What about the Stoa, or Porch? There are a lot more porches than there are academies or lyceums.

Rutherford isolated the nucleus of the atom. He wasn't, however, concerned with its possible applications. He died believing nothing would come of that discovery, and that the release of the energy from the nucleus would not mean much. He gloried in the knowledge for its own sake, i.e., real knowledge. Not "stamp collecting". — InternetStranger

It's less than clear to me that a person who seeks or acquires "knowledge for its own sake" is in any sense admirable, let alone more admirable than someone who does so for a purpose or with a regard towards what the consequences or use of that knowledge may be. Depending on the circumstances, I might think the former short-sighted, or unduly self-involved, or uncaring, or a practitioner of a kind of intellectual onanism if the person "glories" in such self-gratification.

Ego quo ibo?

In philosophy, to understand myself; to understand the rest of the world, and others, as well as possible; to do the best I can with what is in my power and take the rest as it happens; to do no harm; to be happy and make others happy when I'm able to do so.

And, of course, to be square and obey the law of the pack.

Well, the Gospels were written in Greek. Bad Greek, according to ancient commentators I know of, but I have no idea whether that's the case. Paul used Greek as well. I suspect Paul's use of Greek whether good or bad was unsuccessful, judging from his rather petulant words about confounding the wisdom of the wise. Paul would debate pagans now and then, and may not have done all that well.

I don't know Rutherford. I had to read Weber in one connection or another in one class or another in one school or another, long ago, and haven't been inclined to read him since then. I was brought up Catholic, you see (not one now, though). Never understood those heretic Protestants. Damn their ethic, anyway.

In the Western tradition, philosophy has been distinguished from the mundane, day-to-day lives of everyone (philosophers included) since Plato, probably before. It's supposed to be the study of a kind of a postulated "higher reality" which differs from the base, mutable "lower reality" in which we live. I think that's a misguided view and so react negatively when philosophy is portrayed as the study of something superior in some profound sense to life as lived.

It's odd that Peter and Jesus speak to each other in Latin. When in Rome, I suppose.

At first blush I disagree, since it presupposes what the human and what philosophy is. But I'm not sure what you mean by this. What is the reason? Do you mean because "what is" is determined as what always is, as something fixed? — InternetStranger

Well, you've said that philosophy is "the highest activity vouchsafed to human beings." You've also said the rest (presumably that which is not philosophy) is "stamp collecting."

I disagree that the rest is "stamp collecting." So, I think that to characterize it as "stamp collecting" is at best erroneous, and indicates neither an understanding of nor appreciation for the rest of "what is" beyond philosophy. And, because characterizing it as "stamp collecting" seems to me express contempt for it, I don't think any useful, fair or insightful inquiry will take place regarding that which is not philosophy (at least as to other human activities) by those who say it is "stamp collecting."

It seems to follow as corollary of philosophy's status as the highest activity vouchsafed to human beings. The rest is "stamp collecting". — InternetStranger

If you're right, then it seems to me philosophy doesn't involve inquiry into "what is" and in fact has little to do with it, if it would have any interest in it at all.

Yes, I'm still at it, for good or ill.

I have little faith in any of our politicians. I think the time has come which H.L. Mencken thought would come:

"The larger the mob, the harder the test. In small areas, before small electorates, a first-rate man occasionally fights his way through, carrying even the mob with him by force of his personality. But when the field is nationwide, and the fight must be waged chiefly at second and third hand, and the force of personality cannot so readily make itself felt, then all the odds are on the man who is, intrinsically, the most devious and mediocre — the man who can most easily adeptly disperse the notion that his mind is a virtual vacuum.

The Presidency tends, year by year, to go to such men. As democracy is perfected, the office represents, more and more closely, the inner soul of the people. We move toward a lofty ideal. On some great and glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their heart’s desire at last, and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron."

But still, money is what matters in our Great Republic, most of all in politics. So, I think that ultimately it will make a difference where the money may be obtained and how it may be maintained. If both can be arranged for in the current climate, it will continue. If not, it will change, if only gradually.

We're compared with Rome far too often. Money certainly mattered in Rome and the Empire, but the legions were more important--they had to be satisfied. That's where money was best spent. Here and now, money is best spent in what the Supremes have considered a form of free speech; paying politicians, directly or indirectly, to do one's will.

