Russia is not conducting classic highly mobile offensives that rely on airpower, but uses grinding attrition warfare making use of drones and artillery. — Tzeentch

Obviously the no-fly zone is more wishful thinking and will not happen.

However, I don't think the role of the Russian airforce should be minimized. The planes drop glide bombs, "the small one" being 500 kg.

The typical 155mm artillery shell is 45 kg, and FPV drones are still smaller in payload.

This capacity to destroy much more hardened targets on the front shouldn't be dismissed in terms of tactical and strategic impact, especially Urban warfare where concrete buildings are good protection against artillery but are vulnerable to much larger bombs.

Without these large bombs it may not be possible for Russia to advance at more than a snails pace, such as we saw in Bakhmut before deployment of the glide bombs.

Of course, even without the planes the Russians are at a significant advantage, as you say, but not necessarily enough to take heavily fortified positions in acceptable amounts of time, resources and man power.

What will be the goal (in Ukraine) if Trump wins the elections? Can you predict that too? — neomac

My prediction is that if Trump wins the elections, for sure Ukraine will have outlived its usefulness.

To what extent it outlives its usefulness before we even get to the election is a somewhat open question.

Support is already being pulled back but we can presume US / NATO still wants to avoid total embarrassment.

At the same time, that doesn't really matter all that much as even extreme embarrassment can be simply spun away and back page news by the next news cycle.

For example, I have a vague impression, a sort of whisper really, from all the way down the abyss of the memory hole that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was an extreme embarrassment, leaving billions in weapons for the Taliban and "friends and allies" literally falling off the last planes as they skedaddled away. Any political consequence for anyone? No.

Within a few weeks everyone agreed (everyone that matters, everyone white) that Afghans just didn't want freedom hard enough, were giving a magnificent opportunity but were lazy fighters and let freedom slip through their fingers.

So it shall be with Ukraine: We gave them everything and they still lost! Losers! Losers! Losers!

Call it a "special defense operation" if you must (or escalation or both). Doubtful that the Kremlin can withstand such a move (cf their posturing propaganda threats). A fairly straightforward strategy. Can send a message to other would-be invaders, by the way. But, while reasonable enough, it's not likely to happen (giving fuel to things like boethius's "drip feed" hypothesis), at least not with NATO as the combined international air force: — jorndoe

Seems we see eye to eye after all this time.

The no-fly zone idea was analyzed also at length at the start of the war, here and elsewhere, especially as Zelensky and social media spent a considerable amount of energy pushing for it.

I also explained at length how NATO boots on the ground could work in practice (especially before the war started). A move I'd be entirely for if it prevented further deaths; of course that wouldn't happen if it triggered nuclear war, but it's also arguable such a move is actually less risky than the current strategy of a slippery slope towards nuclear war.

Neither a no-fly zone nor boots on the ground happen because protecting Ukrainian land or Ukrainian lives is not the goal.

The goal is to drip feed arms to Ukraine enough to prop it up in order to damage Russia (which may not even be happening), super charge arms profiteering both directly to Ukraine as well as indirectly by creating a new Cold War, protect the USD from the Euro by having the Europeans destroy their competitiveness and fully prostrate themselves as meaningless vassals on the world stage.

Like every other US proxy force, Ukraine will be dropped like a shoe filled with spiders the moment it outlives its usefulness.

Ukrainian partisans will say "But, but, but, but what happened to all our promises! What happened to defending freedom and democracy and all that! How is this possible! How is this honourable! How is this acceptable!"

Cries that will travel all the way to the mountains of Afghanistan and echo there through eternity. The Taliban will smile knowingly and no one else will care. Down the memory hole the war will go.

I love the logic of invoking denialism while posting a bunch of articles to then turn around and claim the articles are thus evidence of a much worse problem. It's the kind of backwards logic common to self-professed "free thinkers". — Echarmion

The articles are written at different times and represent a trend, going from a "danger to democracy" and acting (violently, including murder) with impunity and are totally unaccountable by law enforcement (already before the war, either because they've captured law enforcement or then can already intimidate police and prosecutors into doing nothing) to chaos and insurgency could put jews at risk of their fellow citizens (i.e. the problem is already bad enough that Nazis would have time to kill jews as a side hustle to fighting Russian occupiers).

First, you throw up some plausible deniability bullshit arguing that there's no proof these acts of terrorism actually intimidate people into making different choices, and now you move the goal posts to "it's not that bad".

If the state of things before the war was already unaccountable terrorism, only a fool would believe 2 years of war has been bad for these Nazi and other white supremacy factions. There's plenty of evidence of the Nazis taking advantage of the war to grow their power further.

Now, as I say, there is not evidence they are some significant majority in Ukraine, but if their power grows and the power of non-Nazi regular forces is weakened (for example by fighting a war), then a coup or a credible threat of a coup to extort concessions from the state, is possible.

Likewise, simply the threat of Nazis doing crazy violent things can tip decisions in their favour; even if they don't have enough power for a coup, they clearly have enough power that what they may do if displeased requires mindful consideration.

Of course, they aren't the only power block involved; obviously the West wouldn't want to see a literal Nazi coup in Ukraine, and the West has plenty of leverage (money, arms, prestige, normalizing Nazism as much as possible).

If you look at all the evidence, the videos and the article, and conclude "nothing to see here", I can only categorize that as willful blindness.

The problem of Nazis in Ukraine is and will remain a big problem (in and outside Ukraine), the only thing left to be seen is how big.

This really just seems like more evidence that you are conceited about your own abilities, and that your incessant distortion and outright lies merely serve to protect your ego. — Echarmion

So your problem with correct prediction and warning people in power they should pay special attention, using what leverage I have as a corporate board member (with CEO, managing director and chair experience for oner decade; for whatever it's worth) ... is that being right is wrong because it fuels conceit?

I should try to be more wrong in the future so as to learn humbleness?

Now, personally, I would love humble stupidity ("oh! no! no one could have seen this coming!!") to be rewarded in corporate life as it is in political life, but that's just not the world I live in anyhow. First rule of business is if you don't believe in yourself, no one else will even consider it on your behalf.

The second rule of business is being wrong has terrible consequences.

So maybe we just live in different worlds. In my world there is strong incentive to be right, that is achieved by a sober analysis of all the factors while trying to purge oneself of wishful thinking and emotional immaturity. In your world as long as you have some plausible deniability bullshit you can throw around, no matter how thin a covering of shit it can smear on the truth, all is well ... you work in marketing, per chance?

If one wants to live in the real world, the last thing they should do is believe anything you write. — Echarmion

Really? You go from stating my predictions, such as Ukraine could not possibly retake significant territory without heavy weapons (that Javelins, NLAWS and Stingers aren't going to cut) are the most obvious thing ever that everyone who had a clue knew basically ... to now claiming literally nothing I say is true.

Now I get it, Ukraine isn't in a good position, before nor during the war, and NATO could do more (such as just let Ukraine in and then send in ground troops to teach Putin who's the real tough guys with the real toughest tats) but NATO doesn't.

I also get it, if you aren't a Nazi sympathizer it's difficult to process the level of Naziism in Ukraine, but it's there and it's an important part of any credible analysis.

As NBC puts it:

My own grandparents themselves had to flee western Ukraine to escape persecution, and it is tragic to see this cycle continue. If the country devolves into chaos and insurgency, Jews could once again be at risk from some of their fellow citizens. Not acknowledging this threat means that little is being done to guard against it. — Ukraine's Nazi problem is real, NBC

Now, I'd also be worried about hundreds of thousands dead in a war and everyone else that would be purged in a Nazi takeover as well.

However, the evidence behind the above warning is strong enough for NBC to publish the story even in an environment of general denialism and white washing of the issue.

Really, you expect anyone to believe that you care one whit about peace, or lives? — Echarmion

Where were you at the start of the conflict in spring 2022 when peace was most easily achieved?

I was here.

Arguing for peace.

I even wrote to my country's leadership 3 years before the war started explaining that a lack of international leadership (for example rich countries narcissistically only focusing on themselves, and not creating a mobile medical battalion to bring relief to areas experiencing overcapacity) would lead directly to chaos and conflict, most notably in Eastern Europe.

Now imagine if the West also put resources into mobile hospitals during the pandemic to at least be sure to bring basic medical supplies to areas experience a peak.

Even if it wouldn't be all that successful, it's the kind of thing that would bring people together, symbolize our caring for each other. Of course, the danger of this concept is that it may have worked too well and there'd be no need to wait for vaccines.

My proposal was rejected and I was informed the pandemic was in the hands of the experts, not to worry my pretty little head basically.

Exactly the process I described took place.

Now you may argue my mobile hospital concept would not have prevented the war in Ukraine, but I also explained in my letter that the insular attitude, essentially ignoring international diplomacy, would also contribute to the same.

Again, experts are handling it.

But are they? Are they really?

FYI, reportedly, Ukraine has become the most littered area on the planet — littered with Russian mines, bombs, trip wires and traps, grenades, explosives in kitchen gear and toys, ... — jorndoe

That's what choosing to "win", which I believe is your position, means.

You're genuinely surprised by the result?

Has the cost been worth a small sliver of a chance to retake the Donbas without needing to negotiate any sort of increased autonomy of any kind ... or the even smaller change of retaking Crimea?

Exactly. Hence, the Kremlin circle = serial liars (+ hypocrites). Dis/agree? — jorndoe

You can't just throw in a "hence" to construct an argument.

What's your actual argument here, then I'll answer your question.

Whether you do or not, the Kremlin circle does, and employs that as a rationale for their wretched warring, which hence falls flat. Yes? No? — jorndoe

I've explained several times now that the best propaganda with the longest shelf life is based on truth.

So no, it doesn't fall flat. Whether it was the "main thing" or something else that have motivated the Russians to see the war through this far, certainly the denazification rationale was a contributing factor.

Ukraine has made some progress, where Russia has regressed. Agree or not? — jorndoe

I do not think Ukraine has made more progress than Russia on the freedom and equality scale. Before the war there were arguments for and against "who's more free" that has already been addressed (in the context of how many lives are worth sacrificing to "free" occupied Ukraine).

However, now Ukraine seems to be essentially a police state, political parties banned, critical media banned, lot's of disappearing and murdering by the police state. I wouldn't say Russia is doing much better, but my guess is that Russia is still "more free" than wartime Ukraine. For example, Russians were not barred from leaving the country, so that is a significant freedom. You, to contrast, are free to argue or just randomly say that the "true freedom" will arrive when the war is over, all those forced into the draft and sacrificed will be vindicated in some strange sense.

Especially with long weaving comments, eh? — jorndoe

You mainly micro-blog, call everything you don't like propaganda, provide no commentary or analysis of what you're micro-blogging about, and don't engage in any debate for the most part.

The little argument you do is simply a series of moving the goal-posts. You go from claiming the Nazi problem in Ukraine is "alternative world type stuff" in response to my analysis of the Nazi problem the tis backed up by evidence, to Nazi's are literally "everywhere" and no more a problem in Ukraine, to admitting it's a problem in Ukraine but then just provide links of extremists elsewhere ... where they too are a problem such as jihadi terrorism (the difference being it's tolerated in Ukraine but the French, to take one of your examples, are not tolerating it and trying to keep it in check if not reduce it), and now it's "Russia is just as bad", maybe so, maybe Russia is just as bad ... why would I pick Ukraine in a context of equally bad states?

By the way,

↪boethius, the Kremlin gets their way, or it's the nuclear way...?
— Nov 9, 2023 — jorndoe

I've explained several times that nuclear blackmail obviously works.

What's your solution to nuclear blackmail?

What is your alternative analysis to mine that the principle factor determining the outcome in the war in Ukraine is NATO's desire to avoid nuclear escalation, what could potentially cause nuclear escalation? Ukraine winning obviously. So, how is nuclear escalation avoided? Propping Ukraine up just enough to be able to fight but not enough to be able to win.

NATO associated analysts, mainly the neocons, discussed at length what the US could do in response to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine and didn't come up with any good options.

So yes, the Kremlin will get its way in Ukraine because people genuinely believe the alternative is the nuclear way, which no one wants to risk for Ukraine.

Why? Because Ukraine isn't important to the US, NATO, and the EU, not important to risk nuclear escalation.

I explained over several comments how exactly boots on the ground could have worked to prevent the war, of course at the risk of nuclear escalation, a bold move I'd be completely content with if it worked at preventing a giant war.

Of course, it was never even an option under consideration, because Ukraine or Ukrainian lives is not some sort of priority and the games the US and NATO have been playing in Ukraine are for evil ends that do not benefit Ukraine nor Europe more generally (the EU goes along with it because European leaders have decided to just accept being subordinate tools to the US after all, and the EU institutions used to keep rascal nations in check rather than coordinate any sort of independent European foreign policy; the EU has essentially been transformed into the underwriter of the Ukrainian government and a whip that can be cracked at any politician that dares criticize US foreign policy).

