No, that's an absurd suggestion. To make a cumulative case one would need to show that each argument had some probative force, and that would require making each argument. And so the opening post would then have to be thousands of words long. — Bartricks

It's in no way absurd. Plenty of people have written thousands of words to make an argument.

I also have zero problem with you not making such a case; you can if you want, but I'm not going to argue against a case you're not even making.

So an objection arose, that consent is not sufficient basis for antinatalism, you concede that this is the case but there are other arguments that together with this insufficient argument win the day.

You are free to make the next argument in your cumulative series in a new thread and you are free to insist on making it here, but in the latter case I do not continue; I like threads to stay somewhat on topic, that I am committing to a position relative the OP and not indefinitely committing to any alternative of "cumulative" argument apart from the OP (unless of course the OP presents some cumulative project). There's already a thread on the consequentialist argument for antinatalism, and if you don't want to continue that thread for some reason then you can make a new one on your next argument.

My suggestion of making a thread about your cumulative argument is if you want to discuss that; you now bring it up as representing your actual position, but if you don't see how to summarize it, no problem.

I don't see how, once you've failed to establish any one of these arguments individually justifies antinatalism you will be able to make some sort of meta-argument that uses the inadequacy of each by itself to form a formidable argumentative force together. Rather, it seems more likely to me that you are simply creating a perpetual goal post moving machine upon which you can ride away from each opponent to new greener pastures, confident that winning this race away from the previous field is the true strength and metric of victory. However, I am patient and am willing to wait to see if your project succeeds in ever getting to "this cumulative argument justifies antinatalism".

Here I'm concerned with your claims in the OP, and we agree your claims about consent are not sufficient to justify antinatalism. If you want to believe there exists a cumulative case that is too absurdly long to write for any critical investigation of it to happen ... but is nevertheless true, then I have no problem with you believing that.

As for your book analogy, though I agree many intellectual hacks go about writing books in the way you propose, there is, however, another approach to writing philosophical texts which is to assume the case is not one way or another until critical review of all the arguments are carried out to a sufficient standard. You seem to think that because you can imagine writing a book justifying your position that your position is justifiable; however, no such book maybe feasible to create, but rather key arguments (or even all the arguments) may have fatal and insurmountable flaws.

Your position now seems to be "I have no argument to justify antintalism to offer, but I am totally right about my antinatalism position and once I make such an argument over a long, potentially infinite period of time, the justification will have proof".

The alternative point of view is to see things as not justified until the sufficient proof in question actually exists.

This is correct. It is amazing that many people dont understand this concept that you dont have to exist prior to a certain point to be harmed ONCE you are actually brought into the world. — schopenhauer1

Myself, and most of the earlier posters, have no problem with actions now affecting future children. This is even the basis of one of the main criticism of the OP; that there are plenty of actions other than conception and birth that affect not only future children but children in the here and now, a significant portion of such actions for which we are not bothered by a lack of consent (for instance, the functioning of government too affects future children without their consent).

However, if by "amazed that many people dont understand this concept" what you really mean is that you are just haphazardly throwing shade in random directions without any definition of what constitutes 'many' and what might justify amazement without any methodology to speak of, then I concede the point; it is amazing, as is a great many things.

Second, if your complaint is with pedagogy it's not about math. — fishfry

Yes, did you even read my post, this is my complaint.

I have no issue with real numbers "existing" in whatever sense mathematicians using the real number system want to believe. I am not convinced that "the true infinity" or "the true continuum" is captured by these symbolic systems, but I agree with you when you say mathematicians need not care and usually don't care; you can use a different system if it suits your style or problem.

I even cite your own words on this subject and express my agreement.

Your not giving me a hard time, you just have poor reading skills of prose; but I don't mind that, you don't make any claims to be able to understand non-formal arguments and perhaps have formal reasons to believe this task is impossible.

The reason I presented my arguments in prose is because that's the sort of thinking a high school student will be equipped with starting to use the real numbers.

My challenge is that: is there any answers to these prose questions that doesn't involve an entire university course, which maybe not even enough. As someone who's taken these university courses and who works with math in my day job building numerical models, you seem to claim I don't understand these issues. Even if it was true, which I doubt, isn't this more evidence to my point?

It would be fun to teach ZF to SOME high school students, the especially mathematically talented ones. The mainstream, no. I wonder what you are talking about here. Again, the axiom of choice is not needed to defined or construct the reals. — fishfry

Again, terrible reading comprehension; mathematicians not learning any humanities really is a problem.

I do not claim the axiom of choice is needed to construct the reals.

My argument is above the tdlr which doesn't mention the axiom of choice. My tdlr is an over simplification of my argument in a recommendation that I believe most people who understand this subject and have good reading comprehension would get.

Which you seem to agree with, that ZF can be taught at a high school level, which is my recommendation. I think you would agree that most high school students would not be prepared to deal with C (which for me, is what then makes the real number system mathematically interesting; unless there's been some breakthrough since I last looked at this topic that C is no longer required).

It's worth noting that the pedagogy retraces the history. — fishfry

This is basically our difference.

I disagree that the pedagogy retraces the history. If it actually did, maybe I'd have less of an issue.

Newton did not have the real numbers to do calculus as you note, yet high school calculus students simply start with the real numbers.

Dating from 1687, the publication of Newton's Principia, to the 1880's, after Cantor's set theory and the 19th century work of Cauchy and Weirstrass and the other great pioneers of real analysis; it took two centuries for the smartest people in the world to finally come up with the logically rigorous concept of the limit. For the first time we could write down some axioms and definitions and have a perfectly valid logical theory of calculus. — fishfry

You realize you're just adding more weight to my contention in the OP here?

If you need to read Principia mathematica and two centuries of the smartest people to understand the real number system ... maybe this is too much of an ask to high school students?

Do you agree?

If not, my challenge is that you explain the answers to my questions in a way that a high school teacher and then students would understand. If you can't, just agree with my OP rather than try to prove your smarter than me, which I so far not seeing any evidence for: going off on random tangents, not addressing the point of the OP, cowardly hedging your own complaints etc.

For instance, I did not define "infinitesimal", it's just a word that I find perfectly suitable to use to refer to series converging to a point (i.e. the distance becomes infinitely small). My use of infinitesimal was to contrast using prose (using words most people here would understand) the definitions one would find in numerical calculus compared to what we usually just call calculus; not to conjure up 17th century philosophical debates.

To lift from wikipedia because I do basic "google the subject matter" research when engaging in internet debates.

From the wikipedia page on infinitismals:

Logical properties

The method of constructing infinitesimals of the kind used in nonstandard analysis depends on the model and which collection of axioms are used. We consider here systems where infinitesimals can be shown to exist.

In 1936 Maltsev proved the compactness theorem. This theorem is fundamental for the existence of infinitesimals as it proves that it is possible to formalise them [...]

There are in fact many ways to construct such a one-dimensional linearly ordered set of numbers, but fundamentally, there are two different approaches:

1) Extend the number system so that it contains more numbers than the real numbers.
2) Extend the axioms (or extend the language) so that the distinction between the infinitesimals and non-infinitesimals can be made in the real numbers themselves.

[...]

In 1977 Edward Nelson provided an answer following the second approach. The extended axioms are IST, which stands either for Internal set theory or for the initials of the three extra axioms: Idealization, Standardization, Transfer. In this system we consider that the language is extended in such a way that we can express facts about infinitesimals. The real numbers are either standard or nonstandard. An infinitesimal is a nonstandard real number that is less, in absolute value, than any positive standard real number.

Followed immediately by a section called "Infinitesimals in teaching":

Calculus textbooks based on infinitesimals include the classic Calculus Made Easy by Silvanus P. Thompson (bearing the motto "What one fool can do another can"[12]) [...]

Another elementary calculus text that uses the theory of infinitesimals as developed by Robinson is Infinitesimal Calculus by Henle and Kleinberg, originally published in 1979.[16] The authors introduce the language of first order logic, and demonstrate the construction of a first order model of the hyperreal numbers. The text provides an introduction to the basics of integral and differential calculus in one dimension, including sequences and series of functions. In an Appendix, they also treat the extension of their model to the hyperhyperreals, and demonstrate some applications for the extended model.

So, not only is infinitesimal perfectly fine mathematical jargon to talk about things "infinitely small" in both a technical and a general sense (as wikipedia starts the article by saying: "In mathematics, infinitesimals are things so small that there is no way to measure them"), but it is a common notion (according to wikipedia) used to introduce students to calculus, as it's intuitive.

This, my contention is, is a pedagogical mistake unless there are answers to all the very normal questions students can have about the real number system (that are as easy to grasp as other associated concepts being introduced). I have yet to see them.

Why is there so much debate around these infinite related questions such as cardinals and continuums here on philosohy forum? And not about questions like solving the quadratic equation or any number of other theorems? Because, in my view, it takes very specialized knowledge to understand modern mathematics modelling of these questions, which as you say, need not bother anyone that specialists are building such systems, but it is bad mathematical pedagogy to introduce to students concepts that they are unable to fully grasp and have zero need for any of the tasks at hand; it serves only to mystify mathematics rather than build understanding.

An analogy would be introducing Euclidean geometry in the context of Reiman manifolds or rotation in quaternians because that's what the cool kids in university do, with neither having any basis to have any clue what a Reiman manifold or quaternion really is nor ever needing the extra things Reiman manifolds or quaternions provide to address the Euclidean problems being asked to solve; now, I understand why concepts got inverted historically (since we were computationally extremely limited until recently), in the development and subsequent teaching of calculus as opposed geometry (pending an answer to my questions), my point is it's now a completely fixable conceptual problem in our teaching methods: that finite computation is a much more basic concept than the real numbers, real analysis, metric spaces and so on (i.e. real numbers are not required for any high school level problem and there's no need to introduce them until they are actually needed).

Now, I'm not saying these issues should be kept secret or something, there could be extra material for students who want to get into it; but I see no high school level problem that is not perfectly addressed in the numerical regime which is far easier to understand; you can really "see" and "get" how a computer functions in principle and why algorithmic approximations that truncate at a suitable number of steps yields answers to real world problems that students can visualize even at a high school level; there is nothing remotely as difficult conceptually as an infinite decimal expansion. It's also critical to understand not just the algorithm that converges on the desired constant but under what conditions are correct to end such an algorithm for any given applied mathematical problem, which is what the vast majority of high school math students will be going into: engineering, computer science, programming, chemistry and even accounting requires intuition of the strengths and limitations of machine computation (i.e. what kinds of problems require special attention to the the finite nature of the computer, in terms of memory, floating point representation, iteration steps, economizing computer resources and so on; and what kinds of problems one can just paste code from stack overflow and let it ride).

