it naturally emerges from a winner takes all system where plurality is enough and bribery is legal. — Benkei

Oh no, no. Not bribery. Just official acts, which may or may not include bribery. For example, bestowing lavish gifts on, or gifting money to, a politician in return for, e.g., setting up a meeting with someone influential or useful isn't bribery. The politician doesn't tell anyone what to do, he's just using his position as a public servant to facilitate a meeting between someone who's given him a nice gift and someone else they want to meet. That's not bribery, for goodness sake. Our Supreme Court has said so.

Conspiracy theory is not even a defensible scientific concept, it is a metaphor, a figure of speech designed to belittle certain ideas that you don't like. — Rafaella Leon

"Defensible scientific concept", forsooth. What does such a thing have to do with this thread you started?

Reagan, the Creator of Ideas. Yes, that's how he'll be remembered, I'm sure.

I'm leery of claims regarding who, or what, rules the world. Power or imperium is more a case of manus manum lavat (if we're to speak of hands) than anything else, I believe, particularly in these sad times. So I think it's unwise to speak of such things as "power elites" particularly where those elites are defined by ideologies or philosophies they purportedly accept. There have been those who blame what they think is the lack of morals in modern times to the Vienna Circle. Thinking that way we tend to become conspiracy theorists. We engage in special pleading.

This should not be some kind of surprise - their support of lawsuits guaranteed to fail is a feature, not a bug. — StreetlightX

According to Disraeli, "[t]here is no act of treachery or meanness of which a political party is not capable; for in politics there is no honour." It seems he was right, and I suppose you are as well. But what's of greater concern is there are people who believe that the unsupported allegations made in these legal actions are true and that their rejection by the courts is just another part of the "steal."

"for a right to exist, it is necessary that, if not always, at least in certain cases, the holder of a right be also holder of the obligation to guarantee in turn someone the exercise of the power necessary to guarantee that right" — Rafaella Leon

The word "rights" carries quite a bit of baggage. If you mean to say that a right to do X exists if doing X cannot be prohibited or restricted by any legal means, i.e. to the extent the holder of the right has recourse in the law if it's restricted--then I agree, as I've maintained that only legal rights exist. Maintaining that a right exists when there is no recourse, sanctioned in the law, if it's violated, for me, is the equivalent of saying that a right should exist in the same sense a legal right exists, but does not. So my references to rights in this thread have largely been references of claimed rights which aren't legal rights.

I'm not entirely clear whether what you refer to are legal rights, or non-legal rights. I don't understand what's intended by the language you quote, which I've copied above. It seems to me that a person with a legal right doesn't accordingly "guarantee" anything, to anyone. I don't "guarantee" the police power of a state when I pay taxes. I would have no obligation to do so in any case. If I fail to pay taxes, or violate the law, I don't forfeit my due process rights, for example. My possession of a legal right isn't necessarily contingent on a "guarantee" as I understand that word.

A classic Chicken and egg situation. — Pop

Well, only if it's assumed there's a "you" that's not your body, and if one of them "came" before the other, and if one of them caused the other to be. Or, of course, if one of them is a chicken and the other an egg.

The quote from Adam Smith is interesting. Before him, Hugh Grotius relied on natural law as a basis for freedom of the seas/trade. Grotius is considered a pioneer of international law. Given the absence of any written law in that area (except to the extent treaties were made and honored), there wasn't much else which could be relied on in claiming that there was such a thing as a law among nations.

Hate speech is an example of the conflicts which I think arise, inevitably, from insistence there are natural rights possessed by each individual. On what basis could objection be made to hate speech if the speaker has the natural right to speak freely, and what would justify its suppression? Hate speech doesn't infringe on the natural rights of others to speak freely. Is there a natural right not to be exposed to hate speech, or other speech (that's a rhetorical question)?

It happens there are restrictions to the legal right to free speech which have been developed in case law in the U.S. The courts recognize what are called "time, place and manner" restrictions to which it's subject. Legal rights aren't absolute; that's one of the reasons why legal rights have a place in the law. Are natural rights absolute, provided their exercise doesn't infringe the natural rights of others? If so, I think that's a problem for natural rights theory.

China is arresting people who say things China's leadership does not want to be said. So a government does not have to protect freedom of speech, or does it? There are universal laws and man laws. Is denying people the right to speak going to make things better or worse? — Athena

When it comes to the law we create, even in the U.S., there is no law which requires the government to protect freedom of speech. There is no affirmative obligation to do so. Pursuant to the Constitution, government is prohibited from adopting laws which unduly restrict freedom of speech or acting to repress it. It isn't required to protect freedom of speech, but is instead forbidden to restrict it.