So, if you want to live in the real world, the problem of Nazis in Ukraine was never "an actual problem" for the US and NATO because they served the purpose of provoking the war, and likewise, in the real world, no one's so foolish enough as to provoke nuclear war on behalf of Ukraine.

Which leaves us where? Ukraine is stuck in a war its backers want Ukraine to fight but not win.

Yes, nationalism plays an enormous role in the causes for the war. The Russian one. — Jabberwock

Again, watch the videos, read the articles if the topic interests you.

Ukrainian nationalism is a major factor in 2014 and what has happened since. The West largely ignores this factor because "meh, they're fighting Russians".

Great, so we agree that nationalists inciting genocide are equally bad, no matter whether they explicitly invoke Nazi symbols or not. — Jabberwock

I don't have a problem with that. I have no problem with characterizing Russia as an imperial state with a very strong nationalist block.

I have a problem of using nationalism in Russia to excuse nationalism in Ukraine.

I have a problem with supporting a war strategy that has essentially no chance of succeeding at an extremely high cost to trying.

I have a problem of turning Russian critique into some moral imperative to arm the Ukrainians while pressuring them to reject peace, even if the war is a terrible disaster.

I have a problem of rejecting a reasonable peace proposal when Ukraine had the most leverage to get as many concessions as possible, on the basis of "no guarantee". Is winning the war guaranteed? Is NATO delivering "everything Ukraine needs" guaranteed?

Now that Ukraine has very little leverage, surprise, surprise, Imperialist Russia isn't interested in a truce anymore.

Russia has now already paid the major costs of the war and passed the major risk points, so continuing the war is now far wore for NATO than it is for Russia. NATO's diplomatic and sanctions quiver empty, there's not much incentive for Russia to not take more land and also try to push Ukraine into a failed state status that becomes the EU's problem to deal with (obviously the US will gracefully take their leave of the situation if and when that happens).

This is what pretty much all the realist analysts, such as Mearsheimer, have been predicting, that Russia would not at this stage negotiate peace even if the West wanted to.

Ukraine is on the back foot having burned up a large part of its reserve "NATO trained" battalions in the counter offensive, is behind on mobilization (so they've passed a law allowing foreign bounty hunters to operate in Ukraine and catch draft dodgers) and even if they catch up draftees need to be trained and the quality of draftees is also starting to be a serious problem.

To make matters worse for Ukraine, the US supplied Ukraine with cluster munitions because they "ran out" of normal shells, and this has unlocked the Russians use of cluster munitions on a large scale; especially cluster bombs which are way bigger than cluster shells. Maybe Russia would have started using cluster munitions at scale anyways, but the fact US supplied them has meant little PR consequence to Russia for their use.

Ukraine's air power is severely attritted and the F16 program, if it ever happens, could be literally years away from being fully effective (a lot needs to be done to make that a thing).

New chaos in the Middle East puts pressure on further ammunition support as well.

So for all these reason, Russia is extremely likely to press their advantages.

You're making an unwarranted leap here from arguing that Ukraine's Nazi problem is beneficial to Russian propaganda efforts to concluding that it was actually a reason for the russian government to invade. — Echarmion

It is actually "a reason", if the the Nazis help the invasion of Ukraine by providing both legitimate motivation (we don't like Nazis) as well as plenty of propaganda opportunity to amplify the threat of Nazis, that is "a reason" to invade, that he Ukrainians, at minimum, make the task easier of motivating your own society.

I have no problem with NATO enlargement being the main reason, but why Putin leads with "denazification" is because the NATO threat is very abstract. Now that NATO has sent NATO tanks into Ukraine and Russia is fighting NATO heavy weapons, it's more easy to sell that the conflict is actually with NATO so you see Russian rhetoric shifting in that direction the more NATO weapons arrive in Ukraine.

Now, the Nazis in Ukraine are also a legitimate security threat to Russia and are shelling the separatists (a situation that is not sustainable anyways). These are facts. A just war theory would need to navigate these facts and demonstrate that the separatists deserved to be attacked and shell (Ukraine's war on the separatists had just cause) as well as the Nazis are a threat but not "enough" of a threat for Russia to justify preemptive war.

No one's done, in the hundreds of pages that @ssu bemoaning (which the primary reason is the war continues, so too the discussion), the work of actually producing a just war theory for Ukraine, even less for the aims of reconquering all the territory and Crimea at heavy cost and little chance of success.

People, such as yourself, simply claim it's obvious ... while also claiming separatists are a thorny issue and that it was obvious to anyone who can read that Ukraine cannot possible prevail with NATO's level of support, that plenty of analysis was available that would make that clear.

Since I don't support NATO's policy even assuming Ukraine has just cause, the issue isn't so important to me and I don't have time to get into all the historical details to be "be sure" who has just cause, if anyone, in this conflict. I just don't see how it's obvious. In particular, I don't see how Russias war on Ukraine isn't justified if the US and NATO's various wars are, so I have particular issue with "it's ok when US does it because US hegemony is the bomb"; I don't have much issue with condemning both the US and Russia's imperial wars (although that doesn't resolve the issue of the Donbas).

What does it mean that it is "worrisome"? What exactly is the worry? — Echarmion

You honestly don't find the statement, assuming it's true, that Nazis with "partial control over as well as free rein to terrorize to affect political decisions and processes" worrisome?

If Ukrainian Nazis are murdering and intimidating for political purposes in Ukraine, that wouldn't worry you?

Certainly? No. You have no grounds to conclude that. — Echarmion

You'd have to be a moron to not have any fear of reprisal if you make peace and radical Nazi groups and affiliates disapprove of that, going so far as to murder a negotiator (negotiating on your behalf, you trust enough to send to talk to the Russians) to make the point. You'd have to be a moron to take at face value the reason for the murder was the negotiator was a traitor without evidence.

Now, if you really think Zelensky is that much of a clueless moron, feel free to state it clearly. Even I give Zelensky more credit.

As far as I can see, you have not provided a single example of them actually influencing a political process with violence. — Echarmion

Watch the videos and read the articles.

If people can murder their political opponents as well as agents of the state without consequence that will influence things.

And some more fantasy piled on top. You just can't help but venture forth into the ridiculous, apparently. — Echarmion

It's not at all ridiculous. There can be severe consequences from the security state for anyone who disapproves of the war, so if some stranger phones you up asking what you think about, you may answer more out of intimidation than freely (and this is ignoring the fact the questions are clearly manipulative).

No, it is not one step away from controlling the state. This is ridiculous nonsense. — Echarmion

Once you achieve enough military power that the state no longer applies to law to you (law enforcement are either on your side or too afraid to do anything), you are one step away from taking power. You maybe a minority of the electorate but you may have a majority of the weapons and people willing to use them.

In fact, one reason that you would want to the war to continue even if you know it is lost is so that the Russians destroy the Ukrainian regulars that could protect the state from a violent coup.

And we're in the realm of just baselessly spinning your narrative where you want it. — Echarmion

Again, read the articles. If you just ignore the evidence presented that Ukraine Nazis are unaccountable and act with impunity, or then believe people with that kind of power can't affect people's decisions, you're just a willfully ignorant fool at this point.

Feel free to engage with the evidence posted. But if it's all just "Russian propaganda" produced by Western journalists, I guess feel free to believe that.

An interesting slip, given you just claimed that you're not arguing that Ukraine is a nazi regime. — Echarmion

This is a paraphrase of the Nazi apologist position, here and elsewhere. If it's not quite exact, then feel free to interpret as Russia has the same Nazi problem as Ukraine. The main point in pushing the symmetry even to the extreme, is how would it matter? How does Russian Naziism, assuming it's as rampant as Ukrainian, justify supporting Ukrainian Nazis?

This consistent effort to lie, manipulate and distort is really tiresome. You claim one thing, then a few paragraphs later you're already backtracking, as if you're somehow unable to go through even one post without dialing up your claims again.

Case in point: — Echarmion

My position is Zelensky is not a Nazi but that Nazis at this point basically control everything that matters in Ukraine, such as the police state. So it's a slight distance away from a Nazi coup.

So we went from "there's a Nazi problem in Ukraine that strengthens russian propaganda" to "Ukraine is only one step away from a Nazi regime and a Nazi regime might actually pop up at any time". — Echarmion

Because we're not talking in some timeless vacuum of eternal abstract concepts.

In 2022, before the war, there were strong Nazi battalions that could act with impunity and unaccountability already, but they were small compared to the electorate and the regular Ukrainian army, so they did not have the power to stage a coup.

From 2014 to 2022 the Nazis main affect on history is keeping the war in the Donbas going, shelling civilians and being generally provocative, and frustrating any peace process. I would categorize them as a danger to Ukrainian democracy and clearly an obstacle to peace.

But they did not have the power before the war to just stage a violent coup.

Now, since the war, they grow exceptionally more powerful within the Ukrainian state but, more importantly, Ukrainian regulars are being destroyed.

If the process continues, at some point (which could exist even now) there would be no way for the Ukrainian state to resist a violent coup.

Needless to say that the latter claim barely even qualifies as a slippery slope fallacy. — Echarmion

A slippery slope fallacy requires an end-point that is either absurd or the proposer of the alleged fallacy anyways rejects. For example, that homosexual rights (broadening the scope of legal sexuality) will lead to legalizing beastiality and pedophilia, is a classic slippery slope fallacy.

A violent coup by an extremist group is in no way an absurd end point to the slippery slope that "can't happen". Has happened plenty of times in History.

I also don't anyways reject that it can happen.

It definitely can. I'm not predicting it (we don't have enough information of the various factions in Ukraine and their relative strength to make accurate predictions for this sort of thing), but it is definitely "in the cards", as I say.

It wouldn't be good for Ukraine obviously, and ruin further the economy, and would make further Western support reduce or stop entirely, but the groups in question would not care about that.

Right now the Nazis and other extremists who want the war to continue as long as possible (for example to "purify" society and amass as many weapons and funds as possible) need Zelensky to keep the money and arms flowing.

What I will predict is that as soon as the money and arms stop flowing, these groups would turn on Zelensky. I also predict that they'd also turn on him if he about faced and wanted to make peace with the Russians.

They may not, however, stage a violent coup even if they were capable. They may see the reason to not kill the goose the lays the golden egg.

What seems clear is that factionalism is rising between the major power blocks in Ukraine, Azov and the Nazis being one power block.

Understanding the war, its origins and causes, requires understanding this Nazi power block and its influence in Ukraine as well as provocative affect on Russia (that is both legitimate as well as ripe for cynical exploitation).

The war has greatly amplified all the "street politics" (aka. terrorism) trends that existed before the war.

It is an important factor to consider.

For example, if Nazis now have enough military and police power to simply take over the state, then they could leverage that to keep the war going to essentially extort the West. Obviously an actual Nazi coup in Ukraine would be a PR disaster for all the politicians and officials who have championed the war, so hardliners in Ukraine can hold that over NATO and to keep the money and the arms flowing.

Which would be my guess that they'd use their power for (and even if it's not clear they could take over, the threat needs to be considered) at this stage in the war.

As I say, it's a problem. Nazis aren't the only actor in Ukraine and in the conflict, but they are a significant force with their own agenda and have means to try to bring it about.

↪boethius, if you went over the thread, I think you'd find that there's no denying that Ukraine has a slew of social problems, so don't put words in my mouth. — jorndoe

Also, what's you're implication here, that all the Nazis in the videos I posted and the articles above are just another "social problem" like alcoholism, homelessness or child obesity?

Is it a "social problem" or "alternate world type stuff". So hard to keep track.

For anyone following:

Step one is straight up denialism, any mention of the Nazis in Ukraine is derided as purely Kremlin invented propaganda.

Faced with the evidence from Western sources that this is obviously not the case:

Step two is to claim that there's no more Nazis in Ukraine than anywhere else, it's just totally normal background Naziism levels, or something like that.

Again, faced with the evidence that is also not the case:

Step three is to claim there there's also Nazis in Russia!!

When this false symmetry is pointed out and also the obvious fact that even if true, that's not a justification to support Nazis in Ukraine; they'd just both have Nazis. What's even the argument, "we can have our Nazis if Russia has theirs?" Makes no sense and obviously presupposes there's a pretty bad Nazi problem in Ukraine if co-founders of Wagner also having Nazis tattoos and German nicknames (which is not enough evidence to constitute a Nazi ideology) is needed to desperately try to make the case that Russia is basically a Nazi regime too!!

Step four is to admit there is Nazis (not "alternative world stuff" after all) and admit they represent a pretty dangerous extremist problem, just that saying the whole regime in Kiev is Nazi is a ever so slight exaggeration Russian propaganda has made.

