Regarding LLMs proclivity to hallucinate or generate bullshit (in the Frankfurtian sense), I had indeed witnessed this often while interacting with ChatGPT (based on the GPT-3.5 language model). But, as I had also noted, GPT4 is much less likely to hallucinate when presented with the same queries. It also is much better at correcting its errors when prompted to do so, and cogently revise the structure of its argument on the basis of updated premises.
Here is a question regarding the game of poker that I had submitted to GPT-3.5, a few days ago, before gaining access to GPT4, and where it hallucinated a bit, and proceeded to hallucinate some more after being corrected. I revisited the same topic with GPT-4. It seems to have 50 more IQ points than his little brother. I am also providing the transcript below. If you are not familiar with the rules of poker (either Texas Holden or PLO) you may want to skip this post or gloss over it quickly.
RevealPN:
In 5card plo why is the small blind folding so much more to a big blind 3-bet than the co is folding to a button 3-bet?
GPT-3.5:
In 5 Card Pot-Limit Omaha (PLO), the small blind is at a positional disadvantage compared to the big blind and the button. The small blind is the first player to act preflop, so they have less information about the other players' hands and less ability to control the size of the pot. Additionally, the small blind has already invested money in the pot, while the button has not. Therefore, the small blind is more likely to fold to a big blind 3-bet than the button is to fold to a button 3-bet.
PN:
Your answer is incorrect since it is the UTG player who is first to act preflop and the small blind is first to act only after the flop. Can you improve your answer?
GPT-3.5:
I apologize for the confusion. You are correct that the UTG player is the first to act preflop, not the small blind. The UTG player is at a positional disadvantage compared to the players who act after them, and is therefore more likely to fold to a raise or re-raise. This is especially true in Pot-Limit Omaha (PLO) where hand strength is harder to read due to the four hole cards. Additionally, the hand range of UTG is stronger than the small blind, who may have a weaker hand, due to the blinds. Therefore, the UTG player is more likely to fold to a raise or re-raise than the small blind is.
PN:
Right, but then why is the small blind much more inclined to fold preflop to a big blind 3-bet than the CO is to a button 3-bet according to solvers?
GPT-3.5:
Small blind is in a worse position preflop than the CO (cut-off) for several reasons:
1- The small blind is the second player to act preflop and therefore has less information about the other players' hands and less ability to control the size of the pot.
2- The small blind has already invested money in the pot, which makes them more likely to fold to a raise or re-raise.
3- The small blind has a smaller stack-to-pot ratio (SPR) than the CO, which makes it harder for them to make profitable calls or re-raises.
4- The small blind's hand range is generally weaker than the CO's hand range.
All these factors combined make the small blind more susceptible to folding to a big blind 3-bet than the CO is to a button 3-bet. This is why solvers suggest that the small blind is much more inclined to fold preflop to a big blind 3-bet than the CO is to a button 3-bet.
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(Note that GPT-3.5 now is hallucinating that the SB is second to act preflop. It is actually first to act. This error completely undermine the analysis and at this point I had given up on this line of enquiry)
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PN:
In 5card PLO why is the small blind folding so much more to a big blind 3-bet than the co is folding to a button 3-bet?
GPT4:
In 5-card Pot Limit Omaha (PLO), the small blind (SB) will often fold more frequently to a big blind (BB) 3-bet than the cutoff (CO) folds to a button (BTN) 3-bet. There are several reasons for this:
1- Position: In poker, position is essential. The CO has better position than the SB, as the CO acts after the SB on each betting round. When the CO faces a 3-bet from the BTN, they can still play in position post-flop, which can lead to more profitable situations. However, when the SB faces a 3-bet from the BB, they will be out of position post-flop, which makes it more difficult to navigate and play profitably.
2- Range advantage: When the BB 3-bets against the SB, their range is usually much stronger, as they know they'll be playing out of position against the SB. In contrast, when the BTN 3-bets against the CO, their range can be wider, as they know they will have position advantage post-flop. As a result, the CO can continue with a wider range of hands against the BTN's 3-bet than the SB can against the BB's 3-bet.
3- Pot odds: When facing a 3-bet, the SB has to invest more money into the pot relative to the CO. The CO has already invested more money into the pot (since the CO open-raises) than the SB (who only has the small blind posted). Consequently, the CO is getting better pot odds to call the 3-bet compared to the SB, making it more profitable for the CO to continue with a wider range of hands.
