"Therefore they greatly deceive themselves, who declare and preach that the perfection of man consists in knowledge of the truth, and that all his woes proceed from false opinions and ignorance, and that the human race will at last be happy, when all or most people come to know the truth, and solely on the grounds of that, arrange and govern their lives. And these things are said by not far short of all philosophers both ancient and modern. . . . I am not unaware that the ultimate conclusion to be drawn from true and perfect philosophy is that we need not philosophize. From which we infer that, in the first place, philosophy is useless, for in order to refrain from philosophizing, there is no need to be a philosopher; in the second place it is exceedingly harmful, for the ultimate conclusion is not learned except at one’s own costs, and once learned, cannot be put into effect; as it is not in the power of man to forget the truths they know, and it is easier to rid oneself of any habit before that of philosophizing. Philosophy in short, hoping and promising at the beginning to cure our ills, is in the end reduced to a longing in vain to heal itself."

-Leopardi, (OM 186–187)

If they can't be reduced, then how are they physical? — Marchesk

If I understand Lewisian supervenience correctly (of course there's many different views), it's that something is "physical" or "supervenes on the physical" just if every possible world with the same organization of physical substrates has the same supervening phenomenon. C is physical iff A and B are physical and A + B = C in all possible worlds that A and B are organized in the same manner.

Of course the biggest issue with physicalism is that there isn't any good definition of what the physical is supposed to be. Usually physicalists, or "materialism" in the vogue sense, is more of a reaction to what is seen as "spooky" dualism. They don't want to admit into their ontology "spooky" minds, so they shift in the exact opposite way and reject anything "like that". It's really more often than not a metaphysical view held for political and aesthetic reasons (a la Jamesian psychology of metaphysics), one that isn't as open-ended as naturalism (which is also less politically powerful). But since they have a hard time explaining what the physical is (and not just what it's not), "material" or "physical" become just as spooky as the apparently-spooky dualism they are against.

It's telling that we have to appeal to goods in life and not life itself in order to justify the latter, which is apparently not able to justify itself and so has to appeal to the accidental contingencies to cover this embarrassing disvalue. As we learned from Nietzsche, life continues not on reason and logic but on emotional impulse and irrationality. We can also take a Heideggerian route and ask: if Being is Good, then why is it that we have such a difficult time approaching and understanding Being? Does it seem right that the Good is almost impossible to apprehend?

I would not say that we are "pawns", as this implies we are being manipulated by an agent, and as far as I know the universe is not an agent. Thus any description of our predicament as manipulative or pawn-like is only a metaphor, a description that only makes sense from the "inside" and not from the "outside", the inside being a phenomenological account and the outside being an (ideally) impartial naturalistic account. Just as it's poetic to say the sea "swallows" a sinking boat, it's similarly poetic to say we are "slaves" to our genetic programming. It's not wrong, but neither is it entirely accurate, either. It's just one way of interpreting the same set of data, just one of many ways of painting reality.

Actually this very point was brought up in a book based upon a conference in Germany a few years ago, called Is Nature Ever Evil: Philosophy, Science, Value, which covered issues including whether or not we can actually see "Nature" as good or bad. Such topics brought up include analyses of "selfish" genes, or "nature, red in tooth and claw", or "a chaotic, indifferent cosmos" or what have you. Science is NOT as impartial as it tries to be. There will ALWAYS be value somewhere.

The best I can say right now is that, ultimately, nothing is intrinsically valuable in the sense that it contributes or plays a role in some cosmic theatrical production. Part of the human condition seems to be the realization of time-linearity as one of many constraints on our being, and the disconnect between what we can imagine and what actually is the case. The angst emerges when one sees that the universe as a whole has an unconscious direction towards maximal entropification, and that this "telos" is not in line with our own desires and expectations.

So, going back to the whole metaphor thing, I think it makes more sense to describe humans (and other sentients) as prisoners, victims, or, even better, exiles. Any sort of description like this is going to somewhat metaphorical and from the perspective of life-as-it-is-lived, and not life-as-it-is-studied. Or something like that.

I took your advice and purchased a used copy of Deinstag's Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit. So far, I am impressed by his style and breadth. His analysis of the time-consciousness of humanity, and the subsequent analysis of pessimism's kernel as the rejection of social progress paralleling time-linearity was fascinating. Thanks.

Neither, I vote Fromm or Rank.

Gonna go see them in a few weeks. Small band + great music + cheap tickets = fun times.

Off the top of my head:

• Simone de Beauvoir
• Lady Elisabeth of Bohemia
• Patricia Churchland
• Hannah Arendt

Probably the reasons there hasn't been as many influential female philosophers as male are:

1.) Female education has historically been limited in comparison to male education.

2.) Females have historically been subjugated by a patriarchy in which males are given the opportunity for transcendence while females are stuck in immanence, oftentimes expected to support their husbands' transcendence.

3.) Philosophy might just be something males tend to do more of, but this doesn't mean males are somehow "better" than females. If anything it might just mean that males tend to be more neurotic and isolating than females, as well as excessively proud of these character faults. It's usually hard to admit when you're not attractive/charming/popular/influential so it's not surprising that these sorts of people rescue their self-esteem by elevating themselves on a plane of existence higher than anyone else simply because they think about things that most people don't know or care about. If this superiority complex has any legitimacy, then, it applies to everyone who does not do philosophy, not just some portion of the female population.

Heaven forbid. Hard enough to deal with 'alternative facts' in the current climate. — Wayfarer

>:O

A lot of epistemological positions are plagued by this matter - is there a fact of the matter whether or not facts are always true? What about that, is there a fact for that meta-fact? Where do we end?

It's not just correspondence theories of truth that suffer from this. Any theory that admits truth-like entities is going to have to deal with this apparent regress.

Keeping that in mind let us look at the God question. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that God has an effect on people - in the way they conduct themselves, in what they eat, in what they wear, etc. In fact no other entity has as broad and deep an effect on us humans as God. In some cases these effects may even be measurable.
Therefore, scientifically speaking God must exist by virtue of the multitudinous effects God has on us humans. — TheMadFool

I don't get it. "God" is not automatically seen as the cause of these effects on people. Rather, a belief in God is what should be (naturalistically) seen as the cause of these behaviors.

It's like saying it doesn't take a scientist to realize that astrological signs have an effect on people. In reality, it takes a scientist, or at least a scientifically-oriented reasoner, to realize astrological signs are bogus and aren't doing anything at all.

Therefore, on the basis of what I believe about Polos and his beliefs, it seems there's a contradiction in his beliefs about how he wants to be treated: For he wants both to be punished (since he wants what is good for him, and I believe it's good for him to be punished) and to avoid punishment (since he believes being punished is harmful and not good for him, and he wants to avoid what is harmful and not good). — Cabbage Farmer

Well sure, this is exactly why someone like Julio Cabrera or similar "negative" thinkers have brought up the "affirmativity" issue: most ethics are "affirmative" in that they focus on the "how" more than the "can"; i.e. "How do I live ethically (deontology)? How do I (ethically) live happily (consequentialism)? How do I live the good life (virtue ethics)?" instead of asking a more fundamental question: "Can I live ethically, can I (ethically) live happily, can I live the good life?"

Affirmative ethical theories rest upon the rough assumption that life and ethics are compatible and will not ever contradict each other. One of the best examples of this in action are forms of (American) pragmatist ethics, for example John Dewey's belief that what is ethical is what helps us survive. Apparently, survival itself is taken for granted. It's assumed that life as a whole is something to be cultivated and mass-produced. As such affirmative ethical theories are expansionist and imperialistic.