So if you want to get back on track, answer my questions concerning the real numbers in a way that a high school teacher and student understands. I've claimed to understand the answers to these questions, but you seem to be arguing it's all too complicated for me and that you will explain to me why I don't in fact understand the issue and you're going to demonstrate that. Well, if this is true, I'll be the first to benefit from your addressing the point in the OP. I eagerly await.

There is evidence that capital has seen the light. Mark Carney the out going head of the Bank of England, soon to become the UN special envoy for climate change, spoke on the BBC a few days ago. That, in no uncertain terms, that investments and infrastructure developed for the exploitation of fossil fuels will become worthless in a few years and that capital should look to invest in investments and infrastructure designed to replace them with renewable sources of energy and the emerging green economy (my wording, but this is the jist of what he was saying). — Punshhh

Yes, this sort of thing is essentially what I mean by depending on our present institutions. In this case, (some) representatives of capital are starting to make some preemptively actions anticipating better policies (which then put additional pressure on policy makers, forming a virtuous cycle). However, if you wish to say here that this is evidence of the "market mechanism" working in and of itself, then I disagree; I would argue it is partly the market mechanism responding to regulation changes and partly the moral concern of the individuals themselves.

For me it is not a question of whether there will be an attempt by our institutions to reasonably respond at some point, the question is whether that point is soon enough, which is a segue into your second point:

I presume the planet experienced a hot house state before, which was liveable . Presumably it is the rapid transition to this state which you are suggesting is unliveable? In which case I agree, however I do expect a small colony of humanity to survive and rebuild. Whether they manage to take any knowledge with them, is the worry. Otherwise we may go back to square one again, and start all over again, as we have done before. — Punshhh

Yes, there was plenty of life in all the previous hot house climate regimes, it is the speed of the transition from one to the next that generally triggers mass extinction of the ecosystems that had evolved under the previous regime. Currently, the extinction rate is estimated to be around 1000 times the historical background norm, and biodiversity within species maybe an even higher rate of loss. It is not the destination but the journey, as with so many things in life.

I agree colony bunker living is conceivable and has some non negligent probability associated with it even with the most extreme climate outcomes. However, non negligent probability in a complex system that something will happen entails also a non negligent probability that it won't happen. The climate transition to a hot house maybe "really bad" but does not crash oxygen levels to unlivable nor a cyanide ocean event ... but, maybe it will; there's also black swan events that may befall our future bunker dwellers such as an ice sheet slipping into the ocean and causing a tsunami which washes away the things on the surface (either infrastructure or biological resources) needed for long term survival, not to mention just "normal" tsunamis and volcanoes and so on that may befall any colony (with glacial rebound causing more of this sort of thing).

A human colony without a breathable atmosphere I think faces sever challenges, and non-breathable atmosphere is entirely possible without the amazon or other forests and deadzones the size of entire oceans.

Avoiding the hot house climate regime not only avoids the above problems of would be bunker dwellers, but also allows hundreds of millions of other people and other species to survive as well: their cultures and heritage in the flesh, not just a few books (which will be the only things that remain long term once the colony clean room becomes too contaminated to produce silicon and the micro films were lost in a fire).

What do you mean 'reverting'? I have said repeatedly that my case for antinatalism is 'cumulative'. That means I think there are numerous arguments - no one by itself decisive - that imply procreation is wrong. — Bartricks

Being unable to defend many arguments does not a stronger argument make.

If lack of consent is a problem, switching to the suffering argument does not provide support for the consent argument. This thread (that you started) is on the topic of lack of consent. If you are acknowledging in your reply here that your lack of consent argument is insufficient to justify antinatalism, then we are finally in agreement. We have come a long way, but I am happy with the destination.

If you believe a bunch of arguments together justify antinatalism, I suggest you make a new thread with this "cumulative" argument and referencing the arguments that accumulate; either debates such as this one, which, though insufficient to justify antinatalism on its own, play some part in the cumulative argument scheme or then new debates that will to occur in the context of your cumulative structure.

There are 4 reasons why I think we will fail to avoid the worst consequences of global warming: — Bitter Crank

This isn't a well formulated point. There can always be "worse".

That being said, we have already dealt severe damage to the ecosystems in terms of biodiversity loss (not only in number of species but genetic diversity within those species), mostly through other means that, along with climate change, will do even more damage going forward, much we cannot avoid in any scenario.

However, as bad as the already passed and yet-to-be biodiversity loss is, things can get even worse.

The climate change battle is now to prevent a "hot house" climate regime where there is no ice at all in the North Poll and rapidly deteriorating glaciers, first in Greenland followed by parts of Antarctica.

There are two stable climate epochs in the current configuration of continents. The one we currently live in is the "Ice box" where there is permafrost, glaciers in the north and a north poll ice cap on the sea. In this regime continental glaciation oscillates wildly in response to volcanic activity and incremental changes in the earths orbit and tilt.

Because of the long term efficiency of weathering to remove carbon dioxide from the carbon cycle, leaving only what is in earth and plants and living creatures, and volcanic additions (which are small) the long term stable state is this Ice Box configuration.

However, it is only a meta-stable state due to earth being a closed system without other sources of carbon to get into the atmosphere in the past hundred millions of years.

With a new source of pumping carbon from underground by humans, the earth can be pushed into a Hot Box epoch.

The consequences of entering the Hot Box climate regime are so severe that it's arguable no humans at all would survive. Bunkers may not be maintainable long term on an earth without one or several of the following elements: edible biomass in nature, breathable atmosphere and relatively calm weather as we are used to now. Weather is, in my opinion, what people forget to imagine in our future bunker dwellers. Even the best setup bunker (that avoided destruction from vengeful pirates / militaries during the transition) will require some interactions with the outside world, in turn requiring some sort of exterior infrastructures to make that interaction efficient enough to run the bunker. Severe storms and hurricanes are going to create crisis points untop of every other problem (which are many). Maybe it is solvable ... maybe not. What is for certain is that bunker dwelling near the polls will be the only option in a Hot Box world and very few will be invited to join.

This scenario is now essentially the path we are currently on, but is still avoidable with difficult, but feasible, large scale action.

There's also uncertainty around the Hot Box point of no return; we may have more time than we think, which is a possibility that, again, warrants taking what action we can.



Edit: found the image I was looking for that shows the above (credit: Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene; Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, ProfileKatherine Richardson, Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke, Diana Liverman, Colin P. Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Sarah E. Cornell, ProfileMichel Crucifix, Jonathan F. Donges, Ingo Fetzer, Steven J. Lade, Marten Scheffer, Ricarda Winkelmann, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber; https://www.pnas.org/content/115/33/8252).

How: Through the overthrow of the existing economic structure by revolution, not necessarily violent, but certainly uncomfortable for those who own the means of production. — Bitter Crank

I agree with most of your analysis of why we have had very little action so far and the difficulty of the task.

But I disagree that political revolution is necessary.

Real political change is a generational affair and takes time, time we don't have. Whatever we are going to do will be through the political institutions we have at the moment. Action has been very light so far, but our institutions are not inconceivably far from doing something effective. For instance, the EU (now that the UK is leaving) is currently discussing a "carbon tariff", which is something the EU is institutionally setup to be able to do and would be actually an effective step to start and then gradually increase. The EU is a large enough economic block to impose a carbon tariff.

One must keep in mind that although the general population was not able to be convinced of the case for action compared with the climate denial PR industry highly attractive offer of being an edgy contrarion, this phase of intellectual failure was in the absence real world consequences. There is a small window where real world consequences may tip the balance of public opinion but are not yet too severe to breakdown or overload the institutions that are able to act. This window may or may not be before or after the point of no return towards a Hot Box climate. Previous failure does not guarantee continued failure: both learning and changes in key factors are a basis for continued attempts.

I am also working on a project developing a renewable energy technology that has no resource, financial or skills bottlenecks to scaling. Although most renewable energy technology has some scaling problem rendering it largely irrelevant to our problem, it is an erroneous inference that therefore all renewable energy technology has a scaling problem. For instance, smart phones rapidly scaled in a incredibly short period of time. Renewable energy is different from smart phones, but the example does demonstrate that it is possible for a technology to "super scale" globally; the ven diagram of "renewable technologies" and "globally scalable technologies in a short enough time to affect climate change significantly while not requiring a too large carbon investment to make" may overlap, if only ever so slightly; it is worth investigating whatever points may exist within the overlap in any case. That the vast majority of firms, scientists, and thinkers and engineers swim around in the part that doesn't overlap because it is spacious and easy to make new discoveries (the bureaucrats and kickstarter supporters having no reasonable criteria about anything generally speaking) and so peddle counter-productive hype, is not evidence that there is no reasonable criteria that can be found and focused on.

Pressuring institutions to do more and developing magic bullet technologies (to either amplify the affect of policy or make large scale disruptions to the fossil industry) are, in my opinion, the only effective actions available. Both are a roll of the dice. We will see where they land in the next couple of decades.

I very much hope political revolutions will bring democracy to China and Saudi Arabia and other tyrannies. I very much hope political revolution will bring proportional democracy to the US and UK. However, these things happening are not a pre-requisite for large scale effective action. The functioning democracies that we do have, despite exterior opposition, can have large scale consequence if bold action is taken. Functioning democracies do not seem bold because they lack totalitarian madmen to write headlines about, but this apparent teptitude is an illusion; once sufficient consensus is reached, action can be extremely swift and efficient due to lacking a "house divided against itself".

But not everything produced can be given away. I think I like sushi is still talking about co-existing in a world of economic transactions. — Brett

Where do I say that?

You say:

You could give it away. But ironically a payment makes people consider how much they really want something. If it’s free people will take with very little thought to what went into it. It’s almost like in the real world, outside of our lives, a monetary value has to be attached otherwise it has no value at all, including the personal value you imbedded in it. — Brett

As mentioned in my first response, I don't see how this claim is supported by some context, but please explain how it is if I am missing something.

Well you’ve focused on only four lines of my post, so it’s a bit out of context. — Brett

Please, show how the context changes the meaning of the four lines I am debating against. I agree with your previous statements setting up the problem of assigning a price; that you may need to do so to recover costs or to make a living; and that price may not reflect your personal sentiment about your work nor transmit transcendental value you may have encountered in the production process.

I have issue with your next claim you make that without a price we wouldn't value something. I don't see how your previous statements support such a claim, and I see lot's of counter-examples of which I provide 3.

But please, explain how the context supports the claim I am focused on.

If it’s free people will take with very little thought to what went into it. It’s almost like in the real world, outside of our lives, a monetary value has to be attached otherwise it has no value at all, including the personal value you imbedded in it. — Brett

This is simply not true. I know an artist that doesn't sell any of her original work, only prints; she simply doesn't put a price on the originals; she does so because she values the originals.

Likewise, hand-made scarf given as a gift may have a lot of value to both the producer and the receiver, but there is no monetary value attached.

