It's quite possible for philosophy to address how people live and what they care about without having recourse to the kind of obscurity, and sometimes even esotericism, analytic philosophy and OLP were and are intended to expose and avoid. But in any case their therapeutic value applies primarily to metaphysics and epistemology.

I enjoyed the reference to the "scriptures" of Hegel.

But I tend to doubt that people find philosophy to be idle merely because you find in it contradictory positions. You can find that to be the case in law, medicine, engineering, sociology, psychology; most any human endeavor in which expertise is claimed, in fact.

They may be more inclined to find it to be idle because much of it has no bearing on how we live. That wasn't always the case, and isn't entirely the case now, but I think that would be a fairly common belief.

The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives. — Pez

I wonder just how we would "plan our lives" if there were no regularities in nature. Very ineffectively, I would think.

If this is the issue, I also wonder if it has ever been asked just how likely it is that what is useful to us in planning our lives--in living--would be in some sense inconsistent with or at odds with nature. This would require, for one thing, an assumption that we're not part of nature, or not wholly part of it, which sadly is an assumption that's been made too often with unfortunate results (including the belief that there's an "external world" separate from us). But much as some would like to think we are apart from nature, I fear we're a part of it like everything else. And as parts of nature we interact with the rest of it necessarily, are formed by the rest of it and form the rest of it as well in some respects as part of that interaction.

This thread is just a dream. Do not trouble to respond, folks. — unenlightened

More a disturbingly recurring nightmare, surely. Sorry for calling you "Shirley."

Sorry, that You can see these questions as mere 'maundering'. I am interested in serious discussion, so, if You can, come up with something less idle talk. — Pez

Ah, but I am serious and I ask a serious question: How have a serious discussion over something (like Kant's thing-in-itself, or Hume on causation) which our conduct demonstrates we don't take seriously? And indeed something which there is no reason to take seriously during the course of our lives?

From the standpoint of our conduct, we never normally think or act as if what we interact with all the time isn't what we think it to be or use it as, except in extraordinary circumstances. So, I didn't wonder what my car really is when I drove to the office this morning, neither did I wonder whether it is something like a car, which does just what a car does, but is something different from a car, which cannot be ascertained.

From the philosophical standpoint, Kant's "thing" (for example) is a perfect example of a "difference which makes no difference" to paraphrase Wild Bill James, or somebody. Peirce admired Kant, but knew maunderings (slow, idle wanderings) when he saw them. So, according to Peirce: "The Ding an sich...can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all reference to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage."

So, let's just agree that you take seriously what I don't as respects Kant and Hume.

But though I understand civil law quite well, at least as someone who has practiced it for many years, and you seem interested in it and whether it has any relation to natural law, I suspect the views of a mere lawyer wouldn't be welcome in that discussion either.

I tend to look at maunderings of these kinds as a kind of affectation, or residue of the belief that the only true knowledge is absolute, certain knowledge which we poor humans cannot obtain, because we're humans and not something else, often God, but in any case something that isn't human. So we forever remain "only human" and thus inferior beings to thinkers of this kind. But if they're correct true knowledge and certainty, if there are such things, are unattainable and simply irrelevant. Much like Kant and Hume themselves in certain respects.

Acceptance of the lack of certainty, and the lack of any need for it, alters the conception of natural law. The most interesting view of natural law I've come across is the "evolutionary view" of natural law favored by C.S. Peirce. It happens that the universe evolved the way it did, and as a consequence certain "habits" developed on which we can rely (statistically, but not as absolute laws), but in other respects the universe remains subject to inquiry and undetermined.

How many, and which, acts are involved depends on what one is doing with the description... — Banno

I'm late to this (language?) game.

But I'd say it more properly has to do with context. "I promise" may create a contract, for example. What the act is depends on what it's for, in a given set of circumstances.

Stoicism appeals to me because of its simplicity. No visions, no frenzy, no ennui; a simple and sensible acknowledgement of the folly of disturbing yourself with matters over which you have no control, and determination to govern yourself instead of trying to govern others, or events.

I wonder whether any of this amounts to more than the not very profound claim that we're human beings, and interact with our environment as human beings do.