Now, Cabrera inserts into the equation what he calls the "Fundamental Ethical Articulation", or the principle that is basically wholly endorsed by all (legitimate) ethical theories (fuck you Ayn Rand): the non-harm and non-manipulation of others. As such, Cabrera finds that life itself forces the violation of the FEA. To exist is to limit, constrain, and be imperfect; yet at the same time expand, dominate, and attempt to self-perfectionize. To exist as an entity is to fundamentally come into friction with other entities, as all entities themselves are at least in part composed of their relations to other entities, for better or for worse.

If we take the golden rule or the platinum rule into account, then, it's clear that it cannot always be used perfectly. Like you mentioned, what a guilty person wants is different from what other people want/expect/deserve. There is a conflict of interests here (why should we have to compromise in an ethical schema?). But anyway, life has to go on for some reason or another and so we have to make a decision, and this decision has to be formulated based upon a second-order ethics. If we're consequentialists, like I am, we'll try to balance and compare the various goods and bads that would result in a decision; in the case of the golden/platinum rule, we would see how much violating one person's liberty would spare the violations of other people's liberties (to be crude and simplistic).

But further still, we could adopt a two-order utilitarianism, in which everyday decisions and whatnot follow general guidelines like the golden/platinum rule or what have you, and serious ethical theorizing would happen only in rarer scenarios of higher stakes. Thus the golden/platinum rule is not supposed to be universal principles but rather heuristics for everyday ethical living in a situation that is already set-up for moral disqualification.

S/he is in a nursing program bro. No one beyond the newbie undergrads in philosophy gives a shit about the mystical connection with wisdom you think is required for REAL philosophy or whatever the hell you're supposedly doing.

I'd tone it down a notch as you're the exact type of person that turns folks like Mary Ellen off in those sorts of classes. — Carbon

On the contrary, I would argue that the very nature of philosophical questions causes us to become "mystical" or "transcendent" or whatever you want to call it. They are so broad and general that they apply to practically all of existence. The questions are timeless.

I've noticed that when I study philosophy for a long time, I tend to lose this feeling and start to restrict the contents of my own psyche. It's not until I stop for a bit and break the cycle of narrowed-thinking that I'm confronted with the addicting nature of philosophical questions.

So if anything, modern (analytic?) professional philosophy has largely lost this feeling of timelessness and has instead become kinda bland and cutesy.

I ask because, although I don't know much about the philosophy of law, it appears to me that the justice system seems to have evolved from a natural emotion/concept - vengeance. And it also seems to me that the law wants to, or at least tries to, distance itself from vengeance. — TheMadFool

I recently read an essay (Ritual Epistemology) by Sarah Perry on what she labels as post-rationalism, or the view that rationality is helpful only to a certain point, and that all these liberal beliefs that pure reason and science and all that will not deliver us into a utopia or provide meaning to our lives. Rather, what provides stability and purpose is more often than not rather irrational rituals, including the justice system.

As Perry argues, the justice system is not necessarily about finding the truth but simply coming to a verdict. The rituals, such as the dimensions of the justice building, the flowy black garments of the justices, the Miranda rights, the strict rules of conduct and behavior within the courtroom, etc. all work together to conceal the irrationality of our justice system and make it seem like it's legitimately finding "the Truth" of the matter.

I would personally argue that justice is simply institutionalized vengeance. The state-sanctioned "setting things straight", the post-hoc rationalization of inevitable inequality. It's telling that we'd rather blame a murderer for her crimes than blame the universe for existing to allow murders to occur. Someone has to take the blame.

If you have to ask that question, then I suspect the philosophy bug hasn't yet bitten you. If you do not feel the pursuit of wisdom to be something akin to a need, without which you would be the poorer and utterly despairing, then the "stock" answers that can be given to your question will probably not have much effect. — Thorongil

(Y)

We can often find ourselves living in a way that might make life seem more like a burden than a blessing. Life would be a whole lot more agreeable if it wasn't mandatory. Wouldn't it be great if we could just shut off for a while at command and come back a few hours later once the annoyance has passed?

Unfortunately, we are given a chore to deal with - and oftentimes the only reward we get for our toils is a brief respite in unconsciousness before we do it again. How much conflict, strife, suffering and loss is due to an inability to cope with the responsibilities ascribed to us by our bodies? How much is caused by evil intentions, and how much is caused by sheer desperation?

It's strange to consider ourselves as being owned by our bodies; usually we see ourselves as the masters of our physical. Yet the Buddhist teachings ring true: if we truly were in control of our bodies, we would not age, we would not contract disease or infirmity, we would not feel compelled to sink below our threshold for pain. And yet our bodies do, and the best we can do is hold on tight and hope nothing too terrible happens. "Planning" is a method in which we attempt to harness external tools to safeguard our well-being against the insecurities and threats of whatever comes our way, including ourselves. One can wonder how many people run away from themselves, to save themselves.

The pessimistic tradition has a long history, filled with thinkers who focus on certain aspects of "the human predicament" - a web of inter-connected general complaints and observations that combined lead to an overall disappointing and embarrassing, if not concerning, picture of human existence and life in general. Some thinkers have attempted to construct a metaphysics from this in order to explain how all these poor evaluations "come together" and why they even exist to begin with. But although it can be helpful and tempting to coalesce everything into a singular explanatory model, this threatens to migrate the focus from the explicit and the obvious to the abstract and the irrelevant. Rival models clash and we're left questioning what isn't that important and ignoring that which is, that which has been irritatingly obscured again by the same sort of metaphysics that had been initially discarded when we originally began collecting these observations in the first place.

inequity — Robert Lockhart

Inequity is a general complaint that can be raised, but it's only part of the picture. As soon as we try to pin down the human condition to a single or group of conditions, we're left with an insufficient frame that fails to capture every aspect of existence. For say inequity was solved. Would there no longer be a human predicament?

The one thing that connects everything together is, I think, the unexplained phenomenological disconnect, an alienation, between the self and the rest of the world that results with a general sense of anxiety or dread, the hidden and repressed feeling that something is very, very wrong, and that it might not be just human-exclusive. Something is missing, something doesn't belong, something is defective. A Problem, lurking below the surface and affecting the current without properly being fully described or explained.

Not just "problems", but "A Problem". A Problem that is the source of all other problems. Sentience itself is a problem, as it is the way in which all problems and "The" Problem are noticed. Existence itself is a spiral of problems-on-top-of-problems, in which problems are fixed by installing new problems in a never-ending process of problem-updates masking as refinement and perfection; "delayed" problems, an act of procrastination, before the problem is finally shown to be what it is.

But here I am again, pursuing a metaphysics that sounds more like a story than anything else. Stories can be helpful, though.

Apologies for the lateness in reply, I have educational commitments I have to attend to.

Pessimists focused traditionally on quieting the Will, the unrest that is the metaphysical kernel at the heart of existence. What you discuss is what I call "contingent harms"- they are circumstantial harms that humans face based on their biological/psychological/social/cultural/environmental circumstances. Traditionally, pessimists are concerned with the kernel. To admonish them for not focusing on contingent harms, is a bit misleading as Pessimists rarely focused on contingent harms- it is what makes a Pessimist a Pessimist. It is like admonishing a cat for not being a dog. — schopenhauer1

I will grant that the metaphysical "kernel" as you mention is at the heart of pessimism, but I'll also argue that it's not just the "Will" (as that's Schopenhauer's thing), and neither is it exclusively these kernels.

In fact I would argue that contingent harms are necessarily part of human existence. To exist means to be harmed in some random and unpredictable manner. Schopenhauer himself used many examples of contingent harms - think back to his analysis of the pain of the prey and the pleasure of a predator. This isn't the "kernel" he speaks of, but it's nevertheless an example of a contingent harm that characterizes an unfairly and unequally-distributed experience machine we call life.

Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann — schopenhauer1

Great stuff by von Hartmann, I had forgotten his name and couldn't seem to find him. Bit of an obscure philosopher, unfortunately, who nevertheless mirrors a lot of my own thinking.

If everyone simply went off to help in whatever situation they can, that would leave little time to develop things and improve them in terms of technology, ideas, social change, etc.. There are so many ways that people create utility unintentionally. Who are you to decide which actions lead to the greatest good? The sports-watching couch potato could think of something on his spare time that immensely increases the utility of people and animals around the world, that he would never have done simply by directly providing aid/volunteer opportunities. In fact, if this guy volunteered, he would have not thought of that novel innovation that increased utility way more than direct aid. Further, the factors that lead to outcomes for greatest utility are so numerous, there is no reliable probability one can calculate to account for everything in terms of which action leads to greatest utility. Instead, direct aid would simply be following one's own notions of what's good, not bringing about the actual greatest good. This then would mean that one would simply follow one's own inclinations, neuroses, and etc. and not what is logically the best thing to do to increase utility at that particular time. — schopenhauer1

Well, again I mentioned earlier how it's not that we all have to get up and slave away doing things. There's charities that we can donate to and local events that we can participate in to help out the community and society at large.

You mention how many good things can come unintentionally. Yet I would argue that you're missing the far greater goods that come with intentional focus! For every lazy sports-watching couch potato that comes up with a marvelous new idea, how many other lazy sports-watching couch potatoes don't, and live their whole lives with their asses glued to their seats?

The fact is that, just as you said, we don't know how to perfectly maximize utility. We don't know whether or not excessive luxury or leisure will result in these marvelous new inventions that will save countless lives. So the best thing we can do, given our epistemic stance, is to do what we do know will help. Not sit around waiting for inspiration to pop into the minds of your everyday hill-billy in Alabama.

Even the starving Ethiopian, if he/she was ethical himself would hope that you would also pursue a life with some happiness that goes beyond helping him/her.. even if he/she appreciates the immediate aid you gave him right there and then.. The hypothetical starving Ethiopian hopefully has ends THEY would like to pursue.. just like you or I.. Pessimists are under no more obligation to have a tormenting life of than others merely because they see life as unrest. — schopenhauer1

True, I accept that the Ethiopian would be ethically obligated to want you to also be happy, even if she's starving. This goes back to Cabrera's analysis of pain, specifically torture and extreme suffering. He draws from Hannah Arendt and talks about how pain is isolating and controlling. Cabrera describes it as one of the ways a person becomes ethically disqualified.

For example, we cannot honestly expect a spy to keep his secrets if he's being horribly tortured by the enemy. Even if what this man does (spill the beans) is immoral and leads to countless deaths, we can't honestly blame him for his blunder. It's too extreme to act ethically under these circumstances.

Now, again before anyone else jumps on my tail on this, I personally believe we do have ethical obligations towards those who are suffering greatly (what Maw called "gratuitous suffering") within a certain threshold and some other minor qualifications. But you can disagree with this without changing anything about the OP, as the OP sets out to describe the differences between active and passive pessimism. The latter being more contemplative, removed, aesthetically-oriented and redemptive, the former being more pragmatic, radical, forceful and openly-disgusted with the world at large. For the active pessimist, then, there's really no place for any talk of "aesthetics" as a top priority or grand schema. There's really no place for "TRUTH" unless it's instrumental to our own ends. There's really no place for comfort, security, or loftiness unless it's in the service of some greater goal.

If I had to try to summarize it, then, it would be that the passive pessimist, when confronted with the reality of existence, tends to retreat from the world, while the active pessimist tends to swallow the bitterness and remain a player on the field.

So then, from a more personal view, as I tried to explain earlier, I don't see how these great fantastic amazing things like "TRUTH" or "A E S T H E T I C S" or "Transcendence" or any of that crap legitimately "fits" in the worldview of a pessimist. It's the same thing when a tragedy happens and someone says "look on the bright side!" and you just want to slap them silly for saying such a stupid thing. There is no beauty in this world, at least no beauty that doesn't come with a heavy price - and what sort of beauty is that? It's this kind of "clinginess" of passive pessimism that makes it what it is, like it accepts pessimism but doesn't "go all the way". One can wonder if someone like Schopenhauer would have pushed that big red button to end the world immediately and painlessly, or if he would have rather not done this for some abstract idealistic ethics or because he wanted to pursue his metaphysics more or whatever. I get the feeling, when reading his work (and others'), that they actually enjoy complaining about the world, in general at least, and it seems out of place and disingenuous. At least to me.

Assuming there aren't any objections, then, I would argue that unless someone is willing to embrace hypotheses like world destruction or biological sterilization or what have you, they really have no business talking about the suffering that inevitably calls for such action. It's like saying there's a fire down the street but being opposed to calling 9-11: like, then why did you even bring it up? Nobody really seemed to have gone far enough, from my ethical perspective, and it's disheartening. Nobody seemed to have the stomach to seriously consider how their pessimism might be implemented. The state of the world doesn't call for calligraphy or fine cuisine. It's out-of-place, like wearing a wedding dress in a war zone. It just doesn't fit, simple as that.

STRFKR is a great band.

Considering most animals are incapable of committing suicide, and considering evolution (usually) has no strict cut-offs, I don't think it's controversial to think we aren't the only organisms on Earth who are conscious of "death" and fear it.

Thanks for the response Maw. I missed your post before.

Though I don't agree with much of your characterization or the usage of non-neutral terms such as "comfortable" or "convenient", what you are discussing reminds me of Joshua Foa Dienstag's thesis in his excellent work, Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit which delineates the common themes and minor divergences between prominent Pessimists from Rousseau to Unamuno. — Maw

Is that book any good? I heard you're re-reading it. I was thinking of picking it up.

I'm actually surprised that you would group Leopardi with the latter considering that Leopardi writes positively about taking action despite the unhappiness often generated by it. He uses the figure of Christopher Columbus as an exemplar of one who took action despite the risks it involved. — Maw

I mentioned Leopardi because I'm currently reading The Philosophy of Disenchantment by Edgar Saltus, and Saltus spends almost an entire chapter talking about Leopardi's life and how he, at least for a while, intentionally isolated himself from everyone else, and thought the only duty one had was to oneself: "be true to oneself".

An Active Pessimist may attempt to mitigate or eradicate gratuitous forms of human suffering, but would need to acknowledge that such attempts can fail, or that such problems can always return during or after the lifetime of the Pessimist. — Maw

Right, exactly. Some people seem to be missing this point. It's not about making the world a utopia, but making it comparatively better than it is right now. We have made progress. It's not perfect and it never will be, but progress has still happened. It's ridiculous, I think, to say we haven't progressed at all. Of course we have.

No amount of passive lamenting is going to stop the machine of blind ambition from spreading to places where it ought not go. The active pessimist, then, is one who does not approve of this continuation, but nevertheless follows along to offer advice and clean up the mess made by these fools.

Also I will point out that it's not just about anthropocentric suffering, but sentio-centric suffering.

Your basic complaint is still, "these figures didn't quite live up to their own ideals or the ones I propose to the degree that I would like." — Thorongil

No, again, you're misconstruing the argument. They don't live up to my ideals, true. But I have specifically stated that the actual argument here is that they don't live up the ideals of an active pessimist. They did not advocate what I have articulated to be active pessimism.

The fact you seem to be getting all pissed off about this says more about yourself than anything I've said.