4- Stack-to-pot ratio (SPR): The SB has a lower SPR when facing a 3-bet from the BB, which means that the effective stack sizes are smaller relative to the pot. This can make post-flop play more difficult for the SB, as they have less room to maneuver and may be forced to commit their stack with weaker holdings. Conversely, the CO has a higher SPR when facing a 3-bet from the BTN, giving them more flexibility and room to make plays post-flop.
These factors contribute to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
Your first point seems incorrect since after the CO calls a 3-bet from the BTN and proceed to play heads up with it on future streets, it with still play out of position on all of them.
GPT4:
You are correct, and I apologize for the confusion in my initial response. When the CO calls a 3-bet from the BTN, they will indeed be out of position post-flop. So, the position advantage isn't applicable in this specific case.
However, the other points still hold true:
1- Range advantage: When the BB 3-bets against the SB, their range is usually stronger because they know they'll be playing out of position against the SB. In contrast, when the BTN 3-bets against the CO, their range can be wider because they know they will have a position advantage post-flop. As a result, the CO can continue with a wider range of hands against the BTN's 3-bet than the SB can against the BB's 3-bet.
2- Pot odds: The CO is getting better pot odds to call the 3-bet compared to the SB, making it more profitable for the CO to continue with a wider range of hands.
3- Stack-to-pot ratio (SPR): The CO has a higher SPR when facing a 3-bet from the BTN, giving them more flexibility and room to make plays post-flop, while the SB has a lower SPR when facing a 3-bet from the BB.
These factors contribute to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
Your point about range advantage also seems premised on an error since the BB actually has position on the SB on all streets, including preflop.
GPT4:
You are correct again, and I apologize for the confusion in my response. In the SB vs. BB scenario, the BB indeed has position on the SB on all streets, including preflop. Let me reframe the range advantage point:
Range advantage: When the BB 3-bets against the SB, their range is usually stronger because they are directly attacking the SB's opening range, which is generally wider. The SB, being the first to act preflop, often opens with a wider range of hands, so the BB can 3-bet with a tighter and stronger range to exploit this. In contrast, when the BTN 3-bets against the CO, the CO's opening range is generally tighter than that of the SB, so the BTN's 3-bet range can be wider, and the CO can continue with a wider range of hands against the BTN's 3-bet than the SB can against the BB's 3-bet.
The other points, pot odds and stack-to-pot ratio (SPR), still contribute to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
Your revised point regarding range advantage seems somewhat illogical to me since it would appear to imply that there are hands that are profitable to call against a tight range that would be unprofitable to call against a comparatively looser range. But I think the opposite is true. When knowing that you are likely to be heads up after the preflop action, it is better to tighten up your calling range when you know that your opponent opens with a stronger range. For instance, BTN should call a tight UTG raise-first-in with a tighter range than the range he would call a comparatively looser CO raise-first in range with.
Maybe you were mislead by the general consideration that in 6-max or full ring games that feature many loose opponents, one is well advised to tighten up one's preflop range. But that's because the flops are more likely to go multiway in those circumstances, and this does not apply to the guaranteed heads up situations that are at issue here.
GPT4:
You are correct, and I appreciate your patience in pointing out the inconsistencies in my previous responses. I misunderstood the context of the question, and I apologize for the confusion. Let me provide a more accurate analysis of the situation.
The main reason the SB folds more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO is due to the relative strength of their opening ranges and the resulting pot odds and implied odds.
Opening ranges: The SB has a wider opening range than the CO. The SB will often open wider, attempting to steal the blinds and anticipating that the BB may fold frequently. As a result, when the BB 3-bets, the SB is more likely to hold a weak hand and will fold more often. The CO, on the other hand, has a tighter opening range due to earlier position, so when the BTN 3-bets, the CO is more likely to have a hand worth continuing with.
Pot odds and implied odds: The SB, with a wider and weaker range, will often face worse pot odds and implied odds when facing a 3-bet from the BB. The BB's 3-bet range can be stronger, as the BB is attempting to exploit the wider opening range of the SB. When the CO faces a 3-bet from the BTN, the CO's opening range is tighter and stronger, leading to better pot odds and implied odds for the CO when facing the 3-bet.
In summary, the main factor contributing to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO is the relative strength of their opening ranges and the resulting pot odds and implied odds.