I hope it works this time

https://memegenerator.net/instance/58479235/dr-smith-lost-in-space-were-doomed-were-all-doomed

I think he shares characteristics with more than one emperor. These come to mind:

Didius Julianus, who became emperor by being the highest bidder at an auction held by members of the Praetorian Guard;
Flavius Honorius, who has been described as follows: "Honorius was racist, wasteful, cowardly and would betray his most useful subjects due to jealousy."
Valentinain III (Flavius Placidius Valentinianus), who didn't have the ability to govern the empire as it fell apart, and aggravated its fall by his vindictiveness and self-indulgence.

I don't compare him to the great-villain emperors like Caligula or Nero, or even Domitian, because it seems to me he's more in the way of a petty, mean and ignorant man, though he shares megalomania with the likes of Nero, and appears ridiculous like Elagabalus, though in a different way. Domitian was far more intelligent. So I compare him with relatively unknown and inept rulers like those above.

Christianity's remarkable success as a religion (judging from the number of avowed Christians over the centuries) is, I think, attributable to the fact that it is both malleable and intolerant. It was adept at assimilating pagan philosophy and religion and Judaism, the result being a mishmash which appealed to one or another cherished belief or dream of those peoples within the Roman Empire, where it was born. So it gained many adherents. But unlike the pagan religions, which included the mystery religions which were similar to it in many ways, it was intolerant in the sense Judaism was intolerant of different beliefs. Once its adherents attained high status and power within the Empire, it was relentless in the persecution of non-believers; the Christian Empire was far more effective in persecution than the pagan Empire. Pagan persecution was sporadic and generally unsustained (Hollywood myth to the contrary), except possibly the persecution under Diocletian--a very thorough emperor (but even that was short-lived relatively speaking).

But in gaining new converts, Christians priests and missionaries appropriated "native" customs and manners even while crushing local beliefs. Christian theologians borrowed heavily from Platonism, Aristotle and the Stoics and attempted, unconvincingly I believe, to make them seem consistent with the story of Jesus and the idea he was God. They still do so now, somehow finding explanation of Jesus' divinity, his death, sacrifice and resurrection in philosophy and the findings of science.

As for its status now, here in God's favorite country kinds of Christianity seem alive and well, especially in the form of Protestant fundamentalism, doing handsprings down the center aisles of churches and supporting creationism, but also in the form of Catholic pentacostalism, Opus Dei, and now it seems "People of Praise."

I would agree, as to both philosophy of law and "philosophy of philosophy."

Here in God's favorite country, the goal of the court is to interpret laws consistent with the intent of the law-maker (the legislature). However, if the language of a law is unambiguous, it is to be applied in accordance with its "plain meaning." Consideration is given to sources beyond the language of the law, even legislative history, only if a law is ambiguous (subject to different interpretations by reasonable people). Also in that case, the rules of statutory construction apply. Many of those rules are expressed in solemn and impressive Latin phrases. For example: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius meaning when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded.

Who would have thought that "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" would be considered ambiguous? This is intended to be ironic, if anyone wants to know.

Of course, there are many more fun things to consider. Is a law to be strictly construed, or is substantial compliance with the law adequate? This can be a consideration regardless of whether a law is unambiguous.

I see philosophy as being defined, to a large extent, by the philosopher themself. What counts as philosophy and what counts as good philosophy are oftentimes bounded by the philosophy which someone is proposing — Moliere

Are you "doing" the philosophy of philosophy, in making this statement? Is "doing" the philosophy of law similar, then? Are philosophers of law simply expressing their opinion of what law is, or their opinions regarding what it is that is done by those people who make the laws, enforcement them, or practice law? If that's the case, I would think an understanding of the law and how it operates would be necessary if such opinions are to have any validity.

But such is always the case or at least should be. We carry with us foundational principles we adhere to and from that we create a consistent world view. How is it that the subject of ethics creates less a challenge to you than your question of what is law? Belief in God, for example will similarly shape the ethical theory you accept. — Hanover

It may be that we carry with us beliefs that influence in some sense in all we do. But in my reply to Erik I said that philosophy of law would become a kind of special pleading "unless it considers first the law in its actual operation makes reasonable inferences from such an analysis." I have hopes that preconceptions may have less of an effect if that's the starting point.