“Let him who is without sin among you be the first to throw a stone at her.”

>:O Are you for real right now?

Since character, so far as we understand its nature, is above and beyond time, it cannot undergo any change under the influence of life

I disagree. Why can't it change? After all it was Schopenhauer who said it takes time to get used to isolation and asceticism. Character can change, for the better.

I observe in myself that at one moment I regard all mankind with heartfelt pity, at another with the greatest indifference, on occasion with hatred, nay, with a positive enjoyment of their pain. (Schopenhauer, "On Character")

It's a shame pity and good intentions won't help anyone unless it motivates action. Simply recognizing suffering, as I've already said, is the hallmark of passive pessimism. The active pessimist goes further and fights back.

Okay? Tell me more. — Heister Eggcart

I'm saying "justice" is no longer about finding who is responsible for whatever action but rather a means of preventing this occurrence from happening again. Is it not fair to say that as the stakes become higher, the more value we place on justice?

Most people, it seems, see justice as a way of "setting things straight", and "getting back" at whoever "intentionally" perpetrated the event. Vengeance masked by ritual.

I come from a different perspective: justice is a means of "showing an example". Those who disobey civil order will be dealt with. Cause and effect. It is based on an element of fear and intimidation, just as practically any social relation is, or any legitimate learning process for that matter.

Schopenhauer's main ethical principles are: "Harm no one; rather, help everyone as much as you can." That's not far enough or amenable to your position? — Thorongil

That's a good representation of what I would say active pessimism is about. I just don't see how Schopenhauer embodied this principle, nor do I see this principle in effect in his writings. Why didn't you bring this up earlier?

But those who do have access to aesthetic enjoyment, contemplation, and the gift of intelligence aren't bad for making use of these things. — Thorongil

The problem, unfortunately, is when those who have the opportunity to enjoy these things mistake their own existential luck as desert and pursue these things exclusively, or at least are focused on these things as a high priority.

And who's to say they did not do precisely this? You? Why should we believe you? Your only argument to this effect has involved the ludicrous complaint about the quality of their pillows, something I doubt you have much expertise in. Unless you have the bank account records of these men and have deduced from them the precise amount of money they could have given to the equivalent of whatever infallible charity you give to, then you will have confirmed the feeling of hot air emanating from your posts. — Thorongil

Come now, I've offered more than just the plush pillow and poodle example. I've shown how Leopardi intentionally isolated himself and was a thorough-going egoist - "be true to oneself" was his motto; he missed an epithet, though: "by neglecting everyone else". And I've shown how Cioran was curiously drawn towards suffering and intentionally submerged himself in its depths, and analyzed suffering as an abstract notion pervading time and space. I've shown how Nietzsche's amor fati is flawed and insulting to those who are suffering. Please don't ignore these examples anymore.

This is so vague a charge as to be meaningless. I feel that any amount of specificity would bring about its death. — Thorongil

No, I'm getting this from several sources, including a biographical account of Schopenhauer in The Philosophy of Disenchantment by Edgar Saltus, who is extraordinarily praising of Schopenhauer in general.

I actually don't recall you saying this at all, anywhere in this thread at least. — Thorongil

Come now, open your eyes man. I've said it multiple times now, even to yourself. I prioritize non-human animals.

You again assume he had a free choice in the matter! — Thorongil

Determinism? Is this what this is all about?

No, it's not. There are ascetics who literally starve themselves to death, such as the Jains with their practice of sallekhana. They clearly prefer that to ennui and might even say that they suffer less thereby (since it's their ticket to leaving samsara, the world of suffering, behind). — Thorongil

Clearly if someone willingly undergoes torment and turmoil, they aren't really "suffering". They're experiencing pain and discomfort but they aren't suffering because they have freely chosen to experience these things. In short, they prefer to feel these things, they are more satisfied by doing so.

The ascetics don't starve themselves to escape ennui, they starve themselves in pursuit of a metaphysical end-goal.

Consider also that some philosophers, like Galen Strawson, object even to our being responsible for anything at all! Thus, your position is very far from being as obvious as you claim. — Thorongil

And once again I have to tell you that active pessimism does not require moral responsibility, but merely altruism.

Maybe because they can't help it, owing to their characters! — Thorongil

Maybe it's just my "character" to point out hypocrisy.

Once again, I find myself repeating the same unanswered questions and objections. This will likely be my last post to you here. — Thorongil

Same, but mostly because you seem hell-bent on misunderstanding the main thesis of the OP and instead try to bring it all back to me apparently hating on Schopenhauer or something.

No we don't. You sound for all the world like an optimist here! — Thorongil

You cut yourself on a piece of wood. You don't just give up, you find a goddamn bandage to stop the bleeding. That's the point of intelligence, of rationality: problem-solving.

Once again, it's not about fixing the metaphysical problem. It's about making hell a little less hellish.

Hold the phone! Darth is appealing to his character to explain why he might not do something?! — Thorongil

I'm saying it's one of those things I doubt anyone could seriously condemn me or anyone else for not doing anything about. Just how you can't seriously condemn someone for not failing to kill themselves for the benefit of everyone else. It's too extreme.

And the argument in the OP is that these sorts of things are not the things an active pessimist would be expected to accomplish. You might as well ask them to teleport or shoot lasers out of their eyes. It's not reasonable. But the things that separate an active pessimist from a passive pessimist are reasonable. The passive pessimist just doesn't see them as important enough to pursue.

Victoire si douce! — Thorongil

Umm, okay? It's not as if you "won" anything, as I never said there was inherently something wrong with being a passive pessimist. You just played yourself...

Again, I have presented the descriptive qualities that separate active from passive pessimism. Whether you see this as a "threat" to your way of life is a you-problem.

But I've already told that I have no means or power to help them. — Thorongil

But, you do...

I'm not a sociopath thank you very much. — Thorongil

Nor do I think you a sociopath...? What the hell?

Intentions are important because my walking toward you with a knife means something completely different depending on if I intend to murder you or intend to chop up some onions for dinner. — Thorongil

Yes, as a means of predicting what you're going to do with the knife. As you said you're not a sociopath so I doubt you'd have the intention to stab or slice me.

Most laws are based on moral principles, so this is a false distinction. — Thorongil

Most laws are based on common-sense moral principles, sure. There's a reason legal issues are tangled up with moral issues, as common-sense morality, the one that drips with ad hoc intentionality, is inadequate in many cases.

No he didn't. In fact he objected to the term. — Thorongil

Oh?

From what? It's not completely different from Schopenhauer's. — Thorongil

But there are differences.

Trying and failing, yeah. — Heister Eggcart

Okay, then...:-}

Consider yourself falsely accused of murdering someone, when in reality you merely acted in self-defense. Regardless of this fact, however, you have been sentenced to life in prison without parole. If you wanted to contest such a verdict, how ought you go about doing so? Ah, yes, through an appeal to good intention. Otherwise, you must accept the wrong done unto you simply on the grounds of "what's left over" - i.e., you killed someone, they're dead, and because you done did it, you're guilty, whether you intended to kill the intruder in your home, say, or not. — Heister Eggcart

Right, so there's a difference between legal code and moral code - justice and values. Some might argue that justice is a value, but for a consequentialist, justice is merely an instrumental value of a rather ritualistic and vindictive nature.

Dear God in Heaven, is this a philosophy forum or a cook-book message board? — Heister Eggcart

If it wasn't apparent, I was trying to show how intentions have little importance. One can always characterize any situation to suit one's needs by invoking intentions here and there. That's the lesson of consequentialism - the only thing that matters at the end is what's left over.

