Gladiators were slaves. Period. — god must be atheist

But that's not true. Some were, certainly. That was especially the case early on, when they were generally taken from conquered peoples. Some were criminals. But some were freemen, some were equestrians or "knights" (Roman citizens who had less social status than those of the senatorial class, but were usually well off), some were even senators. Grave inscriptions for gladiators establish this was the case as do other sources.

It's rather strange that as a lawyer, you don't see life as a struggle for survival/the upper hand. — baker

Well, we're pretty strange, sometimes. But lawyering can be a kind of contest or struggle, especially in the courtroom, and there's an audience as well (though an unwilling one, mostly, but now and then there are interested spectators). I play chess, and that's a kind of struggle as well. But I don't see life as a struggle comparable to blood games, because to the extent life is a struggle I don't think the struggle is normally one that is admired and lauded by others, and one's participation in life is simply expected.

First, thank you.

If the gladiatorial games were governed by rules and regs, that would reflect the costs incurred in putting the games on. — Bitter Crank

Very true. Training, feeding and boarding gladiators was expensive and so were the games. That's why contests weren't fought to the death that often.

The nonsense that justifies body contact sport disguises the action in which a lot of people find pleasure. I don't know whether bloody sports are good or bad, but a lot of people clearly get a charge out of them. — Bitter Crank

There's something about the idea of purposely killing or harming someone before an audience that makes characterizing it as virtuous or as art objectionable, true. But I have the sometimes disturbing feeling (and that's all it is, perhaps) that there can be something virtuous in the conduct of the participants, and that the combat may evoke responses that aren't merely bloodlust, and that this evocation might be something similar to what art can do, and this is part of the appeal.

Good post.

I think admiration of skill and courage is involved in the attraction to blood games, and would think mysticism of a kind could be significant at least among the participants. Not as to the spectators, though. One sees mysticism involved in the Eastern martial arts more than the Western, and that may be part of the tradition which is behind them. The samurai tradition behind Kendo, for example. I wanted to try my hand at Keno once, but was told that I would have to buy the (mock) sword before I could even give it a try. This irritated me.

I think that the festival/spectacle aspect would be significant as well. It certainly was in the Roman games, which were open to the public and typically took place on holidays. I thought this thread might have a place in Political Philosophy because the Roman games were often given by aristocrats (who were usually politicians) to endear themselves to the people. Later, the Emperors wisely prohibited anyone but themselves from holding games.

Such things may account for admiration and popularity. Is there more to it?

What about the aristocrats who participated? Did they do so entirely by choice or did it have something to do with status or wealth? — praxis

A good question. From what I've read, reasons for their participation varied. Some were down on their luck and turned to the games, some merely wanted to, some wanted to impress women (who it seems would fawn upon gladiators if the ancient graffiti is any indication). I don't think an aristocrat would think to increase his status by fighting in the games, as it seems gladiators, though admired, were thought to be of inferior social status.

Commodus, of course, is the most famous example of an aristocrat who fought as a gladiator. He was a special case, though, as an Emperor could do much as he wanted to do as long as he mollified the Senate and controlled the legions, no matter how ridiculous he was thought to be. He managed to do that for a time, but was strangled by a wrestler in his bath. He apparently thought his prowess as a gladiator and athlete made him popular with the people and discouraged assassination.

I think Hemingway and Mailer felt this. — Tom Storm

Oh yes. I can't understand Hemingway's fondness for bullfighting. No doubt there's risk involved, and I suppose the matador must, to be seen as admirable, kill the bull in certain ways, and that may involve skill. But it still is simply a celebration of a man killing a beast, and I can't think of that as impressive in any sense, particularly as the picadors typically weaken the animal and goad it before the matador is exposed to harm. Hunting doesn't strike me as admirable or worthy either. Using firearms to kill animals who pose no threat normally isn't exactly glorious.

So I think there must be something more involved in the game, or sport, in order for it to be deemed art or an example of virtue worthy of admiration to those who think it such.

I personally think this is largely nonsense - playing the flute would probably accomplish the same end, but it isn't as cool and there's no blood unless you do it wrong. And it is probably true that any activity that helps people take their minds of drug use and hanging out looking for trouble is helpful in some way. Even golf... — Tom Storm

A reasonable view. But how account for the mystique, the appeal of blood games in that case? Is the reference to virtue and artistry mere puffery? It's hard to deny the appeal. I'm hardly an athlete or heroic figure, but I've enjoyed competing in "combat" sports like fencing, and gave Escrima a try; I've enjoyed shooting clays (not birds or animals, though). These certainly aren't blood games (though Escrima can be) and merely mimic them, but competing in them seems to be satisfying in a peculiar way. You feel a sense of worth when you successfully hack at and stab someone with a sabre while being hacked at and stabbed (at least I did). I imagine a boxer or martial arts contestant would feel something similar.