If the pot in your example was given away, it may hold more value than if it was sold, as the sales price may indicate that it can be replaced for the same price; so, if it's not expensive, the owner may not care much about it. Whereas, as a gift, it may symbolize the entire relationship.

The difference of course is that original artwork, scarves, and pots that are not placed on the market are not commodities.

I don't think we're in much disagreement here. Of course we could get into the ethics of evaluating forum participation, for instance on what basis would be evaluate a "good" use of the forum (what's the basis of deciding who we are helping, why, to do what, and how would we know? etc.), but that would quickly just resolve down to more general ethical discussions that happen here all the time.

I'm glad you liked my translation of L'infinito. I tried to render more (some of) the feeling than a literal translation (which is basically impossible in this case), so am happy you felt it.

Wallows has been asking for and receiving advice for as long as. He has been around long enough to know and predict all the likely replies.

You made some excellent points and suggestions but look at the response.
It's an addictive pattern. — Amity

Even if you are right, what is it to me? what is it to you?

If the content is not appropriate, it is a question for the moderators, and I need not trouble myself.

Perhaps some lessons take decades to learn.

Perhaps others have similar questions and may benefit in any case.

If indeed philosophy is an addiction here, how are we to intervene? If philosophy has failed, as you suggest is the case, perhaps we must widen our perspective, as you have suggested, and seek in poetry some help for this condition that seems persist indefinitely:

Always dear to me is this lonely hill I keep coming to
and this hedge and all its details,
hiding from me the ultimate horizon.
Yet crouched and staring, endless
is the space beyond, that humanless
emptiness, and that depth of stillness,
my thoughts drift; not far
the heart, the terror. Then, the wind speaks,
swaying the trees, and the
infinite silence and these rustling leaves,
I compare the two: I remember the eternal,
the seasons of death, the present,
the living, the sound of it. In this,
immensity, my thoughts start to drown:
and I drift off sweetly into this sea of thoughts.

This small "l'infinito" of Leopardi is perhaps a start to such recurring ailments.

Well, I don't think I've conflated accessible and possible, for me it's very clear the difference, and I agree with everything you said. But I still cannot understand exactly how this two terms are to be formally expressed without requiring one another. — Nicholas Ferreira

If they are not the same, it's not circular, they simply depend on each other to be understood.

There is no proof of theorem being offered that could have the problem of being circular, it is the basic concepts to provide meaning to the symbol manipulation to follow.

You will encounter the same thing with all foundational concepts.

For instance, logicians and mathematicians will use the word "statement". If you challenge what it means ... of course you can only get statements as explanations; if you truly don't understand what a statement is and need that understanding to understand any statement, the explanation of statement can never make sense. All such explanations will be just different versions of the same thing with various caveats and relations to each other all expressed as a series of statements. So, it's as puts it, that what's being offered is different ways of looking at the same thing, and that's all that can be offered.

We have an intuition of what a statement is, likewise possibility. In dealing with formal reasoning systems we can relate our intuitions to some property of the system (in this case there is a relation by symbolic manipulation between the worlds in question that we can intuit as our concept of "possible"), this however is exterior meaning we give it; what exists internally to the system are the symbolic rule relations which do not require meaning. The usual analogy is long lost languages we cannot decode; we can deduce some rules between the symbols but have no idea what they mean; we can look at formal systems the same way, but we are not obliged to (if we want to make some decision based on the symbols and relations to each other, there must be some relation, some correspondence, to what we believe the actual world we live in is; and we focus on systems of rules that seem to have some innate ability to model aspects of our real world, rather than just randomly invent symbols and rules and randomly permute them without ever assigning meaning).

It's like starting a book that begins with "the woman sat next to the tree"; what do we know about the woman, that she is next to the tree; what do we know about the tree, that it is next to the woman. Math and logic books are generally not an exception to this feature of all books and tend to start the same way too.

Based on just what you report here, my guess would be you have conflated accessible and possible.

Accessible I would assume means expressible; the statement can be understood with the system of rules and postulates in question.

Possible is not the same as accessible. A statement can be accessible but always false.

To be possible means there is a world where that statement is actually true (where world means a system of rules and postulates, not the actual world).

The main theme in this sort of framework is that "modal necessity" is equivalent to the proposition being true in all possible worlds accessible to the system in question, so in this framework you can hop around systems and relate them to each other and try to find counterexamples or then prove no counterexamples can exist to investigate and conceptualize necessity, as well as investigate what possibility means by building a concrete example of an accessible world where the proposition is true.

In a sort of colloquial "everyday" modal logic, you can understand this process as explaining the concept of "it might rain tomorrow" by describing that possible world of tomorrow where it's raining (which is different to explaining what is true about the world today which makes rain tomorrow possible; in this colloquial everyday sense, Kripke is building what relations need to hold between what's true today and the imagined world of tomorrow to imply possibility or impossibility; we can not only imagine it but it is a world accessible from what we believe to be true today).

Likewise, explaining the concept that "the sun will necessarily rise tomorrow" is the process of explaining how every possible world of tomorrow includes the sun rising. (of course this isn't rigorous as someone with powerful rockets could stop the spin of the earth, or the entire sun could potentially quantum tunnel to the edge of the galaxy or any number of other ways the sun wouldn't rise, but we implicitly ignore these possibilities as so low as to be irrelevant by treating these things in a modal way; a sort of "modal lite" that is the quickest way to reason for a wide range of cases: I necessarily need to eat to live, poison will necessarily kill me, I necessarily am unable to fly on the earth's surface without technology, going to work is not necessary but various possible things may happen as a consequence, various things are contingent on various other things, time travel backwards is necessarily not going to happen etc. The purpose of this "modal lite" way of reasoning is to narrow down the scope of factors that have an ambiguous range to consider by first finding relevant details that are close enough to 100% or 0% to be treated in a necessary or necessarily-not way, and then applying our intuition to the possibilities that remain, as we can't explicitly calculate probabilities for most situations; the necessary and necessarily-not game allows us to build a trunk of necessary things and then at least cut off entire branches that no longer need to be considered if they are necessarily-not, and so better make use of our intuitive capacity on the branching possibilities that remain).

I'm sorry if my assertion about Marxism being "out of date", offended you. However, it wasn't a digression, but integral to my understanding of the article as an "update" of older theories, such as Smith and Marx. — Gnomon

No offense taken. It's a digression if you want to talk about Marx, but framing something as "baseless out of date" is unclear if you want to talk about that thing or not. Certainly out-of-dateness is a fair and debatable point of old theories. Likewise, your following sentence, that the upper class oppresses the workers is also worthwhile to discuss if it's a fair characterization of Marx as other posters have also responded to.

Do you think it's unfair to interpret the new statistical economic model as a valid "update"? I saw it as similar to Newton's law of gravity, which was updated and refined by Einstein, but not invalidated. I have no training in economics, and only a philosophical (not political) interest. So I may have overstated the importance of the Capitalist Casino concept. — Gnomon

Yes, I definitely think it's a good analogy to Newton, that Marx discovered some true principles that resulted in valid predictions (as well as false ones; where we can draw a parallel with Newton's focus and writing on alchemy), and that we have since both discovered new principles and verified new predictions.

Of course, there's a large body of work beyond this paper on inequality, most importantly empirical work showing inequality really does increase under laissez-faire policy frameworks.

For me, the significance of this paper is more as a retort to the "tabula rasa" hiding place / fantasy of laissez-faire proponents (that it's always whatever regulations remain that have caused the inequality, corruption and market failures and not the regulations, designed over centuries to keep inequality, corruption and market failures in check, that were removed).

The paper does it's best to create the laissezfaire fantasy world and simulate what happens. So, the point is that even with granting the laissezfaire proponent's insistence that things like corruption and asymmetry and unequal starting points can be simply ignored, their model still doesn't seem to work (unless the goal is to create oligarchy rather than a free and happy citizenry).

However, nowadays proponents of deregulation and lowering-tax-on-the-rich and removing anti-corruption laws have mostly abandoned the idea that these things are good for society in general; the paper in question is a small addition to a large pile of both theoretical reasons to believe as well as empirical reasons to believe deregulation, lowering taxes on the rich and legal-corruption are all bad for society (of course that doesn't immediately inform us what regulations, taxes and anti-corruption measures are worthwhile, just that the principle that getting rid of them will magically achieve those objectives even better is completely implausible and delusional, or more likely just propaganda from people who want those things regardless of wider social consequence).

Instead of making the case that removing these restrictions on the accumulation of and use of capital just so happen to create a situation those restrictions where designed to achieve, proponents of deregulation, lower-taxes-on-the-rich, and legal-corruption have moved to moral arguments instead of scientific (once empirical evidence is overwhelming it works less and less well to keep making ridiculous claims that are so easily checked to be false).

At least with moral arguments, it's not easy to just check that they are false. If one wants a world dominated by the wealthiest and one simply places no value on anyone else, then such a moral theory is perfectly sound. Likewise, if one is convinced taxes are theft and immoral then it can follow from this that no one should be taxed even if that means collapse of government and mafia rule, and it can also follow from this that lowering taxes of the rich is good to support even knowing that the rich won't reciprocate and lower everyone else's taxes to the point of collapse of the justice system, infrastructure etc (as it's simply the right thing to do).

Of course, few people really have values compatible with wanting a much worse society with much more suffering because taxing the wealthy is a worse crime, but it's much more work to carry out such an analysis and it will be different for each person what exactly their values are and why exactly a functioning society is better than a dysfunctional one for them and to what extent they would lift a finger to promote actions leading to such a better society in their definition; i.e. moral argumentation is not universal whereas the whole purpose of science is to be universal (we can all follow the same observations to same conclusions; so once something really is well established the same body of evidence and argumentation is valid for everyone); hence, why science denialism dressed up as some sort of moral crusade, including denying obvious economic realities, is at the heart of the movement for deregulation, lower-taxes-on-the-rich and legal corruption (which in turn corrupts various scientific institutions which helps, in part, to reinforce scientific denialism; i.e. regulatory capture of supposed objective watch-dog agencies as well a gaming, wherever possible, academics to be biases or at least easily pliant, leading to lot's of ethical failures that can be legitimately pointed to as examples of why self-labeled scientists and institutions cannot necessarily be trusted). Switching to moral arguments allowed 1 or 2 more decades of effective propaganda, but these arguments too are now losing effectiveness and methods of interpreting science without deference to experts have been developed (investigating conflicts of interest, better explaining the actual evidence and logic and evaluating how strong the evidence is or if it's just people paid to say-so).

I don't think we're in disagreement here. I clarify Marx on the forum when others bring up Marx, but I generally don't bring up Marx myself in talking about policy in the here and now. Just as I would clarify Kant or Anselm or Aristotle or any other thinker if someone tosses them in and I thought it's a debatable point.