Should we ditch Stoicism or the descriptor of "Stoic" or Epicureanism and the descriptor of "Epicurean" for similar reasons? — schopenhauer1

I don't know. It may be too late for that. They seem to be far older than philosophical pessimism. But Stoicism has also been called "Zenoism" or "Zenonism" after the school's founder, Zeno of Citium, and I'm not adverse to calling it either one of those names if it pleases you.

Right, but I guess I am perplexed because no one (Ligotti or I at least) is saying that you can't make a "the worst" anticipation of a negative outcome without "making a general judgement regarding life or the world"... So I am not sure what it is this straw man you are arguing against, as no one as I see it, is claiming thus. — schopenhauer1

I think the fact a word like "pessimism" means something in ordinary discourse makes its use to describe a philosophical position inadvisable, as confusing, but say no more than that regarding philosophical pessimism at this time. In other words, I think "pessimism" as it's apparently used in philosophy is something of a misnomer. That I'm not a philosophical pessimist should be obvious, and I think I've said why that's the case already.

To mix the two up would be intentional for rhetorical purposes in a debate to deny Pessimism its proper place in philosophy, or it is simply ignorance of the difference. Which is it for you? Or am I missing what you have done here in your mixing the two? — schopenhauer1

I didn't think I was mixing them. I merely say that "pessimism" as I understand it, as I would use it in a sentence, isn't "philosophical pessimism" as I understand it. One can anticipate negative outcomes, or think that "the worst" will more likely happen than not, without making a general judgment regarding life or the world. I don't question whether there's such a thing as "philosophical pessimism."

I tend to interpret "pessimist" and "optimist" according to their more common, less philosophical, meanings. I think I can be called a pessimist because I don't expect a good, or the best, result in practical matters of the world, nor do I expect the best of people in such matters. Years of practicing law and seeing the mess we can make of matters and each other may have contributed to the development of that point of view. But this is a view of people and what to expect of them. It's not something which constitutes a view of the greater world. I'm not "pessimistic" regarding the world; I don't think it will act in its own self-interest, or is lazy, or malicious, or inclined to act badly--those are human attributes.

Not everything. Just the parts that are smug and parochial.

My point is simply that the Crusades were holy wars waged in the name of God, like jihad, and the crusaders were promised heaven if they died while waging war, as it seems jihadists are promised. I don't consider holy war, killing in the name of God, "noble and good", regardless of the God invoked, but you are of course free to do so. I think war fought for reasons of religion disturbing.

Urban II called for the freeing of the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, and offered the remission of sins to those who died while partipating in the Crusades. That sounds rather like a holy war to me.

No doubt other factors played a part in fostering the crusades But if you think jihad is motivated solely by the desire to kill Christians, I think you're mistaken.

Not bandits, but the entire army of the Fourth Crusade sacked Constantinople instead of proceeding to Jeusalem, together with the fleet of Venice. Those Crusaders backed a rival of the emperor ruling at that time, who it was hoped would be more cooperative and would pay a large sum to the Crusading army. It was also hoped that the Eastern Church would acknowledge the Pope as the head of the Christian Church. Payment wasn't forthcoming and there was no unification of the Churches.The sack was so violent and destructive Constantinople never recovered, and was eventually conquered by the Ottomans.

I assumed you were referring to what philosophers have called "the external world" (those parts of the world we interact with everyday), not the entire world or the entire universe.

Indeed I have. The most popular if one can call it that, and successful of them, the Third Crusade, is of course a favorite as it featured Richard the Lionhearted, Philip Augustus, Frederick Barbarossa (who drowned in a river on the way) and Saladin. It has made for fun movies, and Romances. But after the Pontifex Maximus, Urban II, proclaimed Deus Vult! there followed two centuries of mayhem as various and sundry Europeans invaded and wrecked havoc in the Holy Land and beyond. They even sacked Constantinople, though it was a "Christian" city.

Thinking something, as an idea, under certain concepts. concept-ualise. I take this to mean a something made into an intellectual intuition by way of concepts. — AmadeusD

And in what way is this supposed to differ from experiencing the world? Do you claim that thinking somehow removes us from the universe?

It seems to me that if we're part of the universe, we think, and conceptualise as you call it, as a living organism interacting with the rest of the universe, necessarily. It's what we do as parts of the universe. In other words, it's a function of our existence and is part of experiencing the rest of the universe.