Thank you.

These seem a different kind of game, though. In the Roman games, endurance of pain was valuable, but not the end in view, nor was it accepted or self-inflicted as worthy or redeeming in itself. Gladiators fought one another, and were successful because they were more skillful than their opponent, less fearful, more disciplined. Many were forced to fight, I'm sure, but we know some did so willingly. They put themselves at risk from others who would do them harm, relying on themselves and their training to avoid it--if they were good enough at the game.

In my opinion, the hard problem of consciousness simply doesn't exist. — Hermeticus

Yes--at least as a philosophical problem.

I think this kind of pursuit has its basis in an obstinate rejection of the fact that all we are, and do, and think, takes place in the universe; i.e., that we're just another kind of organism, although a remarkable one from our perspective. The belief--the hope?--that we're more than that, and that there's something literally supernatural about us is hard for us to tolerate. I suspect dualism is the cause of this as it is of so much other speculation.

It may be that we'll discover much more about consciousness, but it's very unlikely philosophy will be the means of discovery.

I'm not interested in the Trinity. Thanks anyway. — Agent Smith

That's okay. I'm not interested in the Holy Ghost.

The Holy Spirit/Ghost is a person. What is a person? — Agent Smith

A good question. Ultimately, though,whatever a "person" is, those three persons are supposed to be in essence a single God.

The early Church faced a problem. It made claim to the God of the Old Testament. However, it wanted Jesus to be God. Since Jesus wasn't around while God was parting seas, hiding in burning bushes, talking to Moses, etc., there were those who thought, quite reasonably I think, that Jesus came into being later. But that might mean Jesus was created by God, and therefore subordinate to him in some sense, as a human or as a lesser God. That wouldn't do, since there was supposed to be only one God, and Jesus was God. So the God of the Old Testament had to be Jesus somehow. The Spirit of God is also mention with some frequency in both the Old and New Testament.

So the Church wanted one God but had to explain why Jesus showed up when he did and how that took place, and the separate references to the Spirit had to be explained as well. I think the Trinity is the rather clumsy, somewhat tortured, solution to the problem of reconciling the desire to have a single God but account for Jesus and the Spirit as described in the Scriptures without being seen to worship more than one God.

The three Persons all have the same substance, was the answer. I think of the Persons as being expressive of the different functions or purposes of the single God as interpreted through Scripture. It makes no sense to me.

That's quite good.

Just when he was about to crack the problem - the way to a man's heart is through his stomach! :lol: — Agent Smith

We can only pray that his idea will serve to inspire someone to finish his work of interpretation and explanation.

Ain't the belief in one god a doctrine? — Raymond

I was brought up Catholic, and associate "doctrine" with its endlessly complicated beliefs and rules. The doctrine involving God as Ham Sandwich is only one of many devised by it over nearly 2,000 years.

What's the difference between a unitarian and a catholic? — Raymond

I don't think unitarians have any doctrine, nor do they support any particular version of a deity. They seem more in the way of deists. But I'm uncertain.

It's pointless to argue when no argument was made to begin with. — Agent Smith

If you're looking for something resembling argument, I'm sure you could find some supporting the Trinity.
You could try Augustine's De Trinitate, but there are other works as well. Google "Triune God" and you'll find a bunch of stuff about it. I once listened to a priest compare the Trinity to a ham sandwich. I don't think he ever published his insight, though.

Christians have always had much to try to explain about their religion, Christianity being a curious hodgepodge of religions and cults which sometimes fit together only very awkwardly.

These days it is quite safe to be a unitarian, and eminently sensible. — Bitter Crank

I've thought about attending a unitarian meeting, or whatever they call the equivalent of a mass. But from what I read, it's too similar to a mass. Readings and singing, though the readings and songs are different, of course. I hate it when people sing and it's expected you should sing with them, with some exceptions. Perhaps a Quaker meeting would be best, as it seems nobody says, or sings, anything, unless they want to "testify" I think it is the word. I could always leave when someone decides to speak. Who knows? Maybe they would say something worth hearing.

