I've actually witnessed glossolalia. By "witnessed" I mean hearing it and seeing people (apparently) speaking in tongues; I have no desire to "testify" to it in any religious sense.

I attended a gathering of Pentecostals quite some time ago. As the meeting progressed, people seemed to become more and more excited, and eventually some of them began what I would describe as singing--making a kind of ululation or ebullition. They didn't speak as one normally would speak a language. They didn't, for example, do something similar to speaking Latin or Greek or Italian, suddenly, in the midst of a group of English speakers. Thoughtfully, someone would then "translate" the burbling or fluting sound into English. It would have something to do with Jesus.

A kind of tension preceded the singing. I don't know if anyone here has been in a crowd of people who suddenly start rioting, but the feeling of tension was similar if less threatening. My guess would be glossolalia is the result of strong excitement or emotion.

It's interesting to see who shows up and contributes to this thread.
— ArguingWAristotleTiff

Not really. Your interest appears to be unwavering support for whatever management does in this context. You mention 'rare disagreement' but I suspect that it's rarer than advertised, and incidents of rebelliousness outside the forum are completely irrelevant. — praxis

If you think it's not interesting who shows up and contributes to this thread, then you shouldn't be interested in Tiff's comment, nor should you be interested in making any response to it, let alone this one. Perhaps your praxis is passive-aggressiveness, though.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_norm — Benkei

Ach, du lieber! I would side with Hart when it comes to such thinking, I'm afraid.

Theaetatus was something of a milquetoast, it seems.

. I've repeatedly espoused silentism, not atheism. — Banno

Ah, blessed silence. But religion brings out the noise in us.

Medieval Christianity borrowed the arguments from Islam. They had to, since they had destroyed the Classical culture that was their own stoa. — Banno

Yes, early Christianity was superb at repression, and at assimilation when repression was unsuccessful. This was especially the case with Latin Christianity, I believe, which naturally was dominant in most of Europe during the Middle Ages. The early Christians found Neo-Platonism fitting to the task, so it was never completely repressed, despite the systematic burning of books pagan books. But the "rediscovery" of Aristotle courtesy of Muslim scholars was something of a bombshell, and it took Fat Tommy Aquinas to assimilate his work.

I'm not sure what you consider "opinion" to be, but if you're going to hold any kind of view about, or make a judgment regarding, most anything, you're going to have an opinion. You may withhold doing so in certain cases, of course.

I've always found it interesting that, even if the traditional "proofs" of the existence of God had any validity, they don't serve to prove the existence of a personal, peculiarly Christian God, although they're regularly touted by Christians and have been for centuries. The same would apply in the case of other personal Gods if the "proofs" are used to "prove" them. Even if they're true, there's still a long way to go to get from them to Jesus or any other personal deity.

The closest to it would probably be legal positivism which suffers from "turtles all the way down". — Benkei

In what way does it do so? Legal positivism merely addresses the existence of law. It's possible also to address the sources of the law, and why it's considered the law, but it seems to me that you're simply claiming that the law must have merit to the the law, which is just what legal positivism insists is not the case. If you claim that the law must be "good law" to be the law, I think the likelihood is you're the one who'll be looking for turtles to stack.

we did have a similar debate previously. His position, and I don't mean to misstate it if I do, is that he recognizes only positive law as being the law, meaning only those formally passed laws are to be considered. This is in opposition to natural law, which would arise regardless of what our legislatures do. — Hanover

Yes. I took the legal positivism position, essentially. When people speak of "natural law" or "higher law" they speak of something that isn't necessarily the law but which they wish was the law.

Our current debate, on the other hand, doesn't really delve into what is natural law (except to a limited degree, which I'll point out), but more so asks what is a meaningful positive law. That is, if a law is passed illegalizing murder but it imposes no consequence and no means of enforcement, then does the fact that it's toothless deem it no longer a law? — Hanover

I think when we speak of a law, we mean something recognized as regulating conduct, though we may disagree with it, enforceable through the imposition of some penalty or liability (thought it may not be in practice).

I've already explained what law is, you know. It's the law, and only the law. Sorry.

Don't pack more into the definition than that. — Bartricks

That's quite enough packing, I believe.