Or perhaps you think that we're not part of the universe; we're somewhere else, thinking.

we don’t experience the universe, just conceptualise it. — AmadeusD

Oh dear. And what does "conceptualise" mean?

Avowed Christians have been ignoring the teachings of Jesus as stated in the Gospels as it suits them since they were written. But a little history:

Spartacus was not afraid of the roman legions and he lived only a few years before the Christians would burst onto the scene. — Average

He died in 71 B.C.E., most likely in the final battle which ended the revolt. That's at least 100 years before Jesus is said to have been crucified. Marcus Crassus, who lead the Roman army which defeated Spartacus' is said to have crucified 6,000 of the rebels along the Appian Way back to Rome. If Spartacus didn't fear the legions, he should have.

Christian theory and practice seems to have revolved around the persecution they faced in the world for their loyalty to an otherworldly master but they didn't embrace the idea of a Jihad like the muslims. I know of no documented cases where christians waged war against the roman emperors who so viciously attacked them. — Average

You might want to read up a bit on the Crusades.

The claims regarding the persecution of the early Christians by Imperial Rome prior to the reign of Constantine are largely mythical, as modern scholarship has shown. There's little or no evidence of the many martyrs claimed by Christianity, and persecution was localized and sporadic, though a more serious effort was made during the reigns of Decius and Diocletian, but by that time it was far too late to prevent Christian assimilation of the Roman state.

They fetter us with their sniveling. — Ligotti- CATHR

Wow. Even I wouldn't go that far. But I must find a way to use this sentence in court. It's marvelous.

Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are.
— Ciceronianus

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Perhaps. But I think that "what is the meaning of life?" is a question which wasn't asked antiquity in the sense it's asked now because it arises in the modern sense due to the "triumph" of Christianity, which effectively (though not immediately) extinguished the ancient world. With Christianity (and perhaps monotheism in general) came the belief that we're made for a particular purpose, associated with God/Christ. Thus, the old Baltimore Catechism of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, on which I was raised, provided a simple answer:

Q. Why did God make you?
A. God made me to know Him, to love Him, and to serve Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in heaven.
Q. What must we do to save our souls?
A. To save our souls, we must worship God by faith, hope, and charity; that is, we must believe in Him, hope in
Him, and love Him with all our heart.

There you have it. The meaning of life is clear. What happens, though, when that God no longer serves, as began to be the case for many from roughly the 17th century and continues for many now? There must be some other "meaning of life" to take its place, and so we seek an answer to the question,

This of course relates to the history Europe and where Christianity and monotheism extended, not to the East, of which I know very little.

I've always though Nietzsche's amor fati was merely derived from Stoicism. That may be why he disliked the Stoics.

What do We Mean By “The Meaning of Life”? — George Fisher

Does it mean anything at all? I don't mean life, I mean the question itself.

What's being asked? How best to live? That isn't the same question, though, is it? Is it being asked what the purpose of life is? Why we're here? What will happen to us? What God has planned for us? Why, or if, we matter?

How best to live might be determined, or at least the ancients thought so, in some cases at least without reference to "the meaning of life" as we understand the question, if we do. So, the best way to live is to obtain tranquility, or happiness. The other questions can't be with any certainty, I think. Maybe the ancients were wiser than we are.

Yes, that's the case now, in any event.

I do think that there are the old fashion conservatives, but they are simply muted out by the Trump crowd. — ssu

I hope you're right. But at least when it comes to elected officials, it seems that most are willing to follow Trump's lead regardless of their principles, if they have them.

The demonizing of Republicans/Conservatives as ethical monsters in the last 20 years has much, much more to answer for imo. — AmadeusD

I'm uncertain whether there are any Conservatives left, since Bill Buckley died. Conservatives are against the intrusion of government in our lives. Those called "Conservatives" now seem to relish government control, except perhaps when it comes to the ability to acquire and retain money.

No, it's not about morality, it's about the facts of the matter. — schopenhauer1

Yes, if it was about morality "should" would be used, not "must." But while I face the issues of being human every day, they don't involve

a certain sense of angst, existential dread, isolation, loneliness, ennui, and meaninglessness. — schopenhauer1

. Sorry.

