And PN - the "N-word," by which you mean "nigger" but are too coy to say, has always been a degrading term for black people. — T Clark

The word I was thinking about isn't 'nigger' but rather 'negro' (or, in French 'nègre'). They weren't originally pejoratives and indeed were routinely used by black people to refer to themselves in a neutral way. Still, complaining about contemporary uses of them (especially by white people) because of recently acquired connotations isn't a case of objectionable political correctness.

I don't expect to see a swastika on a Nike shoe or a VW car anytime in the near future. 250 years from now? It's quite possible that the swastika will be a neutral symbol by that time. Betsy Ross is about as far back in time. — Bitter Crank

Betsy Ross also lived further back in time than the appropriation of her flag by white supremacists, just like the originators of the swastika are much further back in time than Nazi Germany. They're both irrelevant. You are the one trying to make this about Betsy Ross. But the complaint wasn't about Ross, and Kaepernick didn't suggest that Ross was a white supremacist (did he?). The complaint was about Nike's use of a flag that had more recently been appropriated by white supremacists, regardless of Ross' personal politics.

That’s a persuasive point and if it means that words can’t always be claimed by their users to mean what they want them to mean then what next? — Brett

It means that sensitivity to salient features of the historial and social context (and not just origins) is required and the display of such sensitivity can't always be blamed on rampant "political correctness".

Using Kaepernick's reasoning, we should conclude that the Romans and Americans are both fascist since we were all using a symbol attached to 20th century fascism. — Bitter Crank

On the other hand, using your own reasoning, it ought to be perfectly alright for Nike to put zwastikas on their shoes since the zwastika was an ancient Eurasian religious icon before it historically came to be associated with the German Nazi party. This may be a more extreme case, but it illustrates that symbols and icons, just like words (think of the N-word, for instance) can't always be claimed by their users to mean what they want them to mean or what they originally meant when they were first created.

Where do you believe he argues that? — andrewk

It's been more than 15 years since I've read Naming and Necessity back to back. So, I must acknowledge that I may now tend to conflate some of Kripke's original arguments with those of other pragmatists/externalists who have followed in (some of) his footsteps, and expanded on his views, such as Gareth Evans, Hillary Putnam, Michael Luntley, Gregory McCulloch, John McDowell and David Wiggins.

I am dubious of that claim (and he offers nothing to support it) but, even if it were true, that would not mean that it is essential to a descriptivist theory that one takes that interpretation. — andrewk

Well, for sure, you yourself attempted to supply a more nuanced account. But there is some unfinished business above since I have claimed that your own proposed account still is vulnerable to Kripke's objections. Do you propose to amend it as the claim that, whatever set of true beliefs a speaker happens to have about the item she intends to refer to, this set determines descriptively what this item is? Or maybe you want to phrase it differently?

See if I have this right...

Here the difference between reference fixing and reference determining would be that the former makes use of an otherwise inadequate description(one that is incapable of successfully picking out an individual), whereas the latter is making use of a purportedly adequate description, according to one who argues in favor of definite descriptions. — creativesoul

That sounds about right, with the caveat that there is nothing wrong or inadequate about referring to an item purely descriptively (and thus ensuring that our description of it is true, if the item uniquely exists) if this is what one intends to do. (Mathematicians often refer to mathematical objects purely descriptively). Kripke's main point is that reference by means of proper names doesn't work like that.

If all that Kripke is saying is that, where every single belief that a person has about a person, including that he is standing at 12 o'clock, or that I was introduced to him yesterday in a meeting, or that my grandmother told me a story about him, is false then one cannot give an account of how the person can be referred to, then the situation he is using is so rare that it is ridiculous to use it as an objection to any theory of anything. — andrewk

Kripke isn't arguing that it isn't rare that all of our beliefs about an item that we are making reference to non-descriptively (e.g. by means of a demonstrative device or of a proper name) are false. That might indeed be extremely rare. What he's arguing only is that however big or small the core of our true beliefs about this item might be, it's not this true core of beliefs that determines what the reference is. He's arguing against descriptivist theories that make some core of beliefs about an item necessarily true of this item in order that the believer might be making reference to it, or that make it necessary that there be such a true core.

