How do you define Free Will? I find that when people use the phrase "free will," they really mean "free choice." Humans possess the latter, but not the former, and the lack of this clarification tends to muddle a lot of contemporary philosophical debate on the topic. In other words, I am free to choose whether to stand up or to sit down so long as no one and no thing forces me to do one or the other, but I can will only one of these options at a time. I cannot will to stand up and sit down simultaneously. As Schopenhauer says, "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." Nor can he will that he wills. Willing is concomitant with simply being alive and existing.
In this way, "free will" is a nonsensical phrase, akin to "free thought" or "free digestion." So long as one lives, one wills, thinks, digests, etc. Freedom, at least generically, only applies to the absence of compulsion in determining what to decide. — Thorongil
Willing two opposites simultaneously seems nonsensical. It that were the case, willing should be described as indecision, not decision.
I hold that free will requires the ability to do otherwise. In other words, I hold that the free agent has a power of volition that enables them to will different options in an undetermined and nonrandom way. While I am sympathetic to the compatibilist pursuits as good philosophers (questioning unreflective assumptions about freedom and responsibility) and are sympathetic towards their interests (feelings of freedom and moral responsibility that are deeply human and practically unavoidable), I ultimately remain unconvinced by their efforts. I do not find an unfettered will (a will unrestrained or overridden by direct external causes) to be sufficient to have moral responsibility.
[...] If determinism is true, then we could not have done anything different than what we have done, are currently doing, and will do in the future. In a counterfactual sense, things could have been different if the parameters had been different, but that is irrelevant to the actual state of affairs. — Chany
Yes. To my thinking, hypothetical ability -- that is, our choice would be different if circumstances had been different -- does nothing to satisfy our ability to do otherwise. 'Otherwise' pertains to an alternative, which by nature depends upon the "first" option (the option that will be chosen, if determinism). But under compatibilism, all that's changed is the first option, which the agent is still compelled to choose.
Aristotle's concept of choice (liberum arbitrium) is the mediation between reason and the passions.
It was Christianity, specifically Paul who discovered 'free will' as a faculty wherein I struggle with myself. In Romans he says "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (7:15) The emphasis on God's laws changes from the blind obedience of Thou shalt, to the love of God' and his laws in freely willing of their fulfillment, and one's own guilt when his laws are nilled. — Cavacava
Since you bring up reason and passions... Say that our reason and our passions are inherent to our design, and in that way, determined. Yet we have the ability to deliberate between them and choose our preferred. Does this undermine self-determination/free choice? In other words, we have the choice between two options, but the options presented to us are externally determined.
Something I've been thinking about.
With regard to choice: the absence of coercion, human nature in general, genetic predisposition in particular, and environmental circumstances. — Galuchat
You're saying that human nature and genetic predispositions qualify as coercion, correct? Are uncoerced choices possible, then? Human nature and genetic predisposition would seem inescapable and fully influencing of our choices, since they affect the mechanisms by which one chooses.