I don't think it's too controversial to say that most people, if not all people, live most of their lives "in the future". They contemplate what reality could be like, what their lives could consist of. This is one of the great contributions from phenomenology, it seems: possibility is always "better" than actuality - existence itself seems to be some sort of imperfection. So long as the dream is maintained, the actual world is forgotten. An escape from reality that provides a person meaning even if the dream never actually comes to be, a dream in which they imagine a perfect avatar of themselves.

Perhaps you will say that if they had given more to charity then things would have been comparatively better still, but this assumes you have some criterion for determining the adequate amount of charitable giving a person is obligated to meet, and that one is indeed obligated to meet it, which you have not yet divulged. — Thorongil

So, yes, we of course have to take into account input as well as output. However like I said I am focused more on passive pessimism as an ideal. For Schopenhauer et al, it's about minimizing harm that you yourself experience, even if it's just small bouts of anxiety or what have you, since that's a symptom of the overarching metaphysical "problem" so to speak. It's why Schopenhauer advocated contemplating the aesthetic as a means of calming the Will, or "escaping" the Will's grasp.

The fact that they didn't seem to really advocate anything more is the main point here. Their actions themselves of course are also evidence but the fact that they offered no real plan of action is what separates them from active pessimists. Not everyone has access to the aesthetic. Not everyone has the opportunity to contemplate the universe as a leisure. Not everyone even has the intelligence to think about their condition (non-human animals for example).

Their emphasis on the "big problem" is what made them overlook the smaller problems.

The criterion imo would be to at least emphasize charitable and altruistic actions for the benefit of others, so long as you yourself don't drop below whatever you would see to be the line between "manageable" and "okay I'm suffering big time now".

Schopenhauer got a lot of inspiration from Buddhism and other Indian religions that emphasized non-self, yet curiously seemed to be overly-concerned about his own well-being and status in mainland Germany and Europe as a whole.

Thus, it could be that Schopenhauer et al suffer more profoundly than the Ethiopian villager, in which case your priorities ought to be reversed. — Thorongil

Just...no. To attribute the angst and ennui Schopenhauer apparently felt as "suffering" is to bastardize suffering and insult those who actually are suffering. Like it just boggles my mind how someone can actually think this, that a first-world countryman somehow inherently suffers more than a third-world "country"man. Maybe Schopenhauer should have just left Europe and hung around the slums in Zimbabwe or something if he really thought he was suffering more than anyone else. That sounds more like a him-problem than anything else.

Schopenhauer can say all he wants about how increasing knowledge increases suffering, yet if he actually was suffering because of it he wouldn't have pursued knowledge. Thus his decadent and indecent equivocation is apparent. And if he thought this way then he probably shouldn't have taught or done anything related to philosophy as a whole. That's just bourgeois entitlement - decadence.

What is more, if you bring the Ethiopian out of his physical misery, then you have merely served as the enabler of his entering new forms thereof, that is, forms common to the materially satisfied and affluent, such as depression, substance abuse, risk of suicide, and other psychological disorders and conditions. In the absence of physical suffering, one creates fresh desires to strive after, whose unfulfillment causes yet more suffering. Paradoxically, then, the materially disadvantaged Ethiopian villager may actually be happier and more content than the materially prosperous American. — Thorongil

Again, just...no. I don't know how I'm supposed to argue against something like this, or how anyone for that matter can actually take this seriously. It's just obvious that extreme starvation is worse than ennui. One is manageable - you can still produce philosophical works if you experience it. The other one is cripplingly overwhelming.

So maybe Schopenhauer was more focused on the increase of melancholy in those who are more intelligent or knowledgeable, a so-called "burden" of the academic. This might be true but I think it's blatant equivocation to see this as legitimate "suffering" and not just a general disenchantment with the world. This is exactly why someone like myself sees Schopenhauer and co. as almost solipsistic in their philosophy. They "recognize" that other people exist but don't seem to really act like it, as they seem to be caught up in their own world of metaphysical theorizing. Suffering is analyzed in an abstract manner and detached from anyone actually experiencing the condition.

The threshold I typically like to use is the one that establishes a point in which someone can "take care of themselves". Schopenhauer obviously wasn't doing all that bad considering his biography and works, so he wouldn't be that important in the prioritarian/sufficientarian sense (consider how absurd it would be for someone like me to knock on his door and tell him I'm here to give him a massage or something because he's suffering extraordinarily). The Ethiopian obviously isn't, so they are who we would be focused on (consider how welcoming the Ethiopian would be to even the smallest of aid).

Also, those who are extremely disadvantaged and are brought up to a higher level of living typically have a lot more appreciation for their new living conditions. They may still be in an all-things-considered "shitty" existence but they don't seem to recognize this as such.

But again, like I said, I have very little hope for humanity as a whole. Human-oriented charities are inevitably fucked by the corrupt governments of the countries they're trying to help. This is why I said I'm focused more on non-human animals, the sentients that don't have representatives, who can't contemplate the aesthetic, and who probably actually suffer more than higher-intelligence sentients. That's one point Schopenhauer was 100% wrong about. Higher-intelligence does not necessitate higher suffering. Lesser-intelligence oftentimes constitutes a higher likelihood to suffer, as one doesn't have the capability to grasp and understand the cause of the condition but rather simply has to endure. They have two options: endure or escape. Humans have a third: fix the problem, or even a fourth: dissociation/distraction thanks to our "will" or what have you.

Thirdly, if you wish to end or alleviate suffering and agree that procreation is the principal cause thereof, then you ought to be focusing all of your efforts on encouraging people not to have children. By not doing this, and instead providing charitable assistance, you're acting in conflict with said goal. In other words, to use a word you accused Schopenhauer of earlier, you are in fact an accomplice to suffering by refusing to address the source. If the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the consequences of it, and the desired consequence in this case is an end to suffering, then it is wrong to give to charity, since it frees people to have children, which is the cause of suffering. — Thorongil

Not necessarily. I mean, I could go up to my university's speaking ground everyday and advocate antinatalism. I could blow up a sperm bank or put sterilization chemicals in the water. I could.

But this probably wouldn't be as effective as you might envision it to be. Nor do I think I have the guts to do something like this. Furthermore, this could actually be counter-productive; if everyone's sterilized, then suddenly research into test-tube babies will skyrocket exponentionally as everyone freaks out about the prospect of extinction.

Trying to advocate AN to even my closest acquaintances is like talking to a brick wall. It just doesn't compute. Whether this means I have to resort to violence, I'm not sure. It's one of those things I'd rather not do. Thinking about this makes me feel like a supervillain. But there's always that veil of ignorance - I don't know how effective things like this will be. It might be really effective, or it might backfire. Who knows. It's easier and more effective, I think, to focus on educating the public and increasing the welfare of those already alive. I may not approve of birth but I also harbor disapproval of extinction. There's all sorts of goofy and uncomfortable clashes in intuition. I accept this.

Simply put, I am suited to the vita contemplativa, rather than the vita activa, and civilization needs both. — Thorongil

Civilization only needs the vita contemplativa, or whatever you called it, as long as they make their ideas known and try to put them into practice. Otherwise you're just as you said: a hermit, irrelevant to the rest of the world as much as the rest of the world is irrelevant to yourself.

If that's the case, fine. Okay. But this doesn't change the fact that you are not an active pessimist. Again, if you don't find anything wrong with this, fine. If passive pessimism suits you and fulfills whatever ethical criteria you see as important, fine.

Burn-out is real. You can't pursue a high-paying job that you hate. I recognize this. EA is all about doing the most you can do, which is also why we typically don't like comparing how much we all do. But the focus of active pessimism is involvement in the world at large and being a productive asset to the overall increase in welfare of sentients.