You're saying that false description does not pick out the referent, but rather that it has/had already been picked out by true description or demonstratively(pointing, showing).

Is that about right? — creativesoul

That the intended reference might already have been determined by a true description (e.g. andrewk's "...at twelve o'clock") might be a requirement of a purely descriptivist account. Kripke is arguing that the reference can be singled out entirely non-descriptively but that, in some cases, in order to enable the reference to be communicated non-ambiguously, a definite description (either true or merely believed to be true of the intended reference) can be supplied to other people in order to draw their attention to the intended item and thereby enable them to refer to it under the same (or deferred) mode of demonstrative reference. (I am somewhat adapting his account of proper names to demonstrative reference since, in spite of the obvious differences, they both are de re modes of reference that rely on the possibility of knowledge by acquaintance).

On the one hand you agree that false descriptions can successfully refer. On the other, you seem to be implying that they cannot refer 'descriptively'. How else do descriptions refer if not descriptively? — creativesoul

Remember Kripke's explanation that he intended to use the phrase "reference of the description" in order to match up with the descriptivist logical tradition. (That was on page 25, if I remember). That's how referring descriptively works. You supply a definite description of the item you intend to refer to, and you intend this item to be whatever uniquely satisfies this description. (That's what makes the description definite). By definition, such a description is about the item (if there is any) that uniquely satisfies the description. Another way for a definite description to refer would be as a reference fixing rather than a reference determining device. In that case, it might serve to disambiguate among several items that a speaker could be making reference todemonstratively, or by means of a shared proper name, while accounting for the fact that the content of the description could be false and merely believed to be true by the speaker.

Not to speak on behalf of andrewk, but rather on my own behalf...

The above criticism is based upon a misunderstanding of belief and how it works. False beliefs are not true. What's said about the referent in a false description is about the referent. It need not be true in order to refer. — creativesoul

Of course. It only needs to be true in order to refer descriptively, in case the intended reference would be singled out descriptively by the predicative content of the definite description. If the intended reference is singled out demonstratively, for instance, and we can account for demonstrative reference non-descriptively, then it's possible to express a false belief by means of a false definite description of this demonstratively referenced individual.

Jane believes Joe killed Bob. She refers to Joe as "the man who killed Bob". Joe did not kill Bob. Allen did. When Jane says "the man who killed Bob", she is not expressing a belief about Allen even if and when it is the case that he satisfies the description.

That alone shows us that satisfying the description is not necessary for successfully reference.

To talk about "matching up with this belief" is to talk about whether or not the description is true. That is irrelevant to successful reference.

This is all common ground between Kripke, you and me. It is @andrewk who relied on this matchup in order to make his descriptivist account work.

I do not understand this. How can it be the case that I have a belief about somebody that is in my field of view, and yet the belief is not about that person? Isn't that a bare contradiction - "I have a belief that is about X and not about X"? — andrewk

I was only considering the set of persons (person-1, ..., person-4) who are perceptually present and can reasonably be thought of by the intended audience to be the person being talked about (and demonstrated) by the speaker. One of them might be drinking champagne unbeknownst to the speaker. Of course, the speaker herself would know who the person is that she is looking at and thinking of, but she would not know that by description (or so would I be prepared to argue on Kripke's behalf).

Would it help to break it up? My belief is about the person at 12 o'clock (so in the above sentence we can replace 'X' by 'the person at my 12 o'clock'), and the belief is that that person is a young man and has a glass of champagne and has winked at me. As far as I am concerned 'the person at my 12 o'clock' is enough to identify the person. But talking to somebody else, I probably feel a bit more info is needed to avoid confusion - for instance my 12 o'clock may be Sabrina's 10 o'clock. So I add in the belief about the champagne and the age and sex, and the belief about the wink becomes a question rather than a part of the DD.