PN:
In the first point regarding opening ranges, you correctly state that CO is effectively in earlier position. This is because, in the context of the present problem, we assume that all the players who have already acted before the CO (starting with the UTG player) folded. But the CO who raises-first-in still has to worry with three players having position on him preflop, namely the BTN, SN and BB. On the other hand, the SB who raises first in only has the BB to worry about. On the other hand, if the SB or BB were to call the CO's raise, or 3-bet, the CO would have the opportunity to proceed to play heads up in position with them. This is a mitigating factor, but it is not mitigating enough to compensate for the fact that the combined range of three potential opponents is much stronger that the unfiltered range of only one. It is this consideration that would explain why the CO opens with a narrower range to begin with.
GPT4:
You're right. I appreciate your detailed explanation and patience in helping to clarify the context. The CO does indeed have to worry about three players having position on them preflop (BTN, SB, and BB), while the SB only has to worry about the BB. This leads the CO to open with a narrower range compared to the SB's range.
To summarize, the key factors contributing to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO are:
The CO has a tighter opening range due to having three players (BTN, SB, and BB) with position on them preflop, while the SB only has one player (BB) to worry about. This means the CO's range is generally stronger, and they will be more likely to continue against a 3-bet compared to the SB.
Pot odds and implied odds: The SB, with a wider and weaker opening range, will often face worse pot odds and implied odds when facing a 3-bet from the BB. The BB's 3-bet range can be stronger, as the BB is attempting to exploit the wider opening range of the SB. When the CO faces a 3-bet from the BTN, the CO's opening range is tighter and stronger, leading to better pot odds and implied odds for the CO when facing the 3-bet.
The combination of these factors results in the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
I think there still remains a defect in your argument presented in point 1. As I had pointed out earlier, facing a looser opening range from the SB (compared with the tighter CO opening range that BTN faces), the proper adjustment for the BB would be to call or 3-bet with more hands, not fewer. If the opposite was true, it would have the unlikely implication that there are some hands that the BB can profitably call or raise against a tight SB opening range that are more profitable to fold against a looser range.
GPT4:
You are right, and I appreciate your continued patience in pointing out the inconsistencies in my response. I apologize for the confusion, and I would like to provide an accurate assessment of the situation.
The key factor contributing to the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO is mainly due to the opening ranges and the post-flop position:
Opening ranges and 3-bet ranges: As you pointed out, the SB opens with a wider range since they only have the BB to worry about, whereas the CO has to worry about three players (BTN, SB, and BB). Facing the SB's wider opening range, the BB will adjust by 3-betting with a wider range, as you correctly mentioned. Similarly, the BTN will 3-bet the CO with a range that targets the CO's tighter opening range.
The reason the SB ends up folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet is due to the difference in the strength of their opening ranges. The CO's tighter opening range consists of stronger hands, which will continue against a 3-bet more often, while the SB's wider opening range includes more hands that are not strong enough to continue against a 3-bet.
Post-flop position: Another factor is that the CO will be out of position against the BTN post-flop, while the SB will also be out of position against the BB post-flop. However, the CO's tighter opening range makes it more likely that they can profitably continue against the BTN's 3-bet, even when out of position. In contrast, the SB's wider opening range and being out of position against the BB make it more challenging to play profitably post-flop, which contributes to the SB folding more frequently.
The combination of these factors results in the SB folding more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
I think the first point is inconclusive since the conclusion hangs on the exact quantitative balance of two opposite considerations. First, the fact that the CO opens with a tighter range than the SB, for the reasons you mentioned, should make the CO less likely to fold to a 3-bet than the SB. Secondly, however, the fact that the BB exploits the SB wider opening range with a looser range of his own should make the SB more likely to continue. While both of those considerations are valid, it is the exact balance of them that ought to decide the response to our question.
The response that I has assumed in my initial query is derived from the observation of of output of a Nash equilibrium solver for 6-max multiway preflop situations. You initial remark about SPR ratios still seem to me to be relevant, however.
GPT4:
You are correct that the balance between these two opposite considerations will determine the response to the question. It's important to understand that without knowing the exact quantitative balance, it's difficult to provide a definitive answer. However, based on your observation from the Nash equilibrium solver output for 6-max multiway preflop situations, it seems that the SB folds more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet.
The SPR point that I mentioned earlier can still be relevant in this context:
Stack-to-pot ratio (SPR): When facing a 3-bet, the SB has to invest more money into the pot relative to the CO. The CO has already invested more money into the pot (since the CO open-raises) than the SB (who only has the small blind posted). Consequently, the CO is getting better pot odds to call the 3-bet compared to the SB, making it more profitable for the CO to continue with a wider range of hands. Additionally, the CO's higher SPR when facing a 3-bet from the BTN gives them more flexibility and room to make plays post-flop, which can also influence their decision to continue against the 3-bet.
