I suppose I should make it clear, if I haven't done so already, that I while there are aspects of OLP I think are admirable and useful, I think of it as therapeutic. It was largely the philosophy I was taught when I received formal instruction in philosophy--the philosophy of my joy and my youth, so to speak, as the God of Catholicism was the God of my joy and my youth (opening words of the Mass, sorry). Wittgenstein, Austin, Urmson, Strawson and such--that was what we read outside of courses on the history of philosophy. I was impressed by the way the method employed in that kind of philosophy dissolved the traditional "problems of philosophy" as did the pragmatism of John Dewey (or so I thought, and still think).

As a result, I suppose, the "question" of Being isn't one I've considered nor have I thought it worthwhile to do so. And I'm leery of what seems to be the tendency of many philosophers to come up with definitions of such grand concepts as "Being" and "Thought" as part of an effort to understand, finally, what they are, or what reality is, or what knowledge is, what "Good" is. I suspect that efforts to do so are tainted by what Dewey referred to as "the philosophical fallacy" which he summarized as being "lack of context."

So I acknowledge that such concepts have been the subjects of philosophy and that their use in philosophy is specialized. I also think that philosophers tend to redefine them or use them uncommonly in their efforts to understand them once and for all. So, for what it's worth, I acknowledge that in doing so--in philosophy--such concepts may be used uncommonly and and have uncommon meanings. I don't think those efforts are rewarding, however, and think that we're better served if "ordinary language" which is quite versatile is used in explanations and discussions, and ordinary events considered, even in philosophy. Words may invoke great insights, but I think that's the business of poets.

o I don’t believe in theft, whether it is legal or not. My conscience forbids me from coercing some to give their wealth to others. I do believe, however, in charity, philanthropy, and willingly helping others in need. — NOS4A2

What do you think of the inordinate desire to acquire or possess more than one needs, especially with respect to material wealth?

Well, I suppose an innovation in thought doesn't have to be a good one.

They used all those words uncommonly? What did "writing" mean, and "hearing"? "Is" we know has more than one meaning, thanks to former President Clinton.

Having no idea what these philosophers achieved in uncommonly defining these words, or how they defined them, I'm afraid I can't comment on whether an innovation in thought resulted.

Someone was perceptive.

The Assyrians did not ring the earth with military bases and conduct violent military campaigns on every continent bar Antartica. — StreetlightX

True. The extent of violence is much greater, if not the severity of it, and in light of the examples you give the greater severity of the Assyrians' violence isn't clear, though it may be more personal (more violence was hand-to-hand back then). And violence has been glorified in popular culture here, although I don't think our government has boasted of butchery quite as much and as openly as did the Assyrian kings. Toleration or encouragement of it, though, is another matter.

The internet is isn't introducing something new. It's just speeding things up. — frank

I don't think the internet introduced something new, either, beyond the ease and speed of access to information and ideas and their propagation, regardless of their worth, and the immediacy of participation in global communication by anyone, regardless of their character, ignorance or intelligence, and motives. But I think that ease and speed of access encourages thoughtless and emotive communication. Immediate and limited communication and responses are encouraged. There also seems to be a tendency to communicate without restraint. It's far easier to say something bigoted, inflammatory and malicious in writing.

Frankl gives no philosophical proof of this statement — Rafaella Leon

Clearly, that's not a concern.

With or without the world, he would act the same way. Acts then acquire a supra-temporal, supra-historical meaning, that is, eternally man should do so before the world exists or when it ceases to exist. Here action is taken as the direct expression of a divine quality that acts without the existence of the world. — Rafaella Leon

What kind of "acts" could take place without the world? Acts which don't require actors or something acted upon?

The American crisis is not generated by the perverted effects of mass communication. It is generated by the contradictions that emerge from the racist nature of the most violent country of all time". — StreetlightX

Well, perhaps not of all time. The Assyrians were an extremely violent people/country/empire, if the inscriptions attributed to Ashurbanipal are any indication, and gloried in the violence they inflicted.

But we're a violent bunch, no doubt about it. I think the violence is encouraged through communication technology, though. Here I'm not referring to "Big Tech" which seems to be the latest boogeyman, but instead to the fact that people may instantly communicate with, encourage and incite others of like-minds. That was harder to do in the past, and a technology which facilitates immediate response facilitates emotional reaction.

Good lord, how does one convey an innovation in thought WITHOUT either using the common stock uncommonly or inventing neologisms? — Joshs

Languages evolve, certainly. New words derive their meaning in the same manner as old words did, thus becoming part of the "common stock" of words. Once they have done so, then ascribing to them a another meaning or significance can create problems.