In that case, when you add "...at my 12 o'clock" to the description, you are relying to the content of the true part of the description to secure reference in spite of the falsity of the other parts of the description. When you are thus relying on a true descriptive core (however small) in order to account for the determination of the reference, you move back into the target area of Kripke's objections to descriptivism, which you had attempted to evade by means of your account of reference by means of (potentially false) descriptions that merely match up with the speaker's (potentially false) beliefs about her intended reference.

As a result of the speaker knowing how to use language to draw an other's attention to the 'object'. — creativesoul

Yes, that's sketchy but basically right. It also takes us out of the realm of Kripke's descritivist targets, and dovetails with his own account.

That isnt true either. Black communities love to make fun of white people by talking about, for example, invented people who dont exist, when actually talking about the white person. And Ive heard them do it many times without the white person realizing it and some black teenager sniggering out of sight. There's alot more forms of communication than are obvious from the blithe statements of simple truths and falsehoods that people for whom English is not a first language figure out, and then deliberately connive to humiliate native English speakers together without the native English speakers realizing it. — ernestm

That's interesting, but what I meant to say is that for reference to be successful, on Kripke's account, it's not a requirement that the descriptive content associated with the speaker's 'idea' (i.e. the de re sense of a demonstrative or proper name) of her intended reference be mostly true. I did not mean to imply that making use of misleading descriptions can't possibly, indeed, mislead outsiders to a conniving community.

hence belief is removable by occam's razor. Its irrelevant to the theory. You too. — ernestm

That's not an argument against Kripke, neither does it help @andrewk who does appeal to the content the speaker's belief in his account of reference.

Again, it is a common technique in black communities to deliberately lie about descriptions which is known to others. As an overly simple example, they will say 'don't insult my brother like that.' The person who is not his brother then nods in agreement and raises a fist. — ernestm

That the descriptive content can represent false beliefs about the intended target is common ground. What we're inquiring about is the positive account for the reference of the thought (or of the speech act expressing this thought) being what it is in spite of the fact that the definite description by means of which the speaker thinks of the individual is false or mostly false.

I've tried to help understand the issue but I do have to rest.

Rest in peace :wink:

Well I regret I must agree with andrewk. As you are interested in externals only, the belief doesnt matter. All that matters is that the two identify a sufficient part of the descriptive properties as referring to the same person. Thats the point of the theory. It doesnt matter how many of the descriptive properties are true or false, or if some of them could truthfully apply to others too. — ernestm

In order to establish that the speaker and his intended audience share (a sufficient part of their) beliefs about the same individual, to whom they are thinking about, one must first be able to say who it is that their beliefs are about. However, even if we leave this circularity problem aside, Kripke made a good case that shared beliefs aren't necessary. The audience would normally know who the speaker is thinking about even if the audience knew most or all of the descriptive content used by the speaker not to be true of her intended target. @andrewk got at least that right.

If one believes that the person is drinking champagne, then the description represents the belief. The belief refers to the person the speaker believes to be drinking champagne. — creativesoul

This is common ground. The issue is to explain how the speaker's belief comes to be about the speaker's intended referent in the world. @andrewk's account of the reference of the speech act relies on the assumption that the mental act thereby expressed is about the very same object she is thinking about. What accounts for the reference of the belief in the first place?

'Sabrina! Don't look, but did you see how the man over there with champagne in his glass just winked at me?' — andrewk

On your view, the person you are making reference to is person-1 on account of the fact that, between all four people who are perceptually present, only person-1 is such that your belief about that person satisfies the DD you are thinking of (and expressing). This account presupposes that your belief about that person indeed is about that person and not about someone else who might actually be, unbeknownst to you, drinking champagne, (or about nobody, if nobody is having champagne). What is this account of the reference of your belief on the basis of which the truth of the predicative content of the DD can be evaluated as matching up with this belief?