If we depart from the laws we adopt, then an argument can be made that freedom of speech should not be restricted according to natural law. But I would maintain that it ought not to be restricted on that basis because it would be unjust to do so--it would be the imposition of the will of the government and particular points of view without basis--not because there exists a "natural right" to freedom of speech. Repressing freedom of speech would be improper for that reason, not because we all have the "right" to speak freely.

We can imagine duties to exist without an underlying right to exist. — Benkei

I agree, and think this indicates that rights and duties are not intertwined, dependent or complimentary.

However, I am extremely thankful that I live in a society where at least half the people believe we have rights. — Athena

So am I. But those rights exist only to the extent they arise from the law. Even if they do, I think it's clear enough that other people, if not the government, would gladly trample on your rights or mine if they saw fit to do so, particularly if they felt their rights were threatened in some self-serving manner. Their rights may not be restricted; if they conflict with those of others, why should those rights be considered superior to their rights? What standard is to be applied when rights conflict, apart from a legal standard? If there is a standard to be applied in that case it must be one based on something other than the rights themselves, which indicates that a theory of morality based on supposed natural or inherent rights is lacking.

What you said is true and is why I make my arguments! — Athena

Then I must have misunderstood. You seemed to be saying duties derive from rights. I don't think they do, unless "duties" consist solely of the duty not to infringe on the rights of others

Sworn affidavits, of which Rudy claims to have hundreds, is considered evidence the last time I checked. — NOS4A2

Judges seem to disagree, I'm afraid. See link. I've prepared and reviewed and objected to many affidavits. This sort of thing just doesn't work in a court. If the affidavits made public and referred to are representative of what's available, no material evidence is being submitted.

https://reason.com/2020/11/20/judges-are-not-impressed-by-rudy-giulianis-evidence-of-widespread-nationwide-voter-fraud/

Social duties arise out of rights. — Athena

I disagree. Ancient Western thinkers--I mean Greeks and Romans--felt that what was appropriate according to natural law could be determined in part from the fact that we're social animals. It's our nature to live in communities. It's a view which is, I think, foreign to the view that we're by nature individuals, each with inalienable rights; in effect, antisocial animals. The individual is of primary importance and is to be protected from the community (and government) according to the modern conception of human rights. There are no obligations to be considerate, or kind, or noble, or honorable towards others, or even to be honest. One need only forego violating their rights.

I've always understood it as reciprocity. If you believe you have a right and wish to have that respected, you have a dirty to respect another's same right. My right to property implies a duty to respect yours, if I don't I can't expect you to respect mine and the system collapses. — Benkei

And that could well be what is meant, in which case the duties nature imposes on us become purely negative--we should not infringe on someone else's right to property, right to free speech, right to life, etc. These rights and duties are arguably necessary to restrict the power of government and protect us from others. Understanding that, I think that the concept of individual rights and their sanctity, so to speak, is fundamental to a system of laws. But I think it's flawed as a foundation for morality because it says nothing regarding what we should do, i.e. what positive obligations and responsibilities we have.

Perhaps an argument can be made that natural rights carry with them a duty to exercise those rights responsibly in a positive, proactive sense. I don't like the word "proactive" myself; I mean, though in a manner which, e.g., isn't purely self-indulgent. Maybe that would result in a theory of natural rights which could be included in what the ancients thought to be natural law (I haven't begun reading that book yet, but I will--it looks very good).

I wish you'd visit my post there. (Just click on any part of my portion of the quote above here. It will take you there.) — god must be atheist

I'll check it out. Been a bit tied up.

A right is what gets us what we want. A duty is taking responsibility for doing the right thing. — Athena

The questions I'm (now!) trying to pursue (which I think are still pertinent to this thread) are--assuming there are natural rights, in what sense are duties associated with them, or arise from them? If there are no rights without duties, why is that so? What duties supposedly arise from rights? Are those duties a condition of natural rights--do we forfeit rights if we don't comply with those duties? Doing the right thing wouldn't seem to be dependent on a concept of natural rights.

