I think what is being presumed is that members of a family have grown up together and share a certain type of bond that would be, in principle, ruptured by incest. Whereas any bonds that are ruptured due to homosexuality are contingent upon things apart from the family itself. Homosexuality may threaten some families, but incest is taken to threaten the concept of family.

Fucking your sister is probably going to destabilize family dynamics, no?

Then again, Game of Thrones made it hot.

Our culture of work has been influenced by Protestantism. Working hard (is supposed to) build character. It's just another partially-obscured belief that everyone holds regardless of whether or not it's actually true. The belief is pernicious though as it tends to makes someone who works and suffers expect that everyone else work and suffer alongside them. Just like how older generations get mad at younger generations for demanding affordable college education ... "if I don't get a slice of the pie, nobody gets a slice of pie!!"

Once you're born, the logic of ethics changes. You are now someone who requires help. Giving someone the opportunity to work so they can take better care of themselves is a beneficent thing to do, as long as you're not taking advantage of them (which is usually the case).

Chapter 3: The Antinomy of Pure Reason

I found this chapter to be more challenging than the previous two. There are a few areas that I am not confident I fully understand. I need to let these ideas digest before raising any questions, so only the summary is given.

Summary:

Kant uses the Antinomies to demonstrate how reason contradicts itself when thinking about certain questions. He attempts to show that there are two equally compelling but incompatible answers to each question. Kant claims that both answers to each are false and that the questions themselves rely on presuppositions derived from transcendental realism. More importantly, Kant says that the questions naturally arise from the transcendental realistic position, and so if the answers to the questions are all false (leading to a contradiction), then the questions and the presuppositions that ground them (transcendental realism) are also false, which entails that transcendental idealism is true.

Both thesis and antithesis for each question are apagogic. Kant believes that the equal success of each position in refuting each other demonstrates the impossibility of a solution to the conflict that respects the transcendental realistic (dogmatic) assumptions underlying it. These conflicts of reason arise from its demand for an absolute totality of conditions (grounds) for any conditioned (given). This “intellectual categorical imperative” is a logical requirement for a complete justification or explanation for every assertion. Every true proposition must have a ground. Kant claims that problems arise when this logical requirement to “think the whole” is applied to states of affairs, where the totality is the world of space and time.

Only the temporal aspect of the First Antinomy is discussed by Allison in his book. With respect to the world of space and time, Kant says there are two mutually exclusive options when considering its conditions: either there is some first element, limit or beginning, or the inquiry into its conditions extends ad infinitum. These are the thesis and the antithesis, respectively; the temporal world is either finite or infinite.

Allison emphasizes that Kant is focused on the world, and not space and time themselves. The world, according to Kant, is “the object of all possible experience”; it is not merely the whole of representation, but the actual representation of the whole as a united totality. It is not just the thought of an aggregate of items, but the thought of these items as constituting a whole (Ganze).

The thesis (for the finitude of the world) is broken down by Allison into six steps:

1.) Assume the world has no beginning in time.
2.) It follows that up to the present, an eternity has elapsed.
3.) This means an infinite number of successive events has occurred, i.e. an infinite series has been completed.
4.) According to the “transcendental concept of infinitude”, an infinite series can never be completed through successive synthesis.
5.) Therefore the concept of an infinite series of events in the world that have passed away (been completed) is self-contradictory.
6.) So there must have been a beginning of the world in time, a first event.

Allison discusses various critiques of this argument, raised by philosophers like Russell and Stawson. He provides responses to these critiques, and while the issues discussed might be interesting to some, I was not particularly curious about them but was more interested in the later things that Allison brings up.

In the Second Antinomy, Kant distinguishes between a totum syntheticum and a totum analyticum. A totum syntheticum is a whole that presupposes its parts. The question of whether a totum syntheticum is possible is equivalent to the question of whether a complete collection of its parts is conceivable. A totum analyticum is a whole, the parts of which are only conceivable with reference to that whole. Space and time are tota analytica, but the material universe in space and time is conceived as a totum syntheticum.