For example, "website" is a relatively new word. Nobody contends that it really means "the location of a spider's web" though. If some philosopher began claiming that the mind is a website, however, then it may be that some proponent of OLP might suggest that philosopher is taking a word with a recognized meaning and running with it off to Never-Never Land.

I'd be interested in some examples of instances where an innovation in thought was communicated by using common stock words uncommonly. Note, though, that I don't think saying something is like something else is to use common stock words uncommonly.

Sounds like a recipe for mediocrity. I wonder how much of that ‘common stock of words’ would remain if we removed the contributions of writers in innumerable fields of culture who thought them up in their armchairs(Plato, Freud, Shakespeare,etc). — Joshs

Quite a bit I would think, compared with those thought up in armchairs. Care to name some of the latter?

The simple fact is, though, that philosophers, and everyone else, makes use of the common stock of words all the time. Some err by construing and using them uncommonly, however.

Again, it's not that philosophy is "misusing" language, and OLP is arguing that it is using it correctly. — Antony Nickles

I think of Austin's example of referring to a stick in water as looking "bent" or "crooked."

f you read Philosophical Investigations, it is full of open-ended questions — Antony Nickles

You see, I don't think of those as rhetorical questions.

And again, the claim of OLP is hyperbolic — Antony Nickles

You mean it's exaggerated? Beyond reasonable? I think we're operating with different definitions. Also with "strident." I see nothing in OLP as being harsh, grating or unpleasantly forceful. The same with "extravagant." In what sense can OLP be described as lacking in restraint or absurd?

I think you may be taking a view of OLP that's too metaphorical.

The "role of force" the "value of force." I can't imagine any philosopher I think of as being a proponent of OLP saying such a thing. It's almost like citing to Will or elan vital (don't know how to do those accents). Ryle and Strawson for sure, and Moore I think.

Well, this defense strategy makes a certain degree of sense. Now, if only he has a history of psychiatric treatment...

I would say the that Derrida's odd insertion of a vague but suggestive concept of "force" or "the value of force" into the mix may in some manner invoke Nietzsche, but doesn't seem like something Austin would have contemplated.

I must join Banno and express my surprise that you claim Frantic Freddie Nietzsche exemplifies OLP. I suppose that surprise may result from the fact I look on OLP and analytic and linguistic philosophy (largely) as being a kind of tonic, serving to restore rigor to philosophical thought by disposing of faux problems arising from misuse of language, and as Banno suggested in another thread an emetic, serving to purge philosophy of its extravagance. Nietzsche with his hyperbolic claims, often ending in exclamation points, mixed with rhetorical questions, and brimming with certainty, is more a philosophical rabble-rouser than physician.

If there was a "Pronouncements" category, these posts could all be put in the same place. If anyone wanted to read such things, they could easily be found. It wouldn't be necessary to search the forum to find unsolicited declarations of belief, personal Credos, as it were. It only makes sense.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAHJCPoWCC8

I admit I'm not sure just what is being condemned so adamantly in the OP. But by some of its content and tone, I can't help but be reminded of General Ripper's eloquent comment, in this clip. I confess to nostalgia.

Perhaps there should be a forum category called "Pronouncements" reserved for announcements and declarations by those inclined to make them. It could have subcategories, e.g. "Pronouncements on Politics", "Pronouncements on Religion", or "Pronouncements on Science."

I suppose it would then be necessary to create a category called "Pronouncements on Pronouncements." There can never be too many, though.

I guess it's all over for the US if this is how the president behaves. — unenlightened

Well, it will certainly be more difficult for our Great Union to hector other nations about the rule of law and proper governance, thanks to recent events and claims that the results of our elections can't be trusted. We've lost a great deal of moral authority in the world. As we're being told by friends and foes.

So tell me how is it possible that the most admired man in America (according to a Gallup poll) had fewer votes than Joe Blow, who couldn't bring fifty people together at a rally? — Rafaella Leon

Well, he's no Franco, I'll give you that. Or, perhaps you prefer "Caudillo"?

But seriously, the claims and cases you refer to were almost literally laughed out of court. It's difficult to believe any lawyer, even one of limited intelligence, could summon the nerve to file them. Those who claim massive electoral fraud have the burden of proof. Nobody must prove there is no fraud. The affidavits submitted simply were not evidence, being conclusory and largely hearsay. Others have dealt more than adequately with your popularity claim. Preposterous claims don't become more persuasive with time.

