I'm sorry, I don't remember this question. — RogueAI

Well, I raised it in every post today...

It's more like: how can you not see the absurdity. — RogueAI

At first sight, it does seem absurd that these devices could compute, but when you work through the Turing-equivalence argument, you see that it is not, after all, absurd at all. So here you have a difference between an emotional and a rational response to the issue.

No. I don't think a rock-shuffling device that can pass a Turing test is absurd. — RogueAI

There seems to be something of a misunderstanding here -- my question referred to Turing equivalence; I did not (and did not intend to) raise the Turing test. The fact, however, that you accept that a rock-shuffling device could pass a Turing test -- something that not even an electronic digital computer has done so far -- just goes to show that your issue is not, after all, with the medium in which the computation is performed, even if it feels to you that, somehow, it should be.

I think a conscious rock-shuffling device is absurd — RogueAI

We can, with complete generality, substitute 'digital computer', or any other type of Turing-equivalent machine, for 'rock-shuffling device' in this statement. Therefore, this just underscores the point that you just cannot believe that any Turing-equivalent machine of any type could be conscious, and that your objection is not actually dependent on the type of device.

Materialism's absolute lack of progress... — RogueAI

Yes, we already agreed that it is a premise, but no other approach has done any better.

It reminds me of the tortured explanations fundamentalists give — RogueAI

Have you read any Chalmers recently? And Chalmers is a model of clarity compared to, for example Hegel; It is just that his arguments are subtle and nuanced for an ordinary mortal such as myself. Arguments that qualia are factual knowledge are, IMHO, as tortuous as anything that fundamentalists come up with.

The obvious difference between mental states and brain states. — RogueAI

That is not a problem for materialism: mental states are abstract emergent phenomena caused by physical processes.

A blind person really could understand what "seeing" is if they just knew enough about the brain states involved. — RogueAI

Any materialist who thinks that is probably mistaken - knowledge of brain states does not necessarily give you the ability to instantiate them.

. Why shouldn't I assume minds and consciousness are the foundation of reality? — RogueAI

You can believe whatever you like, but why, then, do you care what us illusions think?

I don't believe there are physical devices. I'm an idealist, for the reasons given. — RogueAI

Why, then, would you have any opinion at all about what rocks can and cannot do?

OK, I think we all get the point that your mind is set. Providing yet more examples of what you are sure are absurd is not going to make that point any more strongly -- or make it any more true.

On the other hand, you seem very determined not to answer my question, which I will repeat: do you consider it to be absurd that a rock-shuffling Turing-equivalent device (or any other device in your 'absurd' category) could win the game show Jeopardy?

I am sure you are aware of where this is going: if the answer is "no", then it would seem that your issue is not actually with the medium in which the computation is performed, but if it is "yes", then there is the problem that a digital computer has actually achieved this task, and, according to some completely straightforward and non-controversial theorems of finite mathematics, any other Turing-equivalent device with sufficient memory could perform the same task, so long as we are not concerned with how fast it does it.

Reductio ad absurdum is a valid move in philosophy. — RogueAI

Indeed it is, but its English name, 'proof by contradiction', is clearer than the Latin: it means to refute an argument by deducing a logical contradiction from its premises (or to prove one by refuting its antithesis.) It most definitely does not mean simply declaring something to be absurd (even if it really is!)

I guess I can argue why it's absurd, if you like, but... — RogueAI

This is exactly what I mean when I say that it is often used to avoid considering the issue. I think you would find it a very useful exercise to put your intuitions aside and formulate an argument for it being absurd.

...it seems prima facie very unlikely consciousness would arise that way. — RogueAI

The materialist premise does not propose, imply or depend on it being at all likely.

Is panpsychism compatible with materialism? — RogueAI

This is not panpsychism, which is the premise that consciousness is ubiquitous. The possibility that a sufficiently-large collection of anything could move in a way that creates consiousness is not the premise that any sufficiently-large collection of anything is necessarily conscious. While any of these 'absurd' forms of consciousness are theoretically possible in those versions of materialism that admit strong AI, they are way beyond astronomically-unlikely in any finite region of space, so are not, in any sense, even close to being ubiquitous.

To me, there's no difference between that and transubstantiation — RogueAI

I am no expert in this matter, but doesn't transubstantiation violate some physical laws?

https://xkcd.com/505/ — RogueAI

If I am not mistaken, here Randall Munroe is accepting the premise! He is not making an argument against anything.

I notice that you have not replied directly to my question in my other post: do you consider it to be absurd that a rock-shuffling Turing-equivalent device could win the game show Jeopardy? That was not intended to be a rhetorical question, and I am genuinely not sure how you would answer it, though I would think that to be consistent with everything else you have said on the matter, your answer would be that you find it absurd.

My intent was to make a general point about a certain style of argument, but as you want a quote, I have added one to my original post. One prominent example of this style is Searle's assertion that syntax cannot give rise to semantics.

Now that we are on this particular issue, however, let me make a couple of points that did not come out in the earlier discussion of it. Firstly, if someone claims that something is necessarily so, they assume the burden of justifying their claim, rather than challenge the rest of us to prove them wrong. Secondly, do you consider it to be absurd that a rock-shuffling Turing-equivalent device could win the game show Jeopardy?

If all psychological research were conducted in the lax manner you propose, then no, it would not be science!

Firstly, we should beware of pop-phi concepts of what science is. Prediction and falsifiability are important concepts in general, but consider Linnaus' work on taxonomy: it is not clear that it had either, yet its importance for setting the framework for Darwin cannot be over-emphasized. 'All' Linnaus did was to look at diversity without trying to force it into a preconceived grand scheme, as many of his predecessors tried to do.

Secondly, we should not assume that a science of psychology must be a neurological one. If psychology is as successful in characterizing the mental as Linnaus was with respect to biology, or Brahe was with respect to astronomy, it is already a science.

With respect to the question of whether people are being honest, we should pay attention to what they do, as well as what they say. It is much harder to behave consistently with a lie than it is to say it.

People passing notes back and forth aren't going to create an instantiation of consciousness. — RogueAI

Declaring that "X cannot give rise to Y" (or asking, rhetorically, "how can X give rise to Y") does not answer anything, or advance our understanding. It is like asserting that an iron boat could not float. Often, this rhetorical style is used as a way to avoid considering the issue.

The premise that consciousness can be simulated rests on a number of lesser premises, none of which are obviously false (at least if you put aside 'arguments' of the above form):

• Consciousness appears to arise in physical brains doing physical things.
• Physical systems can be simulated by a digital computer.
• Something processing information in a functionally-identical manner to a conscious brain would have a conscious mind.

I like the way Scott Aaronson puts it: if you replaced each of my neurons, one at a time, with a functionally-identical silicon device, would there come a point where I stopped being conscious?

These are all premises, but not unreasonable ones. You might disagree with the conclusion, but that alone would not be an argument against it.