Much of the debate around Jesus (the Son) and God (the father) revolves around existence (did Jesus really exist and does God exist?). No such quarrel in re the Holy Spirit! — Agent Smith

Well, the Holy Spirit is supposed to be God according to those who accept the Trinity. So, if God doesn't exist, the Holy Spirit doesn't exist; if God exists, the Holy Spirit does as well. The Holy Spirit is one of the three Persons which make up the One God--three Persons, who nonetheless are consubstantial, one in Being.

Much time and effort have been spent trying to explain the Trinity. Too much.

The Holy Spirit has functions, or primary functions, or is its own "mode" (I think that's the term), According to the Nicene Creed (as represented by the Catholic Credo), the Holy Spirit is "the Lord and Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son" and spoke through the Prophets. Here's some Latin for you:

Et in Spiritum Sanctum, Dominum et vivificantem:
qui ex Patre Filioque procedit.
Qui cum Patre et Filio simul adoratur et conglorificatur:
qui locutus est per prophetas.

The Holy Spirit is, if you will, the Chatty Person of the One God, or at least evokes or inspires chattiness, speaking through the Prophets, getting all the apostles to run out and start speaking in tongues on Pentacost. But, it's also called the Paraclete--an advisor, advocate or counselor. So, I like to think of him as the Lawyer Person of the One God. A Deity made up of the Father, the Son and the Holy Lawyer.

I see more clearly what you're getting at now, so thanks. I think concern in this respect is understandable.

I'm uncertain what we can do, though. Virtually all we do is technology. Being what we are, I'd expect that the "distance" between the knowledge of most of us and our technology will continue, unless we place a limit on it, and that would require significant effort, political and legal. I doubt we'll make that effort and am concerned whether it would be worth it if we do. I very much doubt that there will be any such effort merely because most of us know only how to use technology; that's something we've grown used to. In fact, we take it for granted. It would require a kind of agreement that certain technology isn't merely dangerous, but wrong. Something like genetic engineering, perhaps. Regulating that has at least been considered.

Yes, I knew this was coming. — Pantagruel

Only because of technology, though.

But the self-perpetuation of the manufactured portion of the "natural" world consisting of human products is contingent on the transmission of cultural knowledge, which means that the kind of understanding-gap problem which is the theme of the OP then becomes a critical issue. — Pantagruel

Hmm. Is this a kind of Terminator or Matrix-inspired fear of manufactured products? It's the "self-perpetuation of" that which we manufacture you refer to that leads me to ask the question.

It seems clear to me that we perpetuate what we manufacture, when we want to do so. Cultural knowledge, if I understand what you mean by that correctly, is something we've always relied on. If there is an "understanding-gap" problem then it's a problem which has existed since we began to make tools which were more than rudimentary. No knight knew how to make a longsword, or armor, though it may be said they were essential to his status and survival.

So, if we're not addressing what's been a common sci-fi topic for decades--machines taking over from humans--is the concern that our tools, now, are too complicated, too sophisticated, and this is bad for other reasons? If so, why is that the case, and what can be done about it? What level of technology may we aspire to without being harmed by it? Should we live as the Amish do?

Well, the natural world is a self-creating, self-maintaining, and organically fundamental and essential environment, for starters. — Pantagruel

You see, that's an assumption you make, and I don't. I think Nature, i.e. the "natural world", i.e. the world, includes human beings. Because it includes human beings, it includes all they do. Because it includes all they do, it includes their works.

In other words, we're as much a part of nature as any living organism you may name. If we choose, we can of course claim that the "natural world" doesn't include us or anything that we do or make, or doesn't include particular things we do or make, but these are distinctions I think are misleading.

No doubt someone who lived life in "the wilderness" would have problems surviving in the city as well. I don't see how a city would be less "reality" than the wilderness.

I think there is a real distinction between expert knowledge and not knowing how electricity works. Or gravity. — Pantagruel

I'd think "expert knowledge" would be required to know how electricity works, or gravity works. I doubt it's common knowledge. Does knowing how electricity or gravity work create a special kind of "power dynamics" different from that involved in the case of other kinds of expertise or specialized knowledge?

Technology commands us.. We consume it, and yet we don't know it. There is at least some form of power dynamics that comes from being excluded from that which we survive from. — schopenhauer1

Chances are fairly good that I know a lot more about the practice of law than most others gracing this forum. That gives me an advantage--in practicing law and knowing how the legal system works. Doctors have an advantage over others when it comes to knowledge of and the practice of medicine. Plumbers have an advantage when it comes to plumbing. Do these entirely commonplace, unsurprising forms of power dynamics disturb you as well?