The alleged contradiction of the infinitistic position is in its application of the concept of infinite to the material universe. Since it is a totum syntheticum, the thought of a complete enumeration or synthesis of its parts contradicts the thought of the inexhaustibility of the infinite. Thus there are two incompatible rules for thinking the same object, amounting to a contradiction. Because the world is taken to be a totum syntheticum, it cannot be a series extending infinitely into the past, but instead it must have a first moment.

However, the presupposition here is that the world is a totum syntheticum. This is the transcendental realist assumption that is rejected by transcendental idealism.

The antithesis asserts that the world can have no beginning in time and no limit in space. Allison breaks it down as follows:
1.) Assume the world has a beginning in time.
2.) The concept of a temporal beginning presupposes a preceding time before the thing exists.
3.) Therefore it is necessary to think of an empty time before the world existed.
4.) But such points of time cannot be distinguished from one another.
5.) A world cannot meaningfully be said to have come into existence at one time rather than another time if both times are empty.
6.) So we cannot meaningfully say the world came into being in time at all, therefore the world is infinite with respect to past time.

Step 6 is a non-sequitur and Kant recognizes it as such, but the point does follow given the fact that the world must be either finite or infinite.

As with the thesis, Allison discusses objections that have been raised by people like Strawson and Bennett. But again, as it’s clear throughout the chapter, even with the rebuttals given by Allison, neither the thesis nor the antithesis are convincingly sound. I think they are less important to the overall understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism, so I won’t discuss them much here.

To summarize though, Allison says that the conjunction of a first event with a first time is incoherent. An event is defined as a change of state of a thing in time, so the first event designates the earliest change to have occurred in the universe. The problem is that if the first event occurred at the first time, there was no prior state in which the thing existed. An event not preceded by a time in which the world was in a different state is incoherent. Allison says that “it is a condition of the possibility of conceiving of a change of a thing in time that we are able to contrast the state of a thing at an earlier with its state at a later time.” We can say that time began with creation, but we cannot meaningfully claim that creation occurred at the first time.

Allison ends the chapter by focusing on what the consequences are for transcendental idealism with respect to the Antinomies. Because the conflict between the two positions is based on a “transcendental illusion”, it is “merely dialectical”. The conception of an absolute totality of conditions that constitutes the world in itself violates the rules of empirical synthesis. An experience of an infinite space or elapsed time, or a boundary of either, is impossible.

All forms of transcendental realism, according to Kant, must regard the absolute totality of conditions for a state of affairs as constituting a world-in-itself, “in-itself” meaning the independence of this world so conceived from the conditions of empirical synthesis. It is logically committed to the proposition that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in itself, but it forgets the conditions of experience in which this world is given. The regulative Idea of totality, which is grounded in the intellectual categorical imperative, is conflated with the thought of an actual object (the world) - and this is the transcendental illusion.

Kant says:

“From this antinomy we can, however, obtain, not indeed a dogmatic, but a critical and doctrinal advantage. It affords indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of appearances - a proof which ought to convince any who may not be satisfied by the direct proof given in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This proof would consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite. But both alternatives are false (as shown in the proofs of the antithesis and thesis respectively). It is therefore also false that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in itself. From this it then follows that appearances in general are nothing outside our representations - which is just what it meant by their transcendental ideality.” — Kant

The argument here contains two suppressed premises: that the antecedent proposition (the world is a whole existing in itself, a totum syntheticum) is entailed by transcendental realism, and that transcendental realism and transcendental idealism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive positions. The negation of the antecedent entails the negation of transcendental realism, which entails the affirmation of transcendental idealism.

Phase 3 The crowd's answer — schopenhauer1

Why do you care what the crowd thinks? Their misery is not your problem. Let them do whatever they want and you can try to focus on the well-being of yourself and the people you care about. Is it therapeutic for you to express these thoughts?

Normally I would just say the prols on the right are fools, just like the prols on the left. But my question was about those who actually support their masters on principle; not simply because they were fooled. Who is worse? Who's principle is a greater threat to America? — James Riley

I don't know.