I do, however, find it relevant the fear of Marx and the popular intellectual game of trying to rediscover Marx's points without ever crediting Marx and insisting that Marx was about something completely different and wrong ... by people that haven't read Marx.

The issue for me here is more to do with propaganda; sometimes, as you suggest, there's no need to bring up propagandized names and new names can be coined for the same concept to out-maneuver the propagandists (such as saying 1% instead of capitalist ruling class). Other times, I think it's useful to call propaganda's bluff and unpack propaganda's game and explain what the words meant to the people using them at the time, or that still are, as this can strengthen individuals as well as the community's critical thinking skills in being more aware of how propaganda works.

So I think we agree here that both points of view are legitimate.

That willingness to play is obviously a part of Marx's observations of class but it does not make all other observations along those lines "Marxist." — Valentinus

Yes, my goal is not to retroactively expand Marx's writing to include everything arguably that fixes problems or then is a compatible extension with it. As I mention above, I wouldn't bring Marx into any specific contemporary policy debate, unless someone else does inaccurately and it's an opportunity to expose their ignorance and so undermine all of their other claims too.

However, since this is a philosophy forum, as mentioned above, my view is Marx is a relevant thinker to understand like all the other important thinkers. It's useful to know when and where an idea originated and how it has developed since and what historical actors and movements, explicitly or implicitly, used or were influenced by the idea and what happened to those people and movements. Though name dropping long dead thinkers can seem like haughty erudition, my view is the opposite is more confusing as it leads people to believe that everything was thought of yesterday (a laziness that leads to an endless stream of rediscovery fever and praise).

The heads of states. Stalin, Mao, Castro, Pol Pot, etc... The individuals that really took power, for me, they only used Socialism as a mean to inhibit their egoism, because they didn't accepted who they really were. — Gus Lamarch

Which is why I asked you to clarify what you meant by socialism. Most people do not qualify socialist as referring to the the leaders of dictatorships, but you are free to do so if you make your meaning clear.

As for your statement here, if you read a biography of Stalin or Mao, for instance, they seemed fairly lucid and accepting of their tyrannical ambitions. Indeed, when Stalin got word from his agents in China (in charge of helping to organize the soviet sponsored communist revolutionaries there) that there was a sadistic and crazy Mao guy killing and raping and torturing (and really enjoying it) as well as ruthlessly getting rid of potential communist leader rivals (who doesn't even seem to believe in communism, just opportunism for power), and so these agents recommended needing to deal with or sideline Mao in some way, Stalin sent word back: That's my guy, put him in charge!

However, that sadistic tyrant use social crisis and movements to take power is a constant throughout history, there is no special relationship to socialism.

"Socialist revolutionaries" (at least as described by their opponents, whenever convenient) also brought the 40 hour work week, child labour laws, worker safety, and built the social welfare states in Europe that have the highest quality of life (Finland now the happiest place on earth).

More so, the socialist movement that brought Stalin to power was explicitly vanguardism (the idea that a revolutionary elite need to seize power ... and ideas are pretty vague from there), which was an offshoot of more mainstream socialism in central Europe that was more democratic and incremental rather than revolutionary (that whatever socialists want to achieve, it must be first through sharing ideas and organizing with normal people and second through creating or strengthening democratic processes and third through those democratic processes; and if this results in compromise, especially in any short of medium term outlook, then that's fine).

Vanguaridism was fairly fringe and just not that popular in central Europe, which is why Lenin and co. went to Russia during a chaotic civil society collapse (due to WWI) and tried the Vanguardism theory there (which, mind you, is not what the "Soviet" movement was about; the Soviets were local democratic units wanting more local rural self-management and at least some representation at the state level, and the first Russian revolution resulted in a compromise situation with the aristocracy, of having a democratic representational house as a check on a house of Lords (that controlled the military), but in the wake of disastrous military defeats due to aristocratic incompetence, the Bolsheviks (still fairly fringe) just seized the parliament buildings and managed to cut deals with enough police and military units to consolidate power; most people didn't know what was going on at this point, and keeping the Soviet name was a good marketing tactic to undercut potential opposition.

My point is, social democracy or democratic socialism is just that, socialist and democratic and has a very different history than the Soviet Union and the CPP and it's also pretty clear why vanguardism would and did immediately produce dystopian totalitarianism states, and socialist opponents of vanguardism made all those arguments at the time (what they called the delusion of capturing the state).

Now, you can decide not to call it a form of socialism if you want, it doesn't matter to me, but what I wish to draw your attention to is that there is a historical project of self-described socialists that resulted in very different conditions than the Soviet union and has developed lot's of policies that we now have the benefit of being able to simply check that they work empirically (universal health-care, free and equal funded education at all levels, robust public transport systems, rehabilitation based justice systems, paid vacation, paid maternity leave, homes for the homeless, ownership participation of key industries by the state, hyper strong labour union protection laws ... and collectivist defense programs such as conscription that provide a credible deterrent to invasion at a reasonable cost).

PS__I didn't intend to disparage Marx, but to promote the linked article. — Gnomon

Yes, that's why I say you didn't need to preamble with a digression about Marxism, just talk about the article, but if you do preamble about Marx then it's fair to expect more digression about Marx. I have no problem with just considering the linked article's merit and implications; likewise, I have no problem discussing the Marx critique of capital and relation of it to this paper as well.

Both are "old news". Any 21st century solution to the problem of economic inequality will have to take into consideration the "invisible left hand" of the market casino. — Gnomon

But this is what Marx is talking about: capital accumulation has no natural balance, market transactions are not fair (favour the owners of capital) and the system destabilizes itself.

What the casino paper seems to be doing is simply a numerical simulation of Marx's model of unregulated capitalism. I see nothing in the paper nor in what you present to lead to the conclusion that such a numerical simulation is needed to arrive at the conclusion (just as numerical simulation wasn't needed to find Neptune or to tell us the sun will rise in the East tomorrow, though will of course simply confirm these conclusions).

Again, I have no need to digress into Marx to discuss the casino paper's content or implication, but if you want to disparage Marx, for whatever your reason, this seems like a poor choice of disparaging. Perhaps I'm wrong, that Marx has the right conclusions for preposterous reasons and this casino model finally brings us the right conclusions for the right reasons, but that seems far fetched.

This definitely describes the kind of people that enjoy the egoism of Socialism, but my point is that they use their rethorical power over lies to govern over the masses, i'm not saying that this is wrong or otherwise, i'm just pointing out that they don't accept their own greed. — Gus Lamarch

But who are you talking about?

If you're talking about Stalin, sure.

If you're talking about every single person that has tried to unionize (take some degree of control over the means of production) or that has founded a cooperative for socialist beliefs or the people who overthrew the Russian Tzar (not knowing yet the Soviet Union would become a totalitarian nightmare) or the communists that resisted the Nazi's (and were tortured when found), I'm just not seeing the greedy hypocrisy in all these cases.

You'll need to provide some argument that collective ownership somehow leads to the mental state you describe as a tendency, or then that the theory you are concerned with has an inherent contradiction such as self-interest based theories, we seem to agree, do have.

In regards to the discussion of the fetishism of commodities, it seems pretty clear from Marx that he was chastising identification of personal fulfillment with the acquisition of particular things. — Valentinus

I agree it is also a prerogative, a chastisement as you say; my elaboration was is simply to clarify that it's not prerogative in a way we understand fetish today (for obvious reasons). It's also not without philosophical content.

In my opinion, the philosophical content is that Marx is drawing attention to the religious transition happening in the development of capitalism: between devotion to the church and the immaterial well being of the soul and devotion to science and material wealth (all while claiming the previous social relations were also due to material conditions), in using fetish in the context of capital accumulation: that money is the new object of worship with mystical significance in a capitalist economy (greed of course existed before, but was not approved of; and church and monarchy could dominate merchants, and lords and priests could of course be accused of greed, but gold and power in feudalism operated differently than capital accumulation in capitalism).

However one interprets his program to make the world better, that observation is his rebuke to others and the device by which his insight is turned against him. — Valentinus

Could you elaborate on this?

I mean that all socialists (at least the politically active ones) use the method of hypocrisy to their advantage and this is the "doublethink", they know that what they say in most cases is not true, but they accept it as the only truth, because for them, that "truth" is the best one in the immediate case. — Gus Lamarch

Are you going to even define socialist for us?

Would you agree with the first paragraph of Wikipedia:

Socialism is a range of economic and social systems characterised by social ownership of the means of production and workers' self-management,[10] as well as the political theories and movements associated with them.[11] Social ownership can be public, collective or cooperative ownership, or citizen ownership of equity.[12] There are many varieties of socialism and there is no single definition encapsulating all of them,[13] with social ownership being the common element shared by its various forms. — wikipedia

So please, defend why "all socialists (at least the politically active ones) use the method of hypocrisy to their advantage and this is the 'doublethink', they know that what they say in most cases is not true, but they accept it as the only truth" for this large class of theories, or then define socialism if you don't agree with the above definition.

For instance, does socialism to you include regulation and progressive taxation? Or only collective ownership of one form or another as the wikipedia entry?

I think a better theory of hypocrisy is with regards ideologies that view self interest as fundamental to market transactions and deregulation and lower taxes as good things that also happen to benefit the private interests of the speaker. Isn't it by definition self-interest to propose an ideology that, if implemented, furthers' one's self interest, and therefore, by definition, a hypocritical position?

Not to say you are a proponent of such a theory, though you are welcome to elaborate your own view, but rather, because you have a keen eye for what kinds of people and theories are hypocritical, wouldn't this be a better fit to the hypocritical pattern: belief that self-interest is justified, therefore reasoning backwards to what ideologies promote one's self-interest (regardless if the ideology is true or not)?

Marxism is old news, based on outdated science. — Gnomon

For example, Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" theory suggested a more positive interpretation of self-interest inadvertently producing unintended social benefits. — Gnomon

Why is Marx old news but not Adam Smith?

Furthermore, Adam's Smith's invisible hand was about patriotism stopping capital flight from the imperial center, England towards their colonies.

And on this point, Marx was right that capital will relentlessly go where it's gonna get the best returns; i.e. patriotism be damned, to which any modern economist will say "of course". So Marx seems to have the modern view of things on the invisible hand business you bring up.

Furthermore, the central economic prediction of Marx is that capital accumulation is relentless and without an internal limiting natural balance (until the system destabilizes itself), exactly the same prediction the casino market arrives at.

Adam Smith also has this basic prediction and a large part of the Wealth of Nations is about what the sovereign needs to do (what state intervention is necessary) for the system to keep functioning.

Where Marx disagrees with Smith are on these potential fixes. Marx is a market economist who sees the market as more efficient than the previous feudal order.

