In the good old days, science was known as 'natural philosophy'. Life was simpler back then, and these questions were not asked. — unenlightened

Or, alternatively, life was so much harder back then that nobody had the time to ask these questions. Efficiency in productivity and more leisure time (i.e., time to think) might be the greatest development for philosophy.

I assume he's saying that it's ontologically impossible for someone's nose to both grow and not grow. — Michael

This is where the justification is missing. The leap from logical impossibility (e.g., that the Pinocchio paradox demonstrates a logical contradiction in causing someone's nose to both grow and not grow) to the ontological impossibility of a world with simultaneous contradictory truth-values.

The liar paradox can be resolved without dialetheism because the contradiction can be resolved by excluding semantic predicates, however

The Pinocchio paradox is, in a way, a counter–example to solutions to the Liar that would exclude semantic predicates from an object–language, because "is growing" is not a semantic predicate. — Eldridge-Smith

Yes, I understand the history of the paradox. The history of the paradox is distinct from the significance. I don't refute your proof of a contradiction, and I don't think others did either (aside from some confusion about some terms).

The paradox as initially presented by Eldridge-Smith anticipates the response he uses against dialetheism, in particular,

Having one’s nose grow is a facial, not a semantic feature. Moreover, although Pinocchio’s nose grows just when he is telling an untruth, the relationship is not semantic. It might be supposed to be causal or of some other nature, but it is not semantic. If Pinocchio’s nose is growing it is because he is saying something false; otherwise, it is not growing; and ‘because’ stands here for a non-semantic relation. The facts are that ‘is growing’ is not a synonym for ‘is not true’ and the Pinocchio story is intelligible without pretending that ‘is growing’ has a different meaning." — Peter Eldrige-Smith

Eldridge-Smith used the paradox to allegedly undermine dialetheism, but he doesn't address the issues I raised here (i.e., the justification for claiming logical impossibility entails ontological impossibility).

The paradox is designed to challenge the axiom of non-contradiction. You can discuss it however you want, but the significance of the paradox is particularly in the resolution of the contradiction, not simply demonstrating that there is a contradiction.

The rule can't be followed. There is an x, G, where ¬(G ↔ ¬x). — Michael

You are importing the metaphysical baggage without justification again. Why can't the rule be followed? Because it results in a logical contradiction? Why does that preclude the ontological possibility of following the rule?

Isn't G ↔ ¬G a semantic contradiction? — Michael

There are some that want to reduce it to a semantic contradiction. The dialetheists do not, and it's not clear to me where they've gone wrong, if at all.

How can "X exist" be true if "X" is logically-impossible? — Michael

Because "true contradictions" can exist. Logical impossibility is distinct from ontological impossibility.

Why do we need to resolve the contradiction? Do we need to resolve the contradictions "an X is a four-sided triangle" and "I am a married bachelor"? No. We just point out that they're contradictions and so necessarily false. The same with the rule "Pinocchio's nose grows if and only if he claims any falsehood". — Michael

Other contradictions (e.g., square circle) are semantic contradictions. We can dismiss them as a peculiarity of language. Redefine the terms and move on. The Pinocchio paradox posits a "true contradiction" insofar as it has a consequence of a simultaneous contradictory state of affairs.

It has nothing to do with metaphysics. It just points out that it is logically impossible for the rule G ↔ C(x) to hold for any x. — Michael

The metaphysics is introduced when the contradiction is recognized. It is logically impossible for the rule to hold without contradiction, but what does that mean for poor old Pinocchio? Does logically impossible entail ontological impossibility? How does logical impossibility impose itself on ontological possibility?

"Now" is a place in time though. — ProbablyTrue

I understand the language implies duration or a particular moment, but the point of the paradox is not to fixate on the time interval between the lie and the growth, but merely to point out the causal connection between a self-referential statement and the outcome.

I am not sure exactly what you mean here. If you say "now" is the cause of the growth then it is obviously false because he has not said anything before this to cause it to happen. So his nose will grow for lying. — Sir2u

The word "now" was only meant to indicate that the statement is an indexical and that the cause of lying (i.e., Pinocchio's nose growing) is tied to the utterance (i.e., self-referential). The word is indexical insofar as the truth condition of the statement is dependent on the statement itself, but not the time of the utterance.