Are you asking which is worse, to be foolish or to be evil?

One of the neatest tricks of the capitalist technological system has been the commercialization of libertarian values for the bourgeoisie.

Big-tech companies (like FAANG), Democratic politicians (like Biden or Obama), and liberal-minded universities across the country encourage people to celebrate BLM, LGBTQ+, feminist, pro-democracy and anti-capitalist ideas while simultaneously being capitalist, bureaucratic, patriarchal, authoritarian and racist themselves.

They dish out products to satisfy the deep and completely reasonable frustrations that people have with the system, providing an outlet for all the pressure, which keeps those in power safe from any real threat. The point is to make people feel like they are rebelling, without them actually doing so.

The best thing for all men and women is not to be born; however, the next best thing... is, after being born, to die as quickly as possible. — Silenus

I'll check out Nussbaum's book, thanks.

We can only apply Hillel's / Confucius' golden rule as much as we're practically able or as prudence allows; no viable ethics is a suicide-pact. — 180 Proof

You say here that we can only apply the golden rule as much as practically able, and that no viable ethics is a suicide-pact, but this seems to presuppose that ethics is compatible with living.

There is an Argentine philosopher I have studied on-and-off, Julio Cabrera. He is developing a "negative ethics" that keeps in mind the structural problems of life, and advocates antinatalism. He believes that ethics is normally not radical enough. Cabrera would argue that people, simply by being alive, are disqualified from nearly all real ethical behavior. The situations in which we find ourselves in, and the constitution of our bodies are such that we can only ever approximate ethical behavior.

Then there are some of the Stoics, who thought it better to commit suicide than to lose ones virtue.

Do you believe ethics and life are congruent?

I hate being physically injured, but I may physically injure someone who tries to do so to me.

I think society is not quite collapsing, but I do think it is eroding. I don't know if there will be a sacking-of-Rome scenario, I think it more likely that there will come a time in which humans will have been conditioned to such a high degree as to make them completely dependent on technology and thus unable to take care of themselves if (when) the technology fails.

:up:

Ever read Ellul?

Ah man you got me all worked up for nothing :yikes:

Yes, there do seem to be simple ethical principles that we tend use, like the Golden (or Platinum) rule, personal accountability, compassion, virtues (like courage or discipline), etc.

But as pragmatic as these principles can be, there are holes in them. They contradict each other. There is no one-size-fits-all. A more complicated theory may be less pragmatic, but it might also be more self-consistent. Is the question under-determined?

One thought I had was that, similar to Sellars' manifest/scientific image, there could be a manifest/"enlightened" morality. Buddhism has its bodhisattvas and buddhas, enlightened ones who have learned the middle path, for instance.


I like your point about the illusion of complexity. Very interesting.

Why should people be forced to go looking for animals and edibles berries in a hunter gatherer tribe? — Tom Storm

mmm more like they're forced to not be a hunter-gatherer...human potentiality is defined in reference to a prison. Who wants to live in a stupid city except those who can't survive without it?

The wild is no piece of cake, but those who are born into it are uncorrupted by the luxuries of the city and, for the most part, are well-adjusted to whatever hardships occur. These people are the last remnant of the natural age of humans, before there was any "humanity", "civilization", "institutions", or "technology", when much, much less people lived shorter lives but with the greatest amount of freedom possible, when domesticated life was sneered at, when what mattered were actual real goals achieved through the full utilization of the body, before civilization came along and introduced countless insane imaginative systems of control that have systematically wreaked havoc and quite simply have no good reason to continue to exist.

It is shameful that nearly everyone would choose to continue to live in a civilization because "it's too hard" to live outside of it. It's mostly not even our fault, but we really are truly disgusting creatures.