Because they cannot alter change, and due to a fondness for authority and order, conservatives are often the hand-maiden of socialism, insofar as compromises and appeasement have led to greater state control (See Bismarck and the foundation of the modern welfare state). — NOS4A2

I'm not certain about conservatism leading to socialism, but it seems clear enough that here in our Glorious Republic, it has come to encourage the restriction, through the power of the state, of the thoughts, conduct and influence of people who are different from what conservatives have become.

It's no longer a question of controlling the power of the state, but assuring that power is exercised only for the benefit of particular people.

Just because the GOP in America is in chaos doesn't mean that conservatism around the World is in chaos and has been defeated by right-wing populists. — ssu

You're right. I should have limited my comments to the state of conservatism in the U.S. Here, it seems, we're witnessing a sort of rebirth of the views held by the John Birch Society, which was once denounced by conservatives.

Warning: this is a leftist forum and you will be attacked unceasingly if you disagree with them.

Edit: correction, the forum is dominated by leftists. — Brett

It isn't possible to usefully assess the existence of "leftists" and their worth without defining what they are, which in turn requires that you define what "rightists" are (or whatever those who stand in opposition to leftists are called).

For my part, I'm not sure that the right wing, or conservatism, has any champions or supporters of note here in God's Favorite Country or elsewhere as far as I know, who demand respect as thinkers. Conservatism as I understand once did. It isn't necessary to look as far back as Burke (who, sadly, embarrassed himself so extensively by his comments on the death of Marie-Antoinette that he nearly made himself seem pathetic). Not all that long ago, ii could boast of people like Russell Kirk and Bill Buckley, who were at least capable of defending or promoting it as reasonable in certain respects.

But now? It isn't possible to listen to members of the right wing media or its pundits without marveling at their frantic, self-righteous display of militant ignorance. Conservative politicians seem dull, mendacious, venal and craven. [In truth, I don't care for pundits or politicians of any kind] Are there any conservative or right wing thinkers or intellectuals anymore? Has our grotesque president, his followers and his enablers managed to snuff them out or driven them into silent exile?

Conservatism as I understand it was admirable in its emphasis on civil liberties, less government control where unharmful speech, though and conduct are concerned, a respect for traditions--perhaps I understood it to be more like Classical Liberalism than it was in fact. In any case, there was a time when I valued these views; I still do, though not as I once did. But now it seems a repository for bigotry, jingoism, nationalism and is anti-science and anti-reason.

Until today, I didn’t know who was Chesterton, so, thank you for this post. — Hrvoje

He can be quite amusing and is insightful sometimes. A clever man rather than a thoughtful one, I think.

I think Trump should be arrested and stripped of his powers immediately. — Wayfarer

Yes. But our politicians are venal and craven as a rule, and I doubt this will happen unless their paymasters feel threatened.

Requiescat in pace, "American Exceptionalism."

You must be able to visualize future positions and assess all possible counter play. It's about sight and pattern recognition, not rationality. — BitconnectCarlos

I think that's true. But the assessment of responses is, I think, a process of judging what is reasonable given the position and rules of the game.

I recall reading somewhere that aesthetics used to the fashion in chess at some point in history, don't recall what era. — praxis

That makes sense to me. I think it still does, at least for me. For example, there are some openings/defenses which I think look better than others, a judgment which has little or nothing to do with their merits. Not to say that aesthetics is purely a matter "looking good." But I have to admit that some defenses, for example, simply "look" or "feel" good to me. e.g. the Dutch Defense, though it weakens the king side.

Well, I play chess too, but am cautious when it comes to comparing what is, I think, a beautiful game with life. Bobby Fischer said "Chess is life" and I suppose it was for him, at least until he transported himself into a world full of evil Jews and other enemies trying to cheat him out of Fischer Random Chess and fame and fortune. His life is a cautionary tale for those enamored with the game.

G.K Chesterton, that glib, facile thinker, said something about insanity resulting from rationality, and I think may have pointed to chess and chess players as evidence of this claim. But I think to be rational is to be reasonable, and don't think one can be "overly reasonable." At the higher levels, though, I think chess play has become less and less a matter of intuition and ingenuity. I don't think there's much room left for inspired play among grandmasters; too much is book. But I may be wrong.

I seem to recall--actually, I do recall, but only vaguely--a thread in the old forum on whether he should be allowed to travel to Ecuador from the UK back when his stay at its embassy just began. I argued he should have been allowed to do so, but can't remember the details. I'm sure my opinion was well-founded and wise, though.

As for this, based on the new article it's an interesting decision and I wonder what the grounds for an appeal would be. That our prisons are demonstrably wholesome and nobody commits suicide while incarcerated in them might be difficult to establish. So I imagine there will be some kind of burden of proof, or excess of jurisdiction or authority argument. I may have to read the decision and appeal if they're available, when I have the chance.