For my part, I think it a major problem that we infer, from the fact that we don't know everything about, e.g., the workings and production of a cell phone, that we don't know what objects "really are", or that we're "helpless", or that we're excluded from our own "world of being."

Our ignorance of what it takes to do something or make something or use something we haven't personally done, or made, or used is unsurprising; it's to be expected, in fact. This has been the case forever. Romans who had not made or used concrete in constructing harbors, or temples, or many other things were ignorant in comparison to those who had done so. Those ancients who weren't architects didn't know how structures were designed or built. Those who weren't shipbuilders were ignorant of the making of ships.

Although we've used technology of various kinds for millenia, it seems to me that only recently, relatively speaking, have some of us come to believe that technology renders us somehow divorced from "reality" and "being" or some-such in what strikes me as a hyperbolic, Romantic, quasi-mystical manner a la Heidegger with his talk of hydro-electric plants as if they were monsters, or our coercing the world to do what we please, summoning forth the power of the sun (I forget what he condemned so excitedly). He compared it to the peasant lovingly planting seed in Nature's bosom, if I recall correctly. There was a chalice too, I believe. Chalice good, coal bad.

Technology presents real problems, but I suggest some restraint when it comes to contriving metaphysical and epistemological horrors arising from the fact that we don't know how to make certain things.

I'm the soul of futility, Sisyphus' avatar. — Agent Smith

I know someone who pretended he had no hands, then ended up acknowledging he had them after all. That's a level of futility even Sisyphus couldn't rival. Sisyphus never purported to doubt the existence of the boulder he rolled up the hill, only to establish it was, indeed, a boulder.

Well, when you put it that way, imagination does have merit; nevertheless, I feel it's more trouble than it's worth. — Agent Smith

There's nothing wrong with imagination, or imagining, provided we recognize it as such and nothing more. The same can be said about pretense, or pretending, which I think are closely related. Mere imagining or pretending may soothe, may amuse, may gratify, may even suggest. Taken as more than what they are, though, they may confuse, bemuse, misdirect and may even become exercises in futility.

See his essay Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.

Musement, you mean? I've always been interested in Peirce's Neglected Argument for the Existence of God. But no, I don't think he was pretending, as he wasn't purporting to doubt what he didn't doubt.

Notorious Nazi Heidegger
Whom Hitler had made all-aquiver
Tried hard to be hailed
Nazi-Plato, but failed
Then denied he had tried with great vigor.

I'm incorrigible, sorry. Imagine not acknowledging his supremacy. World's greatest Nazi, for sure. Philosophy's Fuhrer, as it were.

Looks like I managed to cut myself off. People may want to take a look at Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, in which he explores the fascination with certainty and explains why he feels its been harmful.

Then where does the fascination with certainty come from? — Reformed Nihilist

You may want to read Dewey's The Quest for Certainty. He thought the fear of the uncertainty of life led people to seek something certain. What they felt was certain came to be though superior to the world in which we live and our lives in it, which are subject to change. The practical became separated from what was considered "ultimate reality." Knowledge became something separated from practice and conduct. It became something apart from the world, unattainable. Something like God, I would think, or a kind of replacement for God.

Then where does the fascination with certainty come from? — Reformed Nihilist

Philosophers have been enamored with it since the time of Plato at the latest. The certain, the eternal, the unchanging, were felt to be superior to the uncertain and mutable. Nature, the world and our lives in it are subject to change and uncertainty, and so were considered inferior; even less than real. It may be the result of a psychological or religious need people have, I don't know. The result was

What you are describing is closer to what I think was CS Peirce's critique (it might have been a different philosopher) of Descartes, referring to his radical skepticism as "sham doubt" or "paper doubt", meaning he didn't actually doubt that he existed until it occurred to him that existing was a prerequisite for thinking, he just imagined doubting. That it was just a theoretical proposition. — Reformed Nihilist

No, it was Peirce alright.

If we address what should be the case, instead of what is the case (I assume we are doing that), I can think of no reason why relatively few people should make and retain huge amounts of money while others do not, and in fact have much less. There's no basis for the belief that a person is virtuous, or admirable, or worthy, or good in any moral sense because they make or have a great deal of money, unless making or having a great deal of money is considered to be morally virtuous, admirable, worthy or good by definition.