Unfortunately my tutor at oxford has retired and she was too polite ever to write down the criticism. What she pointed out, which I think was a good observation, is that when people talk about 'the man holding the glass of vodka' they are not talking about a cluster of properties viz, male, with arms, holding a glass containing liquid, etc.' even if that is how the reference breaks down for the purposes of logic. They are saying 'that person', in a Wittgensteinian manner, pointing as it were, to enable an assertion about them without befuddling other detail once the reference is defined. — ernestm

Well, strangely enough, this rough account of demonstrative reference seems to me closer in spirit to Kripke's causal/externalist account that it is to Davidson't internalist/interpretivist account.

(I think Gareth Evans's account of demonstrative reference combines the best of both Kripke's 'world-involving' pragmatism and of Davidson's interpretivism. It also somewhat breaks the false dichotomy between externalism and internalism; what is internal to the rational order of linguistic practice in the world isn't internal to the brain.

Specifically, kripke initiated the idea of dubbing. The problem with it from Davidson's point of view was that purely referential theories of naming have trouble with defining meaningful knowledge, for which he provided new ideas on meaningfulness that allow for indeterminacy, in case there are mistakes in the act of assigning a label to a reference. — ernestm

I think I can imagine how Davidson's coherentist and somewhat internalist account of meaning would raise problems for Kripke's externalist (or "purely referential") account of reference. However, do you have a source where Davidson explicitly adresses Kripke along such lines?

One simply lists the people she can see and her beliefs about each one, then compares them to the DD and picks out the one for which the beliefs match the DD. — andrewk

(I have completely rewritten this post because my initial reply was misguided and based on a misreading of your position.)

OK. I see what you mean now. However, in order to carry through this procedure you need, in a first step, to survey the potential references (e.g. the people who are perceptually present) and assign to them what it is that the speaker believes about each one of them specifically in order to, in a second step, compare those beliefs with the content of the DD. So, you need to first rely on an account of the reference of the speakers mental act of demonstrative reference. The speaker must be able to pick out in though who it is that she believes the predicative content of DD to be uniquely true of. But she can't do this by means of the very same DD, on pain of circularity. (That was basically my earlier objection).

What I wrote was, not that the facts about the person match the DD, but that the speaker's beliefs about the person match the DD. — andrewk

However you also said: "It seems to me that, if the DD picks out a unique individual based on the speaker's beliefs, then that explains how it is precisely that person, and not someone else, to whom she is referring."

In this sentence, what did you intend to be the anaphoric antecedent of "that person"? It is "the unique individual based on the speaker's beliefs", right? How it this individual singled out by the speaker's belief, on your view, if not as the individual that satisfies the predicative content of DD?

I totally agree, but I reach the conclusion this is a good argument for Davidson's 'dubbing.' In your example, the person is dubbed with the properties which may or may not be true, resulting in ideas about the person which are unprovable. That does seem to be the normal state of affairs in human interactions. — ernestm

I'd like to know a bit more about Davidson's 'dubbing'. Would you happen to have a reference?

It seems to me that, if the DD picks out a unique individual based on the speaker's beliefs, then that explains how it is precisely that person, and not someone else, to whom she is referring.

One simply lists the people she can see and her beliefs about each one, then compares them to the DD and picks out the one for which the beliefs match the DD. — andrewk

In that case, the person who the speaker is looking at does not match the DD (since the DD expresses a false belief about that person), and hence, by your own account, isn't the person who the speaker is talking about.

It looks like you may have made the slide from (1) "X is the person that the speaker falsely believes phi(...) about" to (2) "X is the person who satisfies the predicative content of the speaker's false belief phi(Y)". But (2) doesn't follow from (1). The negation of (2) rather follows from (1).

The quantity of CO2 that would be required to account for the young climate would have left a mineral behind that is absent from the young rocks. — frank

Those are empirical estimates that have huge margins of uncertainties associated with them. The atmospheric CO2 concentrations several million years ago are estimated roughly by a few different proxy methods that give somewhat discrepant results give or take one or two orders of magnitude. Those remaining uncertainties and open scientific questions regarding the state of the climate in the very distant past can't be used to cast doubt on our understanding of the physics of the current climate system (for the last million years or so) where the data is known much more precisely.

