Well, I'm not sure about that. From the perspective of someone who most of us would think is a selfish asshole, simply not being the kid in question renders their torture ethically neutral. But I'm a relativist, so I would say that. That's the contingent set of circumstances, the fact that I (i.e. selfish asshole bert1) could have been the kid, but phew!, I'm not. — bert1

But you are being called upon to remove your being the kid, not being the kid, being selfish, and so on. These are quite out of consideration, for the argument looks directly to, and only to, the pain simplciter. THAT pain is not diminished. If you don't care because you are, as you say, selfish, you are looking in the wrong place: Your regard for others doesn't matter. Consider this an argument about value qualia. Qualia is usually just easily dismissible (see Dennett, e.g.), note what qualia is supposed to be: the simpliciter "presence" of color or the sound, and nothing more. Here,. it is the same.

Of course there are. Especially if they’re religious. Those can mitigate the badness of anything. But thankfully I don’t agree with any of them and I hope no one here does either. — khaled

No, I say rather firmly on this. What is mitigated is not the inherent badness of the torture of the the one child: the thumbscrews still are equal in there pain production, and the pain production is not one whit diminished. It stands outside the ethical dilemma, as an independent, unalterable, for the badness in play is not contextual, does not depend on anything form its being bad. This is the point.

In a forum discussion long ago, someone proposed to have solved this problem by pointing out that ethics was originally a part of aesthetics, and that it was aesthetics that dictates what is ethical.
How do you feel about this? — baker

We know where this comes from, Wittgenstein in his Lecture on Ethics (Tractatus, too). Ethics and aesthetics are value themes, and at the center of value is what Witt thought has no place at all in discussion, which is Moore's non natural property. Mackie thinks like, is influenced by, Witt, and they are both wrong: In the proffered idea above, the one thing that stands out is this: take the extreme example of a finger put to flame and abstract from this the ethical, well, "badness", and I mean badness simpliciter. All that could be predicated of the event removed, the physical observables, the evolutionist's claim that pain is conducive to survival and reproduction, the possible ethical contexts, the regard one might have toward the event (all of which beg the question: Oh, you are averse to having your finger in the flame, you abhor it, denounce it, are disgusted by it, and so on...The question begged being about the unexamined value simpliciter: the literal horrible suffering event unnamed; or, the value qualia of pain, if you prefer). Remove all that falls safely within the boundaries of standard meaningful utterances, and there is the residual ethical; the metaethical, which isn't as "meta" as one thinks
Flaming fingers are not like the "facts of the world" as Witt noted regarding his great book of facts, facts like Mars being closer to the Sun than Jupiter or that my shoe is untied. All are equal, AS facts, according to Witt, and value never reveals itself sufficiently, as with logic, to discuss its nature, and thsi is true! BUT: It does reveal in its nature very explicitly, with the sharpest "presence" possible, the injunction not to do something (as well as to do something, on th e positive side of the metaethical).

And you arguing that belief content is a broader semantic category - I don't know what kind of things you throw in it, other than that it can be "pre-linguistic" - and so since not all of that content is even "linguistic" (presumably not all words or symbols, I don't know where you come from on this), not all of that content can be propositional; since propositions must be linguistic. — fdrake

I found this point about belief being a broader semantic category to be closer to the truth. Just make an observation of one's own, if you will, ready-to-hand "belief" that the cup is on the table. The semantics, that is, the meaning, of spontaneous, unreflected passive affirmation is not explicit at all. It is in the fluid affair of grabbing the cup while reading, adjusting the light, checking the time and so forth. One can hardly call this propositional, only dispositionally propositional; and even when attention turns towards the cup which, say, spills, the "the cup is on the table and it spilled" proposition is certainly not entertained at all. The entire event is a seamless, propositionless doing. I do think we are in a cat's world of prereflective engagement.

As to the content: mostly pragmatic, like walking down the street, each step assumes a secure landing, and the implicit "belief" that is dispositionally "behind" this, stands at the ready if one is called upon to speak, or if one commences to think things out. Language and its propositions stands apart from the execution.

Prelinguistic? Pragmatics is this, and most of our engagements in the world are like this.

Beliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement? — fdrake

A disposition towards some state of affairs: this disposition presents itself as a conditional "if...then.." which is a pragmatic construction. Dispositions are anticipatory and language and logic merely formalizes this.

All such claims miss the point rather dramatically, which is to be expected from analytic philosophers. They hover over a problem on wings of categorial thinking (minimal moral realism??? you're kidding, right? I know you're not) having fun mingling logic and concepts, never touching the ground. Mackie and others needs to, perhaps, spend (well, he's no longer a living person) time in a Roman dungeon before he realizes that the world is, as Kierkegaard put it, qualitatively distinct from armchair theory.