But there isn't a world in which Pinocchio exists. — Michael

There is a fictional world of Pinocchio whereby his nose grows if and only if he claims any falsehood. In replying that it is impossible by virtue of a contradiction is to import metaphysical baggage into the Pinocchio world. What justification is there for the import of that baggage? Are "true contradictions" impossible? If so, why? The Pinocchio paradox does not shed light on how to resolve the contradiction.

The dialetheists would contend that the contradiction will be simultaneous, not oscillating. Our cognitive faculties want to resolve the paradox by collapsing it into a definite state (i.e., by oscillating truth values), but there doesn't appear to be a reasonable justification for that collapse. Pinocchio's nose will grow and not grow simultaneously.

If helpful, it can be likened by analogy to Schrödinger's cat.

I'm not sure it is sufficient to point out the contradiction in the paradox. It was conceived to demonstrate a contradiction exists semantically, and that dialestheists that claim "true contradictions" can exist have a problem. It's not clear how it does that though. There is a world, so to speak, in which Pinocchio exists, so how do we resolve the contradiction in that world? What happens when Pinocchio makes his utterance?

No, I just thought I was being clever. I love philosophy!

There is no point to philosophy, it is exceptionally dull.

There are some razors that crop up in philosophy.

and "Now" isn't a reference to time duration but reference to a lying utterance (i.e., my nose grows in response to this sentence). Growth can occur immediately or in the future, but such growth must have a causal connection to the utterance (i.e., now in reference to itself).

When I started writing the essay I didn't have an end or conclusion in mind but I was hoping that I could find or pull out a position about art restoration by exploring some ideas. It might for that reason, appear unfocused or noncommittal. My prejudice towards art restoration is that it is destructive and offers a new art work in place of the original. My worry is that art restoration cannot be justified as an interpretive exercise because there are tremendous epistemic challenges that obscure the judgement of value from the restorer. Perhaps we should view restored art works as distinct from the original and having a merit of their own, but that doesn't seem to be the case (e.g., when people visit the Louvre and see the Mona Lisa, they act as though they are seeing a work painted by Da Vinci). The superficial aspects may have been restored, but the nuance of value in the painting is lost in restoration. Despite that, art historians, to some degree, do not distinguish the restored work from the original.

Other issues that might come up in justifying or rejecting restoration are identity (e.g., the ship of Theseus) and authenticity (i.e., the restoration was not done by the artist). I am less concerned with those issues (although they do merit some thought) and more concerned about the interpretive exercise done by the restorer.

could one become a gymnast, or martial artist by studying technique while awake, but only physically practicing it while asleep? — Wosret

I'm not sure it makes sense to say one has become a gymnast or martial artist if the practice is only done while asleep. We would be reluctant to refer to a person as skilled in a discipline without a demonstration of the skill. There are also variables in dreams that would hinder a direct translation from dream practice to non-dream practice (e.g., gravity and the limits of one's muscles moving through space). If the dream world could be controlled to perfectly mimic non-dream practice, there might be a possibility of mastery through dream practice alone, but absent that I would say dreaming only makes improvements on skills already developed by real-world practice.

Pessimism as a descriptive account of things seems to be fairly accurate or at least defensible. The normative pessimistic conclusions overreach. Pessimism and optimism are character predispositions and inform action based on individual predisposition and values. Pessimism and optimism can occasionally try to persuade or formulate arguments that the respective predisposition ought to be held, which is inappropriate. As long as you're not harming others as a result of your pessimism, I'll leave you to your despair.

I think, to sum up the difference between a pessimist and a non-pessimist would be the answer to the question of: Is it better to have lived/loved/etc and lost than to have never lived/loved/etc at all? — darthbarracuda

I would say the pessimist reveals the predisposition in positing the question. The pessimist questions the negation of an intrinsic quality. While it is a reasonable question, the optimist might see the negation as an unnecessary or contingent feature of reality. The optimist goal is then at removing the contingency whereas the pessimist becomes fixated on it.

Philosophy is the practice of asking questions and making distinctions that others find irritating. Good philosophy is the most irritating sort and bad philosophy is comments or questions that most people find agreeable. Consensus is an enemy of philosophy such that, when a consensus is reached, the subject is demarcated as an entirely new field of study outside of philosophy. Philosophers try to break the consensus by posing questions pertaining to the new discipline, but those questions are largely ignored from within the discipline itself.