I've always loved this quote from Julio Cabrera:

"The negative human being has a greater familiarity with the terminality of Being; he neither conceals it nor embellishes it, he thinks about it very frequently or almost always, and has full conscience about what is pre-reflexive for the majority, that is, all we do is terminal and can be destroyed at any moment.

Negative life, in this sense, is melancholic and distanced (but never distracted or relaxed), not much worse than most lives and much better than them in many ways, a life with neither hope nor much intense feelings, neither of deception nor even enthusiasm. And, above all, without the irritating daily pretending that “everything is fine” and that “we are great”, while we sweep our miseries under the carpet. Therefore, it is usually a life without great “crisis” or great “depressions” (by the way, depression is the fatal fate of any affirmative life); negative lives are anguished lives, poetic and anxious, and almost always very active lives.

In the Critique, I have already written that a negative life shall emerge, basically, on four ideas: (a) Full conscience about the structural disvalue of human life, assuming all the consequences of it; (b) Structural refuse to procreation (a negative philosopher with children is even more absurd than an affirmative one without them); (c) Structural refuse to heterocide (not killing anybody in spite of the frequent temptation to violence); (d) Permanent and relaxed disposition for suicide as a possibility."

The only part I really disagree with is his views on heterocide, as I see murder as an open possibility in extreme cases.

An ethic isn't more true to the degree that it is demanding. — Thorongil

Right, but I see these sorts of ethical limitations as ultimately baseless.

No, if by "not my problem" you mean "not responsible," then it's simply correct. If you honestly think that I am responsible for people starving in Ethiopia, then your definition of responsibility is in error, since it would say of me that I caused or intended to cause their suffering, which I clearly did not. Nor, as I said, do I have the means or the power to end it, unlike the drowning child example. — Thorongil

You didn't intend that they starve, but you did intend to ignore their plight. There is no "no action" here. Every single thing we do is an action. Allowing something to happen is still an act. You intended to allow something to happen so long as you are knowledgeable of it and did nothing to interfere. And if you're not knowledgeable of it, you're at least knowledgeable of the general existence of things like it.

Again, I ask why intentions have any importance here. They might be important in the legal sense, sure. But in the moral sense, what is so important about them?

I've never done drugs before, unless you count caffeine and the rare consumption of alcohol at get-togethers or what have you. Never really have the opportunity to, though I'm not opposed to trying some weed to see what all the fuss is about.

In other words, they weren't what you wish them to be, and you're upset about that fact. — Thorongil

Nope, this is just you projecting. I'm disappointed that they weren't active pessimists but it's not like I expected anything more. I'm condemning passive pessimism as an ideal more than I am condemning those who practice it. You're taking this waaay too personally. Boo-hoo, so I pointed out how your idol Schopenhauer wasn't as productive as he could be. Oh well.

You can't change the past and you can't change other people, so stop acting like a petulant child. — Thorongil

>:O

But I don't make it a habit of going out of my way to create essay length threads condemning them. — Thorongil

Nice straw man.

Productive in what way? Tell us all how great and wonderful darthbarracuda is in comparison with those icky "decadent" pessimists like Schopenhauer and Leopardi. — Thorongil

Part of Effective Altruism is that EA-ers don't typically go around bragging how much they do. Safe to say I donate to specific organizations and contribute time and energy to local projects. I also am pursuing a degree that not only interests me but will make me a relatively large amount of money, which I plan on donating most of.

So no, I'm not on the front lines, but as I've already said, for every soldier on the front, there's ten behind. EA may be liberally optimistic but they do more good than the alternatives.

"In the grand scheme of things...." — Thorongil

And as I have said several times now, the grand scheme of things isn't important because it's not feasible to work with. But every life is a world-in-itself. Every instance of suffering is important, perhaps even more-so if we take the block theory of time seriously.

The total amount of suffering is not lessened one single iota due to Schopenhauer giving to charity. Not one. Suffering and misery in fact increased exponentially after his death, as the human population exploded and we embarked on one of the most barbaric and violent centuries yet seen in the history of this sad, pathetic vale of tears. — Thorongil

So maybe let's team up and do what Schopenhauer couldn't/didn't?

Consequently, I do no wrong in withholding charity from starving Ethiopians, for I am not the cause of, and so am not responsible for, their plight. Now, lest you misconstrue what I am saying, charitable giving is good, undoubtedly, but not giving to charity is not bad. — Thorongil

Of course you can argue that doing good is entirely supererogatory. This is a popular move. But it still misinterprets the OP, as I already have said how an active pessimist could still see this as supererogatory and yet be a part of it. For example, bodhisattvas.

But consider a drowning child. Do you do anything wrong by not helping the child escape the water? I think you'll probably agree that it's not simply an instance of altruistic good but an instance of moral expectation. To ignore the child is to be neglectful, possibly even criminally.

Or what if you saw a man kidnap a young child, and saw the license plate number on the vehicle? Surely you would think you have an obligation to call the police, no?

And what about those suffering by natural disasters? Who is to blame for this? Surely not the tsunami, but perhaps those who stood idly by and watched as people died. People who didn't have to die.

I have to ask you, what reason do we have to accept this distinction between doing and allowing? Why is it important? What motivation do we have to see morality this way? I suspect many attempts to limit morality in this way are at least partly due to a dislike of how demanding a morality without it would be - yet I've already shown how this is nothing more than an affirmation of the status quo and how the over-demandingness stems from a non-ideal and unequal distribution of responsibility. Not everyone are consequentialists, so those who are are given a taller order than they should.

So it's easy to just say "not my problem" when the issue is thousands of miles away and whose causes are difficult to attribute. In a world as complex as ours, there hardly ever is one single determinate cause for a problem, and no amount of pointing fingers is going to sort things out. That's why the active pessimist is going to say "to hell with it" and start fixing things themselves, even if they don't have to. Such a move could thus be seen as that of virtue. Or altruism, as I had already said in the OP and several times already in this thread.

Schopenhauer, being a pessimist, should of all people been the one to realize that the world is non-ideal and unfair - yet for some reason found room to push in these idealistic, absolutist moral codes that drip with appeals to intention. Once again we have an example of a security-bubble; the world is crazy and malignant, but there's a special code that recognizes intentions when the rest of the world quite obviously does not. A world that harms indiscriminately is not a world which has this sort of morality. To the consequentialist, there is no difference between doing and allowing. To the non-consequentialist, there also shouldn't be a difference between doing and allowing in extreme and non-ideal circumstances. To deny this screams, to me, the just world fallacy.

You must like being coy, because you have continually refused to give me concrete examples of what they did wrong, what they ought to have done, and why. — Thorongil

On the contrary, you seem to just enjoy being an argumentative ass. I've given you plenty of examples already. And I've already conceded that Schopenhauer donated to charity.

And once again, I'm not arguing that they did anything wrong, per se, I'm explaining how they certainly were not what I would call active pessimists. So stop taking this so personally and stop being so belligerent. Whether there is something wrong with being a passive pessimist is not really the point of the OP, although I hope you and others will consider what it actually means to be a passive pessimist in the long run.

2) These figures, or at least Schopenhauer, would say that the problem CANNOT be solved, outside of abstaining from procreation. This is part of what makes them pessimists. — Thorongil

And I have already stated multiple times that it's not about solving the entire problem but of making things comparatively better than they otherwise would.