As to what natural duties are imparted upon those endowed with the natural rights, that sounds like you're asking what I'm commanded to do by virtue of my humanity. I suppose I would be prohibited from lying and stealing, should honor my mother and father, and shouldn't covet my neighbor's wife, to name a few. To be more secular about this, my duties might entail being a charitable and kind person. — Hanover

The claim that is no (natural) right without a duty, though, indicates that for each such right, there is a corresponding duty. A duty not to lie, or a duty to honor my mother and father, don't seem to be associated with a right--unless a right to be told the truth exists, or a right to be honored.

You seem to be referring to a duty of government, though. What are the duties of those endowed with the rights, if there are any? Those are the duties I thought were being referred to when it's claimed there are no rights without duties.

There are no rights without duties. — Athena

We hear this often, but I wonder what it means, at least in the context of a belief in natural rights. Does it mean there are natural duties as well as natural rights? If so, what are those duties? Is the duty being referred to simply an obligation not to infringe on the natural rights of others? That would seem merely another way of saying natural rights generally shouldn't be violated, which in turn seems to be merely a way of saying there are natural rights.

If we have a natural right to life, what is the duty associated with it without which the right wouldn't or couldn't exist? If there's a natural right to own property, what is the corresponding duty?

Meanwhile, Rudy's Dripping Hair Dye stole the show. It was infinitely more classy than anything he actually said. — Wayfarer

As a lawyer, and as someone of (largely) Italian descent, I'm horrified by this seemingly demented and contemptible faccia di cazzo.

This is actually a very serious question I ask. — god must be atheist

If it has to do with possessions, it is of course a very serious question.

If yes, good for you, you fulfil your own definition of virtuous. If not, you have proven that you subscribe to self-interest, and as such, you declare (no, I don't declare that, because my values are different) that you are not virtuous. — god must be atheist

The fact that self-interest isn't a virtue doesn't mean one cannot be self-interested. It merely means that that one isn't being virtuous when acting solely in one's own interest. It means, in other words, that you and I don't show moral excellence when acting solely for our own benefit. There's nothing admirable or laudable about self-interest, but neither is there anything necessarily evil or wrong about. It may be perfectly natural and appropriate depending on the circumstances.

You decry certain rights as not virtuous. — god must be atheist

I don't think so. I think I merely say that a belief in natural, individual rights may give rise to an ethics which is inappropriately limited, encourages purely selfish conduct and may even be used to justify it when carried to an extreme.

This, after you avoided the question of the right to own property being equally distributed among the population, which is independent of property distributed. — god must be atheist

I'm quite aware that in this country there is (normally) a legal right to own property. I'm not convinced there's a natural right of that kind, or any kind. I think that the fact there is such a legal right and its extends to most of us doesn't mean that the possession or exercise of that legal right is virtuous or moral in itself. The fact I can or do legally own property and it can't be legally taken from me in most cases doesn't make me moral or virtuous, nor is the existence of that legal right a matter of morality.

Thank you!

You write so beautifully I didn't think I would find anything to argue. — Athena

Thank you.

However, there are people who would disagree with the above statement. Among some aboriginal people it would be taboo to accumulate wealth and not share. The chosen leader among native American tribes is the one who gives the most. — Athena

I don't know for certain, but I think it's likely those cultures/societies have no concept of the individual rights claimed to exist in the modern Western tradition.

However, the US does tax people and distribute wealth to a limited degree. A minimum wage law, assistance programs take from some to give to others and hopefully most people think this the morally decent thing to do. — Athena

Yes. But it was a struggle even for that to take place. FDR was condemned for his support of social welfare programs we now take for granted, implemented during the Great Depression, and there were many attempts to prevent their implementation. Congress wasn't formally authorized to impose an individual income tax until the 16th Amendment was adopted in 1913 (there were efforts to impose a tax previously during the Civil War). Income taxation was bitterly opposed. Even now, social welfare programs are condemned as socialist. Many of us are so convinced of the sanctity of our rights that we consider being told to wear masks is a form of tyranny (there is, apparently, a right not to be inconvenienced for the sake of protecting others).

How can there be nature laws without natural rights? Are you saying Jefferson's word's wrong? — Athena

Jefferson was a hypocrite among other, better things. Regardless of his personal failings and accomplishments, though, I think he was wrong about our being endowed by our Creator with "inalienable rights."

I think the distinction between natural law as conceived by the ancient thinkers who developed the theory and natural rights as conceived for the most part from the 17th century to the present may be as simple as a difference in emphasis, but that difference is significant. That difference arises from the emphasis in natural law theory on what we should do and the emphasis in natural rights theory on what we should be free to do if we want to do it.

