Yes I believe its possible for god's commands to be moral, but one has to sacrifice the omnibenevolence bit. The now boring main issue is the arbitrariness. And I don't believe that there is a difference.

Yes but if god is omnibenevolent and all that is good, and his moral commands are also defined as good then his commands would be: "God commands god." Which of course makes no sense; that's not a valid command.

On point. But he actually says that nothing he's saying applies to normative ethics; he is just making a claim about the objectivity of god's commands. This is, of course, false. Indeed I think that Dennis Prager would just bite the bullet on this one, being he's a nut.

We all have on average the same nervous system, the same type of brain, the same intellectual and emotional profile

What about mentally ill people and those with personality disorders?

Making sure that populations are empowered by education to reach maximum achievement rather than hampered by an inadequate system is also an important concern. Enhancing medical treatment and technology in general is vital to the prospects for quality of life.

This is exceedingly obvious and doesn't need to be stated in my opinion.
This:

Assuring we do not destroy ourselves with our own technological development is a salient dilemma.

is somewhat interesting.

what detracts from one life detracts from every life in approximately equal measure.

You are really making quite a claim there. Being deprived of social media might be devastating to one person but not to another. I think you must mention privations.

Commonalities of need informing civilized social relationships and the mechanisms of institutions have obtained for roughly ten thousand years, while the window of time within which human decision-makers must exercise themselves to apply and augment social factors in institutional contexts is only a few generations at the most, a fraction of the single lifespan.

Are you saying that people have not acted within institutions to bring about changes in social norms or to change those institutions until less than one lifespan ago? I don't really have any idea what you're trying to say here.
What is this:

evolutionary relativism

to cover their asses

You cannot say this in a scholarly essay.

prevent this rampant destructiveness

Where did this come from? Why are you just mentioning it at the end of the essay?

I tried very hard to understand your essay but it just doesn't make sense to me. Sweeping claims are made with no evidence, such as those about human nature, and the language is muddled. I would recommend sticking closer to a functional thesis. Sorry.

I see more what you're saying. Yes I agree that if people value fetuses they should value the children they become,

Well I'm a white man so maybe I'm moralizing here, but I don't think that no one cares about the child; in fact I would argue that people care too much about fetuses, being they're non-persons for much of their existence. No one has these kinds of attitudes about factory farming. More to the point, I agree that it should be a personal decision on the part of the woman and that a better foster care system should be set up. But I think its okay to have these kinds of debates. But even if women are driven to get abortions by society, that doesn't make abortion moral. So I guess that's where we disagree. Nevertheless it might make condemning women extremely distasteful.

Yes but you should be writing copious essay about the cruelties visited upon ants.

I see that he did that. Fair enough. But if its immoral it ought not to be done right? Or am I missing something?

lol I feel stupid. Yes he should be focusing on those other things.

You didn't answer my earlier question. What's your argument against human life being intrinsically valuable because that life can eventually feel pleasure and have preferences?
Most argue that a woman's autonomy outweighs the fetus's life. You claimed that women should "bear the consequences", which I can only assume means carry the child to term. That, whether or not its correct, remains to be an erosion of autonomy. You did use the word should after all.

He just admitted that he cares about all life.

Well I respect you then. Many are very inconsistent on that point.

I don't think Tzeentch is depreciating the value of fetuses, but rather the autonomy of women. He just doesn't want anything killed.

But its a vegetable. It cannot feel; it is not sentient or conscious. If you think its wrong to kill fetuses that are non-persons then you must have a problem with killing vegetables, or all life. You must also abstain from eating meat. I don't see any tragedy in eating a head of broccoli.

Is it wrong to rip a carrot out of the ground and eat it? You might have to swear off vegetables.

I don't think the unenlightened is arguing that abortion is okay because its fashionable or because its socially acceptable; I believe they're saying that women are treated terribly often times and that they face hard choices. But correct me if I'm wrong.

Would you argue that a justification for abortion arises out of the existence of an autonomous person's rights? Because ending a human's life might be argued to be an act that prevents an intrinsically valuable being capable of having preferences and feeling pleasure from entering the world. At the very least conservatives seem to put this kind of value on the fetus's life. How would you argue against this?

If god's commands are arbitrary, and not derived from moral facts, I see no reason to follow them and not one's own values. God has no commanding authority apart from his own unjustified commands under Divine Command Theory, and even commanding his commands to be obligatory would be arbitrary.

I find your viewpoint to be refreshing!

Quite frankly, Dingo, I don't understand half of what you say, and I have not been arguing in bad faith. I did indeed address you because you failed to understand the simple point that just because god commands something doesn't mean that it is not arbitrary. Maybe you can answer me a question: how is it that divine command theory is objective to believers? They might believe that they are following absolute moral laws but in reality they can't be unless absolute moral laws independent of god exist. Their belief is completely irrelevant. If I believe something hard enough does it make it the case?

“Does God command this particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right because God commands it?” It is in answering this question that the divine command theorist encounters a difficulty. A defender of Divine Command Theory might respond that an action is morally right because God commands it. However, the implication of this response is that if God commanded that we inflict suffering on others for fun, then doing so would be morally right. We would be obligated to do so, because God commanded it. This is because, on Divine Command Theory, the reason that inflicting such suffering is wrong is that God commands us not to do it. However, if God commanded us to inflict such suffering, doing so would become the morally right thing to do. The problem for this response to Socrates’ question, then, is that God’s commands and therefore the foundations of morality become arbitrary, which then allows for morally reprehensible actions to become morally obligatory.

The Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy.

It's peer reviewed and says gods commands under divine command theory would be arbitrary. I think this can end that argument. But perhaps you have more criticisms?

Furthermore what other than reason or observation would moral facts obtain from (If not of course from god)? I think that that one is just a given.

I'm trying to show why Dennis Prager's worldview is not as consistent or based on sound reasoning as one might think. I just don't see how you can think that something being good merely because god commands it is not subjective. How one might go about determining moral facts in god's absence is irrelevant mostly as this has little to do with their existence. But in order for the commands to be not arbitrary they must have been derived from something that exists independent of god. .

First off when I say "reasoned" I mean "not arbitrary". And yes, I would indeed assert that all moral facts must be derived from some sort of reasoning or observation in order for them to be absolute. Otherwise the moral facts are correct merely because of god's will. And if this is the case god is neither just nor evil, and cannot be a perfectly good creator of values; he is just a creator.

But it seems that if the correctness of god's commands depends entirely upon god's will and not upon reasoned and thus absolute moral facts it is indeed arbitrary. Under divine command there is only god's will.

Oh and skepticism about moral reality according to Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is a denial of moral facts. Should've defined that.

I'm always up for a debate!