Chapter 2: Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealism

Summary:

Allison claims that there are two metaphilosophical positions that one can hold: transcendental realism, and transcendental idealism, and that they are mutually exhaustive and exclusive. While individual metaphysical positions may differ in details, they must belong to one of these two metaphilosophical positions. Indeed, Kant claims that all metaphysical theories before him, such as those of Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, Berkeley, Hume and Locke, can all be defined as holding a common prejudice which defines transcendental realism. Kant also holds that it is this common prejudice which has caused every one of them to fail.

Allison begins by elaborating on what is meant by transcendental realism:

The common prejudice of transcendental realism is that it confuses representations (appearances) with things-in-themselves. The transcendental realist takes the spatio-temporality of objects' externality to entail the independence of these objects from the subjective conditions of human knowledge; they hold that space and time are aspects of objects as they are in themselves. In other words, they conflate the transcendental sense of actuality with the empirical sense. Kant claims that transcendental realism entails empirical idealism; which is basically an external world Cartesian skepticism.

There are other conflations of terms in transcendental realist theories:

• Berkeleian ideas and Humean impressions are given to the mind as they are in-themselves and thus confuse the appearances in the empirical sense with the things-in-themselves in the transcendental sense.
• Cartesian dualism regards appearances (in the transcendental sense) with things-in-themselves (also in the transcendental sense)

Then, Allison says that transcendental realism can be further understood in terms of what he calls the "theocentric" model of knowledge. This model has it that human knowledge can be compared to a theoretical "absolute" or "infinite" intelligence which knows objects are they are in-themselves, i.e. a "God's eye view". This is well demonstrated in the Leibnizian doctrine of the analyticity of all propositions; for any true proposition, according to Leibniz, the predicate is contained in the subject, and that any syntheticity of truths is from the limits of humans and not a nature of the truth itself. In this way, Leibniz can be said to have "intellectualized" appearances.

Another example of theocentrism in transcendental realism is that of Locke's nominal and real essences, which can be understood by the analogy of the outside and the inside of a clocktower; the outside is merely the appearance, while the inside holds all of the gears and wires that the clocktower is made of. For Locke, human knowledge is limited to some outward appearances. Divine knowledge is not a difference in kind but a difference in amount; God simply has more perception than humans, he is able to see the entire clocktower.

All of these examples show that the transcendental realist share a common assumption: that "genuine" knowledge is of things-in-themselves. But transcendental realism fails to recognize the a priori conditions of knowledge, and it also fails to make the transcendental distinction for appearances and things-in-themselves which leads to its theocentric model of knowledge.

Allison then goes on to explain transcendental idealism. Just like transcendental realism, transcendental idealism is a metaphilosophical standpoint, not a straightforward metaphysical doctrine, although there are metaphysical consequences of transcendental idealism. It is the opposite of transcendental realism, in that it recognizes a priori conditions of knowledge, makes the transcendental distinction and holds an anthropocentric model of knowledge; the shift from theocentric to anthropocentric is what Kant called his philosophical "Copernican revolution". Kant's transcendental idealism is "critical" or "formal", in the sense that it focuses on the conditions and not the contents of objects of experience.

Kant describes transcendental idealism as the doctrine that

everything intuited in space and time, and therefore all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, that is, mere representations, which, in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings, or as a series of alterations, have no independent existence outside our thoughts.

Thus transcendental idealism holds that objects in space and time have no independent existence from us in this manner (of space and time). It is not the claim that objects have no independent existence from us, but that such an existence cannot be attributed to them in the manner in which they are represented (in space and time, the forms or conditions of human sensibility).

The Copernican revolution, or the flip from theocentrist to anthropocentrist knowledge, entails the belief that objects must conform to knowledge, and not vice-versa. While theocentrism holds that true thoughts are those which conform to the "real" nature of the objects of perception, anthropocentrism holds that it is the objects that conform to the nature of the mind. In other words, the way objects are represented reflects the manner of the mind, not of the objects in-themselves. And, as noted earlier, transcendental realism (with its theocentric model of knowledge) is incapable of explaining how we have any knowledge at all, which leads it to skepticism or empirical idealism.