A descriptivist position with less straw in it would be one in which the reference (if it makes sense to talk about one - see my earlier comments about the folly of always dissecting speech acts) made by the speaker is to the individual that she believes satisfies her description. That reference will be correctly interpreted by the listener if that description also uniquely picks out the same individual in the context of the listener's beliefs. — andrewk

I have no idea what Russell would have said since he was mainly interested in the logical reconstruction of a scientifically rigorous language (just like Frege and the logical empiricists were) and wasn't very sensitive to the pragmatic features of ordinary language.

However, it seems to me to be common ground among most contemporary parties that, in Donnellan's champagne case, the speaker is making reference to the person that she merely believes satisfies her description. The problem is to account for it. If the individual being referred to doesn't actually satisfy the description then what makes it the case that it is this individual to whom she herself intends to be referring to? It is not enough to say that he is being referred to in virtue of the fact that the speaker (merely) believes him to satisfy the description. That's because, by saying that, we haven't explained how it is precisely him (and not someone else) who is being referred to. In other words: we are trying to account for who it is who is believed by the speaker to be satisfying her definite description. If we merely appeal to the speaker's belief regarding who it is that she is thinking about, we still have to provide an account of the reference of her belief.

Of course. And about the faint young sun paradox? — frank

The problem in the OP stemmed from only considering CO2 variation and ignoring solar variations. The faint young sun paradox stemmed from only considering solar variations and ignoring CO2 variation. Taking into account both solar and CO2 forcing solves both problems.

thats actually the entire problem of averages in one sentence, because before man-generated co2 since the atmosphere was first cooled down by plants consuming co2 and generating oxygen, sun radiation has been a larger varying factor, as well as, of course, cloud cover, which is almost entrely unkowable. — ernestm

In recent times solar variations have provided very small forcing variation compared with the enhanced greenhouse gas forcing. See the second and third graphs in this web page.

The magnitude of the cloud feedback is the main source of uncertainty regarding climate sensitivity to radiative forcing. But it's a feedback, so it merely amplifies or mitigates climate change, whatever its cause.

It would have to actually oscillate to track large scale ice ages. — frank

The total forcing (solar + greenhouse) and the continental mass distribution effect on albedo feedback and ocean circulation tack large scale ice ages; and not any one single factor in isolation.

It's hard to see how solar forcing would be a significant factor in large scale ice ages, which come and go. We're in one now, obviously. — frank

One mustn't confuse the glacial/interglacial periods that are occurring within the current ice age with major ice ages. The former is governed by the Milankovitch cycles and is modulated by the ice albedo and carbon cycle feedbacks.

Does solar luminosity vary significantly over time?

Indeed it does. As I pointed out above, the variation over the last 300 million years is equivalent to a fourfold decrease in CO2 concentration.

Are you sure you're thinking of the Carboniferous? That was only 300 million years ago. — frank

The Sun is only four and a half billion years old. 300 million years ago is about 7% of its age. One estimate that I've seen is that the total solar irradiance increased by about 4% over the lase 400 million years ago. That would translate into a forcing change of 6.75 W/'m^2 over the last 300 million years. This is just about the same as the effect from a fourfold increase of atmospheric CO2 concentration. Hence, other things being equal (e.g. same continental mass distribution), an atmospheric concentration of 1200ppm, 300 million years ago, would have yielded the same surface temperature as the recent pre-industrial era (300ppm).

Would you say this is a more significant factor than the impact of glaciation? — frank

Over large timescales, glaciation is an effect rather than a cause. Snow and ice albedo functions as a feedback. It's the sum of the forcings (mainly greenhouse gas forcing and solar forcing) that is the independent variable and that determines whether or not glaciation is supported. When glaciation is supported by a low enough total forcing, glaciation ensues and the snow/ice albedo feedback lowers the temperature even further.