As such, Marx and Smith are in complete agreement on the production capacity of free markets (for this reason Marx views the early stages of capitalism as a good thing). Marx's prediction that free markets will lead to large iniquities (large capital accumulations) and labour arbitrage and other advantages of capital will out-maneuver "parliamentary" (first-past-the-post representational systems) was essentially immediately proven correct in the 19th century leading to the predicted "destabilization" of WWI (which included a "communist revolution" that predictably failed due to not being global enough) and then repeat of the same processes leading to WWII with massive Smithian sovereign interventions that stabalize the system ... but, as predicted by Marx, capital accumulation wins out in first-past-the-post representational systems (but there are much more equal society's in direct democracy systems, that Marx viewed favourably).

Marx also has extremely modern elements to his economic theory such as the roll of psychology in the free market: that the desire to accumulate more capital is a psychological feature that will dominate the market; in contrast to the "fair Aristocrat not motivated by money but rather honor and justice etc." view of the elite; that the Aristocratic elite of the time definitely viewed themselves as, going so far as to having a game of not touching money to symbolize this. Only recently are economists bothering to deal with this obvious fact (that people who have read Marx have pointed out but also people with a knowledge of philosophy) that simply because something has wide utility, such as money, doesn't justify accumulating as much as possible (one still needs a goal to justify this process and if one has a goal, one will presumably spend money on this goal rather than accumulate it indefinitely). It's fairly recent and extremely modern accepting indefinite capital accumulation is a psychological feature of the market and there is a modern psychological explanation for it which is people compare themselves to their peers and as they get richer they just continuously update their peers as equally rich. Marx doesn't have this modern scientific explanation, but the conclusion is accurate (that there are enough of these people to always push capital accumulation further, and whoever doesn't loses) and this psychological feature in his economics was proven correct with time and with modern psychological and sociological methods.

There's of course a lot of completely wrong predictions Marx makes and Marx mixes moral judgments into economic theory (again a very modern twist, but I agree not scientific in either case), but the unfair position of workers (most people) leading to ever greater and global concentrations of capital and so an oligarchic tendency of unregulated markets is pretty much the essence of Marx's critique of capitalism; the predicted market crashes happened, and the organizing of labour also happened, but the global communist revolution did not (and I don't think will) happen (rather I disagree with Marx's view that industrialism is good and workable, regardless of who owns the means of production, and so I predict either ecological collapse or de-industrialization and a return to more local economies that do not really fit in the Marxist conception of the future).

Now, I understand that in the States it is safer to approach foundations of social policy with "Marx was wrong ... but" or "socialism is wrong and can never work ... but" and also just assume Marx is all bunk without ever reading Marx; however, this is a safe space to get to know any thinker. It's a safe bet that Marx is not likely the most negatively propagandized (non-religious founder at least) thinker of all time because he had nothing accurate to say. The creation of the middle class was a Marxist project by people self-consciously using broad elements of Marx's economic theory, just differing with Marx on the moral objective of economic policy; and, inline with Marxist theory, almost immediately after the purpose of creating the middle class (avoiding Soviet expansion through communist revolution) disappeared, capital is immediately dominating labour through global labour arbitrage and even more intensely in first-past-the-post representational systems and the middle class is dwindling leading directly to labour agitation and instability (where is the middle class rising in contemporary times that proponents of capitalism point to as success? China, where every economists has read Marx and the sovereign intervenes extensively as Smith recommends).

This doesn't really have anything to do with your post, but if you want to preamble your with a digression about Marx I thinks it's fair to then expect responses that digress about Marx.

No shit. Been learning philosophy since 2005 on online forums. That makes it 14 years of interacting with people. — Wallows

Yes, my point was to just learn the things you want in the dialectical manner you prefer; but perhaps get more structured about it. I.e. do what your doing but at the next level of intensity and challenge.

You know what makes me mad, apart from losing the old database, which I will buy back from Porat once I get enough funds. It's seeing people come and go. What the fuck is with the turnover rate here? — Wallows

The old database is for sale?

I recently ordered Kripke's Reference and Existence and feel like a fucking moron for not being able to even read some of it. Infuriating shit in my little world. — Wallows

Kripke won't make much sense unless you are really concerned about how language works and the history of the problems he's trying to solve. They are all unsolvable in my opinion, but it's useful to be aware of them. What are called "solutions" are, in my view, just pointing out how previous solutions don't work, and none of them do and none can. Language is fundamentally mysterious to us, as is our process of decision, as is our consciousness and experience, as is our existence, as is existence in general.

It's easy to check this, in my opinion, in considering primitives such as "truth". We cannot define truth without claiming our process of definition is true, presupposing we already have the concept of truth to then claim each step in our definition process is true and likewise our conclusion about the truth is also true. There is simply no way to abstract out of our concept of truth. We can describe the operational affects of what deciding something is true or not-true would be, either for ourselves or for others, but this doesn't solve how and why we come to actually believe something is true or false nor again explain how we could attempt an operational definition of truth without following through with the predicted pattern of presupposing our reasoning process is true at each step and so on. The concept of truth is one of many primitives that "boot up" our entire reasoning ability, and that we can then turn our reasoning towards these primitives is a bizarre feeling but does not allow us to escape them.

I have a question to you to just spark a debate. Is the number 2 an empty name, and if not what does it signify? — Wallows

In sticking to the "rules and primitives" approach to language, we learn "discrete entities" in this primitive real experience associated with words way. However, there is no logical basis to assume discrete entities exist to begin with (indeed, we can follow discrete logical steps to conclude two is an illusion and all is one or then continuous flow of indivisible substance, quantum fields or contextual relations or whathaveyou, within which no discrete thing can properly be delineated from the whole, and then double back and claim our discrete step reasoning process was likewise equally illusion.) That we understand what two means does not guarantee that two discrete things actually exist, in substance or conceptually. So, two maybe a primitive that we understand, but all options are still on the table as to what individuality means from which there maybe only one thing ... or maybe two or more things. In terms of foundation of mathematics, the situation is even worse as there is nothing even to find.

My business with language is to understand it insofar as it is needed to increase the effectiveness of my political consequence (as the utility of language assumes other people are around), and again it is a mysterious process that words have consequence, but insofar as it is the case, they must be cared for.

I learn in a dialectical manner — Wallows

Then just learn on this forum.

Assuming you want to learn philosophy as you're posting here, get acquainted with a philosopher or philosophical position in whatever brief way you enjoy, and then just post your thoughts here and discuss with others, or then jump into conversations already started.

If you are interested in your own reasonings, this is a good place to test if they hold up to scrutiny and to learn new things and issues to include in your reasoning.

As for books, there are lot's of collections of the key parts of "a bunch of philosophers", on one theme or another, that bring together the famous passages of the authors in question.

There are also philosophical traditions that value brevity and don't value much which order things are presented, such as the Tao and zen. In the western tradition there are famously brief authors such as Spinoza and Wittgenstein and famously disordered non-systemic writers such as Montesquieu and Leopardi. There are also modern "intense reasoning" essayists such as Russel. There's also a philosophy magazine (philosophynow.org) that provides short articles on philosophy subjects. There's a podcast History of Philosophy without Any Gaps (historyofphilosophy.net) that delivers the goods fairly impressively in roughly 20 minute episodes per philosopher (mostly).

If you like the Republic I can almost guarantee you will love Boethius.

I somehow did not see this reply so am replying now, rather late in the day. — Bartricks

I'm not convinced of this statement, but that of course does not make it untrue.

No I didn't. Why might a surgeon sometimes be justified in performing surgery on someone who cannot consent? When not doing so would result in a great harm to the patient. — Bartricks

You don't seem to have bothered to have read the argument.

Greater harm according to who?

Isn't letting the unconscious person just die avoid harms? Isn't this a lucky case where a person has returned to pre-conscious state and without intervention we can avoid all the harms that this person may experience if they continue to live?

This is the point in this example. The surgeon cannot know what the patient's definition of harm and not-harm is; the surgeon may also even have a basis, in some situations (such as attempted suicides), to assume the patient does not want to be saved.

Saving the patient cannot be based on the patient's consent and guarantees further suffering of one sort or another.

Therefore, if we don't know, and lack of consent is "default wrong", then the default position should be to do nothing for the patient if "default wrong" is to mean anything at all.

The surgeon is imposing their idea of morality on the unconscious patient without any thought at all of what the patient may or may not consent to. If the surgeon considers the the consent of others it will not be the patient but first the governing laws and who applies them, and only if these laws allow family members' thoughts to matter (cutting life support in brain-dead cases for instance) will the surgeon consider the thoughts of family.

You previously stated it's default wrong if there's no consent and it significantly affects the person; isn't the unconscious patient in such a position of no consent and any life saving action significantly affects them?

Aren't parents doing the same thing? Aren't they imposing their idea of morality on their future children in deciding to have and birth a child, without any thought of consent?

You have not explained how "default wrong" affects the case of parents but not of surgeons.

You want to fall back on "of course surgeons will save the patient, more good than harm" and have a completely normal view of the thing, but the normal view of parents having children is likewise viewed by society as, in itself, a good and happy thing. Most people, such as yourself, are not concerned about the consent of unconscious patients, but, likewise, most people are not concerned about the consent of the yet-to-be-conceived.

Furthermore, now your position seems not to have to do with consent but is:

Now, compare that to a procreation case. Does not creating someone result in a great harm to them? No. — Bartricks

Not only is this the consequential argument, not having children avoids harm to them, but it's an extreme version where it is assuming all children suffer great harm.

Parents obviously disagree. If you're argument is the birth process is painful to the new-born and there will certainly be other instances of pain, regardless of whether on the whole the infant grows up to be happy about life or not, as stated above we can say the same for the unconscious patient.

Please note, this seems to me exactly the same as for the unconscious patient: recovering from surgery will be painful, one maybe in chronic pain indefinitely, if living is generally bad we can assume this person's life will be generally bad if revived. Doesn't letting the unconscious person just die avoid these harms?

If you're argument is that others would be sad, isn't that incompatible with your Kantianism as everyone should actually be happy that all further harms to the individual has been avoided? And it's certainly not a Kantian's business if people are mad about being wrong about something?

Are you reverting back to your original argument that it's the lack of consent that's the problem? Or are you changing your argument to the extreme consequential argument that living entails lot's of suffering?

Please clarify.

So, sometimes - sometimes - we are justified in doing something that significantly affects another person without their prior consent when failing to do so would result in a great harm befalling them. — Bartricks

First, to simply recap what I say above: doesn't letting the unconscious person die avoid further harm, especially if life in general is more harm than good? Where exactly is the harm if the surgeon let's an unconscious person drift off to death?

Second, whatever your answer to the above, why isn't having children one of these exceptions?