That could be the subject matter of philosophy of law. In that case, though, I think the philosophy of law would be derivative of some pre-formed philosophical position, e.g. belief in God, belief in some kind of Platonic Form of law which the law seeks to emulate. It brings premises along with it, and becomes a kind of special pleading. Unless it considers first the law in its actual operation and makes reasonable inferences from such an analysis.

I don't know what your saying, alas. It seems to have something to do with reactions to unusual sexual practices.

I'm simply wondering what philosophy of law is, and suggesting that as it seems it isn't about the law, it's about something else, probably ethics. I suppose there could be something like "meta-law" but again that would seem to be addressed to ethical issues, I think. If it's supposed to be about law, though, it should take into account what the law is in practice.

Unless, of course, we must first encounter the "not-law" in order to understand the law. Perhaps that's the philosophy of law.

Well, we'll see what happens. The Supremes when led by the conservative justices are capable of extremely silly decisions like Citizens United, converting money into speech, and the Hobby Lobby one which sanctified, as it were, the proposition that business corporations may have religious beliefs entitled to constitutional protection, but there's always hope. As to interpretation of the Constitution, I've always felt the "original intent" approach to be a kind of insult to the framers--as if they were too stupid to comprehend that the future might bring profound changes to the United States and its society which could make other factors relevant in the interpretation of the Constitution. Interpretation of the Constitution shouldn't be an "either or" process.

Cicero's emphasis on enforcement is interesting, because it does not distinguish the legal system from the Mafia at all. — unenlightened

I think this is the kind of concern which arises only when we treat "Law" as unrelated to the law, and I think that's also the case with the claim that the law arbitrary because it doesn't reward homicide.. I suppose we could consider whether the law is like the Mafia, or why we prohibit homicide, but I don't think the law is being referred to except in a very superficial sense. These seem more in the nature of ethical issues, and I'm assuming, perhaps wrongly, that philosophy of law is intended to be something different from ethics.

If someone were to define law without some knowledge of the law, be it in practice or in its history, then I'd probably not think their position was well founded. But that wouldn't invalidate their position, but rather their method -- they could have, after all, stumbled upon a good answer. They just don't have good reasons for it. — Moliere

I think there's more involved than that. I wondering whether philosophy of "law" has anything to do with the law. I suppose it might in a very vague, very general sense, which I think involves speculation regarding why there are laws, which I wonder is of much value. Also, treating "Law" as something apart from, perhaps superior to, the law seems to me misguided.

A guard against metaphysical infection in the practice of a profession that prides itself on objectivity and facts is not unheard of. And I'm not just talking about the practice of law. — Caldwell

I wondered whether that's the case, but don't feel knowledgeable enough in those professions to address the philosophy which is "of" them.

Good to see you again, too.

Lawyers may be like tigers. I know some who are like mountains, of a certain substance.

I guess I was assuming it was understood Law or the law is something humans create or do. So, I don't think it's like a tiger or a mountain strictly speaking. Sometimes, though, we encounter tigers or mountains and they present certain problems or opportunities for us as Law/the law does, though of different kinds, and we think and act as we think appropriate to resolve the problems or take advantage of the opportunities.

I'd say the law is unlike philosophy if only because it's something that is enforceable in the sense that its violation may result in monetary penalties or incarceration, and decisions rendered in civil proceedings may likewise be enforced by collection of damages, injunctions, etc. This tends to make it a greater influence on our conduct than philosophy. Certain philosophical positions and issues are, I think, routinely ignored by us in our daily lives, without recourse by philosophy or philosophers.

And while I'm quite aware of the fact that legal decisions may be arbitrary, and even some laws may be, I'd say that in the main the law isn't arbitrary in the sense that laws generally are not randomly adopted, or adopted by chance, but have ends in view which relate to things we actually do and are intended to regulate what we do, prohibit what we do, or allow us to do things we want to do depending on the circumstances. They're grounded in something very real, human conduct, desires and aversions, and their purpose is determined by what those making and enforcing laws want to achieve regarding those things.

I think it quite possible to think about Law and the laws and say certain things regarding them, and if that's philosophy of law, so be it. But I think if that's not informed by the actual way in which the law operates, conclusions drawn will be insignificant or trivial and will not serve to define or describe the law, which is an operating system.