Broadly speaking, and for purposes of providing an example of the difference:

The ancients, like Cicero, thought we should act in accordance with reason as exemplified in nature (constituting the natural law). Since law is part of what we do, that should be based on reason as well. Natural rights theorists posit that nature has endowed us with the certain rights we should be free to exercise provided we don't infringe on the rights of others also so endowed. Law, therefore, shouldn't restrict our rights unless by exercising them we infringe on the rights of others.

The emphasis on individual rights may lead to (and does lead to, I think) the view that there is nothing morally objectionable in satisfying our own desires and interests provided we don't directly infringe on the natural rights of others. It may even be admirable to do so. For example, there would be nothing morally objectionable in accruing as much wealth and property as we can, even if it means we are much better off than others and have far more power and influence than others do. We're merely exercising our natural rights. We're not directly infringing the rights of others if they have far less than we do, or nothing at all for that matter. They have no natural right to our support, and the law/government cannot be allowed to require that our wealth be used to support them.

I don't think a natural law theorist would be required to hold a similar view. Right Reason doesn't necessarily justify the accumulation of far more wealth than we can possibly use or need, nor does it necessarily prohibit laws which wouldn't allow us to do so, particularly if it's to the detriment of others even if it doesn't infringe on their supposed natural rights.

Likewise, it is the mark of a radical democrat to be able to vote against an autocrat without uncritically accepting the shil-technocrat alternative. — 180 Proof

As Voltaire said of another loathsome thing--Ecrasez l'infame! (I don't know how to do the accents, sorry).

I know all this because I talked to a priest about it, which was an interesting event. — Hanover

Yikes. What you've experienced is almost unimaginable even to me, an old altar boy who attended a Catholic elementary school and a Catholic high school for two years, and so has some familiarity with the ornate nature of the doctrine of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.

But I wonder whether what the priest was referring to was more a question of status, and the privileges available to those who attain that status, than what we would think of as rights. That may seem to be not much of a distinction, but I think it has significance.

And there's the similarity in American law, where our Declaration states we have an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but the pre-13th Amendment Constitution specifically protected the institution of slavery. — Hanover

But where great functionaries of a legal system (especially Ulpian--a Praetorian Prefect as well as a jurist) acknowledge slavery is an institution in contravention of natural law, and yet sanction it, I think we have a situation different from the peculiarly American tolerance of slavery. Supporters of slavery in the U.S. (like John Calhoun, for example) didn't think it contrary to natural law. The author (with a little help from Ben Franklin grudgingly accepted) of the Declaration was of course a slave owner, and thought slaves were not the equals of whites. As far as I know, nobody in the U.S. thought slavery contrary to natural law and yet thought it should exist.

A question I'd submit to you is that If we're both in agreement with what the law ought to be (e.g. there should not be slaves), and we're both in agreement as to why the law ought be as it is (because natural law dictates such things), why would you want to maintain a system that allows government to pass laws that it shouldn't? Why don't you see the evolution toward a natural rights system a step forward? As you present it, you portray this step as a misstep. — Hanover

I don't think I've ever said government should be allowed to pass laws that it shouldn't. I think laws which protect civil liberties through the creation of rights are essential. I think, though, that rights are appropriately a legal construct to be employed to restrict the power of government. My problem with natural rights--rights which purportedly exist independent of law and are somehow granted by nature or God--is that they're conducive to an ethics which is excessively narrow and limited to consideration of satisfaction of the desires and interests of individuals and their capacity to indulge them. I think there are other problems with the concept as well, such as the complications which arise when individual natural rights conflict, but am not addressing those in this thread.

don't know, I am just providing some sort of outline. — schopenhauer1

I know. I don't know if I could do more. I can see that as authority came to be questioned and the advantages of unrestrained thought and conduct came to be recognized, the rights of the individual came to be seen as more and more important.

It may not be a virtue but self-interest is why most people do what they do. If laws weren't in place to protect our interests then we would have no reason to follow them. — 8livesleft

It may be more accurate to state that we would be less inclined to follow them absent the protection.