If a couple invokes your exception rule because either not-having children will make themselves sad and the potential-grandparents sad, or then because they view life in general more good than bad, or then because without children the old will suffer when there is no new generation to keep society running, or all of these and more reasons, seems they can just invoke your "sometimes - sometimes" rule.

Furthermore, if "more avoiding greater harm" can overrule consent, isn't avoiding greater harm the default principle? I.e. consent doesn't matter, what matters is the avoiding harm principle as the usual consequentialist anti-natatlist position?

And none of your answers even addressed the issue of government significantly affecting people, both currently living or yet to be born, all the time without consent. If you're reverting back to consent being the real issue rather that the presumption that being born is harmful (which seems to be the basis of your argument now), why are you fine with government disregarding the consent of children, the yet-to-be-born, anyone who rejects the social contract and refuses to consent to anything, why does "lack of consent is default wrong" not bother you in essentially any other case where we ignore consent without a second thought?

No need to apologize.

We seemed on the same page, but it's a page worth discussing in fine detail in my opinion, which is why I asked more clarification.

In my first comments I did not make the distinction between honest and dishonest critical thinking.

For, one can engage in critical thinking in order to create propaganda to circumvent people's critical thinking defenses. Likewise, a community of this sort of critical thinking can exist.

So your point about dishonest intellectuals I completely agree with (why used "arguably critical thinking" to leave room to make this distinction).

I completely agree I would not equate "intellectual" with "honest critical thinker", as you suggest; for an intellectual can be dishonest and using critical thinking skills to undermine an individual's or even public critical thinking.

Which is why we are here having this debate.

Dishonest intellectualism has taken over large portions of the public sphere, and not simply intellectuals (that are part of a cult like Randianism) being dishonest about what they think is a good argument, but the whole hearted embrace of doing away with even the pretense of trying to be intellectually honest -- because, in my view, intellectual honesty had started to adapt to "dishonest pretending to have an argument that passes even cursory scrutiny" (reality was catching up with the lies) and so it was necessary to just jettison the entire framework of critical thinking, get behind Trump, to stay politically relevant (to keep and, if possible, get more power).

As you point out, it's not at all clear how to deal with it.

Essentially all of my posts here are with the objective to develop a better methodology than current practice to deal with this collapse in trust in critical thinking (which is different than trust in institutions, which may very well no longer deserve to be trusted; the root cause of our predicament in my opinion).

The community of honest critical thinkers, precisely because dishonest critical thinkers usually avoid them or must anyways be ignored for practical time constraint reasons or then get too angry to deal with so require self-censorship to be around -- the community of critical thinkers does not have, based on our usual debates among ourselves, the skills needed to deal with the collapse of critical thinking as an obvious public sphere objective. How do you debate the idea that critical thinking can simply be ignored?

It's not simple and not necessary with regard to finding the best critical arguments as-such (non-serious arguments, such as computers programmed for gibberish, can simply be ignored), but, due to circumstance, it has become politically necessary (just as if a large group of people suddenly started to believe the random ramblings of a computer, it would suddenly be relevant to discuss what the computer is actually saying and why it doesn't pass critical scrutiny nor should we expect it to).

In other words, in such times, it becomes necessary to form "team critical thinking" (which, almost by definition, is addressing other critical thinkers) and to craft arguments that are as immune as possible to critical-thought-rejection (arguments of which the basis is calling out the intellectual dishonesty of the opposing side: lot's of people are working on this, and I think progress is being made; engaging in this forum is one of my contributions to this effort; that not only are arguments wrong but dishonest).

In this particular conversation, the piece of this methodology I am trying to fashion is "how far can one reach out with the fig leaf before falling over". My purpose is that any methodological improvements I make can be used in other contexts; for instance, useful source of content to benefit your students or then useful reflection upon which to create such content.

I agree that arguments should be made as accessible as possible, useful tools in the trenches as you put it. Likewise, not everyone has the ability and time to become a widely read and sharp critical thinker. I place no moral value on having such abilities and time, only the responsibility to use that ability and time to the benefit of others (how to craft arguments that protect people from manipulation without leaning into manipulating them). In other words, how to use critical thinking to benefit less-powerful-critical-thinkers? Not an easy question, as I'm sure you're perfectly aware, and it is more a question of interpersonal trust than the content of such arguments in themselves, as I'm also sure you're perfectly aware, but, that being said, it is still better for the critical thinking community to craft the best arguments for the task possible (in an open way that anyone can review and improve upon) for the benefit of those that happen to trust them.

Thanks for clarifying further.

Although I'm still not sure what your position is and where you disagree with my points.

I was careful to chose the words "arguably critical thinking course or group or forum" since I'm aware we can argue who and where honest critical thinking is found, but in so arguing we are attempting to create a critical thinking community about critical thinking communities, and in so doing we will inevitably find some arguments are serious and other not. For instance, we would probably agree that programming a few computers to say gibberish to each other is not serious critical thinking discussion; there maybe a grey area between what we agree are serious criteria for a critical thinking community and what's permissible, but, based on our conversation so far, I think we will be largely in agreement.

Precisely because we have limited time, as you point out, we must inevitably make a serious / not-serious distinction to organize our time; positions that can't be taken seriously, because they simply don't pass basic critical scrutiny, are not discussed, not because it's important to discuss every world view in exhaustive detail, but because other people believe it and it's politically important.

If a large number of people weren't racists or fascist, you wouldn't mention it at all. Likewise, if a large number of people didn't subscribe to "altruism is evil ... but a government that neutrally protects my property rights rather than the selfish interests of the people that control said government is still possible" we wouldn't be discussing it.

I'm not sure if you're trying to edge-wise defend Mormonism as credible or "credible light" (a apologetic of why other people believe without defending the underlying beliefs are believable), but if so, why not Scientology? Is it because thetans don't pass critical scrutiny better than Jesus flying to North America? Or just because it's been largely discredited in popular culture and can be more easily dismissed (popular culture has managed some level of critical scrutiny that can be relied on in this instance).

If you are trying to defend the ancient wisdom contained in the Bible and not Mormonism, then I would suggest making a distinction between what might be ancient wisdom and worthy of review and reflection and what is not ancient wisdom.

There are approaches to theism, the Bible, other religions, that pass my definition of "can stand-up to critical scrutiny, or, at least, very difficult to demonstrate not withstanding". If you have what you believe is a serious argument for Mormonism, post it in the religious subforum and I'll engage.

I am a theist and a Christian, but I have no problem with the idea there are lot's of cults around of all sorts of kinds, some referencing the bible. I have no problem arguing why the book of Mormon is not seriously compatible with the Bible.

I, likewise, have no problem requiring myself to resolve any internal contradiction, in doctrine or factual claims, in the Bible by appealing to symbolism, historical development of the key themes, or by taking the position that a passage, or entire books, that I cannot resolve reasonably, has been selected or miss-transcribed due to political motivations and I simply remove it from the Bible (i.e. I cannot critically defend the selection criteria that led to what's in the Bible, and so do not defend the content selection).

However, as points out, we cannot simply assume to have the truth, either specifically or as "one of the serious things in our serious basket" and work our way backwards; in making a distinction between serious and not serious critical arguments, the epistemological position is taken that critical thinking is the path to the truth. It can be explained why things in the "catalog of not-serious arguments" don't pass critical scrutiny but it cannot be explained why such things are 100% for sure totally wrong; one is, at the end of the day, betting on critical scrutiny, perhaps for reasons that pass critical scrutiny but such reasons are not compelling for those who reject critical thought.

So, if one of the not-serious-things is correct, such as my lampshade as god, then it is correct in a way that all "serious critical thinking" turns out to be incorrect.

My world view is constantly adjusting itself according to the information/knowledge I acquire, and I don't think much of the idea of a rigid, unchanging, unshifting world view. It will crack and break. — uncanni

But is this really true? Or an attempt to extend the olive branch to various communities that don't really care about critical thinking, or then an edge-wise criticism of supposed critical thinkers that are not open minded enough to "really engage" in critical thinking (for by definition we must open our minds to new ideas to be able to critically review them).

Are you willing to shift in your use of the law of non-contradiction? Or are you rigid and unchanging about that? If you discovered a unresolvable contradiction in your worldview would you entertain the idea that it's simply not a problem, that you can shrug it off and keep on defending a position you know to have an unresolvable internal conflict? For my part, I am completely inflexible in this regard, so we may simply be differing on this point; I maybe wrong about this, perhaps condemning myself for having faith in it, but this is my position, that resolving contradiction is the bedrock of reasoning and the truth, whatever it is, must be something that can be built upon it.

I don't understand your point, can you expand on it?

I don't think I have said anything that suggests I disagree with what you are getting at here. — ZhouBoTong

Yes, my point was simply to make the starkest possible contrast, precisely because you are here, on a forum right now arguably welcoming of critical thinking -- and discussing theological and other matters. Serious philosophical theists will argue they are not "starting with the 'truth' then using critical thinking in an attempt to justify or prove the already known 'truth?", but rather starting with first principles, whether that passes critical scrutiny will be what's up for debate.

Here is where I am getting confused. Can you point me to the best example of "serious theology" using critical thinking to find the truth? — ZhouBoTong

By "serious theology" I am not assuming here theists are correct. A theology course or group or forum will also deal with arguments that all theist arguments are wrong (either as a category or then one-by-one theist arguments turn out to be wrong) and likewise arguments that we cannot possibly know.

Nor am I assuming that that any position with respect to serious theology, taken seriously by critical thinkers, is correct. For instance, I could claim on the theology sub-forum right now that this lampshade is god (to the exclusion of other lampshades and material configurations); I wouldn't be taken seriously, but not because I "am for sure wrong" -- maybe god did decide to be contained in this lamp-shade -- I wouldn't be taken seriously because my argument does not pass critical scrutiny.

My whole point here is that critical thinking cannot out right own the truth. It is a faith based assumption to assume the law of non-contradiction is true as well as other argumentative methods (that we generally try to either derive from non-contradiction or at least pass credibility by showing consistency with it).

In other words, the critical thinking community is a faith-based community, labeling arguments as "serious" and "not-serious" and "maybe serious with significant amount more work or evidence (i.e. if my god as lampshade tells me the future of sporting and political events without fail and intimate details of your life and thoughts, and I'm able to demonstrate this, maybe you'll take my argument more seriously ... but I can't demonstrate this, which is the point you'll be making meanwhile)", in relation to what passes critical scrutiny, or then, at least, very difficult to show does not pass critical scrutiny.

This faith maybe wrong, things that don't pas critical scrutiny (my lampshade is god and you should believe it even without any supporting evidence) maybe the truth. If so, however, the entire critical thinking community is on the wrong track, critical thinking is a barrier, potentially a permanent barrier, to knowing the truth.