Why are we even deliberating this kind of evaluation? — schopenhauer1

A good question. Why indeed bother? But I dislike being told what I must think or feel by virtue of the fact I'm human.

Rather, the "excess" of consciousness brings with it a set of issues that humans uniquely must face. — schopenhauer1

You see the "must" in that sentence, don't you?

How much do you expect and or fear that a strong fascist moment could be organized within the next 5 years? — BC

It's not clear to me that we don't have one already, although I can't say that it's organized. Let's say there are plenty of fascists, or crypto-fascists.

Ever read Sinclair Lewis' novel It Can't Happen Here? It's American dictator, Buzz Windrip (love the name), is described as disturbingly similar to You Know Who.

If I wasn't interested in this thread I wouldn't be posting in it.

Whether it's claimed we're different, special, abnormal, whatever word you prefer, because unlike other animals (that we know of) we can deliberate, reflect (again, whatever word you prefer), I don't accept that the result is we necessarily feel the way about ourselves and our lives that you, Brassier and Zigotti seem to think we do.

More significantly, I think that the claims being made by you and them (if I understand them correctly, and I think I do) are unsupported. I'm sure that there are those who feel the way it appears they do, and you do. One may say we have the capacity to feel that way due to our "specialness" and other animals lack that capacity if we like. It doesn't follow that we do, or must. But I don't think you achieve anything towards establishing the claims made by maintaining that any statement that someone doesn't accept the dreary perspective set forth in this thread does so in bad faith--as if someone like me is really miserable because condemned to live but pretending not to be.

I've never been known for my buoyancy. I'm not the most cheerful of individuals. I don't look on life as a gift. But, I think that our lives are largely what our thoughts make it (sorry about paraphrasing Marcus Aurelius).

This point of view seems based on the assumption that we humans are special. We're not. We're instead just another kind of creature in a vast universe, not special but different from others in some respects. I don't see this recognition as a defense mechanism; it's merely what is the case.

No one is saying that the "universe needs to sanction our existence". Rather the point is that we are not like the rest of existence and this leads to a unique circumstance and shifts our mode of being- one of deliberative means, and self-reflection. — schopenhauer1

I'm uncertain how to describe the view that "we are not like the rest of existence" without understanding it to be a claim that we're separate from it, or excluded or isolated from it. Would you prefer to say that we're abnormal? That would include being unnatural, I think, especially when we're comparing ourselves with the rest of nature.

Assuming you mean "abnormal" or "unnatural" in that sense, while it's true those words are sometimes used in reference to monsters and freaks, I don't see why our abnormality would in that case condemn us to the state of misery which seems to be referred to in this thread.

I doubt anyone would claim we're the same as other animals in all respects, but our differences don't make us any less natural, nor do they doom us to crave what we cannot have and do not need. We don't have to be like the other animals or the lilies of the field to avoid ruminating obsessively on the fact that our existence isn't sanctioned by the universe or justified by it in some sense. We need only accept what is the case. If we speak of poetry we need only "cast a cold eye" on life and death, and pass by as Yeats put it in his poem Under Ben Bulben and his gravestone. I suspect Zigotti is simply projecting his own disappointment in the cosmos on the rest of humanity.

Sorry, but I don't think there is a "human craving for justification on matters of life and death." I think some humans crave that, but it's foolish to do so, and I know of nothing which makes it a necessary human characteristic, i.e. a part of being human. And like it or not, humans are as much a part of nature as any other animal.

Life isn't good or bad because I can't change it, nor is the cosmos. They merely are. My part is to live. I can (and do) live without judging the cosmos. Montagne wrote something like "Not being able to master the world, I master myself." As 180 Proof has said, it's futile to disturb ourselves over what we can't do or change. Instead, do the best you can with what is in your power and take the rest as it happens, to paraphrase Epictetus.

We're alive. No amount of bewailing will change that; in fact, it will likely make us miserable (more miserable, if you prefer). Horror can be self-imposed, particularly that horror claimed to be cosmic. This is the ultimate example of disturbing yourself over matters beyond your control.

My opinion is that no words are inherently bad or harmful,only bad actors. — GTTRPNK

Bad actors who use the words, you mean?

God's teeth. Why even consider such questions?