Nicely done, I thought.

Husserl takes one the threshold, and Fink's Sixth Meditation puts analysis to the generative threshold of "enworlding." I never got around to finishing this work, but my thanks for reminding me. It is quite a wonderland of extraordinary thinking that follows along with this. Caputo takes this up in his Radical Hermeneutics, but his Tears and Prayers of Jacque Derrida reveals, I believe, where this stain of though ends up inevitably: apophatic theology. Jean luc Marion's Being Given is a nice read on this. Existentialism cannot die, only evolve.

There is a way, HedoMinimalist, to make this "work": It would require a serious reconstrual of theism, not a popular frivolous one. It can be reasonably argued that religion's essence lies in material foundation from whence it springs, which is the moral dimension of existence. It is questions like, why are we born to suffer and die? and, what is the nature of the ethical good and bad? as opposed to contingent good and bad, as in, "My what a good couch" where in the goodness can be discussed, issues from context. Ethical good and bad (see Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics. He is right on this) turns to metaethical good and bad: the badness and goodness that issues directly from the pains and joys of Being. This latter, W says, cannot be discussed, metavalue cannot be discussed, for the rub lies in the nature of language and logic's delimitations. But this is the source of a defensible moral realism and it is, as well, the authentic basis of religion.

Dualism is a surviving vestige of a failed attempt, failed because it tries to divide Being into parts, while it is an entirely simpliciter concept, beyond predication: you say Being is such and such and you have already presupposed being.
And meditation, I do this and have found that what stands in the way of real progress is the unseen assumptions that normalize the world constantly in play keep in place a foundation our affairs. Meditation works to undo this foundation, this language and culture, but more deeply, (and this is where things get frankly beyond weird) it undoes, or intends to undo, the very fabric the world, and by world I refer to Heidegger's dasein, being in the world. Phenomenology is the ONLY way to make sense of meditation., and this puts the matter in the hands of an examination of the structures of the self for it is in the self that the world is bound to the familiar.

I am aware of how this might sound, for most do not read phenomenology: it is thick and hard and alien to common sense. In my view, it is the only, heh, heh, true view.

By genetic disposition you refer to, more generally, the imposition made upon decision making, bringing into play possibilities that are yours, that constitute the choices you can make. A world, so to speak. Genetic predispositions are only a part of this. These possibilities are there, at the moment of choice, and while they do define what choices are there for a self, they do not decide. Now, this is a rather iffy proposition, for it will be insisted that choice requires freedom, and this term is nonsense, given that the principle of sufficient cause is inviolable. But here, this principle is dduly noted, and dismissed" it is the critical existential withdrawal from habit and familiarity that defines freedom.

But therein lies the rub: Buddhists do not try to eradicate the self in order to achieve abstract nothingness. Beneath the self, so to speak, the empirically constructed self or memories, attachments, the "stream of consciousness", is joy, bliss unparalleled. There is nothing more palpable than this.

It is an argument that begins with an analysis of ethics and I will have to present it in pieces. First, ethicsd is a matter of parts, and are all things. There is, on the one hand, the "presence" of that which ethics fights over, the material presence of suffering, bliss and everything in between the referring this as "presence" is to reduce the material part to its phenomenological essence: the very clear and actual feelings of the deliciousness, the gladness, the the raw feel of the arm breaking, the tediousness of doing homework, and on and on. This is, of course, the existential basis of all ethical issues, for if there is no actuality of this nature in play, there is simply no ethics.

On the other hand, there is the entanglements in our engagements in the world, our politics, interpersonal contradictions and our principles, culture and the magnificent messiness of our lived lives. These conditions are in themselves ethically incidental, that is, they are the, as Wittgenstein put it, facts, and factual affairs are without ethical nature.

So the matter turns away from what to do and how make principles of good behavior in entangled conditions, and it turns to metaaethics: the GOOD. This is the beginning of the argument, pending your response thus far

I think what you are talking about really is what is called the ego by psychologists, and is the conscious entity which makes decisions. It could be called a self but the idea of a self has wider implications, encompassing deeper levels of consciousness which merge in and out of conscious awareness. — Jack Cummins

The ego, or, better, the egoic center to release this term from the grip of psychology. Deeper levels of consciousness? But the self is only revealed in the conscious unfolding of such things, and when they do arise, as with a good old fashion repression, they do not present the observing agency with a disclosure of the self, only a presentation TO the self. I, this self, am not the recollection of the trauma of my parents arguing.

That is the way of apophantic theology/philosophy (neti, neti in the East), and this is certainly does seem to be the "end" of philosophy, in both senses of the term. I am reading Caputo's Tears and Prayers of Jacque Derrida, and an epigraph is from Meister Eckhart: Oh God, deliver me from God!" Derrida infamously uncenters all thinking, revealing a kind of nihiism of semantics. But once there, Husserl's epoche, one might say, reaches its definitive juncture. I think this is essentially what the Eastern philosophies of liberation have been teaching for many centuries.

What you are looking for, Solarwind, is something that is not merely posited to make the ontological difference. You cannot insist that "who one is" constitutes a real basis for the distinction of being a singular "who"? Or, the singularity of "whoness" does not constitute the need for an ontological distinction.
OR DOES IT? They way to go is to examine this "I", the who in question. The matter turns to the self (and certainly not to physics). One has to make an examination of the self, and this is done via phenomenology: One begins the inquiry with the world itself, which constituted by the self, and therefore free of the nuisance of dualism (an absurd idea supposing that existence as presence is divisible), and one then faces the most authentic terms of analysis. The self becomes an altogether different concept, for it is not viewed through the lens empirical science but as it is presented in its most immediate describable features, and here, it is not ontology that rules, but meaning and ethics, and the self is first and foremost an agency of meaning. It is though this premise, the singularity, if you will, of meaning/value.

If you want to affirm the self, you cannot do this via trying to conceive of a different form of something that has absolutely no meaning to begin with, physical existence. A nonsense concept.