For a proper understanding of what nihilism is, and what nihilists are, you must watch The Big Lebowski.

I read several of his works in my increasingly distant youth. There was something of the Romantic in him, and that pleased me then. But I see him now as a fundamentally religious thinker and ultimately conservative, similar to Tolstoy in some ways and in his belief in Russian exceptionalism. He wasn't as sanctimonious as Tolstoy though, thankfully. His reaction to the crisis of faith it seems was experienced by so many among Europe's intellectuals in the 19th century was to have recourse to greater faith.

Starting from Gibbons onward (and very likely with similar views given by even older historians), the most cherished reason for cultural decay has been seen as moral decay, the culture becoming decadent, rude and obsessed with wealth and losing it's belief in the values that the culture has upheld as important earlier. The moral judgment is quite apparent. — ssu

Well, Gibbon wrote regarding his history of the fall of the Western Empire that he had "described the triumph of barbarism and religion." As for barbarism, he credited the barbarians with having the sense to seek to preserve the great temples and monuments of the Empire, but noted that the Christian leaders and their followers sought to destroy all trace of pagan Greco-Roman civilization. They were, in fact, very successful in doing so; what we have of what was written during classical civilization is very little, thanks in large part to the fondness early Christians had of burning whatever they could find they felt wasn't Christian in origin.

Gibbon was very much a man of the Enlightenment, and I think it's fair to say he thought that the fall of pagan civilization resulted far more from what he felt was the negative influence of Christianity than "moral decay" unless that decay was due to the acceptance of Christianity.

What would a reasonable degree of probability, how can we decide that before it’s required? Especially under conditions of stress, or too little time or limited information. Maybe this depends to a large degree on the people who make these decisions, who we elect to govern us? Then again the same people governing during a period of peace may not be the people needed in more stressful times.

How do you think you might respond in a similar situation? Is there a situation where if you could, or had to, you might disregard the law? — Brett

The decision would be a hard one to make, but I would maintain it should be when it comes to disregarding the law. The claim that war or other extraordinary circumstance requires dispensing with the rule of law is an easy one to make. It may even be a "natural" one to make in the sense that it seems to be a matter of common sense. Why should those who seek to do harm receive the protection of the law?

The problem, though, is determining whether those in question seek to do harm. The assumption that a person intended to do harm is one that's in opposition to the position that one is innocent until proven guilty, and must be tried before conviction. The assumption is contrary to our system of criminal law (in the U.S.). So, we normally make no such assumption. We have to ask ourselves what is it that justifies making that assumption in extraordinary circumstances.

As I said, I'm not aware of any evidence supporting that assumption, at least as a rule.

If there is evidence that someone, or some group of people, intend to do harm by engaging in criminal activity, have the means to do harm and the opportunity to do the intended harm is imminent, that might justify detaining the individual or the group. But that is supposed to happen in normal circumstances as well; that would be probable cause to detain, or to search. I'm not sure why that standard wouldn't apply in extraordinary circumstances as well as ordinary circumstances.

That is not quite what is going on. If you have a look at that part in the full speech you see that Cicero is making a very orthodox legal argument, namely, "this is a clear-cut case of self-defense. We all have right to defend ourselves. The law lets us kill robbers who come to us in the night. Logically, this principle should apply in this situation." — afterthegame

Very true. But that argument is one that derives from the claim that ordinary law (prohibiting killing anyone) should not apply in extraordinary circumstances (where one's life is threatened and killing someone is reasonably necessary to protect oneself).

What situation could there be, where the law was to be dispensed with, that could prove it necessary before dispensing the law. It seems to me that from the point of view of those dispensing with the law they’re saying that it’s only by dispensing the law in the first place that we will know how necessary it was. — Brett

For me, that's an inadequate response--X is necessary because we must do X in order to know X is necessary isn't an argument I find acceptable. What might be acceptable evidence is information establishing with certainty or to a reasonable degree of probability (sorry for using this lawyer-language) that if the law isn't disregarded, then great harm will result. That's a heavy burden of proof, but I think that burden should be applied when the rule of law is threatened.

Is there evidence that doing so achieved anything? From whose perspective are we asking? — Brett

I think we should, at the least, ask if there is any evidence supporting the claim that the circumstances are (or were) such as to justify disregard of the law. Typically, justification is supposedly based on the need to prevent grievous harm. So, for me at least, a question arises immediately: What supports the claim there is such a need? If the claim is unsupported, another question should be asked: Why should the law be disregarded?