If the war goes badly (for Western policy and geopolitical strategy; obviously Ukrainians don't matter much to us) and also serves as the predicted breeding ground for far-right extremism mentioned above, the West may come to regret doing absolutely nothing about things like:

Another frequent honoree is Roman Shukhevych, revered as a Ukrainian freedom fighter but also the leader of a feared Nazi auxiliary police unit that the Forward notes was “responsible for butchering thousands of Jews and … Poles.” Statues have also been raised for Yaroslav Stetsko, a one-time chair of the OUN, who wrote “I insist on the extermination of the Jews in Ukraine.” — NBC

If there's a literal Nazi coup, which is not out of the cards, and an overt Nazi regime comes to power, it will suddenly be "OMG, what is happening, how did we ignore the Nazi problem".

Which is something, @Tzeentch, you should easily understand the relevance of, having already pointed out that proxies have a tendency to go out of control.

The West assumes Ukrainian democracy is going to survive the war. That is not certain.

The West has a lot of leverage in that Western money is needed to avoid terrible suffering in Ukraine, but fanatical extremists may not care about that. Russia has no intention of conquering the West of Ukraine, as you've likewise pointed out, so one potential end result is that if the war is lost for East Ukraine, the fanatical Nazi elements seize control of power in the West, Russians take what they want in Eastern Ukraine and then there is an actual frozen conflict, and some sort of dystopian nightmare unfolds in West Ukraine.

From what I understand, the CIA-neocons genuinely thought letting the Nazi problem grow wouldn't be "their problem" but Russias problem, be that insurgency they loved talking about. But if Russia doesn't conquer all of Ukraine then it will remain a Western problem.

And what can the West do about it if the worst elements in Ukraine come to power? Intervene militarily to avoid appeasement?

Goodie then, you don't defend/uphold the Kremlin's fabrication, glad to hear it. — jorndoe

Your claim was:

↪boethius, still going on about the Nazi stuff, eh? :)

I guess I can re-repeat. Nah, Ukraine still isn't ruled by a Nazi regime; those claims are straight from the Kremlin's propaganda machine (don't echo them). — jorndoe

I point out that's a straw man, I do not claim Ukraine is ruled by a Nazi regime.

No where do I claim Zelensky is a Nazi, and I wouldn't have a problem with the criteria that your leader needs to be a Nazi for the regime as a whole to be a Nazi; rather have pointed several times to Zelensky's inability to control the Nazis in Ukraine.

I have zero problem believing Zelensky's promises to make peace with Russia in his election campaign was a genuine desire and intention on Zelensky's part. As much as I think Zelensky is a fool, I do not think he's foolish enough to actually want war with Ukraine.

However, there is a powerful actor in Ukraine that did and does want war with Russia, which are the organized Nazi's and their mere "extremist white supremacist" affiliates.

These Nazis represent a problem. In the recent discussion, the main point is that they are a problem that contribute to Russian motivation to prosecute the war. If you simply ignore the Nazi problem (as the Western media did immediately before and then during the war) then arguments like "Russia doesn't know how it's fighting and has low moral" seem plausible.

The main reason for this total denialism of the Nazi problem, is that Nazis in Ukraine fighting Russian speakers, shelling Russian speaking civilians, overtly declaring their life style is one of warfare and their goal is a Great War with Russia, burning people in buildings and all sorts of other "street politics" (aka. terrorism), is an obvious provocation to Russia.

For example, if I go around with a swastika arm band, someone punching me in the face is still assault, but it's obviously not unprovoked. You can't say it's a random act of violence. And even if you want to argue that the assault is illegal and so on, almost no one in Western society will have sympathy for me as a explicit Nazi intentionally provoking aggression towards me by people who don't like Nazis (we're assuming here I'm of sound mind and not going to a halloween party or act in a play or whatever).

So if you want to keep the West behind the war then you need the Western media on board with the propaganda that there's no Nazis in Ukraine, oh ok there is but they're "everywhere" (as you put it), oh ok you got me they are a particular bad problem in Ukraine but they've reformed, all right all right they haven't reformed still Nazi as ever, but Russia has Nazis too!!"

Now what is the Nazi problem in Ukraine?

Since the question of Ukrainian perspectives was brought up, here's a Ukrainian perspective on the Nazi problem:

Far-right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy.
Far-right extremism represents a threat to the democratic development of Ukrainian society. The brief provides an overview of the activities and influence of the far right, differentiating between groups that express radical ideas but by and large operate within a democratic framework and extremist groups, which resort to violence to influence society. — Vyacheslav Likhachev, Freedomhouse.org

A key passage:

During confrontations between right-wing groups and law enforcement bodies, the police show unacceptable passivity when it comes to preventing or suppressing unlawful activities, investigating incidents, and bringing perpetrators to justice. For example, the Svoboda party activists who threw grenades during a rally outside parliament in 2015, killing four national guardsmen, have not yet been convicted. One of the latest examples of the authorities’ tolerant attitude was on display in February 2018, during clashes in Kyiv following a hearing of a case involving Odessa’s mayor, Gennadiy Trukhanov. After the hearing, National Druzhina activists and members of other radical groups attacked police officers using gas cartridges and even firearms. The officers reacted rather passively; one activist, who shot and wounded a police officer, has yet to be taken into custody. — Vyacheslav Likhachev, Freedomhouse.org

Now, what would killing a national guardsmen with a grenade outside parliament or congress be called if it happened in the EU or United States?

Terrorism.

What would "activists" shooting and wounding police officers be called in the EU or United States of political messaging motives?

Terrorism.

Well, at least if brown people of whatever shade did it.

This atmosphere has created favorable conditions for right-wing radicals and extremists, despite not being attractive as an electoral option. It has also left the state and society very vulnerable to their expansion. Radical groups no longer have to worry about societal or government reactions when it comes to recruiting members, they also face few restrictions when it comes to spreading their ideas. Effectively, they exist in an environment characterized by lack of accountability and impunity. — Vyacheslav Likhachev, Freedomhouse.org

Let's move onto NBC, a rare example in the Western Media that explains the Nazis in Ukraine are obviously a problem:

Ukraine's Nazi problem is real, even if Putin's 'denazification' claim isn't

But even though Putin is engaging in propaganda, it’s also true that Ukraine has a genuine Nazi problem — both past and present. — NBC

Obviously, the best propaganda is based on truth.

Imagine if the US actually found some WMD's in Iraq, no matter if they were in terrible condition and basically forgotten or lost by the Iraqi forces (and in no way some imminent threat to the US as was claimed to justify preemptive warfare), the US would be parading those photos around to this day. The problem with the WMD propaganda was that it had no truth to it at all; it was not an exaggeration of some smaller but still concerning fact, but completely fabricated and so didn't stand the test of time.

Likewise, imagine if Trump was not literally a Russian agent, but a pee tape did actually exist completely consensually and in save hands, just that Russia didn't have it and it remained zero evidence Trump colluded with the Russians. People would be going nuts. Indeed, the fact that members of Trumps administration did meet with Russian diplomats, there was at least some communication, was what fuelled Russia gate for years.

Point is, that there is an actual Nazi problem in Ukraine makes the propaganda work of motivating Russians to support the war far easier, even if you personally believe, and is critical to understanding the war and critical to take into account in understanding Western policy.

For example, if you're the US and actually want a war between Russia and Ukraine you would do nothing to stop the arming, funding and training of Nazis in Ukraine, and if your own country passes a law to make that illegal you just ignore that.

Just as disturbing, neo-Nazis are part of some of Ukraine’s growing ranks of volunteer battalions. They are battle-hardened after waging some of the toughest street fighting against Moscow-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine following Putin’s Crimean invasion in 2014. One is the Azov Battalion, founded by an avowed white supremacist who claimed Ukraine’s national purpose was to rid the country of Jews and other inferior races. In 2018, the U.S. Congress stipulated that its aid to Ukraine couldn’t be used “to provide arms, training or other assistance to the Azov Battalion.” Even so, Azov is now an official member of the Ukraine National Guard. — Ukraine's Nazi problem is real, NBC

Not only will the Nazis in Ukraine themselves take the initiative to provoke Russia as much as possible, but those provocations and the fact they are Nazis gives strong reasons and motivations for Russia to escalate and a factual basis to amplify with propaganda to sustain a larger conflict.

If one is interested in actual peace, obviously literal Nazi actors that have partial control over as well as free rein to terrorize to affect political decisions and processes, is worrisome.

For example, one reason for Zelensky to reject the Russian's offer was certainly Boris Johnson pressuring him to do so, but another reason is certainly fear of reprisal from the Nazis who (as all these articles point out) have very little electoral success (so do not legitimate represent the majority of Ukrainians) but who can affect political process by direct violence, as this Atlantic Council article points out what the actual problem is:

To be clear, far-right parties like Svoboda perform poorly in Ukraine’s polls and elections, and Ukrainians evince no desire to be ruled by them. But this argument is a bit of “red herring.” It’s not extremists’ electoral prospects that should concern Ukraine’s friends, but rather the state’s unwillingness or inability to confront violent groups and end their impunity. Whether this is due to a continuing sense of indebtedness to some of these groups for fighting the Russians or fear they might turn on the state itself, it’s a real problem and we do no service to Ukraine by sweeping it under the rug. — Ukraine’s Got a Real Problem with Far-Right Violence, Atlantic Council

Or as Washington Post describes the problem:

For the most extreme among these neo-Nazis, the plan is even more sinister. They see Ukraine as a chance to further “accelerationist” agendas, which seek to speed up a civilization-wide collapse and then build fascist ethno-states from the ashes. This school of thought is demonstrated vividly by “Slovak,” whom we at SITE consider one of the most influential accelerationist neo-Nazi voices in the far right. On Feb. 25, Slovak announced that he was leaving an unknown country to fight in Ukraine. “This war is going to burn away the physical and moral weakness of our people, so that a strong nation may rise from the ashes,” he wrote. “Our job is to ensure that conditions remain terrible enough for long enough for this transformation to happen, and happen it must. Our future is at stake and we may not get another chance, certainly not one as good as this.” — Neo-Nazis are exploiting Russia’s war in Ukraine for their own purposes, Washington Post

Have the above sort of ideology by powerful factions Ukraine is not a good thing for any peace process.

And not just a problem for Ukraine, but has wider implications for decades to come:

The issue at hand is not a matter of validating or invalidating narratives, though. The issue is security — for Ukraine and for the countries these extremists come from.
In many ways, the Ukraine situation reminds me of Syria in the early and middle years of the last decade. Just as the Syrian conflict served as a perfect breeding ground for groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, similar conditions may be brewing in Ukraine for the far right. Syria became a plotting and training ground for terrorists to mount attacks in the West, such as the attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels in 2016 attacks.

The extremists who successfully make it to Ukraine could return home with new weapons and combat experience under their belts — or stay in Ukraine, where they can further influence their countrymen online. — Neo-Nazis are exploiting Russia’s war in Ukraine for their own purposes, Washington Post

So what can we conclude from actual facts.

First, Ukraine has a Nazi problem.

Second, Nazis are able to influence the political process with violence instead of electoral success.

Third, the Nazis are powerful enough in Ukraine that they can commit clear acts of terrorism and face no consequences. They may not totally control the state, but they act with "impunity", so one step away of taking control of the state.

Why all this matters, is not only in understanding events, but also is another "thorny", I believe is the word, issue in terms of Western policy.

The first issue is when terrorist organizations can act with impunity and are fanatically devoted to further warfare, even if it reduces the country to "ashes" as some sort of purifying exercise, this factor in Ukrainian politics must be discounted in any justification for support for Ukraine; especially pressure to keep fighting rather than seek a peace deal. Since we know Ukrainian politics is affected by various Nazi projects through the threat of violence, we have to consider the possibility different more legitimate political actors are influenced by violent extortion.

"That Ukrainians want to fight," for example to retake all the land including Crimea, is not in itself justification for supplying arms to support that cause but certainly a necessary requirement for (at least public) Western political discourse. If that objective is more a Nazi objective than anyone else's, and polls are not only manipulative as we've seen but people can be intimidated to give one answer over another, then the West shouldn't support it. Which doesn't exclude any support at all, but could lead to supporting a defensive posture and negotiations instead of trying to reconquer territory at a massive cost to Ukrainian lives and economy (and may also have no chance of working).

Second policy problem is that even if one completed the complicated exercise of discounting Nazi influence on Ukrainian politics, certainly it would be important to any country that doesn't explicitly support fascism to make sure there are safeguards to prevent the grown (not just in Ukraine but internationally as seen above) of Naziism.

For example, you might want to have mechanisms to track arms and money and a veto on which foreign fighters can openly travel to Ukraine who "see Ukraine as a chance to further 'accelerationist' agendas, which seek to speed up a civilization-wide collapse and then build fascist ethno-states from the ashes," rather than structure support to Ukraine as an untraceable slush fund, both in terms of finance and arms (except of course the money that never enters Ukraine but is transferred directly to arms manufacturers).

Anyone knowing even a bit of Russian history (and from this post it is very clear that it is not you) knows that before Wagner Group started recruiting prisoners, it was an elite PMC who was very strict about its recruiting. I was talking about WAGNER, you know, like in WAGNER Group, i.e. its founder. He is not a random guy from prison, he is a guy who (along with Prigozhin), used his elite troops to medle in various conflicts around the world, with the blessing and financing from Kremlin. — Jabberwock

Yeah I get it, a real tough guy as tough as they come.