Love is the primal essence of everythin — Thinking

Is this true? I wonder if you would put some meant on this. Not that I disagree, at all. But it is stated, not argued, that is, justified. I think for starters, one has to examine love. How is this an absolute?

I guess I don't understand this. The whole idea here rests with theism, but it is not open to a discussion to what this can meaningfully be about? Doesn't this trivialize the argument down to a simple logical play?

the world around us is physical, — Manuel

I have no idea what the term "physical" means. I take it to be a nonsense word, but a convenient place holder for as assumed stability.

But the easy problem has no merit in its explanatory explanatory basis. Such things do not touch ontology.

Metaethics? No more non existent than any given empirical concept. Indeed, more real than these.

Beliefs as mental states/dispositions with content vs beliefs as holding some statement to be true. Issues there might be: is a disposition towards a state of affairs the same as an attitude towards a statement? What role do t-sentences play in that account?

To me, the whole matter has to be reconstrued. Don't know if you will appreciate this. If not, then that's fine.

I abide by the pragmatist's hypothetical deductive account of belief: Prior to an affirmation, there is an predisposition to affirm. What is this if not a disposition towards a state of affairs, as you say? But does this stand clearer analysis? I affirm, after all, in time. Can the temporality of the affirmation's nature be analyzed? This goes not just to propositions, but to concepts, as all concepts are inherently propositional: so what is, say, nitroglycerin? We define this as a pragmatic, temporal structure of the conditional form: Nitro is, "If N is impacted with force F, then it will explode." Nitro is also, "If N is combined with chemical C, then result R will occur"; and so on, and so on.

All concepts have this form, and therefore all beliefs have this form. We live our everyday lives in the temporal dynamics of, to put it is Dewey's terms, the consummatory successes of problems solved. Language itself is constructed in a complex series of successful problem solving events whereby signifiers (sounds) and their signifieds (concepts) are matched with their objective counterparts which are achieved by hearing sounds, witnessing associations and assimilating models of language behavior in the environment.

But what does this do for belief being propositional? Well, it presents an understanding of beliefs and propositions that does not recognize the distinction. Propositional affirmations and beliefs are reduced consummations of problems solved. "My cat is on the rug" is true by virtue of a body of anticipations regarding rugs, cats, the copula 'is', the the ascription of properties, etc., which are themselves all confirmed in their repeatable behaviors. Knowledge that there is a sidewalk that will sustain my steps is a science experiment at every step, consummated, and this and a great number of other pragmatically based assumptions about sidewalks is what a sidewalk IS; this collective of pragmatic assumptions are the very definitions of Being.

Then why bother with a philosophy forum? There are plenty of science forums.

Because science isn't philosophy. Apples and oranges. The latter deals with an entirely distinct set of problems, those that are presupposed by the former. If you find yourself reading science to find your philosophical answers, then you are just asking science questions.

THE RADICAL EVIL OF DECONSTRUCTION: A REPLY TO JOHN CAPUTO

I will read this and get back to you.

Can an animal believe? Does my cat "believe" the open front door goes to the outside where the trees and squirrels are? Most definitely! Is it propositional belief? I think it is a proto-propositional belief. Consider the propositional structure of the conditional: If X opens the door, there will be Y that ensues. Note that my cats certainly gets this essential structure, but I while it is foolish to think her "getting it" is propositional, what is propositional cannot be wholly other than what actually goes through her mind (yes, mind). After all, our conditional logical form very likely is constructed on t he foundation that pragmatically "mirrors" the primitive, non symbolic cat knowing.

Nicely done, I thought.

Husserl takes one the threshold, and Fink's Sixth Meditation puts analysis to the generative threshold of "enworlding." I never got around to finishing this work, but my thanks for reminding me. It is quite a wonderland of extraordinary thinking that follows along with this. Caputo takes this up in his Radical Hermeneutics, but his Tears and Prayers of Jacque Derrida reveals, I believe, where this stain of though ends up inevitably: apophatic theology. Jean luc Marion's Being Given is a nice read on this. Existentialism cannot die, only evolve.

There is a way, HedoMinimalist, to make this "work": It would require a serious reconstrual of theism, not a popular frivolous one. It can be reasonably argued that religion's essence lies in material foundation from whence it springs, which is the moral dimension of existence. It is questions like, why are we born to suffer and die? and, what is the nature of the ethical good and bad? as opposed to contingent good and bad, as in, "My what a good couch" where in the goodness can be discussed, issues from context. Ethical good and bad (see Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics. He is right on this) turns to metaethical good and bad: the badness and goodness that issues directly from the pains and joys of Being. This latter, W says, cannot be discussed, metavalue cannot be discussed, for the rub lies in the nature of language and logic's delimitations. But this is the source of a defensible moral realism and it is, as well, the authentic basis of religion.