Finally, Allison clarifies how Kant understands the term "actuality" by comparing his theory of transcendental idealism with modern "phenomenalism". Superficially, Kant holds the same thing the phenomenalists do, that first-order statements of unperceived things can be translated into second-order statements about possible perception. But he differs from phenomenalism in that he holds that the possibility of a perceptive state is only a consequence, and not a criteria, of actuality. Whereas Berkeleian idealism holds that only what is perceived is actual, and phenomenalism holds that what is perceived and what could be perceived is actual, Kant holds that the actual is that which is in conformance to the a priori principles of human knowledge. Thus an unseen force, like gravity or magnetism, can be considered actual, even though it not directly perceived, because that is a conclusion that we can draw based on the experiences that we do have, which conform to these formal conditions of knowledge.

Questions/Thoughts:

• Allison uses the terms "outer" and "inner" sense, but only ever explicitly defines outer sense/perception as empirically external, spatial objects. What is inner sense, is that space and time?

Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Problem

Summary:

What Allison calls the "standard picture" of Kant's transcendental idealism is roughly defined by P. F. Stawson as the doctrine that reality is supersensible, and that we can have no knowledge of it. Kant is interpreted as being an extreme skeptic, because his position is taken to entail that we can only know what things seem like to us, and not how they really are independent of us.

Allison shows that this interpretation fails to distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental version of ideality/reality, and appearances/things-in-themselves.

Allison offers three senses in which the ideal/real can be understood:

The general sense of these words are:

• Ideality: mind-dependence; in the mind (in uns)
• Reality: mind-independence; external to the mind (ausser uns)

The empirical sense of these words are:

• Ideality: private data of an individual mind
• Reality: intersubjective spatial-temporal objects of human experience

The transcendental (the philosophical reflection of experience) sense of these words are:

• Ideality: universal, necessary, a priori conditions of human knowledge, e.g. space and time, the forms of sensibility
• Reality: referring to an independence to any appeal to these conditions

From these definitions, Kant can be said to hold that empirically real objects and transcendentally ideal, and that a transcendentally real object is non-sensible (noumena).

Allison also offers two levels in which appearances/things-in-themselves can be used:

The empirical level (the "language of experience"):

• Appearances: "mental", as an object seems
• Thing-in-itself: "physical", as it "really is"

The transcendental level:

• Appearances: conforming to human sensibility
• Thing-in-itself: independent of the conditions of human sensibility

He then goes on to define what an "epistemic condition" is: it is a condition or rule that must be conformed to in order for an object to be a representation. It is an "objectivating" condition. These are not logical conditions of thought, like the principle of contradiction, which demonstrates the difference between general logic and transcendental logic. They are also not "conditions of possible experience", like a brain, an eye or an ear, nor are they psychological conditions, like habit or custom. They also are not ontological conditions of being a thing in themselves, like the Newtonian vision of the substantiality of space and time.

Questions/Thoughts:

• While it is certainly possible that Kant has been greatly misunderstood in the standard picture of his transcendental idealism, I think it may also be possible that Kant himself did not fully understand his own position, which could explain why he frequently seems to use misleading terms like "mere appearances" which are frequently used to support the standard picture.

Do you have any specific examples in which you think someone on here has defended these stereotypes? I wonder if there is some psychological projection going on here.

Otherwise intelligent people can believe in things for very poor reasons. I think that if you are confident in your beliefs and have a stable sense of positive self-esteem, then whatever stereotypes people think of you should not worry you too much. If someone is stereotyping you, that says more about them then it does about you.

If you are sensitive to what other people think of you, this could mean that you are worried they are right. Generally speaking, insults only hurt if you fear there might be some degree of truth to them, otherwise they just don't matter. This fear could be grounded in reality, low self-esteem/self-understanding, or a combination thereof.

There have been times when I have been called stupid, and I didn't care because I knew I wasn't being stupid. Other times, I have been called stupid, and I did care because I wasn't very confident in what I believed. And then finally other times I have been called stupid, and I cared because I realized, yeah I was being really stupid.