One of the first arguments used to apologize for the Nazi's in Ukraine is that they are just tough guys and having some spooky SS symbolism is just boys will be boys kind of things, doesn't mean anything.

The videos I posted clearly demonstrate the groups adoption of "Nazi stuff" is far deeper than just tattoos.

However, if there wasn't evidence of organized groups who are happy to explain their "Aryans will rise again" ideology, then it's a fair complaint that you're going to find these sorts of tough guy tattoos on tough guys the world over, may not mean more than that.

If your point is that Wagner is also a Nazi organization similar to Azov, you need that evidence you keep talking about.

Now, if your point is that Wagner is a tool of the Kremlin to advance its state policies where violence is needed, seems legitimate political process to me. How is Wagner different from American PMC's?

Putin since his second term have been coveting support from Russian nationalists (I have given tons of links with my exchange with Mikie). It happens so that many of the 'mainstream' (if you can call them that) nationalists have close relations with definitely-not-mainstream far-right nationaiists many of whom are neo-Nazi. They have been pampered, supported and financed by Putin for his political gain. — Jabberwock

Nationalists there definitely are in Ukraine. But please demonstrate there are groups that honour Nazi collaborators and are clearly organized around an explicitly Nazi ideology, not just have a few "bad apples". Now, if you want to say the nationalism is a different flavour, not explicitly Nazi, but just as bad, sure, I don't have a problem with that.

Lol. You clearly have no clue how propaganda in Russia works. I recommend watching some excerpts prepared by Julia Davis. — Jabberwock

You're telling me that Putin calls the military campaign major objective "denazification" and that didn't play well in Russia.

Normal Russians were just like "pfff, plenty of that over here, denazify Russia already".

It's simply obvious fact that the Nazi groups that rose to positions of power and prominence (though not through legitimate electoral means) and openly talked about their desire to destroy Russia (I believe one slogan was "first Moscow, then Berlin!") does not help motivate the Russian population to get behind the war (which a large majority of Russians support).

It's also an obvious fact that when you have fanatical groups willing to use "street politics" (what terrorism is called when white people do it) to kill opponents and intimidate everyone, murder a negotiator in a peace process, it both clouds political legitimacy and frustrates peace processes.

Both points are essential to understanding the war: there are very motivated forces in Ukraine that do not want any peace and are willing to use violence to prevent peace, and those forces also provide some reasonable basis for regular Russians to support the war.

Since we're on a philosophy forum and no one has actually detailed a just war argument for Ukraine, explaining how the separatists deserved to be shelled, etc. the Nazi's in Ukraine must also be touched on in a just-war theory for Ukraine. I keep on being told that the answer to this issue is there "is not enough Nazis in Ukraine", I ask "what would enough be?" and this question is never answered, but apparently just asking for a little expansion of the just war theory, to clarify a key term, is "pro Putin".

However, this whole business of trying to prove there's "just as much Nazis in Russia" is completely absurd as it clearly accepts what the posted reporting shows, there's a Nazi problem in Ukraine.

How is there being a Nazi problem in Russia, assuming that's true, justification to ignore the same problem in Ukraine? And if this is the case, why would we care about either?

Is the logic here that we can support, train, arm and finance Nazis in Ukraine, that's justifiable and honours all the forebears who fought or resisted the Nazis, as long as Russia too has some Nazis?

My position honestly doesn't seem to warrant any controversy at all, as a Canadian I don't want to see Canadian money and arms and training in the hands of Nazis. Indeed, there were laws passed to make sure the government wasn't inadvertently arming Nazis in Ukraine in support of the "legitimate government there" ... and a reporter goes and demonstrate exactly that is happening and ... nada.

The West could have made a real tangible distinction between the Nazis and the Ukrainian government (which would have limited significantly the growth of the Nazi organization and the "street politics"; aka. terrorism) but the West doesn't, that's my main issue. And why does the West (as in Governments) not even try to distinguish between Nazis and not-Nazis in Ukraine? Because it's only the Nazis willing to shell civilians and keep the conflict going in the Donbas come what may!

Well that presupposes that you know what is pro-Ukrainian. BTW positions that get hundreds of thousands of Palestianis killed and do not accomplish the war aims, is not pro-Palestianian, right? — neomac

Go on, explain how hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians dying for war aims that are not accomplished and seems clear to everyone now was completely obvious to everyone all along that the war aims wouldn't be accomplished with the means supplied ... is "pro-Ukrainian"?

BTW positions that get hundreds of thousands of Palestianis killed and do not accomplish the war aims, is not pro-Palestianian, right? — neomac

I have no problem saying that if the war aims are not accomplished at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, knowing the disastrous result ahead of time was guaranteed, positions that supported such a military disaster are not "pro-Palestinian".

However, if you want to talk about Hamas here, I am not in favour of terrorism: Palestinian terrorism nor Israeli terrorism, as terrorism frustrates legitimate political process and the mutual cycle of terrorism in Israel and the occupied territories demonstrates exactly why terrorism is so toxic to solving things through dialogue.

Fortunately, Hamas is competent and savvy enough to avoid a path that gets hundreds of thousands of Palestinians killed, only mere tens of thousands.

More importantly, likely Hamas has achieved its war aims of demonstrating to the Arab world that Israel can be humiliated on the battlefield, this will motivate additional fanaticism for decades to come.

With enough irregular forces with enough asymmetric assets borne from modern technology, irregular forces that can't practically be deterred with nuclear weapons, there very well may come the day when the IDF loses to a ragtag collection of groups originally created, trained, financed and incubated in the wars of the US.

It seems that the exchange of violence in this war disfavours the Palestinians, but that isn't their calculus. Hamas killed a meaningful percentage of the total Israeli population, whereas Israel has killed a meaningless percentage of the total Muslim population, of which, along with Israeli merciless reprisal and the anger that fuels, the other aim of the operation is to rekindle the dream of a Muslim-Isreali war (or then at least enough Muslims to raise enough funds to attract enough jihadists to the holy land to give the IDF a run for its money).

As a racist and genocidal group, I do not support Hamas, but their strategy does make sense.

Anyone who knows anything about Russian history (that one made me laugh out loud!) knows perfectly well that there are quite a few people branding Nazi symbols in Russia as well, in nationalistic circles quite close to Kremlin in particular. — Jabberwock

Complete false symmetry.

What you describe is called actual cherry picking (what the people complaining about Ukrainian Nazi's were accused of, that of course among "tough guys" you're going find the odd Totenkopf or two and maybe even a Swastika).

Wagner is recruiting hardened criminals from prison.

What the reporters reveal in the videos I posted (did you watch them?) are organizations with a sophisticated Nazi ideology, not just a few "tough guys" with some tough symbols.

So on the substance, unless you can provide more than some cherry picked tough guys with tough tattoos to signal their toughness, it is simply false to say Naziism is as popular and influential in Russia as it is in Ukraine, as tolerated in Russia as it is in Ukraine.

Are there parades of torch holders with pictures of Nazi collaborators in Moscow, or are there?

On the substance, you are simply wrong, but feel free to provide comparable evidence as the series of videos I posted (all by reputable Western news organizations).

Now, on the point you are responding to, my point is exactly that Putin can make a simplistic argument!

Doesn't matter how complicated you think it is, a lot of Russians will be sympathetic to Putins justification they are fighting Nazi's in Ukraine. You're saying regular Russians hold your view that it's more complicated, that of course Russia has just as many Nazi's?

Think about it, obviously not.

I focus on the symbolism these groups use in that statement just because that's what will be used by Putin to communicate this to the public. I specifically explain that this factual based motivation is going to be even stronger with propaganda.

You just said you wanted to understand the war:

Yes, I do have a problem with that. I am trying to understand the conflict, not cheerleading for a side. — Tzeentch

Well evaluating Russian motivation is part of understanding the war.

We were sold on the idea that Russian soldiers and society were poorly motivated and so would collapse and that was an essential advantage of the Ukrainians.

"Nazis in Ukraine is baseless Kremlin propaganda!" is the common refrain to the subject of the nominal purposes of the war "denazification".

Or you need to actually get deeper into this and see it is a bit more complicated than that. — Jabberwock

My argument is that Nazis in Ukraine is an easy motivator for Russians.

As for just-war clearly Russia has arguments there war is just, my position on the matter is that it is not obvious and I don't accept "pro-Ukrainians" here simply stating the just-warness for Ukrainian fighting is "obvious".

The issue doesn't matter to me as I'm already a war skeptic and my compatriots are difficult to imagine more pro war, and my position is that it's immoral to send arms and not soldiers.

I am for the path that minimizes suffering.

If NATO sent soldiers and ended the war that way (ideally before the war happened) and avoided nuclear escalation and so on and "stood up" to Putin and talked his "language of strength" I'd be all for it.

My position would be that NATO may have done bad things in the Middle East, but at least they avoided this particular war from happening.

Obviously at no point was NATO even contemplating sending troops to Ukraine to stop anything but using Ukrainians for their own purposes, a policy I'm against.

"Is Ukraine's war against the Donbas justified?" and "is Russia's invasion of Ukraine justified?" and "is Ukraine attempting to regain the lost territory justified given the risks and the costs" are all questions that would be relevant to me personally if NATO was sending troops, which is obviously not going to happen.

The position of "Ukraine is righteous!!!!! .... but ... we don't want to escalate" is obviously a recipe to have Ukraine destroyed and attempt to maximize suffering. As "escalation" is code for "Russia losing on the battlefield".

That's why I have no problem to qualify myself as pro-US while you seem to have problems to qualify yourself as pro-Russian. — neomac

To add to reply, positions that get hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and do not accomplish the war aims, is not pro-Ukrainian.

It may simply be true that Ukraine has almost no chance of some sort of military victory, especially given NATO's policy at the start of the war of no heavy weapons ... which we're now told by pro-Ukrainians that:

"You need heavy weapons to prevail in a high intensity conflict" and "breaking through a prepared, tiered defense will be difficult" is not exactly ground breaking stuff. Such analysis was widely available for anyone who cares to look. — Echarmion

Apparently now it's "not ground breaking stuff" and such "analysis was widely available" (even to NATO?), now that it's been proven to be obviously true.

Yet I was accused of being a Putinist, repeating Russian propaganda etc. when I pointed out Ukrainians maybe able to arrest Russian advances and harass salients but have essentially zero chance of pushing the Russians out of Southern Ukraine without heavy weapons.

It's just a true fact it turns out, even according to pro-Ukrainians ... so how was I anti-Ukrainian for posting it out and expounding the reasons for it in March 2022?

boethius, everyone having followed already knows (re-repeating, again), in fact, extremism is a problem all over (e.g. † below), yet, again, — jorndoe

So we're back to the extremists (literal Nazi's) in Ukraine exist everywhere in the same amount?

Please, explain how analogous extremists are of similar problem in Norway, Portugal, Costa Rica, and "all over"?

Ukraine still isn't ruled by a Nazi regime; those claims are straight from the Kremlin's propaganda machine (don't echo them)
[...]
Apr 25, 2022 - Dec 20, 2022 - Aug 2, 2023 — Nov 28, 2023

No where do I claim Ukraine is ruled by a Nazi regime.

I explain they are obviously a problem. The position of "the problem of Nazi's in Ukraine" uses the word "problem". They cause problems.

For example, (again before the Western media got the memo that Nazi's in Ukraine are alright):

Commentary: Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem
As Ukraine's struggle against Russia and its proxies continues, Kiev must also contend with a growing problem behind the front lines: far-right vigilantes who are willing to use intimidation and even violence to advance their agendas, and who often do so with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies. — Commentary: Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem

Saying things like "oh there's extremists everywhere" is called trying to cover for these Nazis sympathizing with these Nazis.

These Nazi's are obviously a problem. Claiming that extremism is some comparable problem everywhere (to therefore try to minimize its problem in Ukraine) is both a bold faced lie (you will not find similar extremism "everywhere", and where you do, such as the Middle East, it is also obviously a problem that likewise frustrates political process), obviously pro-Nazi, and also obviously the whataboutism fallacy (what about the extremists in New Zealand!!) but even worse simply skipping over the fact that where violent extremism is a problem (using violence and terror to affect the political process; aka. terrorism) you either have government doing its best to stop said extremists or then far bigger political problems if the extremists are in government.

It's obviously a problem. "Far-right vigilantes who are willing to use intimidation and even violence to advance their agendas, and who often do so with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies," is a problem. Murdering a negotiator during a negotiation is called using "intimidation and violence to advance their agenda" and obviously has tacit approval from law-enforcement as it is literally law enforcement.

Now, even if you want to minimize the problem as you do, there's clearly plenty of visible evidence documented by Western media such as I posted, so, again, it is simply a bold faced lie to say the problem is Kremlin propaganda. Explain how all the reports I posted are Kremlin propaganda.

