which time Modern English (2020) will most likely have evolved or died. — Luke

it requires someone with perfect knowledge of Modern English to understand each and every idea. This is all fanciful. — Luke

You are arguing that all ideas pre-exist, are discoverable, and will be output by your algorithm. But you think that the practical issue of being able to discover them in the output of your algorithm is beside the point? — Luke

The point is to show that any idea can in principle be found deterministically, so practical issues are indeed beside the point. But even so, my algorithm with the idealized understander will find every idea finitely expressible in Modern English, and even with an imperfect understander, it’ll find a great many ideas that are supposedly invented. Mind you also that any imperfection of the understander is also an imperfection of creative people and their recipients, so creative folks cannot find anything which my algorithm can’t find.

Your arguing against my point is like someone arguing against a determinist that there is no Laplace's demon in real life – he brings up a practical issue which is beside the point (not that I’m a determinist; I just used this as an illustration).


Moreover, I did away with all the practical issues by using the formal, Turing-complete programming speech PASCAL instead of Modern English, so what do you say to that?

Your algorithm will supposedly spit out every possible combination of symbols. This is virtually irrelevant to the supposed pre-existence of ideas. Your algorithm doesn't just output representations of ideas; it outputs mostly junk. This is hardly an algorithmic way of discovering ideas. — Luke

What do you mean by “virtually irrelevant”?

My algorithm finds each possible finitely expressible idea after a finite time. It works without flaw. That it’s very inefficient because of all the junk is of no relevance, except if your goal is to make creative folks jobless rather that prove a point about the nature of ideas.

Your algorithm will also take infinitely long to output all possible combinations of symbols — Luke

At what point does your program stop outputting? — Luke

It won’t ever stop. Bear in mind that the there-is-quantifier ∃ doesn’t commute with the for-all-quantifier ∀, so the proposition that there is a time at which the algorithm has output all finite strings is strictly stronger than the proposition that for each finite string, there is a time at which the algorithm will have output that string. As a matter of fact, the former is untrue while the latter is true. I’ve only ever claimed the latter.

The point is that nobody is omniscient, including any actual "understander". — Luke

Just like the Pascal Compiler doesn’t know every possible PASCAL-program, yet can still compile any and every source-code that obeys PASCAL-syntax as well as check it for syntax-compliance before that.

Yes, because your program wouldn't be able to recreate those books in either of our lifetimes. — Luke

I’m not talking about that practical issue. I’m asking you whether there’s any inherent difference between Rowling’s HP books and my algorithm’s HP books.

The algorithm wouldn't be able to write its own program if you hadn't first invented the algorithm. — Luke

But my program will also find any similar program that you write independently of you, and likewise, your hypothetical program will find my program.

Is there a program that has perfect knowledge of Modern English? — Luke

So do you at least accept that all programs already exist?

Unlike the output of your algorithm, I don't have to disregard a whole bunch of meaningless junk when dealing with the natural numbers. I can simply find any number I want whenever I want. — Luke

What’s the problem with disregarding junk other than that it gobbles up a lot of time? The process of separating the wheat from the chaff is straightforward and well-defined. In the case of the compiler, there’s even no issue whatsoever.

I don't need to; you've already conceded that "There are certainly not-finitely-expressible-ideas". — Luke

Yep, you do, for though I’m quite certain that there are such ideas, that doesn’t mean that any of them have been discovered. In fact, although I think that some unsayable ideas have been discovered (which by definition only the respective discoverer and hypothetical thoughtcasters can know about), I believe that no only infinitely expressible ideas have ever been discovered. Anyways, they’re not of much practical weight, and they’re likely not what you had in mind when talking about ideas. The Mona Lisa, the toaster, the Van-de-Graaf hight-voltage generator, and all other ideas in science, technology, art, mathematics, and philosophy are finitely expressible anyhow.

Your argument is that if your argument is true, then why shouldn't your argument be true? That's not much of an argument. — Luke

No, that is untrue. This argument of mine runs thus: The algorithm-argument shows that all finitely expressible ideas must fore-exist. This includes all practially relevant ideas. Hence, why shouldn’t the same be true for only infinitely expressible ideas and unsayable ones (which aren’t of much scientific, mathematical, artistic, literary, or technological interest anyhow)?

It is your claim that your algorithm will output every idea. If some ideas cannot be output by your algorithm, e.g., because they are "not-finitely-expressible" or because they are "totally unsayable", then your algorithm cannot output every idea and therefore your claim is false. — Luke

It is in fact your claim about mine which is false. I never claimed that my algorithm can output all ideas. Rather, I have claimed that all finitiely ideas will come out of my algorithm. If you focus only on the other ideas, of which you can, by definition, not give me an example, that would already be a great retreat on your part.

You seem to think ideas exist in the ether, and that they are not tied to a consciousness ground, and not subject to evolutionary principles. — Pop

Yes, of course, just as numbers, functions, sets, properties, relationships, and all the other abstract things exist in the ‘above-heavenly world (hyperuranion)’ – which is just another way of saying that they don’t exist in space or time (but not outside them, either, for outsideness is a spatial notion) – and aren’t tied to awareness or evolution or anything conrete for that matter, be it physical, mindly, spatial, or temporal. However, instances of abstract entities of ideas, such as my thought about the fact that all ideas are timeless, are often: concrete, subject to change and evolution, and in need of a physical and/or mental substrate.

You seem to be arguing that cave men could have flown to the moon? — Pop

Not at all, for what does the one have to do with the other?

Really? What substrate do your ideas exist on? — Pop

What you call “Tristan’s ideas” are actually mental instances of ideas, and these exist in my consciousness.

Human ideas exist on a substrate of human consciousness.They are shared via a collective consciousness know as culture. Human ideas and human consciousness evolved together - inextricably linked - ideas are an expression of human consciousness! — Pop

If you replace the word “ideas” with the phrase “instances of ideas”, I’ll agree with you.

For an idea to exist it must exist somewhere – [...] — Pop

Actually no, just as numbers don’t have to exist anywhere in order to exist. Indeed, what just exists (abstractly) has a purer shape of existence and is at least as real as what exists somewhere (and therefore concretely).

[...] – If "they just exist", where do they just exist? — Pop

The question is wrong, in a similar in way in which the question “What color is the electron?” is wrong – they’re both based on false premises and thereby meaningless. I think that you think too concretely.