In the case of the Cataline Conspiracy, it isn't clear to me that immediate execution of the conspirators was justified. I suppose we can't know all the circumstances at the time, but imprisoning the conspirators until they were tried strikes me as sufficient enough to prevent them from pursuing the conspiracy, if preventing them from doing so was the justification given for killing them without trial.

As far as I know, no evidence supported the need to restrict the rights of Japanese-Americans in WII, or the censorship and repression imposed by the Wilson administration in WWI, for example. So it strikes me that, preliminarily at least, we have to ask whether we're "muting" the law merely because we assume that doing so is required to protect ourselves from harm which may occur--harm which would be greater than the harm resulting from disregarding the rule of law. If we are, we're not doing much at all to support disregard of the law.

Cicero's "maxim" may be factual in the sense that we typically dispense with the law in what we think are times of war or emergency situations, but can't be used to support doing so.

Cicero not only argued that the law shouldn't apply in certain circumstances, but later circumvented the law after he became consul of Rome in response to what's been called "the Catiline conspiracy" (in fact the second Catiline conspiracy, but it's the second one that's most remembered--Sallust authored a work about the conspiracy).

Roman senator Lucius Sergius Catilina, other former senators, and some disaffected followers of the former dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla (I rejoice in the names of the ancient Romans--I'm not sure why) conspired to assassinate Cicero and his co-counsel Gaius Antonius Hybrida and gain power for themselves. Catilina was an unsuccessful candidate for election as consul the year Cicero won.

Long story short, as they say, Cicero became aware of the plot and those conspirators at hand were rounded up. Cicero convened the Senate, which sanctioned the summary execution of the five conspirators captured. Catilina and most of his army of rebellion were killed subsequently in battle.

The conspirators were entitled to trial under the law, however, before execution and were deprived of it by action of Cicero and the senate, over the objections of Gaius Julius Caesar, interestingly enough.

Cicero thought that he'd saved the Republic by his prompt action, and was fond of reminding Romans that he'd done so. It's likely he did. But it's been thought by some that if he saved it he saved it by violating the law.

It can be maintained that the situation was one inter arma--in the midst of a clash of arms, and the extremity of the circumstances justified the "muting" of the law, and Cicero was acting in accord with his own maxim. But Cicero as consul wasn't acting as Cicero the lawyer, defending a client against the charge of murder. Cicero the lawyer, had he been retained by the conspirators, would have joined Caesar in objecting to the executions without trial as contrary to law. Cicero the consul was violating the law, though he was wise enough to obtain the senate's consent to the executions and so couldn't be said to have done so himself.

Every lawyer must struggle with the fact that a lawyer's duty may require him/her to persuade others that the law shouldn't be applied in certain circumstances or should be interpreted in a way that precludes its application. For some the struggle is short-lived. Speaking for myself, the struggle is difficult, and lately I've been disgusted by the conduct of some of my brothers and sisters at the bar here in our Great Union.

But I'm not addressing that struggle here. Obviously I'm a Ciceronian; I admire him greatly. But I question whether the rule of law should be ignored even in times of war or crisis--whether certain laws, at least, should be disregarded. Here in the U.S. Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln threw the rule of habeas corpus out the window as it suited them. Woodrow Wilson was a marvel, a pioneer, in restricting civil liberties during WWI. In what sense was disregarding the law proper? Is there any evidence that doing so achieved anything?

I don't know enough about the law in England to comment on what is or isn't prohibited, what sanctions apply if the law is violated or whether there are any exceptions to prohibitions on travel.

Cicero wasn't addressing a situation where extraordinary laws were implemented in response to extraordinary circumstances, however. He was addressing whether ordinary law (normal law prohibiting murder) should have application in circumstances to which--he was arguing--it wasn't intended to be applied, or shouldn't be applied as it would normally be applied, due to extraordinary circumstances.

The pandemic related restrictions on travel are examples of laws being created which prohibit conduct which wasn't prohibited previously. Cicero was arguing that established law shouldn't have application in particular circumstances. I don't think Cicero's argument apply to pandemic-related restrictions.

This isn't to say all such restrictions are defensible or should be honored, though.

Is it mainly good? Is it mainly reliable? — Gregory

"Mainly" is good enough when it comes to reliability, and that reliability is the best we can do in any case when it comes to understanding the environment we're a part of and solving problems we face in interacting with the rest of the world; its primary function. As for the place of reason in ancient philosophy (as opposed to its place in Aquinas and others, where it's reduced to special pleading) it included what I call its primary function though limited by the science of the time, but the ancients were less hesitant than we are to apply it to determining moral conduct