I don't think the ancient Stoics ever doubted that we're subject to emotion. I don't think they believed emotion could be eradicated. I believe they felt that it's possible to limit the impact of negative emotions such as anger and hate, and characteristics such as greed and envy, by accepting, for example, that we shouldn't let matters outside our control to disturb us or concern us excessively and understanding. This required discipline and practice, so it was no easy task. But it would promote tranquility, happiness and virtuous conduct.

Don't get civil on me, now.

You think there's a civil way to talk to the person robbing or raping you?

And that if they remind you that you ought to be civil to them, they are fully justified to do so, and you, as a proponent of civility, should oblige? — baker

Well, certainly that's what he means by "I think of civility as akin to table manners" you gibbering, drooling, fatuous, miserable, pompous, self-righteous, preening, inane cretin. What else would he mean?

The historical connection between the rules of "civil discourse" and the maintenance of structures of power seems clear to me. The English language remains a particularly striking example of this. But non-adherence to the rules of civility as established by the privileged is indeed frequently used as a method to minimise the influence of the marginalized. — Echarmion

I'm not certain what you mean by "civil discourse." Certainly words used, accent, the use of slang, are taken by some as determinative of status. That may be particularly the case with the English language (or at least the English); I don't know. Napoleon famously called Talleyrand "shit in a silk stocking" (in French, presumably) and was thought by Talleyrand to have bad manners ("A pity so great a man should have such bad manners" or words to that effect).

Do the rules of "civil discourse" prohibit the use of insults? If so, how does that "minimise the influence of the marginalized"?

Well...

If "incivility is anger directed at unjust civil ordering" it's difficult to object to incivility, and urge civility, isn't it? On the other hand, if it's merely rudeness, offensiveness or insolence (as "incivility" is typically defined) then the "Eleven Theses" don't seem so compelling.

I wonder if the invocation of Luther is deliberate. If so, let's be thankful there aren't 95 of them in this case.

Let's credit the authors of the piece with knowing how "incivility" is commonly defined, and the understanding that they're engaged in an exercise in rhetoric. In fact, "anger directed at unjust civil ordering" is appropriate. Regardless, though, that isn't to say that "incivility" is, or that "civility" is in some sense protective of or promotes "unjust civil ordering." Incivility, as commonly defined, is (I think) characteristic of many of the right-wing. It's also characteristic of bigots, and those who sexually harass in the workplace, and of other disagreeable folk. It may be that civility is inappropriate in some cases. I think that can be established without redefining words for rhetorical purposes, though.

That people kill or maim creatures for sport or entertainment is indisputable, but not something I'd consider admirable or appropriate. Sitting in a stand waiting for some poor deer to pass by and using a weapon it could not possibly protect itself against to kill it isn't my idea of a good time, nor is using a barbed hook to tear apart the mouth of a fish, no matter how artfully that may be done (fish being, as far as I know, at something of a disadvantage when matched against humans). So I can't say that I embrace fishing or hunting.

Sometimes, a psychologist is just a psychologist (and a neurologist just a neurologist). This doesn't make them philosophers, however. Whether sex or something else may motivate humans isn't necessarily a philosophical question. I don't think it's reasonable to characterize Freud as a neglected thinker when it comes to psychology.

Thanks again for the references.

As I understand "musement" it is, at first at least, a process by which our observations suggest that something is the case, but not as part of an inquiry on our part. That something occurs to us as a possibility, but not as a revelation or inspiration the source of which cannot be described or determined. It's arises from observable "facts" but is evoked, as it were. More traditional forms of reasoning may come into play after that takes place. Dewey believed that we only truly "think" when confronted with problems (broadly defined, as part of his theory of inquiry), but felt our experience as living organisms included much more than purposive thinking to resolve questions or circumstances. Maybe what Pierce called "musement" is part of what we do apart from purposive conduct.

This "musement" (and other aspects of Pragmatism) I think may hint at a connection between Pragmatism and Stoicism (John Lach's book Stoic Pragmatism notes some similarities. I wonder if the Stoic conception of an immanent deity began with musement, from time to time.

es, that is an excellent short introduction. For a more detailed overview, I recommend The Continuity of Peirce's Thought by Kelly A. Parker. — aletheist

Thanks for the reference.

He ended up drafting over 500 handwritten pages, and we can only wonder how the course of philosophy in general and pragmatism in particular would have been different had either The Nation or The Atlantic Monthly published one of the finished texts that he submitted to their editors. — aletheist

That's quite interesting to speculate about. Is that article available somewhere? What about your article?