Understanding that the underlying problem is obviously a problem and not propaganda, is perilous to ignore as it will lead to underestimating Russia's motivations.

You can argue there wasn't "enough Nazis" in Ukraine to justify invasion in some absolute moral framework or whatever framework you like, be the first to actually provide a definition of "enough Nazis", but the strong presence of Nazis is still required to understand political process in Ukraine (that some respondents to a poll may feel intimidated into giving one answer over another, for example).

But regardless if you actually present a just war argument for Ukraine after 536 pages of the discussion, it is an important fact in understanding the war that the Nazis in Ukraine will provide strong motivations for Russians (regardless if they really "rule" Ukraine or not, regardless of their total numbers and strength). That a completely factual based motivation can be further amplified by propaganda should simply increase our estimation of Russian will to fight. Assuming Russians had low morale and would just collapse any day, in the words of our precious NATO leader, turned out to be "underestimating" the Russians, which we should never do!

Ignoring or minimizing the Nazis leads to false understanding the war and poor decision making.

... in fact, they've made progress (re-repeating), while their northern neighbor has regressed (re-rep...). The so-called deNazification of Ukraine is but another political tool borne of ulterior motives. A Nazi regime to join the EU? Nay, Kyiv just isn't that Nazi stronghold narrated by the Kremlin to be cleansed, get over it.

† I'll just stick to links ...

The US · WISN · Nov 18, 2023
Germany · Bloomberg · Nov 5, 2023
The US (military) · VICE · Oct 20, 2022
Russia (military) · VICE · Aug 22, 2022
The US / Online · NBC · Jan 8, 2021
France · France 24 · Oct 29, 2020
Sweden · euronews · Sep 30, 2017 — jorndoe

First of all, the videos don't seem to support your point but rather support the point that violent extremism is a problem (except of course when it's "for democracy") whenever it frustrates legitimate political process.

Second, as the videos I post demonstrate, there are clearly Nazis in Ukraine. The Nazis in Ukraine is borne from the Nazis in Ukraine. If Putin intended to invade Ukraine all along, then the West and Ukraine tolerating and arming and incorporating into government the Nazis in Ukraine simply provides Putin an amazingly good pretext for the invasion. If Putin did not plan to invade Ukraine all along but is reacting to security threats, Nazis in Ukraine growing in strength all the time is an obvious security threat.

The Ukrainians have proven willing to change for the better, but not to be overrun by Russia just like that (again); the Kremlin has proven unwilling to change for the better, and continue to landgrab and bomb others in the name of their authoritarianism. (By the way, shouldn't someone have freed Ukraine from military-political covert invaders like Girkin? Shouldn't someone de-genocide the Uyghurs? Shouldn't someone clean up the Kremlin?) — jorndoe

What is the point you are trying to make? How did Ukrainians change for the better for example?

I'll respond to tomorrow to the rest of your post, and also @neomac I have not forgotten your posts either so don't worry about further education.

However, since I will be focusing on this particular justification next, the "Ukrainians want fight" as both a justification for Ukrainians fighting as well as justification for our arming and financing Ukrainians entire war effort as well as a large part of the their civilian economy, and how this argument further cry-baby logic and cannot possibly stand to scrutiny (for example if you're Ukrainian is your justification to fight that Ukrainians want to fight?), but I wish for today to just foreshadow this next chapter in our little saga together with consideration of the actual poll.

But if you're interested in how Ukrainians view the war here is an interesting study from April specifically about people living close to the front. And here is a Gallup poll from October.

Unsurprisingly, people do actually care about the "cry baby logic" of who has the righteous cause and about defending their country. — Echarmion

First you and anyone reading this notice the goal posts moving from " some 'generalized Ukrainian' that fights on the front" to just Ukrainians in general.

But as for the poll itself, there is a whole science on how polls can be manipulated.

Even assuming everyone in Ukraine feels completely free to express themselves and let's also ignore the fact alternative views to the government have been criminalized and critical media and opposition parties banned.

Just consider the poll itself, the choice is:

Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war — Gallop poll

and

Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible — Gallop poll

The first question is manipulative as it presumes Ukraine can win not only does it add positive connotation but you can legitimately interpret the question as "assuming Ukraine will win the war, should Ukraine continue fighting until it wins?"

The second question is likewise manipulative as it adds "as soon as possible", even if you are in favour of a negotiated settlement to terminate the war you may not be in favour of "as soon as possible" which sounds like simply capitulating.

Not that Ukrainians (even with completely free and critical press and elections unbanned and legitimate non-manipulative polling questions) believing they should continue fighting would form a valid justification, but anyone interested in how the Western media deploys the cry-baby logic of "waaaah, stop asking for justifications and 'reasons' for things, Ukrainians want to fight!" it starts with a transparently manipulative poll to skew the results, in an environment where critical media is banned and skepticism about the war can get you killed, and also the government lying to their population regularly with constant fabricated propaganda (from ghost of Kiev to assuring people the Ukrainian military can and will win and casualties are low and so on).

No it's not. — Echarmion

For someone who is willing to demand evidence for common knowledge (such as Ukrainian mobilization being not remotely close to a majority volunteer basis), you should, and everyone else following, really pause to appreciate you're own argument method of just dropping contradictions without any evidence or argument at all.

Yes it is. Money laundering is the transfer of property in the commissioning of or then to move the proceeds of a crime. Having someone act as a front is fraud and a crime.

In transferring the asset's nominal owner, Zelensky is trying to obfuscate the real ownership and control of the asset, a crime in itself, and obviously for the purposes of further money laundering.

Obfuscating the real owner of an asset is a crime.

Now, if you want to argue it was "just a gift!" feel free just say that.

Obviously you don't. — Echarmion

Are you going to even bother to respond to Reuters reporting what is clearly a bribe:

The wife of Ukrainian president-elect Volodymyr Zelenskiy bought a luxury apartment for less than half the market rate from business tycoon Oleksandr Buryak, according to official income and property records. — Reuters

The above, along with the offshore assets and accounts, are absolutely cut and dry, perfectly clear, smoking gun, caught red handed, indisputable proof of corruption.

But feel free to provide at least some bullshit whitewashing of the issue.

When money laundering is exposed it clearly requires additional cleaning.

And this "moral hazard" is here supposed to stand in for evidence and an argument, but I don't accept such a transparent shifting of goalposts. — Echarmion

I said it's a de facto bribe, which is a kind of moral hazard (there are other kinds, but this is the name of the general phenomenon when).

In economics, a moral hazard is a situation where an economic actor has an incentive to increase its exposure to risk because it does not bear the full costs of that risk. — Moral hazard

In this case, the war represents significant economic risks to Ukrainian citizens: jobs, homes, infrastructure, savings, everything.

If you are able to profit from the war (due to NATO pumping in billions of dollars of money structured as an untraceable slush fund) and in a position of power to make or influence decisions, then you have an incentive to increase your exposure to war because you stand to benefit.

This adds to intrinsic moral hazard that elites can usually insulate themselves from the risk of fighting on the front line that essentially all wars have.

Now, if NATO didn't offer the funds structured as a slush fund and tried to remove the moral hazard, saying something along the lines of they're going to make sure the money is traceable if they're going to pump billions into Ukraine (something that as the funder you can easily demand) then it would not be a de facto bribe. But NATO has explicitly said they don't track what happens to funds or arms once they enter Ukraine, and they obviously knew that offering the funds in this way would be a significant moral hazard to Ukrainian decision makers forming a conflict of interest with their constituents (i.e. a bribe).

You did not provide any. I'm not about to go trawl the web to find some reference that might prove your point. — Echarmion

So if I post the evidence, you'll agree the claim should be presumed true?

Just piling on spurius logic onto bullshit claims. The aid is not "set up as a slush fund", since most of it is material in nature. "Zelensky is corrupt therefore money flowing to Ukraine is a bribe for Zelensky" is entirely non sequitur and a laughably bad attempt to make on a philosophy forum of all places. — Echarmion

Again just saying things that would be convenient for your position if they were true ... without even bothering to educate yourself a minimum on the issue.

If you go to the following page by the Council of Foreign Relations, you will be able to see for yourself how the aid breaks down.

They don't provide convenient totals, but the main support is the EU (82.7 billion financial aid and 2.4 billion humanitarian aid) and the US (46.6 billion in military aid, 26.4 billion in financial aid and 3.9 billion in humanitarian aid) and Germany (18.9 billion in military aid, 1.4 billion in financial aid and 2.7 billion in humanitarian aid).

The sub-totals of the top 3 donors are thus:
- 110.5 billion USD in financial aid
- 65.5 in military aid

The next top donor is the UK with evenly split aid and the others are so small the change will be negligible to the conclusion that most aid is financial.

Now, certainly some financial aid doesn't reach Ukraine, but the West has been clear that what enters Ukraine is not tracked. Obviously the arms can also be sold on the blackmarket so I don't see how that's anyways an argument against people standing to benefit from the war, creating a moral hazard (aka. bribe if things are structured intentionally this way, which they are).

You don't know that, and in any event your claim was that they "are not fighting voluntarily" which is different from being formally a volunteer. You can fight voluntarily as a draftee. — Echarmion

A draftee is by definition not a voluntary occupation, moreso if you are banned from even leaving the country. If you're argument is that "they volunteered in their hearts" ... I guess we'll have to wait until after the war.

You do not need supporting evidence for this.
— boethius

Oh I do. — Echarmion

Well apparently you need evidence that someone caught with offshore accounts and accepting a bribe through his wife deserves every possible suspension of belief when new allegations of corruption turn up. To myself and non-corrupt people you only get one chance to not-be-corrupt, and it doesn't really matter how much additional corruption you do. Maybe the yacht story will prove true, maybe not, maybe just forgotten in the annals of the internet, but we already have the offshore accounts from The Guardian and the bribe from Reuters; that's plenty of corruption for my taste, but if you want to eat more help yourself.

This is of course utter nonsense, but I realize you feel unable to deal with the actual argument and so make up your own. — Echarmion

What's the actual argument?

My argument is that tying dissatisfaction about the world directly to action that immediately satisfied the emotion that dissatisfaction causes, does not constitute a justification for said action.

"Ukrainians want to fight" is not a justification to reject Russia's offer and continue fighting, nor a justification to provide arms to Ukraine, and "Putin can't be trusted!" is even less of a justification to reject a peace offer. Likewise, "illegal invasion", "right to self defence!", "Putin is Imperialist", "fight them there rather than here!!" and so on are not justifications.

A justification would not only need to start with establishing Ukrainian just cause (actually demonstrate Ukraine's attack on the separatists is justified) but then need to further demonstrate that the course of action is worthwhile: aka. that Ukraine can make military gains that are worth the blood paid and that course of action is better than the alternatives.

Since the start of the war, we just get these sound bites as justification for things (for example "Putin can't be trusted! No guarantee can be trusted!" but winning the war isn't guaranteed either nor even continued NATO support: no option is guaranteed and so observing that fact does not justify one course of action over another), and this is what I call cry baby logic. If Ukraine cannot win (as in has an exceedingly low chance of winning), then it is not ethical to send men (and women now too apparently) to their deaths for a cause that has essentially no chance of succeeding.

There are other strategies available; saying one strategy is better than the other requires some actual analysis of the options available. If you simply skip the analysis from a complaint about the world to actions that satiate the emotions but nothing is thought through, this is literally baby logic.

And you say yourself that making negotiation positions public is dangerous, so obviously understand Zelensky's public repudiation of negotiations and public ultimatums and vowing to win back even Crimea is foolish and dangerous; what is the justification of such actions? It simply "felt good at the time". That's the only justification, literally a baby's justification for crying over a broken cookie if a baby could articulate their thought process.

I don't need to provide evidence for claims you make up. — Echarmion

You bring up the Ukrainian soldier wanting to fight as a rebuttal to my explaining how the cry-baby logic works: zero consideration to the costs to Ukraine of "fighting to win", 100% emotional convenience.

Your rebuttal doesn't work anyways, the "tough Azov guy" can be equally stuck in cry-baby fallacy if their understanding and motivations for the war are really as simplistic as the cry-baby logic. I only contradicted your point in itself (that Ukrainians on the front believe Zelensky's cry-baby justifications for the war) because I honestly give Ukrainians on the front more credit than you do. I'm pretty confident most Ukrainians understand most things Zelensky says is propaganda meant mostly for a Western audience.

But it remains your point, so if it's important you should therefore provide evidence that most Ukrainians on the front choose to be there voluntarily. You're the one assuming "Ukrainians on the front" in some general sense want to fight voluntarily. I don't think it's a fact and even if it was I don't see how that would justify anything.

Your rebuttal is basically not a rebuttal, you don't show how the argument for fighting (and sending more men and woman to their deaths) is a more sophisticated argument that "Russia can't be trusted!" or "self-defence!", so you just conjure up the tough soldier on the front as some sort of philosophical human shield and dare me to call a big brawny soldier a cry-baby.