If I want to develop my lampshade religion I will need to address myself to people that do not have such a barrier to belief; but perhaps I will have luck with those enticed by confident assertions, material benefits and longing for a sense of community -- perhaps their innocent eyes can see the light.

The novice critical thinker will say "but without critical thinking there is no way to identify as special one absurd theory from the next; why is your lampshade god but not my spoon" but this may simply be the case, that critical thinking isn't helpful and the best that can be done is to roll the dice between lampshade and spoon and everything else: that those people who I find and manipulate to believe in the lampshade will be saved, and the critical thinkers who scoffed will be doomed.

Otherwise, your argument is fatal, we must assume to possess the truth from the outset before critically reviewing anything we consider a candidate for the truth in our bag of tricks; which is a position that does not pass critical scrutiny. It may very well be that the truth is behind none of the doors we are trying to open nor might ever try to open, but rather behind us, through what we have come to believe is a solid impermeable wall that presents no visible pathway nor any special identifying features compared to all the other solid impermeable walls, that we stroll by obliviously. It is only in throwing oneself without hesitation or doubt at one particular wall that one can take the train to Hogwarts, and those that do not are forever lost in the labyrinth and are eaten by the snake.

Those that have a different faith, to critical thinking, will hear such things and say "yes, yes, the critical thinkers are no better; their faith leads them astray, their own words condemn them; they have been deceived by the prince of deception, do not listen!"; which is not what I'm saying here, but they will not bother to think things through any further, that is what I am saying.

Completely agree, boethius is amazing.

After that, when all resources are exhausted and we have to get diabolical about it because we really have no choice, we're lucky if we have a Republican in charge because they're good at that. — frank

Republicans are good at running a tight governmental ship where nothing goes over budget?

I understand the cleverness you thought you were getting at, but it's based on the myth that republicans are efficient at what they just keep saying they are efficient at, and when you start to implicitly accept not simply myths but myths that are empirically false as part of your thought process, you have a garbage-in-garbage-out analytical framework.

You would still want a sane person motivated to do what's right in charge, even if times are tough ... probably you'd want it even more in tough times.

I don't disagree with much of what you have said, and yet I was certainly inspired to learn more about philosophy after arguing with Randians. If something seems obviously wrong, but is embraced by many, one can be compelled to research. — ZhouBoTong

Sure, but we can say the same about smoking, alcoholism and drug addiction, obesity, Trump's various statements (whatever you want to call the collection of them), activities leading to ecological collapse, slavery, organized crime, the KKK etc. whatever seems wrong I very much hope inspires research about why exactly it's wrong and what can be done about it. Doesn't make any social ill somehow 'kind of good' or a segue to philosophy that we should appreciate.

If there were no social ills and because of this people didn't philosophize much, just enjoyed life. I would take that bargain.

And by the way, haha, have you had a few bad experiences with the mormons? Why are their ideas more ludicrous than the rest of the christians? — ZhouBoTong

I didn't mention other Christians, though please, post why "Bible + Jesus showing up in america and planting some golden tablets (and cursing the native Americans etc.)" is just as consistent as just "Bible" in the religion sub-forum. If you bother to actually backup such an argument, I'll bother to respond to it.

If not, I did mention theology (philosophical theology) compared to how a cult operates: enticing people to join not with reason but claiming to satisfy what modern society does not provide (mostly a sense of community, but also networking for jobs etc.) and coercing members to stay (hassling and excommunication) compared to critical thinking about theology topics and what are serious arguments and approaches.

Please, join a course or group or internet forum that can be argued to be welcoming critical thought on religious and theological matters for a year ... then become a Mormon for a year ... then report back on the appreciation of critical thinking and exposure to challenges to beliefs and assumption in each group.

My point is, maybe Mormonism is right (Jesus flew to the Americas to spread the word to the lost tribe and then cursed the natives with red skin and gave permission to a latter group of preachers to marry (rape) as many minors (children) as they want and have as many wives as they want, even taking other men's wives, as it's gods will ... until it became gods will to bend to political expediency, while not actually, in principle, abandoning the previous position that's the real gods will; sure, it's in the realm of ontological possibility), but, if so, what we understand as serious critical thinking is entirely wrong: the approach, the methods, the content. If mormonism is right it is not the case it was a serious approach to theology that turned out to be correct, but rather that "serious theology is entirely wrong, that critical thinking is not a path to the truth".

We’re not playing a Sims City video game where you pick and choose your designs of society, you have to deal with institutions in the current existing world in order to reorient and change the established order step by step. — Saphsin

What do I say that contradicts this?

My point is that if industrialization is not sustainable then, if you care about future generations (if you don't this isn't an argument for you), industrialization will collapse along with the ecosystems.

Maybe this isn't possible to avoid, that all attempts will fail.

However, your argument seems to be "well, people like industrialization, and whether it's sustainable or not, we have need, for political expediency, to continue with it". Now, if you finish that argument with "... we need to continue with it until the ecosystems collapse", then your argument is sound and I have no analytical criticism. Our difference is one of values, I don't want the ecosystems to collapse.

You can argue industrialization is sustainable, this is an an empirical claim and requires empirical investigation and a lot of time; if you care about the ecosystems and future generations you will carry out such an investigation, if you don't care you will not bother to investigate (you can claim to care anyways, but critical thinkers might not agree that's consistent with your actions). My point is that our view of the current system depends on whether we think it's sustainable or not. If you make an empirical review you can't come back to the myth of progress and just patch it up with "ok, maybe it's not sustainable but that doesn't matter".

If global industrialization isn't sustainable, and if we view sustainability as a moral imperative, then we must try to change our production methods to something else regardless of the political enthusiasm from western populations, either due to not having time to think about it or due to being a beneficiary of the current system or due to profoundly not caring about sustainability. Such a political project is not guaranteed to succeed but if it's a moral imperative then it's simply the reasonable course of action to people who have that world view and ethics.

I don't have analytical criticism of people who don't share my world view and ethics. If someone doesn't care about future generations, wants the status quo and reasons that they should just promote the myth of progress regardless if it's true or not, I have no analysis for them. Makes sense.

My analysis is not directed towards people who don't care about future generations, but people who do, trying to untangle the myth of progress that might otherwise lead them to believe there is no alternative than an unsustainable system and that there are as good moral arguments for continuing an unsustainable system (graphs of gdp and whatnot) as there are for trying to become sustainable (even if it means dismantling global industry as we know it today, and rich people throwing their little rich people tantrums about it).

If you show me the best path to sustainability is more global industrialization, that what has caused the problem will solve it, then I'll accept that's what we should do. But such an argument requires more than hand-waving and vague references to "political feasibility", it requires a very deep empirical investigation that our problems can, in fact, be solved with more industry and small changes to the status quo. My investigation into this subject, so far, leads me to the conclusion that it cannot; that the energy required to run global industry, in particular transportation of large amounts of material, has no industrial fix, and the only solution is shorten the length material travels as much as is feasible (and, importantly, that internalizing the costs of global industry makes shorter-material-flows more competitive; it's not a radical change to the status quo in terms of using markets, but rather a radical change to the status quo in terms of letting the rich and powerful disproportionately dictate the regulation of global markets through their various known schemes to avoid sustainable regulations -- the throwing the hands in the air and saying "ah, well, we can't do anything about that" is simply not true, we can do something about it).

When I look at what is described when people mean by de-growth, you have to practically abolish the global market economy as it is to make it happen. — Saphsin

The issue is "what is good growth" and "what is bad growth". This requires an understanding of the system and where it's going but also a moral theory to be able to decide what's good and bad about where it's going; with an understanding of the economic-ecological system as it exists today and a moral theory it is then also possible to decide what is feasible and justifiable to do about it.

De-growth of globalized industry while growing local production, from the perspective of most people, is actually higher growth in terms of more activity, more things to do; if there is suddenly no mass imports made with slave-labour from China this is going to create room for local fabrication of a lot of things; an activity boom in most places importing from China (perhaps a total collapse of the Chinese economy, but overall more activity).

The core problem with "free-trade is always good" is that it does not account for the ecological costs of the infrastructure and ecological cost of the energy spent to physically trade globally nor the political cost of being dependent on a potentially coercive force (i.e. economists who present free-trade as "efficient" without considering the negatives, are just propagandists -- they are certainly aware the negatives can outweigh the positives, they just choose to ignore reality to fool their gullible students).

For a very large amount (though not all) of products, if you perform an an analysis where the negative externalities are internalized, suddenly it is not at all clear-cut that local production is not-competitive. So why not internalize those costs?

The only argument for not internalizing the cost of negative externalities is:

1. deny such negative externalities even exist (which is not an argument against the principle that negative externatilities should be internalized, just a coping mechanism for being unable to think critically when confronted with empirical evidence one is in denial as well as existing protection from negative externalities that one does not want removed) or

2. not valuing future generations that are most affected by those negative externalities (nor any poor person today affected by those externalities). This is a sound argument to not internalize externalities, but it is not compelling to people who do care about future generations and the poor.

3. society has no right to protect itself from negative externalities from individuals and companies (there is so many problems with this I'll need to make another post if people don't see the obvious fundamental contradictions).

Now, if negative externalities (ecological, social and political) are internalized (which is a case-by-case empirical question requiring empirical investigation), and a product is still competitive being centrally produced, I have no argument against it. For instance, if computer chips simply can't be made locally and all the pollution externalities are internalized into the cost, I have no problem with a centralization of this process. However, if you imagine a world where only things like computer chips or similar complexity are being transported globally, this is a massive reduction in global transport: yes, basically dismantling what globalize industry as we know it today.

A regulated market is trivially easy to render sustainable: you just enforce internalization of costs. It's also not even that disruptive to do this to most people, life improves without those negative externalities (that's why it's negative; the myth of progress is the idea that negative externalities are somehow good for you or intrinsically tied to good things). Who it's not good for are the economic elite who's wealth is tied to global scale infrastructure and material flows.

Now, I agree that the first step is social democracy, we need government able to regulate in the interests of people. But I disagree (with Marx) that capitalism will fail resulting in a socialist uprising that then results in communism. Capitalism (laws dominated by capital rather than people to allow those profitable negative externalities to continue; i.e. "money should be equal to votes, ideally directly but failing that through unconstrained ability for money to influence politics") will fail, in terms of internal contradictions, due to ecological collapse (something that has been revealed empirically, not knowable in principle), and if we want to avoid ecological collapse we need to do something about it before capitalism collapses due to ecological collapse, not afterwards.

And I also agree that part of this step is distribution of wealth (social safety net) so that people aren't subsistence wage slaves and have time to think about global issues and future generations and be able to review what really are negative externalities and how best to internalize those costs.

Vis-a-vis the OP, if communism results from this process it is not because of the failure of markets and revolution, but because enforcing negative externalities in a reasonable way simply makes local production more and more competitive until (most people) are living in relatively small communities and are no longer alienated and, through these direct relationships, money is no longer the principle medium of relation (might still be around, just not a dominant force).

