When we project our preferences on society, it is no longer just ourselves that is affected. Issues that would 'require' collective action often have proponents and opponents, since what is considered an improvement by some, may not be considered an improvement by others. — Tzeentch

I am saying that certain policies will objectively increase people's opportunities and wellbeing, such as attempts to avoid climate catastrophe; anyone who opposes these attempts without a hefty philosophical argument ("party and go" comes to mind) is just wrong. You just need the facts and a few key assumptions. Furthermore, I think that the very process of potentially improving the lot of every human on earth could in and of itself lead to personal growth, even if there are some ideological aspects of your cause. And I don't know what tension you are talking about. I like some of what Jordan Peterson does. And so what if we affect other people in the process of growing? That doesn't nullify the growth.

I would sooner put my lot in with academia and research than with the common person. After all, Trump got elected. That says a lot. That being said, the experiences of those who feel the disenfranchisement you seem to be embodying is still important - especially when the feeling is shared by many. Are you being genuine? I seriously can't tell.

Yeah that's great and all but that's just how you feel it seems. Can you cite research or a study that says that all governments are plutocracies? What about Kibbutz's in Israel? Are they plutocracies? What about the Greeks? Did they not have a democracy? I define a democracy as "a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives". Most of the highest rated democracies are social democracies, but democracies nonetheless.

Good point. But what about those who can't leave and feel like the government has been failing them? Non-violent protest? And if someone who voted in favor of violent protest being justified could give me some hard policy positions that they would like to be implemented that would be great.

Yeah I know and it is messed up. I don't give a crap if people hate me for saying something, but I'm just a little guy with nothing to lose. Free speech is essential. Many of those who are sympathetic to rioters or support violence now will be cracked down on eventually. It's bound to happen; once you sign away free speech as a principle you open the door to the establishment dominating the discourse. I saw someone get fact checked on facebook because they shared this meme: https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/blm-buses-photo/ And while fact checking isn't quite suppression, I don't think people's posts should be fact checked. The fact checking wasn't by facebook, but facebook gets to decide which posts get fact checked it seems, and they appear to be fact checking mostly conservatives. Idiots actually. Only an idiot would believe some of the crap that gets spread around.

Check out this study: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index Maybe the US government isn't as corrupt and backwards as it seems. That being said, "flawed" is still pretty bad.

According to a study I found there are some full democracies: https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index For instance, many of the European democracies qualify and top the rankings. Somewhat ironically they are social democracies. The US is considered a flawed democracy, probably because of corporations meddling with our elections and such. But maybe I'm wrong about the democratic mechanisms being almost broken. More research is needed.

I remember hearing about the study that showed that the US is an oligarchy. Despite this, I think we can still salvage our country however through the existing, but nearly broken, democratic mechanisms in place. Thanks for commenting btw.

I probably shouldn't be serial commenting on my own thread but this is a new cohesive thought: one might argue that racist policies are so entrenched in our government that we need to "start fresh" so to speak. The democratic system, on every level, is not serving the people. I don't know what we could put in its place but this an argument I (think?) I've heard.

I am inclined to agree. Those who support the violence seem to not even have any real policy positions either. It's just burn it all down as far as I can tell. If they want change they should vote in people who will make change instead of making the rest of the left look bad.

I should add that I have seen people openly endorsing violence and sympathizing with rioters on facebook. They just don't get censored because they are on the left it would seem.

Oh jeeze. I hope it had nothing to do with my thread.

One of my favorite quotes

lmao. Yeah it bothers the crap out of me but it's necessary sometimes. Like Slavoj Zizek says:

it is precisely if there is god, that everything is permitted to those who not only believe in god but who perceive themselves as…direct instruments of the divine will. If you posit or perceive or legitimize yourself as a direct instrument of the divine will, then of course all narrow, petty moral considerations disappear. How can you even think in such narrow terms when you are a direct instrument of god?

Yeah I know it's a crap theory, I'm just presenting something from the point of view of someone who subscribes to divine command theory.

Oh yeah I meant moral commands, I think that might have been confusing. Sorry.

I don't prescribe to either, I'm merely attempting to reconcile a claim of amorality within the epistemology of divine command; and I think that divine command only causes events insofar as people believe a god's moral disclosures and act on them. I think we might be talking over each other a little. Divine command theory just makes morality objective, but still arbitrary. All of the existing moral facts would be derived from a supernatural source. The question you pose has little to do with ethics it seems to me, but, once again, I could be wrong.

I suppose that if I change it to "doesn't believe in god" then it makes it a lack of belief in revelation instead of a denial; it's more agnostic.

Sorry, had to make an important edit. I should have said in my first post that I'm referring to merely not believing in god.

First off most atheists don't deny god's existence, they just don't believe in him, so really there is no action to be judged. Second I'm not trying to ascertain whether or not it could be moral to not believe in a god, I'm trying to determine whether or not not believing in god is tantamount to denying god's commands after granting that divine command theory is infallible. I totally agree that there is nothing out there good enough to have been made by an omnipotent, omniscient creator as far as books go. Tell me if I'm misunderstanding you.

I don't believe a fetus can indeed desire to be alive. But correct me if I'm wrong. And it seems wise to me to demarcate human life and personhood. Not doing this is speciesist as Cows are more like cognitively developed humans than fetuses yet we torture and slaughter them without a thought. .