Ok, you don't feel the need to provide any evidence that most soldiers fighting want to be there, but let's put that aside, assuming Ukraine cannot win is it justifiable to continue fighting? If Ukraine can win ... how?

If you want to rebut a claim, just thinking it's not true isn't enough. — Echarmion

I provided you the evidence that implies most Ukrainians on the front are not volunteers: the laws barring men from leaving Ukraine, and going from 250 000 soldiers to over 800 000 through mobilization.

Again, it's your claim that there's some "generalized Ukrainian" that fights on the front with the same simplistic cry-baby logic as you and your fellows here as well as Zelensky. I provide evidence that points to that not being the case compared to you providing literally zero evidence, then my evidence to rebut your unsubstantiated claim isn't good enough for you?

Wildly bad faith, but that's why I'm here (to interrogate how this bad faith and delusions work in practice) now that all the reasonable points of time for a negotiated settlement have passed.

You're a master at closing the door to communication yourself. Both you and Bobo have had closed doors several pages ago and have just been talking to a screen and projected caricature of each other. And thus really only talking with one's self. — Vaskane

This is really not the case, I am happy to entertain @Echarmion's arguments.

And we're not talking past each other but have agreed on the essential point that Zelensky was a moron to repudiate negotiations:

Actual offers in serious diplomatic negotiations are not made public, much less when actual lifes are at stake. Sure Ukraine could publish the offers made, but then why would we believe Ukraine was telling the full truth, and any such move could jeopardize further negotiations — Echarmion

And @Echarmion also agreed that Ukraine's leverage was higher before compared to now, just wants to equivocate on exactly which point was the maximum.

For me it doesn't really matter, as Zelensky repudiates negotiations making his position at the time that Russia withdrawing from all of Ukraine was a precondition to even negotiate again, and in @Echarmion's own words that "such move could jeopardize further negotiations".

This is the main issue of contention, which @Echarmion clearly understand perfectly fine.

He simply doesn't want to admit it, so now has retreated into the wishful thinking that Ukraine will pull off some incredible turn around on the battlefield.

Obviously, that implies that my main points are correct if that doesn't happen, main points being:

1. Ukraine should have pledged neutrality in a negotiation, of course trying to get the best deal for doing so possible (losing a war is not a preferable option in anycase)

2. Zelensky should have repudiated negotiations and make public promises and commitments that would "jeopardize further negotiations".

3. Ukraine had and has little chance of winning the war in any military sense.

4. NATO has not even made a credible effort to even have a good crack at it (fearing nuclear escalation and getting Finland and Sweden into NATO, selling gas to Europe, lot's of funds to arms suppliers, maybe even damaging the Russians a bit, who knows, all make the war worth it without victory).

And these last two points @Echarmion also seems to agree with in claiming that:

You seem to be vastly overvaluing the novelty of your predictions. "You need heavy weapons to prevail in a high intensity conflict" and "breaking through a prepared, tiered defense will be difficult" is not exactly ground breaking stuff. Such analysis was widely available for anyone who cares to look. — Echarmion

Which also gives me a chance to respond to this point in pointing out my whole argument was those things are obvious and so NATO's policy of not sending Ukraine heavy weapons was obviously designed so they can't actually go do what Zelensky promised, not even a chance; maybe hold the line, maybe take back a bit of territory, but not actually rout the Russians (which may have actually been possible in 2022 as Russia did not mobilize any forces for the operation and then delayed doing so a considerable amount of time ... of course they don't need to if we all agree with @Echarmion that it's completely obvious Ukraine could not possibly prevail with the commitment level from NATO in 2022).

As for the Nazi's, they are obviously there (go through the videos if you want to explain how there's no Nazi's in those videos) and they are an important player in the war co-creating many of the events.

@Echarmion claims Ukraine's just cause is obvious, requiring no evidence nor argumentation, and I simply point out (on a philosophy forum) that it's not so obvious: Ukraine is attacking separatists (shelling civilians, which does not seem to be in dispute, @Echarmion just says it's not enough to justify defending said civilians) and Ukraine has this Nazi problem, so arguing Ukraine has just cause is clearly not obvious, you'd need to contend with these two issues, of which the first issue @Echarmion already agreed was "thorny":

Separatism is a thorny issue at the best of times, and the Donbas separatists lack any convincing popular legitimacy. — Echarmion

Not only making a claim with zero evidence (while chastising others for not citing things that should be common knowledge to anyone interested in the subject, such as Ukraine's various rounds of mobilzation), but contradicting his claim that Ukraine's just cause is some epistemological status of "obvious" and requires no argumentation at all.

But clearly according to @Echarmion at minimum a just cause argument for Ukraine requires dealing with this "thorny issue at the best of times" ... which seems completely incompatible with the criteria of "obvious".

Now, my own position is that I don't really care who has just cause in the war, as my own country and the political block I'm apart of (the EU) rules out anyways sending soldiers to Ukraine and there's this whole drip feed of arms to simply prop up Ukraine, but I view as immoral if indeed Ukraine does have just cause. If Ukraine has some sort of categorical imperative just cause (that justifies fighting even without any theory of victory) we should send our own soldiers to help defend Ukraine, which we don't so it doesn't matter.

Therefore, if Ukraine has no hope of defeating the Russians, just cause or not, the best pathway is a negotiated settlement.

Not only have we made plenty of progress already in our discussion, but further dialogue with @Echarmion is interesting as it is revelatory of how easily and quickly people rewrite and edit history and just ignore anything inconvenient to them.

For example, we spent no small amount of comments discussing if Russia did make an offer to Ukraine of withdrawing in exchange for neutrality, recognizing Crimea, some protective status for Donbas. This was common knowledge discussed at length here and elsewhere that this offer was made. The main defence of Zelensky for rejecting the offer was that "couldn't be trusted", entire pages of discussion were dedicated to the meaning of "guarantee" in international agreements (that it is not "ontological" but rather ornamental, there is no way to be sure any international party will do what they guarantee and no body to force them, but that not a reason to reject international agreements, what matters is an estimation of the various forces at play going forward and if a party will be likely compelled to stick to the agreement for many reasons, one being the diplomatic cost of breaking a guarantee). Point is, plenty of discussion on Russia's offer and Zelensky rejecting it.

@Echarmion, having already agreed Ukraine's leverage was greater at the start of the war (though maybe not the maximum but greater than now), then simply refuses to believe even Reuters has a proper understanding of the offer, equivocating on the meaning of "ceasing military operations" and making the additional claim that position are secret anyways.

While we're discussing this, the lead negotiator of Ukraine does an interview where he confirms exactly what everyone understood at the time and more! Saying the only point of relevance was neutrality, everything else (such as Donbas status) just purely cosmetic and provided exactly the justification that I debated with Olivier5 for like a hundred comments, that "Russia couldn't be trusted" (no "guarantee" from Russia is an actual "guarantee").

Now, does @Echarmion apologize for the bad faith tactic of demanding proof of common knowledge?

No, and to that extent he refused dialogue as you say, but for me it is very enlightening into the psychology of adherents to the mainstream narrative when the cognitive dissonance starts.

Which is my new purpose here now that the opportune moments for a peace agreements are passed, and any deal is unlikely to be the result of sober moral deliberation considering the costs of war but because Ukrainian government collapses, so for me the main value of the discussion now is to delve into the psychology of war enthusiasm.

Anyways, if you are better at arguing than myself or @Echarmion feel free to argue any of the main points or then feel free to provide better points of debate of your own.

Money laundering? Perhaps you should look at a dictionary first. You're parroting propaganda to the point of embarrassment. — Echarmion

When you transfer an asset into someone else's name to act as a front man in order to avoid legal scrutiny (for example because you're about to be the President of a country), that's already fraud. Transferring an asset in a fraudulent way to avoid accountability is already in itself money laundering.

We don't need more details about what these offshore accounts were used for and the context of the asset transfer, 1 week before assuming office, makes any argument that moving these shares was just a "gift to a friend" impossible to make. But go ahead and make it.

I don't personally need more evidence that Zelensky is corrupt and knows that the proposal of sending hundreds of billions of dollars Ukraine's way he can take a little off the top.

But even if you want to just believe Zelensky is the diamond in the rough and straight as an arrow, my argument applies not simply to Zelensky but all the Ukrainian elites and decision makers, they will all stand to benefit from billions of dollars structured in the form of a slush fund being sent to Ukraine, and Zelensky himself complains about corruption, even in high places.

My point is the money is a de facto bribe to everyone with any sort of power in Ukraine. Zelensky is obviously well positioned to take advantage with his offshore dealings and proven front men for laundering money, and has since chastised any inquiry into the matter, but if you want to believe Zelensky setup secret offshore accounts and holding companies just to "tempt himself" to prove is moral and assetic solidity, it doesn't really change my argument much consider Zelensky himself complains about corruption in Ukrainian politics and governance. Plenty of people in Ukraine are making bank off the war and have a motivation to see it continue, and that is a what corporate people call a "moral hazard".

Another strawman. — Echarmion

What straw man? My argument is that if you're caught laundering money once (especially if you've been criticizing your political opponents of that exact thing, calling it corrupt, without disclosing you also are doing that thing) you shouldn't get much.

The story about the yachts has actual evidence provided, I have not seen anyone actually explain what's fabricated about the evidence or contradicting claims from the other parties involved.

Exclusive: Wife of Ukraine president-elect got penthouse bargain from tycoon

The wife of Ukrainian president-elect Volodymyr Zelenskiy bought a luxury apartment for less than half the market rate from business tycoon Oleksandr Buryak, according to official income and property records.

Zelenskiy, a comedian and TV star with no political experience, won the April 21 presidential election after campaigning as someone who stands apart from the wealthy elite that dominates Ukrainian business ...
— 2019, Reuters

Again, before the war and before the memo went out that Zelensky is basically a saint now, the most reputable news agencies in the world had zero problem Reporting on and calling out Zelensky corruption.

So again, when the West offers Zelensky billions of dollars structured as a slush fund without any traceability to do their policy rather than accept a negotiated settlement (or even continue to negotiate "just in case" but rather repudiate entirely negotiations), it is not only a de facto bribe but the West knows Zelensky is "a player" who "does business" that way.

And do you have evidence for this or are you once again simply making up stuff as you go along? — Echarmion

In any discussion there are facts that people who follow the issue should know.

Before the war Ukraine had 250 000 soldiers about and then once the war starts mobilizes over 800 000 total soldiers. The majority of these are not volunteers.

There were a reported total of 250,800 personnel in the Armed Forces in 2015.[64] In July 2022, Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated that the Armed Forces had an active strength of 700,000; Reznikov also mentioned that with the Border Guard, National Guard, and police added, the total comes to around one million. — Armed Forces of Ukraine - Wikipedia

Additional fact for you (which should be common knowledge to anyone following the war but I'm happy to spoon feed you basic facts as it makes you ignorant, out of your depth and even more bad faith):

Otherwise why would we assume new allegations of the same is Russian propaganda?
— boethius

Claims need to be supported by evidence. — Echarmion

You do not need supporting evidence for this. If you've been caught money laundering by making a best friend a front man for offshore assets and taking bribes through your wife, you don't get the benefit of the doubt anymore. If papers show up purporting to show 75 Million yacht purchases that's credible until proven otherwise as far as I'm concerned.

But only because I don't like corrupt politicians and money launderers.

If you do like them and want to go out to bat for organized crime, by all means explain this philosophy and why this particular evidence (in the context that Zelensky has done this kind of crime) is not credible.

Evidence shows up that supports a claim, making an accusation that someone has done again crime he's already done: it's credible until proven otherwise. No one (that isn't corrupt) has the mental effort resources to operate otherwise.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed decree 24.02.2022 № 64/2022 "On the imposition of martial law in Ukraine" on general mobilization in the country, which would commence on 25 February for a period of 90 days, calling up conscripts and reservists; all male Ukrainian citizens aged 18 to 60 were prohibited from travelling abroad, unless they could provide documents that they fulfilled specified conditions for exemption. — Mobilization in Ukraine

If you want to live in a world where taking away nearly half the population's freedom of movement and then calling up conscripts and reservists, was simply to "top things off" and not really needed because Ukraine had and still has hundreds of thousands of volunteers, I guess go ahead. Obviously exact mobilization numbers will be "state secrets" so we'll only have a clear idea of exact numbers after the war.

Again, no evidence and also bad logic. — Echarmion

The bad argument without evidence is the idea that there needs be no justification for the war, no justification for Europe and NATO's financing and arming of the war, because "Ukrainians want to fight", an argument that has appeared numerous times in this forum.

You're incarnation is to rebut the fact that simply supporting a war without any theory of victory is cry-baby logic ... Ukrainians on the front aren't cry-babies and want to fight!

This is the position that has zero evidence. You provide zero evidence that most Ukrainians fighting want to fight and the law banning Ukrainians from leaving the country was totally unnecessary and superfluous because Ukrainians want to fight! at least for the most part, so there wouldn't a problem with recruitment.