I'm all fascinated by the emergence of mammals these days, so I came across this odd piece of information about the Carboniferous period: atmospheric CO2 concentration was around 800 ppm (twice the present level, but down from 7000 ppm earlier in the evolution of life). Yet the mean surface temperature was 14C. It's now 14C.

Anybody know why this is? — frank

The Sun is a yellow dwarf main sequence star. Main sequence stars grow brighter over time. The Sun was thus several percents dimmer several hundreds of years ago. This explains why the main surface temperature wasn't much higher, it at all, during the Carboniferous in spite of the higher CO2 concentration. (Also, CO2 forcing is a logarithmic function of concentration rather than a linear function).

OK, I would agree with all of that as well. I have said from the start that I think reference relies either on observation or ostention (which would be the case with those who witnessed the 'baptism' or description (which would be the means by which those who have never met or seen the baptized person, and so must rely upon being told about him or her would fix their reference to the person in question). — Janus

Well, that's cool. That means Kripke and you are pretty much on the same page, after all.

His text and his footnotes both clearly set out his notion of the 'referent of the description' as the object uniquely satisfying the conditions of the description. I'm showing how that notion leads to a reductio when it comes to explaining the referent of false description. — creativesoul

Yes, he sets out this notion as the notion being used by descriptivists in order to show descriptivism's shorcomings. Immediately following the passage that you quoted (N&N. p.25), he explained: "This is the sense in which it's been used in the logical tradition. So, if you have a description of the form 'the x such that phi(x)', and there is exactly one x such that phi(x), that is the referent of the description."

Could you point me to "the case Kripke describes". I'd like to see him put his own notion to use as a means for clearing up the charges I'm levying against his notion of the 'referent of the description'.

This is just the case that you quoted from p.25. It's not his notion of the 'referent of the description' that he's making use of. It's the traditional notion -- as used by descriptivists -- that he is explaining (and which correspond to the first item in Donnellan's pragmatic distinction between (1) the "proper referent" and (2) the intended referent of the definite description being enunciated by a speaker in a specific context shared by the targeted audience.) He is explaining this notion used by descriptivists in their account of proper names in order to argues against its use as a satisfactory account of the way proper names refer.

...Kripke's doctrine doesn't seem capable of properly accounting for false belief. In fact, some cases of false belief are quite problematic for it.

So you may say,
'The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy',
though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even
though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be
another man in the room who does have champagne in his
glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of
'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in
his glass. Nevertheless, I'm just going to use the term 'referent
of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the
conditions in the definite description.

Nevertheless??? — creativesoul

Kripke is saying "Nevertheless..." because although we would, in ordinary cases, understand the speaker to be referring (and indeed, to intend to be referring) to the man who unbeknownst to the speaker doesn't have champagne in his glass, the way Kripke intends to use the phrase 'referent of the description' is to refer to the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description exactly as descriptivists about proper names understand definite descriptions to refer. So, he's not begging the question against descriptivists.

In the case Kripke describes, the way the reference actually works is grounded on the demonstrative perceptual acquaintance that the speaker and members of his audience have with the drinker. Here also, the definite description can be understood to fix the reference (in the mind of the hearers who merely believe the man to be drinking champagne, or who understand the speaker's mistake), and not determine it. It calls everyone's attention towards the intended individual, who is perceptually present to everyone involved, while also carrying false information about this individual owing to a false presupposition (or misperception).

What's at issue is whether or not false description can be used to successfully refer. Kripke's account does not seem to be able to provide an acceptable account of these cases when they happen. — creativesoul

I would have thought that it was, on the contrary, one of the main strengths of Kripke's "causal" account of de re reference (by means of proper names or demonstratives) that it enables people to successfully refer to individuals which they have (mainly or entirely) false beliefs about, whereas this is not possible to do by means of standalone definite descriptions.