Work is stupid but if you don't work, you will eventually die, because (surprise surprise) society has not conditioned you to be able to survive outside of it, so you gotta fill that slot! Yippeee!!!

For the most part, people believe in God for very poor reasons that are easily refuted. Disbelieving in the sky-daddy God is not all together very impressive, it's like shooting fish in a barrel, pretty low-hanging fruit, but doing so can make people feel superior just like winning any other argument can, no matter how stupid it is.

That being said, this is a philosophy forum, so God-stuff is fair game to bring up. I just personally wish the discussion quality was better, and the arguments given for either side more thought-provoking.

So, mind-reading?

Generally speaking, bullies tend to be on the far right, and losers tend to be on the far left. The far right attracts bullies because of its emphasis on social hierarchy, dominance and the glorification of violence. The far left attracts losers because of its emphasis on collective responsibility (as opposed to taking care of yourself), the abolishment of hierarchy (so nobody is better than the loser) and a prophesied revenge upon whoever the loser is jealous of (the revolution). As it stands, both sides of the spectrum are loony, and it's best to not associate with them.

Yeah sure, celestial teapots and whatnot. Not falsifiable and, as such, as equally likely as an infinity of unfalsifiable ideas thought of and not thought of. Each so should be weighted accordingly :wink: — Kenosha Kid

I'm not sure if I agree with your comparison of the issue with teapots. There can be good reasons to believe something even if this belief is not falsifiable, no?

I would not say that the reasons for believing that there is a teapot in space have the same degree of plausibility as the reasons for believing that God exists. Especially because any serious form of theism does not define God as a "thing", but more like the grounds of every-"thing".

But this still strikes me as the same kind of thinking as God-of-the-gaps, or more God-of-the-edges. It's based on our ignorance of what is yet to be discovered and the hope that it will never be so. — Kenosha Kid

Indeed yes I would agree that it can often seem like a God-of-the-edges sort of thing...science has displaced God in explaining natural phenomenon that one can wonder, is the last refuge of the theist in the origin of the universe?, and is that just eventually going to be taken over by science, just as everything else has?

I think this is an understandable position to hold if you only really interact with theists who think that God is a "thing" and regularly invoke the God-card to explain fuzzy things we don't fully understand, like consciousness or morality or really anything else in the natural world that ought to be studied by science. Of course there's not a magic man in the sky. I am in full agreement with you that God should not be used as a placeholder for things that can be assumed to have a naturalistic explanation.

But the point I am making is that I don't think the origin of the universe is something that can be assumed to have a naturalistic explanation. The question, as I see it, is whether the universe has existed forever, or if it has a beginning. The dogmatists can argue one way or the other, but I see no reason to believe that we have any way of determining this. I do not think this is a case of us just not understanding the issue well enough, it's not a God-of-the-gaps sort of thing. This is a metaphysical question, not a scientific one, and I do not think the answers to metaphysical questions are knowable.

What did you have in mind? — Kenosha Kid

In terms of religion, whether or not a supernatural being created and maintains the universe and has a purpose for doing so, what characteristics this being has (if it exists), and what the relationship is between people and this being.

In my view, which is roughly Kantian, the origin and the ultimate aim of the universe are unknowable (a mystery), and any theories about them are unfalsifiable. Though I believe this to be the case for metaphysical claims in general, in which (proper) religious claims are a subset. Religion has gotten the well-deserved thrashing it has in part because it has made claims about things that it should not be in the business of making claims about, things that science deals with quite effectively on its own.

Death on the Installment Plan, Céline

Yeah, I see what you're saying about god-of-the-gaps, and I think that is often what happens. Though I would say that that is because religion has been misconstrued into making claims that conceivably can be investigated by science, like the origins of life and the ultimate fate of the universe.

I think there are claims though that, right or wrong, cannot be determined by science, not because we do not possess the instruments or resources to do so (as would be the case for a flying spaghetti monster), but because in principle they cannot be investigated this way. It is in the nature of these claims to be unfalsifiable.

ok bud :kiss:

tf is this? iFunny?