If ancient Roman law held that all men were created equal by virtue of nature (https://www.politicalsciencenotes.com/cicero/political-ideas-of-cicero-natural-law-equality-and-idea-of-state/1039), then wouldn't this natural law concept necessarily translate into some form of natural right? Surely if I'm equal to you by virtue of my humanity, there must necessarily be some rule that if applied unequally would result in a violation of my natural right to be treated fairly. — Hanover

Well, it's been argued (by Grotius, for example) that the Roman conception of natural law, and even its institutional law, recognized the concept of individual rights even though that concept is never mentioned in the ancient sources. I wonder whether he was correct, however, or merely seeking justification for the concept in Roman law.

I think the argument can be made that natural rights arise from natural law, but it seems to me that that to the Romans, natural law didn't extend to a belief in universal individual rights as we would think of them. In fact, it appears Roman jurists didn't associate individual rights with natural law. For example, slavery was sanctioned by the law in the late Republic and Empire although it was acknowledged that under natural law all men are equal. So, the jurist Ulpian wrote this about slavery:

"As far as the ius civile is concerned, slaves are not
regarded as persons. This, however, is not true
under natural law, because, so far as natural law is
concerned, all men are equal."

And according to Florentius:

"Slavery is an institution of ius gentium by which
one man is made the property of another contrary
to nature."

What I think is striking about these statements is the absence of any positive expression of the belief that slaves have the natural right to be free. They're equal to their masters under natural law, but are slaves nonetheless. Slavery seems to be taken for granted, and I don't think it would be if natural rights were accepted.

I’m reminded of the Jewish refugee from Nazi germany, Aryeh Neier, who while director of the ACLU defended the free speech rights of American Nazis to hold a rally in Chicago neighborhoods where many Holocaust survivors lived. Clearly the Nazi’s behavior was objectionable, ugly, and immoral, but the ACLU was right and moral in defending their right to engage in such conduct. — NOS4A2

I suspect the ACLU was defending a First Amendment right, which is dependent on the law of the U.S., not on a natural or universal right apart from the law, though. I'm not sure, however.

I would propose that we're inclined to find and should find certain conduct objectionable, or ignoble, even if it doesn't directly infringe on what we consider to be the rights of others. So, what is proper conduct isn't limited by considerations of claimed rights of each individual.

So do you have a sort of history of how it went from Natural law as right conduct to Natural law as entitlements? I can think of John Locke perhaps. Life, liberty, property are basic freedoms that should be protected by governments, according to him. — schopenhauer1

It's not something I've studied in any detail, but my guess would be that the emphasis on individual natural rights started to take place in the 17th century, and certainly Locke is one of the pioneers in that approach. Rousseau would be another. I think that from roughly that time to the present the concern became to determine what individuals should be free to do instead of what people should do. What they should be free to do could be determined through reference to natural law, but the interests of the individual became predominant. So, natural law theory began to change (I won't say mutate). Perhaps this took place because certain citizens of influence began to be more able through resources available to them to satisfy their own desires and interests, and wished to do so without restraint by others or the government. Philosophical grounds were sought to provide a justification for the unrestrained satisfaction of individual interests.

But who's the despot?

Well, I don't know that we can say it will do so ironically.

Doesn't seem to matter who you vote for, though. The very act of voting merely perpetuates corruption it seems. Maybe we need Platonic totalitarianism, or enlightened despotism.

You skipped my Greek example of our rights being well understood in ancient times. — Athena

I don't understand how your example establishes the ancient Greeks believed in natural rights as distinguished from natural law.

Rightfully so in my opinion. To me, refusing to interfere in such a manner is good conduct, and defending their rights even better. Censure and objection are not infringements on another’s right, however. An infringement would be some sort of unjust reprisal, like imprisonment.

It is difficult to defend the rights of those who engage in objectionable conduct. But with practice it can be done and those who do so are moral and decent. — NOS4A2

On what basis is their conduct objectionable, if it doesn't involve infringing the rights of others?

Yes. I'm addressing what I think we can fairly call the modern view of rights, as something we're all entitled to regardless of the law. While I think it's possible to construe ancient law as including what may be called "rights" in some circumstances (like the fact a Roman citizen could appeal to the Emperor) to the extent it's based on consideration of what is due to a person under the law, legal rights are something I accept as "real" (there's not much choice after all).

I think the notion that we're all entitled to rights regardless of the law wasn't an emphasis of natural law as it was considered by the ancient jurists and philosophers. Natural law to them established, and provided guidance in determining, right conduct. It didn't provide a basis on which various entitlements could be claimed and demanded by each individual.

Reading this thread, I feel guilty for having voted for Biden. Indeed, for voting at all.