For quite some time, I've been somewhat fascinated with Pierce's A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God and his concept of "musement." I find the traditional arguments unpersuasive and tend to think argument on the question is futile, but there's something about that article that makes me wonder--which I suppose is a part of "musement."

Does nature have any value, whether it is instrumental or intrinsic? — Hello Human

Nature is the only thing that has value, if it's appropriate to think of it as a "thing." What else is there that would?

I think that Pierce is sometimes very difficult to read (as is Dewey). I read Charles Pierce's Guess at the Riddle by John Sheriff, and found that helpful. I should read it again.

I do agree that a philosophy that doesn't spend its time making shit up serves a largely negative function, so can't survive as an independent discipline — Snakes Alive

But there are so many other disciplines making up shit--even philosophical shit. That will keep philosophers busy for many years.

That was standard view of pragmatism in the late 20th century, which seems to be changing. I've never been much of a fan of Pierce's Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and his Triadism, though, if that's what's intended by pragmatism's "metaphysical ambition."

I wonder whether there's something about metaphysics that sends those who indulge in it into Never-Never Land. I don't think Dewey avoided it entirely, however. He just was a naturalist.

Some brain in a vat told me I'm not, and he should know.

Ciceronianus the White or anybody who knows - which book would you pick for starters ? — Amity

Of books by Dewey? Probably Reconstruction in Philosophy or The Quest for Certainty are the most readable.

Mind-boggling that some thought his ideas to blame for the shooting at Columbine High School ! — Amity

Right-wingers have believed Dewey destroyed the educational system for quite some time, and that as a consequence our youth are not being taught Truth,Justice and the American Way as in the good old days.

Can philosophy be mysterious? — Dovidas Sneideraitis

Well, let's say philosophers can be, but philosophy shouldn't be. When mention is made of "mystery" I tend to associate what's being referred to as something only those with special knowledge, training or insight can understand. One has to be an initiate to understand mysteries (like an initiate of one of the ancient mystery religions).

For sure. It is easier to read what others have written about him and his philosophy. — Amity

That's true, unfortunately. I'd recommend Larry Hickman's books about Dewey.

I'm not sure just what it is about Dewey's writing that makes him difficult to read. It's not that he's obscure or because he uses a special jargon, but his style seems awkward. He can be tedious, but is worth the effort, I think.

We can only do our best given our current knowledge and circumstances. How to factor in the 'unknowns'...and filter out our own bias or attitudes. It seems that one way for Dewey is not just through calculation but through education and collaboration. A mix of theory and practice with feedback. — Amity

I think Dewey would say that the process of inquiry educates us. We learn new things as part of the process of thinking. So, he thinks conclusions are, at least in theory, subject to correction, modification or rejection as we learn more, have new experiences and discover new or more evidence.
This troubles some people. His view of ethics has been disturbing to some because he doesn't identify a definite summum bonum, for example. So, in ethics and otherwise, he's accused of relativism. I think that accusation is unfounded because of his emphasis on the method of thinking to be used to make conclusions.

It's all good. This 'Inquiry' business, innit ? — Amity

I think it's the best we can do.

True enough.

Ahh. I love Heidegger's essay on metaphysics. It's like Jimi Hendrix. — frank

He certainly was adept at creating a haze, if not a purple one.

I don't think analytical philosophy would interfere with any of this. I mean, "there's a god" is true IFF there's a god.

What am I missing? — frank

I think analytic philosophy would not so much interfere with the musings, if we can call them that, which result from these characteristics and concerns, as it would analyze them, and find them to be lacking if they're intended to be anything more than evocative. If you're looking for an example of the approach of a form of analytic philosophy to the kind of musings which might result, the one that comes most easily to my mind is found in Carnap's article THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS THROUGH LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE, which you can find here:

http://www.ditext.com/carnap/elimination.html

I refer especially to his analysis of the statements made by everyone's favorite Nazi, Heidegger, in his musings on metaphysics.

I think this is an example of one of the methods employed by analytic philosophy, which I would view as including the logical positivism of some of the members of the Vienna Circle.

Dewey certainly isn't a scintillating writer.