Well, I think the point I was trying to make is that religion is simply a bad way to go about investigating empirical phenomena.

If there is any reconciliation to be done between science and religion, it is not by showing that their claims are identical, but that their claims are completely unrelated to each other and belong to separate domains. Religion is not science, science is not religion, and whenever one of them tries to be the other it ends up being really stupid.

it does say that, it just tries to hide it — MikeListeral

???

Science can be used to predict as much as it can be used to explain. Religion can only try to explain, it has zero predictive abilities, and in fact only explains anything by appeal to mystery.

Agnostic are mute because they're too intelkectually lazy to push back on dogmatic religious "beliefs" or "practices", deluding themselves that they inhabit some "neutral ground" between demonstrably true claims & demonstrably untrue claims. — 180 Proof

How can you speak for every agnostic? That is simply not true. You can be an agnostic about the existence of God while also believing that, if God exists, it isn't Yahweh or Allah.

The counter is that for practical purposes agnosticism and atheism have the same outcome. — Banno

Not true. Atheists won't shut the fuck up. At least agnostics have a respectable silence.

:up:

This kind of all-or-nothing thinking is quite delusional and serves to only further fragment the left. I suspect that some leftists hold such puritanical views because it gives them an excuse to not do anything but complain as a pastime.

Better question when do we give anything moral consideration? — Oppyfan

When it can suffer.

eh

This is what I want to change - more than anything else in the world. I want everyone to expect that they will meet not only their grandchildren but their great-grandchildren and their great-great-grandchildren. Generations upon generations living together, working together, and making decisions together. We will be accountable - in this life - for the decisions we made in the past that will impact the future. We will have to look our family members, friends, and neighbors in the eye and account for the way we lived before they came along.

[...]

To build the next century, we're going to have to figure out where everyone is going to live, how they are going to live, under what rules they are going to live. — Lifespan, David Sinclair

:vomit:

Sometimes scientists can be really fucking stupid.

I'm not sure if I follow. I was not referring to Craig or Plantinga, they're not neo-scholastics.

In his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God, Catholic philosopher Edward Feser provides several long-winded metaphysical demonstrations of the existence of God:

• the "Aristotelian proof" is 50 points long,
• the "Neo-Platonic proof" is 38 points long,
• the "Augustinian proof" is 29 points long.
• the "Thomistic proof" is 36 points long.
• the "Rationalist proof" is 27 points long.

Most individuals will be so bamboozled and flabbergasted by the audacious lengths and complexities of these proofs that they will likely vomit and faint. The absurdity of requiring not one, by five different proofs of these lengths in order to demonstrate the existence of God is prima facie evidence that God does not exist.

These proofs serve exactly two purposes:

• To reassure those who believe in God that their beliefs are not irrational, in order to keep them obedient to the ecclesiastical order, and
• To frighten and intimidate those who do not believe in God, in order to keep them from becoming a nuisance to the ecclesiastical order.

Both of which are crucial characteristics of propaganda.

The main arguments for the existence of god are quite accessible, and it doesn’t take long for one to think them through and become unconvinced even if they don’t hear every new iteration of these arguments. — Saphsin

I would not necessarily say that they are new iterations of these arguments; at least some of the proponents have provided evidence that the standard arguments we are familiar with are not faithfully represented in their original form. In the same way that several prominent scholars seem to have misinterpreted Kant (according to Allison), it seems to be the case (according to these neo-scholastic proponents) that modern philosophy has greatly misunderstood the arguments presented by the ancients and the medievals.

The general narrative about how this occurred seems to be that the misinterpretations were published by prominent philosophers associated with the Scientific Revolution, and due to the success of science, these philosophers (and their interpretations) ended up becoming more greatly studied than their predecessors. Neo-scholastics will often claim that philosophy was at its apex with medieval scholasticism, before it went off the rails with the modern turn, and that ultimately we need to re-learn what the scholastics taught and abandon modern and post-modern philosophy for being founded upon fundamental misunderstandings of the "perennial" philosophy, which has continued to be practiced off-the-radar.