Yes, you're a hypocrite. Think of all the drowning children you could have saved if you slept on a rock and used the money for that Target pillow on them. — Thorongil

I never said I wasn't a hypocrite, just that I'm a more productive hypocrite. :-}

A good deed, but in the grand scheme of things it did absolutely nothing, as is the case of all forms of charity. — Thorongil

I'm sure it did a lot to help those who were on the receiving end. It didn't do "absolutely nothing" as you so boldly claim, otherwise it wouldn't actually be a good deed.

Throwing money at the problem will not fix it, for the condition is terminal and permanent. It will merely act as a fleeting and minutely effective band-aid. I am not saying not to give to charity or that I wouldn't if I had the means, I am only pointing out the sheer idiocy and folly in suggesting that it will make any substantial difference. — Thorongil

And once again I have to tell you that it's not about fixing all the problems but making things comparatively better. But I guess there's no aesthetic to this, it's more aesthetically pleasing to just give up on everything. Everything sucks and there's nothing we can do about it...except there actually is.

That you're not grateful to be so informed by such a man doesn't negate his value. — Thorongil

I'm grateful for his observations because I now am able to do something. It probably would be harmful just to talk about how much life sucks without doing anything about it, because now you've just made everyone's sufferings that much more obvious.

And I believe this too. What's wrong with seeking the truth? Presumably the harshness and violence of the world is true and requires pointing out and defending as such. — Thorongil

There's nothing wrong with seeking the truth, per se, so long as you recognize that some truths are sought because you want to know, not because of some "higher purpose" that truth-seeking embodies.

And in the end, truth won't get food on the table. It will leave you on the side of the road wondering why you even bothered with it in the first place.

I shall seek the truth above all else. — Thorongil

Meanwhile in Ethiopia, over 14 million people don't really care about metaphysics. Because they haven't eaten in ten days. If you don't find anything wrong with this, fine. Just don't pretend Schopenhauer and co. did anything substantial over their lifetimes to help people like this. They were passive, focused more on abstract metaphysics than the suffering they were famous for characterizing. And they were profoundly lucky that they had the opportunity and resources to pursue these sorts of dainty hobbies.

So pessimism fails because it expects reality to be unnatural. Or supernatural. Perfections and utopias are defined in ways that are brittle and mechanical, not fluid and organic. — apokrisis

On the contrary, pessimism succeeds as it recognizes sentience to be "unnatural" and ill-equipped to deal with the oppressive forces of nature. Instead, sentients have to pretend reality is different than it actually is. To be sentient, then, requires one to live in a fantasy. Everyone has their crutch.

Wait a minute, if your solution to the world's suffering is charity, then Schopenhauer's giving his money to charity upon his death is more effective than anything either of us could or likely will do. I have substantial student loan debt, a microscopic bank account, very few possessions to my name, and no desire to be extremely wealthy, so I'm not the sort of person for whom these organizations operate. — Thorongil

That's unfortunate. Remember I did recognize that Schopenhauer donated all his money to charity. So once again you're taking this personally and assuming I'm attacking the virtues of Schopenhauer and co. directly when I'm really not. If anything, you getting all riled up about this effectively has proven my point. I am using these men as examples of passive pessimism - far from being just about their general hypocrisy, I'm trying to show how they didn't go far enough. They weren't radical enough to see their already-radical philosophical views actualize.

But this means your criticism has been meaningless from the start, since you have been assuming an ethic contrary to those about whom you criticize. In order for your criticism to stick, you would first have to show how their ethical systems are false. — Thorongil

No, it's not meaningless, as I have argued that welfare consequentialism is the inevitable next-step after pessimism is accepted. Problem-solving instead of simply problem-acknowledging.

So you're a hypocrite. — Thorongil

No, apparently you missed the sarcasm. I sleep on a pillow I got from Target.

And why should anyone listen to what you think other people should do? More importantly, what makes you think they will? — Thorongil

Well presumably because I think I have offered reasons why I am to be believed.

Like what? Selling their pillows for crappier ones? Come on, man. — Thorongil

Actually Schopenhauer is a better example of an active pessimist than any of the other ones. He still was decadent and self-centered but at least he did donate the charity at the end of his life. Didn't really do much else, though. Thought it was good enough to just talk about the suffering of the world.

What makes a man great is not just the work he produces but what he does with it. Part of my argument, then, is that Schopenhauer (and co.) felt Truth was still "important" for some reason in a world as harsh and violent as the one their perceived. Truth or bust. They maintain an affirmation of something that is "alien" to the rest of the world - this is what I called their "bubble of security"; philosophy is a sort of reassuring comfort of perfect rational structure that isolates someone from the rest of the dirty, wild world. We see the first thinking on this arise in people like Freud and Peter Zapffe.

I have argued that understanding the world this way should lead one to see absolute Truth as something secondary in importance. Sacrifices must be made. That is what ultimately makes the difference between active and passive pessimism.

The simple fact is that, in academic philosophy at present, Schopenhauer is estranged from both the analytic and continental camps. He doesn't belong to, nor founded, any "school," and for this reason is ignored. — Thorongil

This is unfortunate. I get how some people might think Schopenhauer's metaphysics is a Kantian cul-de-sac, but goddamn are his observations of the human condition on point and shouldn't be ignored.

It seems we have a millionaire in our midsts! :D — Agustino

If only ... looks like mac and cheese is back on the menu, boys!

(whether effective or with as much revenue is another question). — schopenhauer1

Very true, this is why we have to be careful and deliberate about who we donate money to. An unfortunately large amount of charities are scams.

Rather, it entails civic involvement by all concerned parties. In short, your ideas are really political more than anything. It is a more an appeal to "Get out the vote" and be more involved in the community. — schopenhauer1

Yes, indeed, however I made the caveat that we shouldn't feel obliged to put our lives or general well-being at risk. Try advocating AN to a college crowd. That'll go over great...

If you want to REFUTE their ideals, that is one thing, but I do not think they are being hypocritical to their own ideals. So again, to entail utilitarianism with Pessimism is to unfairly tie two concepts together that are not necessarily entailed. Pessimism actually has very little in the way of ethics- it is mostly an aesthetic comprehension of the world. What one does about it is more open for interpretation. What it does have (i.e. Schopenhauer's compassionate ideal), is not necessarily utilitarian anyways. — schopenhauer1

I'm glad you recognize the aesthetic component of pessimism, I entirely agree. I don't agree that consequentialist theories necessarily require things to reach this utopia. It simply has to acknowledge that things could be better, all things considered; 9 sufferers is better than 10 sufferers.

We MUST get up, we MUST survive, we MUST entertain. On top of this kernel of uncalmness, is the complexities of contingent harms that we must face. Is this the real metaphysical "truth" of the world, or is this just the product of a certain temperament? I brought that up in a previous thread, but indeed, there is a Pessimist aesthetic and a certain byline that runs through it. — schopenhauer1

No, I completely agree with all this. The unfortunate ironic truth is that this aesthetic can make living altruistically more difficult than had the aesthetic never been accepted.

Though I know you disagree with the execution of Benatar's consequentialism/utilitarianism in regards to his asymmetry logic, you may want to see what he has to say about ethics outside of antinatalism, as you can see where another antinatalist/pessimist that is consequentialist/utilitarian balances consequences and personal responsibility. I honestly don't know much else about what his ethics entails based on his premises. He is obviously most famous for applying his assumptions to antinatalism in particular. How he handles altruism in general would be interesting to explore. — schopenhauer1

Indeed I have been interested in picking up a book on everyday ethics by him.

You can pat yourself on the back, have a secular "Kingdom of God" complex by working to end this or that problem, but the problems of existence do not go away. Existence itself does not provide a smooth existence simply because one's basic needs are met. — schopenhauer1

Right.