His definition of "inquiry" is very broad, I think, because it's intended to apply to problems or concerns whether they be mundane or trivial or highly significant. He believed we only think when we encounter problems we wish to solve or circumstances we wish to change. Otherwise, we act merely by instinct or habit or react without thought. Because the definition is to apply to any problematic situation, it's difficult to specify a particular instance in which it would especially apply.

Let's say we need to buy a car because the one we have no longer works. There are various factors to be considered in deciding which car to buy, e.g. the cost, what we have available to use to make payment of the purchase price, what we use a car for, primarily (distance driving or local driving, off-road driving, etc.) the climate in which we live, the size of our families, the color of the vehicle, safety features, the list goes on. What's the best decision will depend on how we weigh and assess the various factors of concern to us and determine their priority or significance.

Now say we want to go to the moon, or build a house, or travel from point A to B, or are trying to avoid a confrontation with another person, or want to fire an employee, or decide who to vote for, or when water boils, or whether we're a brain in a vat. What is the most efficient and effective means by which we resolve the questions/problems presented? That's the process of inquiry, I believe.

Or perhaps Analytic Philosophy is interested in Philosophy, not politics, and that's the reason why it is apolitical, which Schuringa sees so problematical? — ssu

Happily, I know little of what goes on in the academic world. When I was taught philosophy, what I read and what was discussed had little to do with political or social issues, and much to do with traditional philosophical issues in metaphysics and epistemology, and ethics, somewhat, but primarily with the language used in ethical statements. Professors had their views on politics, but those I encountered who taught philosophy made no claims of special knowledge or insight regarding social issues, nor did I expect them to do so. I didn't expect them to have any special knowledge or insight either. Maybe it's different now. Maybe there's an expectation that professors should expound on politics, society and culture, and Schuringa thinks they should. Everyone else does, unfortunately. Unless they actually have special knowledge or insight, though, I hope they don't, as in that case it's not clear to me they contribute any more to resolution of problems than do the many, many pundits we can find anywhere in the media or the Internet.

'Inquiry' is certainly a broad enough term to include practically anything. — Amity

According to Dewey, "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" though use of reason, experimental method, logic, etc., instead of, e.g., divination, prayer, consulting authority, luck, etc.

What is the cause of this? Too much leisure time? — frank

That would be a factor. Another would be self-love (the belief in one's own importance, and the resulting search for a justification or explanation for one's existence). Related to that would be the need to minimize the significance of ordinary, day-to-day life by positing the existence of some more satisfying reality behind it or transcendent of it. Also the "quest for certainty," based on, I suppose, fear of a world of probabilities and change. The disappointment of those brought up in the Christian faith when they find it to be incredible. That enough?

There is no compulsion to take current issues on board in order to survive.
However, I think the necessary self-questioning aspect of relevance is a good way forward, don't you think ? Thoughts travel... — Amity

The only formal education I had in philosophy was devoted to the study of Analytic Philosophy, Ordinary Language Philosophy, and (through a particular professor) Deweyian Pragmatism.

Dewey, unlike the other philosophers I studied, was deeply concerned with social issues. However, he was similar to them (I think) in his emphasis on the consideration and application of a method of addressing and resolving problems he called "inquiry." "Inquiry" is broad enough, I think, to include the methods employed by AP and OLP in addressing traditional philosophical questions. But Dewey felt inquiry should be applied not merely to philosophical issues but current social issues as well.

So, I have no problem with philosophy addressing social issues.

Instead of diligently cleaning it for the rest of eternity, why not just throw a few grenades in it? — frank

I think that's been tried, at least as to certain aspects of philosophy; metaphysics, for example. And yet it keeps reappearing in various guises--like a demon that refuses to be exorcised. Analytic philosophy (to mix metaphors) is therefore similar to a mallet which may be used in a game of Whac-A-Mole, the moles being replaced by specific philosophers or philosophical theories, satisfyingly wacked by those seeking clarity and rigor in philosophy and eschewing obscurity.

But the moles keep popping up until the game is over.

Again, I view analytic philosophy as a method--a tonic and roborative, perhaps even a purgative. It shouldn't pretend to be anything else, I think. It's not the end of philosophy, it's a way of addressing problems.

Analytic philosophy, like Joe Hill, ain't dead, and like rock 'n roll, it will never die, as long as it's considered to be a method or collection of methods by which the detritus of philosophy is cleared. Those methods may be usefully addressed to such as feminism or critical race theory, but I don't see why it must take them onboard in order to survive or flourish.