I would say she must at least remember having seen him, even if not what he looks like, in order to refer to him. This memory must be under some form of description, or at least be capable of being rendered as such. For example, if I say to you: "Remember that woman we saw yesterday who was nearly hit by a car" neither of us may remember what she looks like, we might not even be able to pick her out in a line-up, so we can only refer to her by virtue of that true description: that we saw her being almost run over. — Janus

The issue was: must this (minimal) description be true in order that the referent of the thought be determined by that thought? What if both you and I saw a woman whom we believed was almost hit by a car, but the car only appeared to us to drive close to her owing to a misleading perspective? In that case, wouldn't you agree that we are still referring to that woman (or to that man whom we falsely thought was a woman!) in spite of the fact that she (or he!) wasn't nearly hit by a car?

We touched earlier on a distinction between fixing and determining reference. You acknowledged that fixing reference relies on description, but you did not acknowledge this for determining reference. I imagined that you were alluding to Kripke's "causal chain" of rigid designation. As I understand it this involves an event (or events in the case of multiple names designating the same person or entity) of baptism, followed by the historical series of uses of the name to refer to the individual; the designating references that cement the rigid designation.

Right. That's how Kripke suggests his causal account might elucidate how proper names determine their referents.

So, those who are present at the baptismal event(s) know who the baptizing name refers to by virtue of having been there and seeing the baptized person with their own eyes. how does anyone who was not present, who has never seen the person or any representation (painting, photograph or whatever) of the person come to know who is being referred to at subsequent times? I would say it is obviously by virtue of descriptions of what the person looks like, where she lives, what she has done and so on.

Yes, new people can be initiated into the already existing naming practice by means of reference fixing descriptions. The important points to remember, though, is that, firstly, a necessary requirement for their successful initiation into the practice is that the practice already exists and is founded on direct "causal" acquaintance by some of the earlier participants into (or founders of) the practice. And secondly, the content of the reference fixing description by means of which new participants are initiated can be entirely false without this impeding the initiate's ability to refer to the named individual.

So Kripke's "causal series" would itself seem to consist predominately in representations and descriptions. That begins to make it look like the only distinction between fixing and determining reference may be that the latter is thought to consist in a whole chain of isolated 'fixing reference' events, and that description plays a large part in the "causal' process of rigid designation.

Again, it doesn't matter at all if the sorts of contents that are made use of in the deployment, use and transmission or proper name using practices are predominantly consisting of (1) descriptions or (2) de re senses (information insensitive "causal links"). That's an empirical question which Kripke doesn't take any stand on. What he's arguing is that (2) is indispensable and that (2) can't be reduced entirely to (1). (And hence, proper names can't be translated into definite descriptions). Also, it's the essential involvement of (2) in the constitution of naming practices that accounts for proper names behaving as (information insensitive) rigid designators.

To say that she is referring to a man she saw yesterday, even allowing that she totally mis-remembers his appearance (which is itself highly implausible I would say) is to say that she has seen the man, and that she refers to him by virtue of having seen him. Usually one would take having seen someone as entailing knowing what they look like, or at least being able to recognize them if one sees them again. So, I can't see how this challenges what I have been saying. — Janus

The issue isn't whether or not it's frequent or plausible that one might encounter something and totally mis-remember its appearance. That's not a philosophical question; that's an empirical question. Both can intelligibly occur, with whatever frequencies. The issue rather is whether or not it's in virtue of the predicative content of such an ability to recognize an individual's appearance, as a result of an initial perceptual encounter with it, than one is thereafter able to refer to this individual by means of a memory-invoking demonstrative. When you are saying that she is referring to the man by virtue of having seen him, what do you mean exactly? Can you specify some more what this "... by virtue of ..." relation consists in? If it's merely an ability to recognize the man she once saw, who (i.e. under what mode of presentation) does she recognize him to be? Recognitional abilities are abilities to re-cognize; that is: to think of an individual under two distinct modes of presentation and to judge the two references to be numerically identical. I would argue that, in the case under discussion, both of those modes are de re senses: one of them is a memory-invoking demonstrative and the second one is a (present) perceptual demonstrative.