I assume at the end of your post you refer the paradox of the heap. I wrote this somewhere else:

The need to define fetal personhood does not indeed lead to a paradox of the heap, as some might suggest; changes in predicates of potential personhood occur at specific points in fetal development, regardless of the fact that it remains genetically identical throughout its development. These predicates are not vague; they are quite specific. This applies if you grant that being human doesn't constitute being a person per say, but rather self-awareness, consciousness, viability, etc. Thus one can retain the belief that a fetus is not a person with a right to life.

And no, fulfilling preferences is not the same as being happy. Perhaps I work hard writing good poetry when really what would maximize my pleasure would be eating a chocolate bar. Both fulfill preferences, but one results in greater happiness.

As for the meat of your argument: according to you it must me wrong to use contraception because one is preventing a being with a valuable future from being born. The same goes for celibacy.

I can't really respond to you too well, as I don't know much philosophy. I haven't read any Plato. But is my argument sound?

ok that makes sense. Thanks.

What do you mean by predicate? I looked it up but it has a few definitions.

Or maybe I should put in more work. nvm.

If god's moral commands are entirely dependent upon his will then they are arbitrary by definition. If its arbitrary for me then its arbitrary for god.

Read my latest post and tell me what's wrong with it. Please.

I define myself as the ultimate moral arbiter and everything I command is objective because I say so. Now kneel.

Yes but even if one takes the first horn god's commands are arbitrary. This is just a fact. If you say that these commands are made good by the properties of god you open yourself up to another dilemma: are properties that are associated with goodness good because God possesses them or does God possess them because they are good?

If you take the first horn then another argument applies:

One might ground moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. One might say that divine command theory is an ontological argument. But an issue arises. Under this view both god and the presupposition of his commands hold the property of being good, even if they are not semantically related. This, however, means that god's nature is identical to the source of his commands. This appears to rob god of moral agency; he is a tool for relaying his own arbitrarily defined nature.

This god might as well not exist.

One could, however, drop the goodness property but then you subject yourself to Euthyphro's dilemma again.

Totally not calling you an apologist TheMadFool, btw. You seem honest and interested in the truth.

Perhaps this will be better.

I'm ascribing supreme prudence to my grandmother who, being supremely prudent in nature, issues supremely prudent commands (wash one's hands, look both ways before crossing the street, etc.) The question here is: if my grandmother's full nature is that of supreme prudence, as a property, and the property is a presupposition of her commands too, then it seems that her nature is the same thing as the source of her commands. This seems to eliminate any agency on the part of my grandmother; she is just a tool for relaying her own nature.

Yeah this is a thinly veiled criticism of DCT. I'm trying to expunge it from my mind still with reason.

And I say full nature because people assume god is only good.

What would you say if I attributed supreme prudence to my grandmother's nature, which is an ontological statement, and then claimed in the same breath that she doesn't embody the word itself, as that would be mere semantics. Could it be argued that she is still defined to be the concept of prudence?

And I appreciate your thoughtful reply. I need to read it a few more times.

Yes, I believe you are right. People look for meaning in a frightening world, often times turning to dogma and faith-based belief. They often times find a belief that makes them feel good then work backwards to justify it rationally. This often times does not work. I'm pretty certain that Divine Command theory can be disposed of. Not even the introduction of omnibenevolence helps the theory.

I'm still confused. What does the promoting or harming? And what is being promoted or harmed?

Yes, most secular people do seem to define good and evil for themselves. Not certain I understand the bit about increasing and decreasing meaning though. Could you explain that?

I'm trying to show that god being omnibenevolent is not a way of escaping Euthyphro's Dilemma. I'm judging by your lack of meaningful response that I made the point.

God says 'don't fuck your neighbour's wife', or whatever... what's the difficulty?

I am the last person to care about a god's commands. Why bring that up?

That's not a moral command but rather learned prudence. But even so her commands are intelligible because they are not tied to her nature but rather just known from experience. Its not inherent to her character or nature. She embodies no concepts. Furthermore for it to be a parallel mummy would have to command prudence exclusively.

My point remains.

I posted this in another thread but its relevant here too.

There is one objection to divine command theory that I used to find definitive but now realized needed more work.

It goes like this: if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good, then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command. This renders god's commands meaningless. If you want them to mean anything you have to drop god's omnibenevolence.

Can you try harder to contribute? Think before you post please. You don't even have to be correct, just on topic.

I have no idea what you're talking about. Did you even read mine or anyone else's posts? And what is creative agility?

William Lane Craig has a seemingly worthy objection to my posts:

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-again?fbclid=IwAR0D-1TnBejeRSklINCFl-ZEI1s7YJukSQbdwOApsNAEdxuy2_AQuFaxpyk

Dr. Craig grounds the moral values in god's nature without making the claim that god is the definition of the word good. He says that divine command theory is an ontological argument. To say, however, that god's nature is good is to define it with a concept: the concept of goodness. Additionally to call god's commands good is to do the same thing. If good describes both of these things then this leads to the conclusion that God's commands are his nature. This renders god a non-person; a vehicle for arbitrary moral commands since his commands are not informed by his good nature but rather by whimsy.

god is good

God's commands are good

god's commands are god

I believe I read this in Practical Ethics.