"I'm saying it may not be sane to seek happiness and possessions, etc. if it will all get taken in an instant as you trip going up the stairs. (Knocking on wood for you!) But if you had actively cultivated suffering you might think, as your face hits the concrete, that this wasn't such a bad thing after all."
The proposed behavioral strategy: in comparison with the misery we inflict upon ourselves,
we will welcome death with a sensation of relief, being happier than otherwise,
“when we are finally free to die.” But if one dies falling down the stairs, one will not experience the relief. One will be in a state of panic for about 2 seconds with no time for reflection.
“ … but at the end of it all it's gone …”
If this is accepted, it undermines the strategy. The broadest categories related to the
fear of death do not involve the
experience of death.
On the one hand, within a mechanist’s view, to identify something as an experience one has to ruminate on past events by way of a physiological memory. Where there is no memory there is no experience, no suffering. Consequently, one will never actually experience death. Consequently, one will never experience this relief: “it wasn’t so bad after all.”
On the other hand, within the viewpoint of an eternal soul, one disagrees and says, “But I will experience death as I pass to the next life!” But then that could only mean that one believes one will (somehow) pass on one’s memories, and the identity that depends upon them, to another self-aware state “beyond” “death.” But that’s not the death of
this self,
this identity,
this ongoing experience. The word “death” here refers to something very different. What we fear in this case is the
continuation of predicaments not very different from what we experience in this life. We fear an uncertainty akin to that of a journey from one “place” to another “place.” This
journey is not the death of my sense of self and memory-dependent identity.
Reincarnation? Or, one is resurrected but not with one’s memories and identity? If one resurrects or transmigrates without one’s memory intact, one is not who one was. It would be the death of
this identity.
This loss would bring us back to the mechanist’s view, that death is not experienced by “us.” Our present identities do not survive the journey.
In sum, death of identity will not be experienced. If we fear that
experience, we misunderstand the predicament. It is losing the sense of self and identity that is feared,
and that entails a value placed upon this life.
In fact, what is there that we fear we might lose that we do not value with that very fear? Just so, if we fear the loss of happiness, we value happiness.
“… if you had actively cultivated suffering you might think, as your face hits the concrete, that this wasn't such a bad thing after all.”
This is just a backdoor to valuing happiness. If we are seeking this reward for our pains, and if rewards are by definition happier than punishments, then we are ultimately seeking to be happier, not more miserable. If our strategy is “it wasn’t such a bad thing after all,” then we are still talking about
progressing from a more painful experience to a less painful one. We are still moving toward happiness, even if in the form of “not as miserable after all.”
1. We can’t experience the relief of death at death.
2. And a current proposal of relief is not the later, targeted relief.
3. And if the proposal involves no real “trade” between pain and relief, it serves no purpose.
• So why not just go through the front door and admit that the goal is to live happier or at least less miserably?
“What I'm suggesting is replace the fear with want, flip it on its head, fear life by making our lives full of suffering and pain, and love it when we are finally free to die.”
This sounds like deliberately buying a very bad novel and forcing oneself to read it all the way through just so that one can be relieved to be finally done with it. And why would one do this? Because one knows that when one reads a good novel one’s joy will turn to disappointment when one comes to the end … ? Does this disappointment devalue the good novel? No, it proves its value to us. It is the
ending of the pleasure of reading that we devalue in the good novel, which means that we value the pleasure of reading it.
Just so, we value the happiness of living when we fear the loss of life and resist unrewarding pain and suffering. We devalue life, meaninglessly, when we deliberately seek out pains whose rewards we can never experience.
One only experiences life, not death. If one believes it is a test, one should strive to pass that test. If one fears the loss of one’s life, then one values that life to the degree of one’s fear. If making one’s life more valuable increases one’s fear of losing this life, then one will add courage to one’s ever appreciating life. The thrill of life is implied, contained, and emphasized by our courage in the face of our fear of its end.