If it isn't, though, we have to consider the worthiness of having a great deal more money and assets than others in a world of limited resources with an increasing population. I think that the very rich are the equivalent of gluttons or hoarders in such a world--in our world--because their conduct is so selfish that they strive to possess and retain much, much more than they could possibly need to live comfortable lives (not just survive) where others merely survive, or live in need and want. Gluttons and hoarders aren't admirable; they aren't moral. We should stop thinking they are.

Knowing someone's complete physiology, present and past, does it make sense to doubt their sex? Some say very insistently, no, it makes no sense, because the sex can be read off the physiology with certainty. Others say most stridently, yes, because a person's sex is determined not by observation of others but by that person's self-perception. The law, in deciding, will need to grapple with the metaphysics. If it doesn't do so explicitly and with argument, then it will do so implicitly and with unquestioned assumptions. — Cuthbert

I think it will be more a matter of definition--the presence or absence of one--at least in the case of the law where I practice. When a word is defined by the law (as in a statute containing definitions of words used) that definition is accepted. The meaning of the word is clear, and it isn't subject to interpretation. Law is subject to interpretation only when it's ambiguous (where reasonable persons may disagree on meaning).

If it isn't defined by the law, recourse may be had to dictionary definitions, and, again, if the meaning is clear, there's no opportunity for interpretation. If the meaning of the word in itself or in context is ambiguous, then courts may interpret the law. That may be done based on legislative history if it exists, comparing the law with other, similar, laws in which the word is used, looking to case law interpreting other laws--there are rules of statutory construction which are followed by courts. Meanings of words, which can change over time and in circumstances, are significant, not metaphysical questions regarding the existence of an external world. You may say metaphysical assumptions are built into the meaning of words, and in a trivial way (as far as the law is concerned) that may be true. The law generally is committed to the existence of an "external world." You won't find me, or I think any lawyer, citing Descartes as an authority in a court proceeding.

Chances are that in a court, those people who assume there may be an Evil Demon or that there's no certainty we have hands won't be considered "reasonable." Depending on the matter before the court, they may be not only considered but adjudged incompetent.

Yeah, except this is a philosophy forum, discussing philosophical topics. You know, "what is really out there?" — hypericin

And, don't forget, "Do we have hands?" Or eyes, noses, feet, etc. "Are our hands really out there? Do we really know we have hands?"

Wittgenstein may have been right when he claimed that a good and serious philosophical work could consist entirely of jokes. Cicero may have been right when we wrote that there's nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't already said it. Being fond of the Classical Pragmatists, I may have a different idea of what constitutes philosophical topics than you do.

Do you have hands, by the way? I assume you're not certain you do. But how could you tell, in any case, "non-pragmatically"?

These reasons are not definitive. They can't be, since we in principle cannot be certain it is not true. — hypericin

Ah, "in principle." Happily, absolute certainty doesn't matter in practice, which is to say that it's disregarded, just as we disregard in practice any pretended "question" regarding the existence of our hands.

One of my daughters has scolded me for being confused by the term "non-binary" and finding it difficult to remember to refer to someone as "they" or "them." I like to think this is more the result of being old than being a bigot.

I can see this as being an issue in law, and know it has been to an extent in the case of restrooms, but haven't had to deal with it yet. I look forward to it being addressed by our Supreme Court, after it has dealt with abortion, again. [Irony warning] Since it's determined speech includes money paid, I'd think it would be able to handle this area with ease.

He is gracious enough to pay me enough to live. I get to go on vacation soon!". — schopenhauer1

You seriously believe "the workers" think like this, and consider their company's CEOs "gracious" because they pay the workers enough "to live"?

Nothing's wrong with a system in which everyone receives enough to live, I would think. My guess would be there would be less wrong with such a system than one which encourages the equivalent of gluttony and hoarding by a few while others get enough "to live."

This was my addition to your list, sorry I thought it was obvious. — hypericin

Ah well, nothing wrong with deliberately misquoting someone, is there? And the list was meant to provide examples of what it is to "doubt" the existence of one's hands according to the definition of that word. I don't doubt my hands exist, nor did Descartes, by that definition, so nothing on that list was an expression of an opinion on my part. You managed to not only attribute to me something I never said, but misrepresent my opinion.

I greatly prefer stable, mind independent objects, over ED. — hypericin

Is there any basis for this preference? One which makes it more likely to be correct than ED, for example?

Even if we could somehow shoehorn this theory to fit all observations, the resulting model would be so baroquely complex we would reject it. — hypericin

Why should we care whether a theory fits all observations? What if it fit most observations, as opposed to theories which fit none at all?