How about future looking histories:

History of Prophecies
History of Predictions
History of Invention
History of Doomsday Scenarios

These, it would seem, are histories that are a little more unstuck in time in terms of the historical study can anticipate future events to complete the narrative.

Do you care about what will happen to human beings in a hundred, thousand, or million years? — jamalrob

I selected "not at all", and although I have some buyer's remorse for that selection, I will nevertheless stand by it. My concern lessens with time and I would say looking beyond my lifetime it would be negligible. I don't hold a special place for humans per se in my deliberations. It would be a shame for life to be extinguished, but particular species are just winners of an evolutionary game of chance.

My stance is one would first have to define 'art' before being able to judge its quality. — Sentient

I wonder if it's worthwhile to note on your account that a definition of art for the sake of judgement need not be a good or accurate definition. For instance, if one's definition is: "art is a painting that uses at least three colours", then a judgement of bad art is constrained by that definition. As the definition is challenged and more works are included in the domain, the judgements one makes about specific works will change accordingly.

Bad art is art that has no or little aesthetic value. Aesthetic value is a judgement made by reference to the culture in which the work exists and can be a function of at least one of the form, techne, meaning (intended or perceived) or materials. As such, pictures of plane crashes might be bad art in a memorial for 9/11 but good art in an exhibit away from that context. Art has a minimal definition as being an artefact so art disqualifies natural objects. Natural objects can be represented in art (e.g., a photo of a sunset), but cannot be art objects themselves.

God is not a solution to absurdity because God risks absurdity par excellence. Either God requires an additional appeal to meaning through an other or meaning is intrinsic in being. Without an other, God's absurdity is magnified infinitely. Creation is meaningful and meaning-giving. The creative impulse in humans (or in God) is precisely where meaning is found and absurdity conquered. Hence, finite existence is given meaning by the creative projects in which individuals participate, and absent the need for God.

Is it because P2 is good in itself (Deontology?), — Pneumenon

For deontology, the only thing good without qualification is the good will. Other things/characteristics (e.g., intelligence) have a value of goodness in relation to a condition or by the ends brought about. Since the good will is good without reference to its success, it is not a consequentialist theory because moral goodness resides entirely in the will and not the action taken.

But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible? What if we ought to kill babies for fun? Would we then wish to be good? Or would we deny morality -- not in the sense that we don't accept its validity; in the sense that we don't act in accordance to it? — Michael

For me, part of the answer is that morality doesn't work that way. It does not prescribe specific actions as good and obligated but prohibits impermissible action. We come to morality with a proposed action and ask if it is morally permissible to act in such a way. It would be peculiar for the moral agent to find right and moral action reprehensible because the moral agent has selected the action as preferential prior to moral judgement (exception would be when coerced to act reprehensibly). Where morality might find some resistance in reprehensible attitudes is when a prohibition is viewed as reprehensible (e.g., the inquiring ax murderer). In that case, the moral requirement is not judged as reprehensible but the supposed outcome of acting on the moral requirement is reprehensible. If a refusal to lie results in the murder of a close friend, then the moral agent finds the refusal to lie as reprehensible insofar as it resulted in a close friend being murdered. Here the end (i.e., protecting a friend from an ax murderer) is judged as good but the means (i.e., refusing to lie) is judged as bad because of the likelihood that it fails to secure the end. Suppose now, that the friend was able to sneak out of a window in a walkway beside the house. Upon hearing the lie, the murderer is turned away and sulks down the same walkway that your close friend has escaped into and by an unfortunate circumstance the murderer meets your friend and murders them. By reference to the outcome, the lie would have the same moral value as the refusal to lie insofar as the end is good but the means were bad. It is on the moral agent to reconcile the means and the end as morally permissible. If it is the aim of the moral agent to protect one's friends from ax murderers/Nazis, then the means towards that end ought to be suitable.

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael

The difference between 1 and either 2 or 3 is the existence of moral agency (i.e., agents capable of making moral judgements). Morality is a nascent, emergent property that becomes realized in a universe that has evolved moral beings. Moral beings are ones that are capable of making and acting on judgements of practical reason (i.e., subjective principles).