You make claims and provide zero evidence and is also bad logic. That Ukrainians want to fight without a theory of victory does not actually rebut that being cry-baby logic.

The only reason I rebutted your claim that Ukrainians want to fight for Zelensky's various cry-baby statements, is because I honestly don't think it's true. A large majority of Ukrainians voted for the peace candidate twice, so I think it stands to reason most Ukrainians knew the dangers of continuing the war in the Donbas (which obviously assumes giving up claim to Crimea as well), and simply because Zelensky starts promising he'll take back all the Donbas and all Crimea in the cry-baby framework of reasoning, I honestly don't think most Ukrainians were convinced that was feasible.

Alternate world type stuff. — jorndoe

Exactly. Especially the nazi stuff. — ssu

They've tossed the "Nazi" word around some, not just regarding Ukraine. — jorndoe

This is called "echoing" each other without making any argument of any kind, nor contending with the evidence that supports the claim you complain about ... all of which comes from the Western media:

As I posted when this subject first came up, posted March 21st, 2022.

Please, watch the videos and then explain how "there are no Nazi's in Ukraine" ... or "if they are they aren't a problem" or "well, maybe they are a problem, but not a big problem" or "they were Nazi!! but since rebranded" or my favourite (aired by the BBC no less) "yes, they are 'extreme nationalists' but they are good fighters".

↪Olivier5

The backlash is people getting into severe cognitive dissonance which disrupts the war horny trance like state they were in previously, when they encounter the fact the "neo-Nazi" problem isn't some fringe skinheads in some seedy bar, but a whole institution.

Which, please pay attention to the "black sun" which doesn't even have any apologist "it's just a rune" or "ancient Sanskrit symbol" whatever explanation, but literally created by the SS for the SS.
— boethius

And also discover, at least the US and Canada (... maybe not other NATO members like Germany, who are the experts on neo-Nazi's after all and arbitrate whether they exist or not in today's media landscape) exposed to be breaking their own laws, which was military aid was contingent on irregular forces not doing any fighting or getting any weapons or ammunition ... which journalists could just go debunk in like, a single day's investigation?



And discover ... that when people talk about this problem going back to 2014 ... there's times and BBC reportings on this very thing:

January First, is one of the most important days in their callender. It marks the birth of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian partisan forces during the second world war.

The rally was organized by the far right Svoboda Party. Protests marched amidst a river of torches, with signs saying "Ukraine above all else".

But for many in Ukraine and abroad, Bandera's legacy is controversial. His group, the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists sided with Nazi German forces [but fortunately we have modern Germany to tell us there's no connection!] before breaking with them later in the war. Western Historians also say that his followers carried out massacres of Polish and Jewish civilians.

[... interview with a guy explaining the importance of Stepan Bandera's birthday party ]

Ukraine is a deeply divided country, however, and many in its East and South consider the party to be extremist. Many observers say rallies like today's torch light march only add to this division [really?!?! you don't say...]. — BBC

Or discover this one which interviews the FBI talking about these terrorists training with Azov ... but ... wait, "the war on terror" doesn't extend to white terrorists training "oversees".

And has the quote (recorded on video) from one of the recruiters:

We're Aryans, and we will rise again — totally not a neo-Nazi, according to the German government

But ... the president is Jewish and is allied with these forces, who don't even hate Jews all that much! So obviously you can have Nazi's if their friendly Nazi's (to your side).



This one's just adorable.



If I remember correctly, the main counter argument was that "there are Nazi's everywhere" ... I ask from where else is there similar evidence of so many Nazi's causing such big problems ... nada.

Then it was "ok, there are Nazi's, maybe more than elsewhere, but there aren't 'enough' Nazi's to justify an invasion".

To which my simply question "well, how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's with too much power and influence that would justify an invasion to denazify said Nazis?"

Is never answered, but I'm simply labeled a pro-Putinist for simply asking the question. It should be simple to follow up an argument that contains the word "not enough" to explain what "not-enough" means. It's not my argument.

Now, for people who want to live in the real world, rather than the entirely fake world created by the mainstream media to comfort the mendacious, why are the Nazi's in Ukraine an obvious problem:

First, that there are Nazi's in Ukraine and they were the primary force fighting the separatists is a problem because they are out of control and want more war and more fighting. So if you do have some negotiation process to try to end the war anytime between 2014 and 2022, the Nazi's aren't going to like that, and if they have plenty of weapons (courtesy of the West) they can use violence to get their way. Paramilitary groups with a fanatical ideology are simply a problem to legitimate political process.

Second, even assuming one of the cry-babies present takes the courage to explain how we'd evaluate "not enough Nazis" to make the distinction with "enough Nazis", the Nazis are clearly visible enough, and documented well by our own Western media (no one got the memo back then that the sun shined out of these Nazis asses) that these Nazis and these clear reports about the Nazis are not going to go down well with Russians. Russians aren't going to split hairs over whether an obvious Nazi symbol is actually "a Nordic rune!" and the association with Naziism in a group that also has Swastikas tats as well, is just coincidence! Russians will obviously be pissed, and so tolerating these Nazi groups and arming them (as the reporting above demonstrates without ambiguity) provides an amazing casus belli for a Russian invasion and strong motivations to fight. Why this matters is not only did Western policy contribute to reasons for the war and contribute to forces that frustrate any peace process, but the motivation is an easy one for any Russian.

Rewriting history after the war begins to conveniently memory hole or rebrand the Nazis leads directly to underestimating, to use NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg word, the Russian motivation to fight.

It's only in the made-up world of Western media that it made any sense at all to go around saying that the "Russian soldiers don't know why they are fighting" and are unmotivated and have low morale and they'll just completely collapse.

Anyone who knows anything about Russian history and then considers this situation where literal Nazis, both proud and openly advocating the destruction of Russia, are shelling ethnic-Russian civilians in the Donbas for 8 years, would not conclude that the Russians would be unmotivated to teach these Nazis a lesson in proper estimation of an opponents strength.

The Nazis were a significant problem and a major contribution to the war, major obstacle to any peace process, and essential to understanding many aspects of the war, such as focus on Mariupol for the Russians at the start of the war.

And the Nazis are causing similar problems to this day.

They may very well be a small percentage of Ukrainian society (who voted twice overwhelmingly for the candidate who promised to bring peace; Zelensky even promised to go on his knees to Moscow to get peace), but when a small group of fanatics get a bunch of arms, NATO training, and key positions in government, the skies the limit (except if your airforce was blown up).

Never underestimate the power of a small group of committed people to change the world. In fact, it is the only thing that ever has. — Margaret Mead.

Now, feel free or or or to actually go through the above videos and explain why the Nazis in those videos aren't a problem.

If the straight up denialism is immediately dropped (as the other times we've gotten to the exact same deniliasm and I repost the exact same evidence) and the argument is once again "ok, there are some Nazis, concerning stuff, but not enough Nazis!!"

Well, again, what would be enough?

It's a simple question, and it's not my theory that there aren't "enough Nazis" to justify an invasion. I'm just asking the question and pointing out that letting the Nazis in Ukraine grow in power to the point they are a problem has a word for it ... a word we keep hearing from Western media ... what was it ... ah yes, "appeasement".

But go ahead, explain this political theory that establishes the bar of "enough Nazis" and explain why we aren't there yet.

A false claim invented by russian propaganda. You're staying current on that front I see. — Echarmion

The Pandora papers, leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and shared with the Guardian as part of a global investigation however, suggest Zelenskiy is rather similar to his predecessors.

The leaked documents suggest he had – or has – a previously undisclosed stake in an offshore company, which he appears to have secretly transferred to a friend weeks before winning the presidential vote. — The Guardian

Zelensky getting caught laundering money is nothing new, are you calling this Guardian article, the Pandora Papers and ICIJ Russian propaganda?

For me, if you get caught having offshore accounts while accusing your political opponents of the practice, as explained by The Guardian:

On the campaign trail, Zelenskiy pledged to clean up Ukraine’s oligarch-dominated ruling system. And he railed against politicians such as the wealthy incumbent Petro Poroshenko who hid their assets offshore. The message worked. Zelenskiy won 73% of the vote and now sits in a cavernous office in the capital, Kyiv, decorated with gilded stucco ceilings. Last month, he held talks with Joe Biden in the Oval Office. — The Guardian

As with the Nazi's in Ukraine, there is plenty of reporting by Wester media outlets on Zelensky's corrupt practices ... which at that time no one had gotten the memo that he was a war hero and untouchable.

But if you are claiming The Guardian article is also Russian propaganda then I'll at least concede your position is coherent. Otherwise why would we assume new allegations of the same is Russian propaganda? Simply because Zelensky created that incredible weakness before the war ... but is totally clean now, you swear it?

You not listening isn't the same as there not being an argument. You don't care to entertain any notion that goes against your fixed assumptions, but that is your problem.

Your incessant repetition of how it's impossible for Ukraine to win is not getting any more convincing, especially since you're still unable to even conceive of Ukrainian geopolitical interests. — Echarmion

If everything hinges on Ukraine winning, then I agree that we'll just get back to this point.

But then at least concede that if Ukraine doesn't win, and turns out that was obvious, and turns out the West didn't even make an attempt to provide the weapons that would be needed to have a chance, that my arguments do follow from such a state of affairs.

We can wait and see if you prefer.

Which only proves that you're unable to have an intellectually honest discussion. — Echarmion

Honesty would be taking into account more Ukrainians fighting do not do so voluntarily than volunteer, as well as essentially the entire male population being unable to leave Ukraine, and therefore the "Ukrainian soldiers' will to fight" is not an argument as it is not willing for most cases.

A fairly transparent fig-leaf, since you ascribe the same argumentation to Zelensky and the rest of the Ukrainian leadership. — Echarmion

So you go from countering the cry-baby argument with the fact tough guys with tattoos are on the front lines, to countering my pointing out that the average Ukrainian soldier I very much doubt use the same logic ... to bringing up the fact Zelensky uses the cry baby logic.

Extremely poor rebuttal.

First, is Zelensky fighting on the front line with real skin in the game?

No, Zelensky doesn't even fit the mythological tough guy Ukrainian Azov-type soldier valiantly fighting to defend the motherland

More importantly, Zelensky's primary role is selling the West on the war, so it's no surprise what he sells the West is what the West is buying.

To the extent ordinary Ukrainians also use cry-baby logic of directly connecting complaints about the world to actions that do not realistically have a chance to resolve those complaints, I have not problem calling cry-babies as well.

Even more important, Zelensky is in a position to lie to the Ukrainian people, and, indeed, when he does it's immediately justified here and elsewhere as necessary propaganda for both Ukrainian and Western moral purposes.

So if Ukrainians did think the effort was realistic, well they may think that because they were lied to and all critical media was banned and they risk also being extra-judicially executed if they don't seem loyal enough to the cause (such as the Ukrainian negotiator that was summarily executed without trial and without any evidence ever being presented).

We outside Ukraine do not have such an excuse.

Now, insofar as any Ukrainian does make the same cry-baby arguments, which perhaps some do, I have zero problem calling them likewise cry-babies, no matter how many tats, wounds, cigars and eye-patches they maybe sporting.

Most importantly, however, Zelensky is being paid handsomely for his services of shepherding Ukrainians youth, and old, to the front lines. His best friends just bought 75 million worth of yachts for example, to add to his collection of European and African property.

So, you can't call someone a cry-baby if they are making bank with their disingenuous rhetoric. That's called being an economically rational agent; even tougher than the toughest Azov storm trooper, to launder money during a war while sending hundreds of thousands of your fellow citizens to their trauma, mutilation and death. You honestly need to be as hard as what neutron stars are made of, which is the exact opposite of being a cry baby.

The label is only appropriate to people, whether Ukrainian or not, who genuinely believe you can jump straight from a complaint about the world directly to whatever action seems to emotionally satisfy that complain.

For example, jumping straight from "waaahhhh, Russia invaded Ukraine" to the conclusion that directly emotionally satisfies that complaint, which is someone (else) should go kill Russians then!!

I get it, the invasion rouses anger and promoting Ukrainian fighting back without thinking things through satiates that anger. Indeed, the less thought that goes into the more the anger is satiated. The guy who gets angry and immediately throws over a table and hits his girl friend in the face is far more emotionally satiated in the moment than the guy who contemplates life, the table, the girl friend, where all this is going and what everything means, moral duties and the divine light, for a few days and then throws over the table and hits his girl friend in the face ... or, you know, doesn't do that because he's thought it through and although it would satiate his anger it would not serve his soul.

The same with the war. Rebuking those that want to think things through, such as my question in March 2022 to pro-Zelenskyites on this very forum of how exactly do they think they can win which just got cry-baby responses of "they're defending their homeland!!" and "they want to fight!" etc., satiates a deep anger, and I get it, but the consequences of not thinking through decisions in a war are far higher than the tough Azov Ukrainian soldier guy taking his anger out on his table and girl friend when he gets back from the front; anger that is certainly legitimate in itself if many of his comrades are now dead.