Dualism is a surviving vestige of a failed attempt, failed because it tries to divide Being into parts, while it is an entirely simpliciter concept, beyond predication: you say Being is such and such and you have already presupposed being.
And meditation, I do this and have found that what stands in the way of real progress is the unseen assumptions that normalize the world constantly in play keep in place a foundation our affairs. Meditation works to undo this foundation, this language and culture, but more deeply, (and this is where things get frankly beyond weird) it undoes, or intends to undo, the very fabric the world, and by world I refer to Heidegger's dasein, being in the world. Phenomenology is the ONLY way to make sense of meditation., and this puts the matter in the hands of an examination of the structures of the self for it is in the self that the world is bound to the familiar.

I am aware of how this might sound, for most do not read phenomenology: it is thick and hard and alien to common sense. In my view, it is the only, heh, heh, true view.

By genetic disposition you refer to, more generally, the imposition made upon decision making, bringing into play possibilities that are yours, that constitute the choices you can make. A world, so to speak. Genetic predispositions are only a part of this. These possibilities are there, at the moment of choice, and while they do define what choices are there for a self, they do not decide. Now, this is a rather iffy proposition, for it will be insisted that choice requires freedom, and this term is nonsense, given that the principle of sufficient cause is inviolable. But here, this principle is dduly noted, and dismissed" it is the critical existential withdrawal from habit and familiarity that defines freedom.

But therein lies the rub: Buddhists do not try to eradicate the self in order to achieve abstract nothingness. Beneath the self, so to speak, the empirically constructed self or memories, attachments, the "stream of consciousness", is joy, bliss unparalleled. There is nothing more palpable than this.

It is an argument that begins with an analysis of ethics and I will have to present it in pieces. First, ethicsd is a matter of parts, and are all things. There is, on the one hand, the "presence" of that which ethics fights over, the material presence of suffering, bliss and everything in between the referring this as "presence" is to reduce the material part to its phenomenological essence: the very clear and actual feelings of the deliciousness, the gladness, the the raw feel of the arm breaking, the tediousness of doing homework, and on and on. This is, of course, the existential basis of all ethical issues, for if there is no actuality of this nature in play, there is simply no ethics.

On the other hand, there is the entanglements in our engagements in the world, our politics, interpersonal contradictions and our principles, culture and the magnificent messiness of our lived lives. These conditions are in themselves ethically incidental, that is, they are the, as Wittgenstein put it, facts, and factual affairs are without ethical nature.

So the matter turns away from what to do and how make principles of good behavior in entangled conditions, and it turns to metaaethics: the GOOD. This is the beginning of the argument, pending your response thus far

I think what you are talking about really is what is called the ego by psychologists, and is the conscious entity which makes decisions. It could be called a self but the idea of a self has wider implications, encompassing deeper levels of consciousness which merge in and out of conscious awareness. — Jack Cummins

The ego, or, better, the egoic center to release this term from the grip of psychology. Deeper levels of consciousness? But the self is only revealed in the conscious unfolding of such things, and when they do arise, as with a good old fashion repression, they do not present the observing agency with a disclosure of the self, only a presentation TO the self. I, this self, am not the recollection of the trauma of my parents arguing.

That is the way of apophantic theology/philosophy (neti, neti in the East), and this is certainly does seem to be the "end" of philosophy, in both senses of the term. I am reading Caputo's Tears and Prayers of Jacque Derrida, and an epigraph is from Meister Eckhart: Oh God, deliver me from God!" Derrida infamously uncenters all thinking, revealing a kind of nihiism of semantics. But once there, Husserl's epoche, one might say, reaches its definitive juncture. I think this is essentially what the Eastern philosophies of liberation have been teaching for many centuries.

What you are looking for, Solarwind, is something that is not merely posited to make the ontological difference. You cannot insist that "who one is" constitutes a real basis for the distinction of being a singular "who"? Or, the singularity of "whoness" does not constitute the need for an ontological distinction.
OR DOES IT? They way to go is to examine this "I", the who in question. The matter turns to the self (and certainly not to physics). One has to make an examination of the self, and this is done via phenomenology: One begins the inquiry with the world itself, which constituted by the self, and therefore free of the nuisance of dualism (an absurd idea supposing that existence as presence is divisible), and one then faces the most authentic terms of analysis. The self becomes an altogether different concept, for it is not viewed through the lens empirical science but as it is presented in its most immediate describable features, and here, it is not ontology that rules, but meaning and ethics, and the self is first and foremost an agency of meaning. It is though this premise, the singularity, if you will, of meaning/value.

If you want to affirm the self, you cannot do this via trying to conceive of a different form of something that has absolutely no meaning to begin with, physical existence. A nonsense concept.