Taking into account the SPR along with the observations from the Nash equilibrium solver, it seems that the SB folds more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet in 5-card PLO.
PN:
Another consideration is that: in heads-up situations, assuming equal ranges, higher SPR ratios favor the player in position while lower SPR ratios favor the player out of position. This is because of the issue of equity realization denial. When the SPR is large, the player in position has more opportunities to make the OOP player fold and hence deny him the realization of his equity on later street. However, since choosing to call or three-bet can enable players to manipulate the SPR, those decisions also affect the ranges and so the proper strategy to employ is hard to assess without the help provided from studying solver outputs.
GPT4:
You're absolutely right. In heads-up situations, assuming equal ranges, higher SPR ratios generally favor the player in position, while lower SPR ratios favor the player out of position. The reason behind this is, as you mentioned, the issue of equity realization denial. With a larger SPR, the player in position can more effectively leverage their positional advantage to apply pressure on the OOP player, potentially forcing them to fold and deny them the realization of their equity on later streets.
However, as you also pointed out, deciding whether to call or 3-bet can affect the SPR and consequently influence the players' ranges. This makes it challenging to determine the optimal strategy without the aid of solver outputs.
In the context of 5-card PLO, the combination of the factors we've discussed, including SPR, pot odds, opening ranges, and post-flop position, contribute to the observed pattern that the SB folds more often to a BB 3-bet compared to the CO folding to a BTN 3-bet. Studying solver outputs can provide valuable insights into the optimal strategies to employ in such situations.
PN:
True. And, as it turns out, at equilibrium, in 6-max 5-card PLO, the BB's 3-betting range (against the SB open) only is very slightly looser (about 3%) than the BTN's 3-betting range (against the CO open) is. However, the folding frequency of the SB is proportionally much larger (about 12%) than the folding frequency of the CO. So, the SPR considerations that we discussed would appear likely to be the the main relevant factor. In order to test this hypothesis, I looked at solver outputs with different buyin structures (that is, lower initial stacks) to isolate the effect of the SPR on equilibrium strategies. To my surprise, my hypothesis regarding the SPR effect on the equilibrium strategies was not validated. That led me to conclude that either those solver outputs aren't solved to a sufficient accuracy, and hence are unreliable, or there is some factor that we have overlooked.
GPT4:
It's interesting to see the results of your investigation into the solver outputs for 6-max 5-card PLO with different buy-in structures. If the solver outputs are accurate, it could indicate that there might be another factor or a combination of factors that we have not yet considered or fully explored.
Some potential factors that could influence the equilibrium strategies include:
The non-linearity of hand equities in 5-card PLO: Unlike in No-Limit Hold'em, where hand equities often run closer together, hand equities in 5-card PLO can vary more significantly. This may affect how players adjust their ranges and folding frequencies in different situations, making it harder to predict the impact of SPR on equilibrium strategies.
The specific board textures: In PLO, the specific board textures can have a significant impact on players' equities and post-flop play. Different board textures may favor the SB or the CO in various situations, which could influence their folding frequencies in response to 3-bets.
The dynamic between the players: While solver outputs provide useful information about equilibrium strategies, they do not account for the specific dynamic between the players at the table. In practice, players may deviate from GTO strategies based on their observations and reads on their opponents, which could affect the folding frequencies in different situations.
If the solver outputs are not solved to a sufficient accuracy, it's possible that the results may not accurately represent the optimal strategies in these situations. In this case, further analysis and investigation may be necessary to gain a better understanding of the factors influencing folding frequencies in response to 3-bets in 5-card PLO.
It's worth noting that poker is a complex game, and while solver outputs can provide valuable insights into optimal play, there is often no single, definitive answer to every situation. Understanding the nuances and complexities of the game requires ongoing study, practice, and adaptation to the specific dynamics at the table.
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The last response offered by GPT4 contains an number of subtle technical inaccuracies that are the sort of mistakes very smart but inexpert human beings are very likely to make during such discussions about poker strategy. It misunderstands the relationship between equilibrium (GTO) and exploitative strategies, for instance. I am much impressed, however, by its ability to bring up considerations and suggest novel lines of inquiry that are creative and relevant in the context of the whole discussion.