My personal feeling is that Carnap goes too far in his critique. Nonetheless I think he and others like Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, and certain analytic and ordinary language philosophers did good work identifying problems resulting from misuse of language in philosophy.

The examples you use don't involve statements, though, and statements (actually, psuedo-statements) are what Carnap is addressing. Statements may be prompted by questions, of course,but are purported to be answers to them. A statement using the dragon motif would be something like "There are dragons on Neptune." We know what that means, but absent some proof, have no reason to think it's true, and good reason to believe it's not true." The result is the same with the statement "Caesar had X hairs on his head" or "No more than 278 angels may dance on the head of a pin."

It's clearly pointless to debate these statements, though not because they're meaningless. They're preposterous.

The examples used by Carnap are statements unlike those, made by a philosopher I will not name and involve what the nameless one called "the Nothing." Carnap claims statements such as those regarding "the Nothing" are meaningless, and in support notes that, first, "the Nothing" is used as a name for something, But, the one who cannot be named seems to understand that it can't be so used. His association of "the Nothing" with anxiety suggests he's using "nothing" in his own peculiar, uncustomary fashion. However, it turns out he's using it in a customary way, and that he acknowledges its use in the form of "the Nothing" is contrary to logic. He then dismisses logic and science, and states in a conclusory fashion that the superiority of science becomes ridiculous it does not take "the Nothing" seriously. "Thus we find here a good confirmation of our thesis; a metaphysician himself here states that his questions and answers are irreconcilable with logic and the scientific way of thinking."

Carnap is addressing pseudo-statements which purport to expressly say something "true" or correct, i.e. assertions, claims. It seems he's quite willing to acknowledge that statements of the kind he believes are meaningless as such may have other uses and purposes, though.

Since we're part of the world, I think everything we do is part of the world as well and is a function of what we are and our interrelation with everything else in the world. That includes thinking, What happens when we read, see, speak, hear, etc. can be considered cognitive in certain respects, but is nonetheless a phenomenon existing in the world like anything else. Concepts are such phenomena; we form them, communicate them and discuss them as organisms in an environment.

However, certain of those concepts, ideas, thoughts, whatever you wish to call them, are not empirically verifiable as others are. They serve a different purpose, It's merely that we should distinguish one kind from another, and not treat them as the same or having the same function.

Part of what is striking about metaphysics, to me, is that this isn't so: those debating it do not seem to understand what they are saying, or what the other is saying. Hence the sympathy for the positivist position that metaphysics is not an area of inquiry so much as a sort of linguistic hitch, to be studied anthropologically as to its sources, but not really possible to be taken seriously on its own terms (and indeed, those who debate it seem not to take it seriously on its own terms either – it's a kind of game whose playing has other edifying effects). — Snakes Alive

I think it's more a question of misuse of language and the resulting bewitchment of our intelligence as Wittgenstein said. So, for example, as Carnap spoke of, the use of "nothing" as if it's a noun and the resulting confusion. It can involve the creation of new meanings for common words.

I think Carnap's claim is that metaphysics can be "meaningful" in the sense that poetry, art and music can be, but not otherwise.

Right, and he provides the criteria for what makes a statement meaningful. In that paper, it's anything which is logical or can be verified by experience. It's an empirical grounding of meaning. — Marchesk

That's hardly surprising, though, is it? What else could it be grounded on but us, our experience and our use of language as living creatures that are part of the world? Language is an empirical phenomenon, its existence and its use are verifiable; why should its meaning be otherwise?

I'm not sure Carnap says what you seem to believe he says about metaphysics. Obviously, the questions of metaphysics have been debated for centuries, and those debating them have seemingly understood what each other were saying. And people can talk of dragons all they like, and know what is being referred to as dragons.

Carnap's criticism is a specific one regarding the misuse of language to make statements in metaphysics. That may be gleaned from the title of his essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." He says:

A language consists of a vocabulary and a syntax, i.e. a set of words which have meanings and rules of sentence formation. These rules indicate how sentences may be formed out of the various sorts of words. Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-statements: either they contain a word which is erroneously believed to have meaning, or the constituent words are meaningful, yet are put together in a counter-syntactical way, so that they do not yield a meaningful statement.