Bringing another person into existence is bringing another person into the burdens of life. It is literally giving another person burdens to deal with, so they can what? every once in a while feel the goods that life can offer? — schopenhauer1

Exactly. It makes you wonder whether or not you should help prevent more than just your own children from coming into existence.

Most importantly, if you do not indulge in those goods yourself, your very logic of helping people makes no sense- it becomes an absurd circular logic. We must help people so they can help people, so they can help people. — schopenhauer1

Right, there must be a balance. And a threshold. Once people can take care of themselves, they can do what makes them "happy" or whatever that is and also help more people get above their threshold.

Honestly, though, with all the political and social entanglements in the world, helping humans on a large scale is practically impossible. It's why I focus more on non-human animals. Under-represented victims.

Honestly this is probably the number one reason why I wish I could become a philosopher myself. I'd just love to have the chance to communicate and interact with some of these people; critique their views, refine my own, get tenure and write a controversial book.

The magnitude of suffering is so great that there is extremely little one can concretely do to alleviate it in any meaningful sense. — Thorongil

This is where you are incorrect. There are lots of effective altruism groups and other similar organizations that operate on donations from people like you and me.

So you're a utilitarian. Great, but he wasn't. Nor am I. — Thorongil

I'm a welfare consequentialist, yes. And my claim is that any sort of active welfarism is what separates active pessimism from comfortable "not my fucking problem" pessimism.

Even if this were true, again, so what? That shouldn't matter for a utilitarian. Also, what pillow do you sleep on? — Thorongil

I sleep on a pillow imported from the far east, with downy feathers and a silk cover. Some say the prince of Persia once rested his head upon its soft embrace.

Adorno is an idiot. To not write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. — Thorongil

Adorno was being hyperbolic. I was using it to convey a point that you're missing here.

Poppycock. If you really believed this, you would cease posting on a forum like this. Or perhaps you will admit to your own hypocrisy, in which case your criticisms of Schopenhauer et al lose all their force. — Thorongil

Eh, no, since I already said you can pursue these things, so long as you're not doing it exclusively. There's obviously a thresh-hold, I'm not saying we should all become altruistic slaves. I'm saying there were things that these pessimists could have done that would not have affected their lives in any unreasonable manner, and they did not do so.

Because most college professors are optimistic, left leaning progressives. I will say that there is a certain kind of pessimism which some of them exude, owing to the influence of certain postmodernist hacks, which I absolutely abhor. It's not "classical pessimism," as you put it, but a pessimism about the merits and achievements of science, Western civilization, truth, reason, the enlightenment, democracy, and so on. — Thorongil

What about scholars of thinkers like Nietzsche or Freud? Don't they have to read Schopenhauer, for example? Or for that matter, Germany as a whole which sees Schopenhauer as one of the great minds of their history?

I'm curious as to why someone we both see as accurately portraying the human condition could be so neglected. IIRC it was Schopenhauer himself who said most philosophers weren't actually doing philosophy.

The claim isn't about its impressiveness. — Thorongil

Rather it's about effectiveness and direction.

I don't recall any incidents in his life that are in any way comparable to this. — Thorongil

I'm not saying there were any incidents like this. I'm saying location and distance have no bearing on our knowledge of suffering. What difference does it make if the person is next door or down the street? What about a few miles away?

The pillow one sleeps on makes not one iota of difference, positive or negative, to the sufferings going on in the world. If a rock were his pillow, is he suddenly absolved? If he went down to the Main river, found a nice stone, and replaced his "plush" pillow with it, is the world suddenly a better place? What pillow do you sleep on? Judge not lest ye be judged. — Thorongil

Well actually technically it would make a difference, as he could have used that money for better use. But that's not really the point. The point is that Schopenhauer and co. all seemed to focus on their own comfort more than anyone else's. And I argued for this by pointing out his plush pillows and poodle, his want for aesthetic and his love of nature.

Which would have been what? The kind of free will you seem to be attributing to Schopenhauer he would reject — Thorongil

So not only was Schopenhauer a determinist, you're saying he was a fatalist as well?

The figures you mentioned were not, in any sense, "indifferent" to suffering. One would be hard pressed to find a more false claim one could make about them. — Thorongil

Well, remember the point of the OP, man. You're the one who is taking this personally and claiming I'm attacking these people in an ad hominem fashion.

I'm not, at least not directly. I'm pointing out how it can't really be denied that they were, in some sense, limited in what they accomplished to actually do something about the suffering in the world. They were not bodhisattvas. The claim is that their pessimism was comfortable/convenient because, as I see it, they did not follow through with their pessimism. One wonders how much they actually accomplished to reduce suffering in comparison to all those comparatively-optimistic social workers who didn't know two things about metaphysics but were more effective in reducing suffering as a whole than any one of these great thinkers.

To summarize, then, I'll quote Adorno: "To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric." The natural world as a whole is like an Auschwitz. Pursuing things like philosophy or art that have no real contribution to the rest of the world as a whole, exclusively, means to prioritize oneself over another.

Again, like I mentioned earlier, Leopardi was a loner and an egoist, who thought being true to himself was all that mattered. Cioran obviously was not a public figure, just more of a shadowy outsider. Schopenhauer didn't just run away from cholera like any rational person would, he went further and called himself a choleraphobe, as if nobody else was, and focused on his own career and fame (especially later in life). Nietzsche was all sorts of crazy, maybe he can be given a break in this case. Camus didn't put two and two together to realize it is birth, and not just suicide, that are true philosophical questions. Even Zapffe decided to stick to climbing mountains all day and for some strange reason found ecology to be very important.

There is nothing wrong with my statement that these men could have done more. Whether they were obligated to do so is a totally different argument, although personally I think they were.

So why dwell on what cannot be changed? Focus on living morally in your own life, which is the only one you have any control over. — Thorongil

...Because I find this to be important and know that my own influence extends beyond my own body in the sense of persuasion.

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Off topic question: if I remember correctly, you are at university, no? Do you have any thoughts on why pessimistic thinkers typically don't get taught as much as other thinkers? Or generally, why do you think pessimism is not as widely accepted as presumably you might wish it to be?

You're still desperately trying to paint him as "uncaring," but that impression simply does not stand up to the facts. — Thorongil

Please don't psychoanalyze me, I'm not "desperate" to prove these people as devils.

But he didn't marry and never desired to have children, so he is not an "accomplice" to human suffering at all, given that, as you admit, its origin is found in procreation. — Thorongil

Not having children isn't too impressive. He was an accomplice to suffering in the same way standing by while a child drowns in water is criminal neglect. Once you know what life entails, sitting on your plush pillows is neglect. With the stakes as high as they are, allowing becomes rather similar to simply doing.

Excessive in comparison to what? — Thorongil

In comparison to what he could have done.

False. — Thorongil

True. X-)

Yes, for we all know that whoever advocates asceticism but does not sleep on a cement block next to a charnel ground in the howling wind is the vilest of hypocrites. And, obviously, to hell with animal companionship. — Thorongil

It's pretty obvious visiting a whorehouse is not the ideal of an ascetic.

Would that all men behaved like saints and lived up to the highest ethical ideals! But they do not, and it is precisely this realization that makes one a pessimist, generally speaking. Your criticism is therefore entirely impotent because it fails to understand all of what pessimism logically entails. — Thorongil

And so what does it "fully entail"? Please enlighten me.

I'm not surprised that these people didn't live up to ethical standards. But I'm disappointed that they didn't even seem to try given what they obviously understood about life.

Funny how you seem to focus only on Schopenhauer when I mentioned other pessimists, like Leopardi, who intentionally isolated themselves from everyone else.