I've answered all this already. — jamalrob

You haven't. My criticism is exactly the fallacy you continuously repeat such as in your next sentence:

We choose to measure specific metrics because they're the things we value, the things we want more of. — jamalrob

Yes, I get that your measuring things.

It's reasonable on this basis to describe their increase as improvements, and this doesn't entail ignoring the context. — jamalrob

This is your mistake. It is not reasonable to describe their increase as improvements in themselves, even less make the leap to "therefore things have improved generally" that "life has improved generally or for most people".

It does entail ignoring the context, that's exactly what it entails. You can only bestow a "moral satisfaction" about the metrics if you ignore the context, if you include the statement "all else being equal" (this is the catchall phrase to say exactly this: if we ignore anything in the context that might lead us to another conclusion, then we would conclude this metric going this way is a good thing) otherwise, the context can lead us to another conclusion.

If the growth comes at massive ecological costs in the future that are far more onerous than all the short term increases in the various metrics, then we can question that growth represents an improvement for humanity.

It's not something that can be resolved in principle, you actually have to go out and check. If you value sustainability then you need to actually go and checkup on the metrics that tell us something about sustainability and if the economic growth you find pleasing comes at an ecological cost you have to make an argument that it was worth it, the argument "I look at some metrics because I care about those metrics ... but I also care about a context out there ... but I don't bother to look at metrics representing that context" doesn't make sense.

If you don't look at ecological metrics: it's because you don't value the ecosystems! Otherwise, by your own logic you would look at metrics that inform us of the state of the ecosystem because you care about the ecosystem. If those metrics are going in a bad direction, you can no longer say "look at this growth, look how everything is going up, certainly a good thing". You need to make an argument that the trade-off is worth it, otherwise your argument is simply "if you only look at things that are going in a good direction then you conclude things are going in a good direction and we can assume will continue to do so".

You can't just throw in a patch-up that "ok, I care about other things too ... I just don't look at them closely ... but I'm sure things are ok over there and in the future". That's what your argument boils down to, a completely baseless assumption that whatever the costs have been, whatever they will be, we don't need to look at those costs closely.

You throw up a graph of growth as I'm sure you've been itching to do as soon as you sense the myth of progress has stood it's ground. But you don't put up a graph of "level of free speech in China" of a graph of "bio-diversity" or "a graph of global forest cover" or "a graph of cultivatable land" or "a graph of remaining seed diversity" or "a graph of ground-water stores" or "a graph of top-soil". You simply assume, if these really are problems, that we'll solve those problems. This is an empirical claim and requires an empirical investigation to know anything about. There are physical limits to what we can do.

However, if industrialization is inherently unsustainable -- that it's industrialization, whether capitalist or socialist or a mix of the two, that has caused the ecological crisis in a physical "cause-effect" relationship (the actual physical objects that make-up industrial civilization) -- then it's simply not reasonable to say "well, more of the same will certainly cure the disease it's causing". Maybe it can! But you need very powerful arguments to convince someone more of what's making them sick is actually going to cure them.

If industrial civilization is not sustainable, you can put up as many graphs as you want showing things, that I agree "all else being equal" are good things, but if the system those metrics are describing is not sustainable then all those metrics are going to crash (that is what not-sustainable means) so not only will you lose the things you haven't bothered to throw up graphs about you'll also lose those things you do like looking at graphs about. You can argue "ok, things may crash for future generation, sooner or later, don't really care; I value people today and an industrial way of life for those people", then your argument is sound, but what follows it that it's not compelling to someone who does value future generations.

And there is an alternative: non-industrial technological civilization, meaning local production and consumption -- which can include doctors, literacy, democracy, low infant mortality, longevity -- but with the critical difference that it can be sustainable and the critical problem that it is a very radical change. However, that it's a radical change and politically difficult to implement (departs from the industrial status quo) is not a counter argument if the thesis that industrialization (large infrastructure with globally integrated material flows) is not sustainable, is correct; it becomes inevitably the only option (again, that's what non-sustainable means), the only questions are "do we get there at all" and "how much damage do we let industrialization do to the planet before making these changes". In other words, if industrialization is not sustainable then we have taken a wrong turn and the further we go down that path the worse off we are.

It does make sense. If I lost my washing machine (income) and didn't have access to a launderette (infrastructure or economic development, not part of the HDI but significant for my example), it would make my life worse. To measure things at all requires the isolation of specific metrics. The ones we choose to measure here are based on the things we all value; they are factors that contribute to freedom, opportunity, health, leisure, and so on. — jamalrob

This is exactly what @Isaac is saying in the what you quoted. I'm pretty sure he doesn't disagree that a metric can be measured, but to say that it is therefore good or bad, the change requires extrinsic factors (an understanding of the system that isolated metric is apart of).

You cannot say an "to measure things at all requires the isolation of specific metrics" to the conclusion "therefore that metric has improved" and from there "therefore the system that metric is apart has improved", without more context (as well as a moral system from which to judge what is good and bad).

Which is exactly why you bring up yourself, "and didn't have access to a launderette": this is an extrinsic factor!

If we see laundry machine ownership is going down we need context to understand if this is good or bad, even from the perspective of just laundry. If people are replacing laundry machines with a more efficient laundromat service (new and cool uber for laundry) we may conclude "insofar as laundry is concerned, it's getting better", but again it's only a "judgement that it's good" if it excludes other extrinsic factors tied to laundry in general.

Now, if both laundry machines and laundry services are going down, you may say "well certainly that's bad" but again we need context. What if people were unnecessarily doing too much laundry and a campaign of awareness was able to decrease the laundry metric and we'd look at the decrease and say "this is great, the program is working, resources are being saved".

What if someone invents clothes that never have to be washed or can be just produced a new every time! Sure, doesn't seem plausible, but it's not plausible due to extrinsic factors, due to context, we must actually go and check this context.

Just as isolated metrics about a patient aren't sufficient to claim the "patient is improving", just like isolated metrics about a corporation finances isn't sufficient to claim "the company is improving".

If the context of all economic development is unsustainable, or comes at the cost of greater 1984 style tyranny, then, yes metrics have gone up and down, but there is no way to jump to the conclusion that "therefore things have improved". If you want to make a claim such as "life for most people has improved" isolating a part of "what life means" such as tracking a metric or two, doesn't get to that conclusion. The myth of progress gets to that conclusion through the various fallacies I have been deconstructing.

By definition to make the distinction between money and capitalism is to comment on the history of capitalism.

I'm not poo pooing the wheel. — frank

Yes I agree with your point about not equating money to capitalism, but your phrasing "It's not so much capitalism that unleashed human potential. It's money." seems to put special emphasis on money as unlocking human potential; seems a very ambitious statement relative other critical technologies (unless the author is saying the same thing about them too). Since this thread is on socialism and communism, I'd be interested if the author you cite, writing on the history of money and capitalism, is aware that, at least as how you phrase it as "unleashing human potential", seems an example of the fetishism Marx was talking about; does the author deal with this idea?

It's not so much capitalism that unleashed human potential. It's money. Read Jack Weatherford's book: The History of Money. He explains why money and banking transformed human life. — frank

But you can say the same thing about writing, or metal work, or the wheel, or essentially any technology required for our economy to work and the history of it's development. Money is a useful technology and has an interesting history, but it's one out of many such technologies.

You have done everything you can to deny that these improvements are improvements at all
— jamalrob

Well that's as good an example of begging the question as you're going to get, you've actually described them as "improvements" when what is at issue is whether they are or not. — Isaac

I've described them as changes in a metric, which I agree the various metrics discussed have changed in the proposed way (infant mortality, longevity, average material comfort).

I've described that to go from the observation of the metric over a given time to the idea of "improvement" is a moral judgement. It's this moral judgement that begs the questions: "improvement overall or improvement in one area at the expense of other, potentially more important areas" as well as "improvement for who".

For instance, China has recently announced that facial recognition will be required to get a phone number and each time you access the internet, in addition to existing mass surveillance, crackdowns on dissidents, and no free speech. It's a question that must be answered whether the increase in average material comfort for the average Chinese is worth while exchange for zero free speech and zero anonymous internet access (a freedom we are both enjoying as we have this conversation). Most of the reduction of poverty in the last decades has been in China, so if we are referencing China to support "progress of metrics" to support "capitalism and/or modernity has improved people's lives", we must actually resolve the question of "is it worth it to the average Chinese, the increase in material things at the expense of even more intimate surveillance and thought policing than existed before?" This is not a trivial question to answer. If you say "well millions of Chinese say it's worth it" well my question for you is "first are you sure it's worth it and they're not mistaken, and, second, do they even really believe this or do they just say it due to coercion from the Chinese state ... and people who disagree we don't hear much from".

I've also detailed how I have zero problem accepting some metric really is an improvement (a moral judgement of goodness) from some perspectives, with the analogy of the embezzling CEO, if he gets away with it and views selfish self-serving as a good thing then life has improved for the embezzling CEO. However, that an improvement exists from one perspective does not entail it exists from all perspectives. If a system isn't sustainable it is by definition "not a good thing" from the generations that will suffer the consequences of an unsustainable system. If we don't care about those generations, then I agree it's possible to conclude "life has improved", but this is just the tautology of "life has improved for those who think life has improved", and if millions disagree later, tough for them.

You know very well that I did not claim there was anything dishonest about repeating your argument and dealing with criticism. This is tiresome. — jamalrob

What then is dishonest? You've made this claim:

which seems likely based on the intellectual dishonesty of your recent posts — jamalrob

I'm defending against this claim not by claiming that you believe responding to criticism is intellectually dishonest but with the argument "I am responding to criticism and therefore intellectually honest".

It' you making a claim without any supporting arguments, my argument is those supporting arguments don't exist. So, back up your claim or then retract it, or then explain how "not willing to backup a claim nor retract it" is anything other than intellectually dishonest.

This is gibberish, but from what I can make of it it's full of baseless assertions, and baseless attributions of what you see as the enemy position. Diversion tactic? What are you talking about? — jamalrob

It's not gibberish. You've made the "baseless assertion" of "which seems likely based on the intellectual dishonesty of your recent posts" and "you missed the point, or else you're intentionally ignoring it".

And you qualify "intentionally ignoring" with "which seems likely based on the intellectual dishonesty of your recent posts", yet you have no supporting arguments for this, nor citation of where I'm being intellectually dishonest.

I point out your claim is baseless and provide an alternative claim, that I'm being intellectually honest with in addition to this the supporting argument that I am responding to criticism, and you view this as baseless and gibberish.

Ok, please also support your arguments here about why my argument with supporting argument is baseless and gibberish, yet your argument that lacks any supporting argument is honest philosophical work.