Carnap believes that metaphysics consists of pseudo-statements:

We do not regard metaphysics as "mere speculation" or "fairy tales." The statements of a fairy tale do not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they are perfectly meaningful, although false. Metaphysics is not "superstition "; it is possible to believe true and false propositions, but not to believe meaningless sequences of words. Metaphysical statements are not even acceptable as "working hypotheses"; for an hypothesis must be capable of entering into relations of deducibility with (true or false) empirical statements, which is just what pseudo-statements cannot do.

I think I would just say that your fashion of answering perennial questions in the philosophy of law is itself a particular philosophical disposition. But, on the whole, I don't find distinctions between the philosophy of some practice and the practice to be terribly useful. Rather, it seems to me that in practicing such-and-such we already have some philosophical notions being put into practice -- some of which, I imagine, get challenged in the practice and some of which get affirmed. — Moliere

I accept that it could indicate a philosophical disposition. I suppose that disposition would be that the philosophy of law, if it's not about how the law works and what it does as experienced by those who are involved in the operation of the law and what it does, isn't intended to describe or define law as it exists. It has some other purpose. Perhaps it's intended to address how law comes to be in some very abstract sense--the creation of actual laws is a part of the operating legal system. Perhaps it addresses why we make laws, assuming it's possible to do so without knowing how we make them. Perhaps it addresses why we, generally at least, follow the law in some sense unrelated to the manner in which it's enforced and the risks involved in breaking the law.

Curiously, certain of those topics which seem to be addressed by the philosophy of law appear sociological more than anything else. "What is law" is a question that's often addressed by reference to social customs, for example. Other philosophers of law are advocates of natural law, but that would seem to go not merely to law's origin but the reason why it's treated as governing. I have a certain affinity for the legal positivists as they tout the distinction between morality and law. Morality may influence law, I believe, but becomes less and less a factor as legal systems grow more complicated, as ours certainly is, and a practicing lawyer gets used to pointing out to clients that the law in its operation can have little to do with justice; with right and wrong.

When it comes to "What is law" I'm not sure there can be any answer which isn't addressed in greater part by saying the equivalent of "here's how it works" and "here's what it does" in given circumstances. Perhaps that's the case with other professions, disciplines or occupations there are philosophies of.

That may be so. Or perhaps "non curo" if it means "I care not" or "I don't care" is intended to be an expression of the joy they're experiencing in the Epicurean afterlife where there are no cares, and they reside in a garden and chat of great things in a friendly manner with Epicurus and others.

Then you could just say: "This is what I was inspired to think about when I read Heidegger." — frank

I appreciate the suggestion. As I said, I certainly may have misunderstood him, and by misunderstanding him wrote the OP as I did and not otherwise. But regardless we're stuck with it as is--quod scripsi, scripsi.

How kind of you to comment as you do regarding my shitty fabrication.

See, if you'll deign to, my reply to frank by way of explanation (which it goes without saying you'll find inadequate if not dishonest--and will say so). But the OP isn't intended to be entirely about Heidegger, I'm sorry to say.

Oh, I forgot--fol de rol.

I don't see the word "death" in there either, though I see references to our mortality, and our being finite creatures, and of dread as a feeling of "being slipping away." But it certainly may be that I misunderstand his association of dread and "the nothing" or what he means by "dread." I have a limiting tendency to accept dictionary definitions and derive meanings from ordinary usage, and am ignorant of German. It's that association I try to address, assuming "dread" means dread or "anxiety" means anxiety, and "the nothing" includes the slipping away of our being.

Just about everything was a tributary to Christianity. The early Christians were adept at assimilating pagan philosophies and religions, and the result was, I think, an awkward and sometimes embarrassing hodgepodge.

The Stoic pneuma, which I think is what you refer to, was in varying degrees a part of everything and in its purest form comparable to what some call a soul. The Stoics thought there could be no void and so pneuma was corporeal and defined as a kind of vital heat or fire given the limited physics of the time. It was the organizing force of the universe. The Stoic God was immanent and not a creator of the universe but its ruling constituent.

As I said, I don't know why the phrase was used. "I care not" may simply be a way they wanted to affirm, before they died, that it wouldn't matter to them they were dead when they died.

Indeed, those ancients I refer to in this thread had nothing to do with what Heiddeger wrote about in his essay, it wouldn't have occured to them. That's my point.

Ah, I see now. I really don't know why it was inscribed on their grave stones. It may have been just for the purpose of noting they were followers of Epicurus.