However, what is even worse than the above, is not only jumping from a dissatisfaction about the world directly to supporting the actions that most directly address that emotion (though not actually going yourself, just satisfied others are forced to do so) is then jumping again without thought or justification from that first jump to an entirely new leap to Europe and NATO should supply weapons indefinitely (although not too much, though not too little!! ... but just the right amount that they lose anyways).

I say ... hol'up, let's think this through, ask in March 2022 if anyone even has any idea how Ukraine could "win", whatever definition is proposed for that, since if they can't win then clearly that needs to inform decisions about the war. Simply doesn't matter how much people complain, people whine, people hate on Putin and try to cancel him like some YouTuber that says things the establishment doesn't like, if Ukraine can't win then supporting the attempt will get many, many, many Ukrainians killed for nothing. If they can't win then their only realistic option is to use the leverage that they could fight to the end, no matter irrationally, but they are also willing to strike a compromise to avoid that.

If they can't win, then Europe and NATO should (if they care about Ukrainian lives) support a feasible negotiation strategy, which can certainly involve sending arms to support the negotiation process, but would also entail things like talking to Russia (like the West talks to Hamas, because they care about Israel and a deal may at some point be what Israel needs, once they too have satiated their anger they can appreciate cooler heads did the diplomatic work for them), but more importantly using their economic leverage to apply additional pressure on Russia to make more concessions in a peace settlement.

Now, you seem to have turned not-thinking-things-through into what you seem to believe is some clever art form.

It's neither clever nor moral. Sit down and think of everyone who has suffered and died in this war and really contemplate the very real possibility that Ukraine cannot win in the war it was insisting it could, and then review again in your mind Zelensky's choice to repudiate negotiations, make them more difficult to restart according to your own explanation of "making positions in serious negotiations public is a bad idea".

People here could have proposed a way Ukraine could "win" on the battlefield; no one could, yet Zelensky proponents would insist supporting the war was the right thing to do and Ukrainians being prevented from leaving Ukraine is simply "common sense", that of course critical media must be banned, opposition political parties banned, and so on etc.

I simply ask the question of how Ukraine can even potentially win, and the only response I get is this cry-baby logic that reality doesn't matter, thinking things through doesn't matter, how many people will die in these military campaigns don't matter, consequences to Ukraine's population and economy doesn't matter, nor consequences on the world food supply, potentially escalating to WWIII, feeling nuclear proliferation etc. all doesn't matter.

All these questions didn't matter before 2022 when only "ethnic Russians" were dying in the Donbas and Russia would inevitably invade, and none of the questions matter while people see this disaster unfold, as long as they can compress and contain all their emotions into "waaahhhh Putin".

And as for regular Ukrainians, this simplistic model that they are all just valiantly rushing to the front to defend Ukraine! and happy to lay down their lives on principle, is completely stupid. Most Ukrainians fighting are forced into service, so they are not volunteers and if criticizing the war was not a crime that can additionally get you killed in Ukraine, we may hear more diverse views from Ukraine on whether it was a good idea to refuse the Russian's offer and whether it always made perfect sense to them to fight for "the right to join NATO" and other simplistic thought terminating clichés.

Which to remind everyone are:

A thought-terminating cliché (also known as a semantic stop-sign, a thought-stopper, bumper sticker logic, or cliché thinking) is a form of loaded language, often passing as folk wisdom, intended to end an argument and quell cognitive dissonance.[1][2][3] Its function is to stop an argument from proceeding further, ending the debate with a cliché rather than a point.[1] Some such clichés are not inherently terminating; they only become so when used to intentionally dismiss dissent or justify fallacious logic. — Thought-terminating cliché

"Fighting for the right to join NATO" manages to an even stupider thought-terminating cliché as "support the troops".

Perhaps too clearly stating your "pro-Russia party" credentials there, tovarich! — ssu

Well, point out the other roots to a negotiated settlement then.

I've also explained several times that the war can also simply go on.

As @Tzeentch and I have explained numerous times, Russia likely does not want to conquer all of Ukraine and would not have the resources to occupy it anyways.

So, even if Ukrainian front lines collapsed (which there are many signs of that about to happen), that would not be a military end to the war, the Russians would move forward but the war would still be on.

If Zelensky can stay in power, post-pone elections further (also called dictatorship), squash any dissent, then it's unlikely the Russians would conquer all of Ukraine anyways, and just holding on to power at the costs of sending even children and women to the front and even if Russia just takes more and more territory (that could be avoided by negotiation) is the best career move for Zelensky and other Ukrainian elites—as long as the West keeps paying for the show to go on then there's literally a money laundering bonanza and it's possible to make a lot of money (called being rational in modern economics) if the war can be transitioned to not even really pretending to compete with the Russians but the country called Ukraine is still there anyways.

If Zelensky can't hold on to power and the Ukrainian government collapses, I guess it's possible the new leadership would want to "fight the war harder" but my guess is that they'd want to just go and accept whatever is necessary to end the war and then try to pick up the pieces.

However, so much money rides on the war continuing and the nationalists seem to have tight control and they know Zelensky is needed to get the money.

The West could stop sending the required money; unclear to me how Zelensky would stay in power, but that doesn't mean the government collapses; the nationalists could take control and continue the war by whatever means they find and would be unlikely to negotiate.

So lot's can happen that isn't a negotiated settlement.

But please, if it's pro-Russian to point out that neither side is willing to compromise (enough needed to get the other side to agree to a peace deal), then explain some realistic compromise that could end the war tomorrow.

Do you have a different pathway to a negotiated settlement that doesn't involve the collapse of the Ukrainian government? And for clarity we're talking about around now, not in a decade.

Yeah, why didn't my country and my grandparents generation accept the wisdom of not fighting back in WW2 and essentially just accept whatever the Russians want? — ssu

Again, a pointless straw man. My position is that fighting back is useful in this sort of situation, to arrest the initial invasion and then use the leverage of potential further fighting (even potential further irrational fighting) to negotiate a peace.

Finland continuously negotiates with the Soviets to find a compromise and the end result is agreeing to cede over 20% of Finnish territory to the Soviets and pay the Soviets for the cost to the Soviets of invading Finland: the exact opposite logic compared to what is proposed here, the Western media and Western social media generally speaking.

The Finnish leaders do not walk away from the negotiation table (negotiation is near continuous through the whole conflict), do not publicly vow to reclaim all the lost territory and make that the only acceptable standard, do not publicly call Stalin evil and demand the world get rid of him, and do not make laughably stupid conditions for negotiation such as the Soviets much remove all their forces from Finnish territory first, then a negotiation can happen.

The analogy to Finland simply illustrates all the terrible decisions Zelensky makes and why they aren't realistic and a tough situation requires tough choices, which the Finns make in order to end the war, save lives, and preserve as much territory as they practically can given unfavourable circumstances.

The Finns follow common sense pragmatic realism of what is attainable.

Furthermore, the Finnish geography lends itself to one particular point that is easier for a smaller force to defend itself against a larger force, the Mannerheim Line, and so they fall back to where the defender has the advantage rather than vow to fight for every inch.

Oh yes, they were cry-babies. — ssu

Again, no one here as far as I know is Ukrainian and currently fighting.

The cost of the war is immense in terms of lives lost or mutilated or traumatized or upended, having no justification for the fighting more sophisticated than "waaaah, Putin!" is just cry baby logic.

We discussed at length at the start of the war and both agreed that based on the information available that Ukraine had essentially no prospects of retaking the territory and winning in military terms.

From this agreed position, I concluded that Ukraine should use the leverage (that includes even the small chance it had in 2022 of routing the Russian forces, before Russia mobilized significantly more troops) to negotiate a peace, that would require compromise, which the Russian proposal seemed to adequate and preferable to more war with extremely poor prospects.

You conclude that maybe Ukrainian generals know something we don't and will bring out some total surprise. Presumably then, if Ukrainian generals did not in fact know something we don't, which seems to be the case, then it would follow from your position back then that deciding to fight was not a good decision. You did agree once upon a time that military objectives should be feasible to accomplish and lives not wasted for essentially fantastical wishful thinking.

To get this topic back to less circular territory: — Echarmion

It's only circular because at some point you understand that Ukraine is not going to reconquer all the territory (not that that would end the war anyways, as I explained at length at the start of the conflict) and that therefore the only resolution to the conflict is a diplomatic one.

We then discuss the diplomatic and political problem Ukraine has (that it turned down a far better offer at the start of the conflict) which puts sharply into question Zelensky's competence, and, in any case, has the political problem of Ukraine fighting to a far worse negotiating position.

You even have no problem agreeing that Ukraine had more leverage at the start of the conflict than it does now, just quibbling over exactly which day was the maximum leverage attained, but in the context of agreeing that it was higher in the past and is lower now.

This puts into question Zelensky's competence even more, and also the good faith of NATO in encouraging and convincing Ukraine to take this path rather than negotiations.

To make matters even worse, as you note yourself, making negotiation positions public can be a significantly frustrate further negotiations. Although you're wrong about making a negotiation position public never being a good idea (it can be a good idea if your position is reasonable), it definitely can be a bad idea such as Zelensky making promises that can't be kept (reconquering even Crimea) and ridiculous ultimatums to restart negotiations such as he'll negotiate only after Russia leaves all the territory concerned, that he won't talk to Putin and he'll negotiate after Putin is replaced and so on.

Which, again, puts into absolute clarify the incompetence of Zelensky.

Not willing to accept the implications of what you yourself agree to, you retreat into your habitual way of resolving cognitive dissonance in just inventing whatever would be convenient if it was true and stating that as a fact.

So, after debating at length Ukraine's terrible negotiating position and terrible political position for (certainly the existing leaders) to sell a deal to the Ukrainian public ... you simply invent that Ukraine is actually doing well in the war (which would indeed make all Zelensky's choices far better if he can "win on the battlefield") rather than look at the reality:

Ukraine cannot retake the lost territory and that is clear now even to Zelensky and the whole west.

Ukraine cannot win a war of attrition against Russia.

Continuing to fight therefore brings Ukraine further away from any sort of "victory", destroys remaining leverage, and brings Ukrainian military closer to collapse.

The strategic situation currently seems almost a repeat of last year, Ukraine is on the strategic defensive and Russia seems set for another grinding assault on a fortress city. As last time they seem to be focusing first on encircling/ turning moves on the flanks. — Echarmion

It is not a repeat of last year.

Last year Russia needed to survive sanctions, needed to keep domestic population behind the war, and needed time to mobilize and train hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers, ramp up military production, and so their strategy was to attrit Ukrainian ground forces in the symbol of Bakhmut using mercenaries (which are far less problematic casualties for the home audience) and attritted the Ukrainian air defence system with sustained missile attacks. While attention was on Bakhmut and Zelensky was going around repeating "Bakhmut holds" the Russians also built hundreds of kilometres of sophisticated defences so that Ukraine's strategy of "Bakhmut holds" while NATO trained and equipped brigades for an offensive this year would not succeed and that offensive capacity (that would be useful to have now in a defensive strategy) is mostly destroyed.

This year is very different from last year.

Ukraine's presence on the eastern side of the Dniepr seems more solid, but it's hard to see what can come of that. — Echarmion

It is not solid and it is completely delusional to believe that Ukraine could more easily make meaningful gains with the additional logistical problem of crossing the Dnieper than it could where it attacked without needing to cross a river.

This was purely for political purposes and is impossible to sustain in place, much less push towards Crimea. Russia built the same multilayerd defensive lines on this front as elsewhere and it is not some sort of "soft underbelly" of the Russian position.

Makes zero military sense, but if you can only tiny gains then having a tiny bridgehead across the river sounds more impressive than taking a village along the main line of contact, that is more obviously insignificant a change.

Ukrainian air defense is apparently still working fine, despite the various predictions to the contrary. It seems that sources of ammunition were found so far. The F16 project is still on the way, though we'll have to see what happens now with the Dutch political situation. Will a deal still go through with the deal if the Netherlands pull their support? — Echarmion

Air defence is not working fine, as Russia can now approach the line of contact close enough to drop glide bombs regularly.

The F16 project could have been a good idea at the very start of the war (if NATO actually wanted Ukraine to have a chance to do something major, such as cut the land bridge) ... but is too little too late now.

Germany seems to want to position itself as a major supporter of Ukraine, which seems kinda at odds with the Bild report. The strategy reported in the Bild is of course the kind of thing you can fit all kind of actual events into in retrospect. — Echarmion

Or the writing is on the wall now, Ukraine clearly can't "win" and "defeat Russia", and that's clear to everyone, so "forcing Ukraine to negotiate" will repaint NATO as the peacemakers, which the Western public will easily swallow. The new narrative will be that Ukraine makes its own choices, and if Ukraine wants to fight then NATO supported that (giving Zuluzney everything he said he needed for his strategy to work), placing massive sanctions on Russia and since fighting didn't work out then peace is just the unfortunate reality.

I don't expect negotiated settlement quickly in any case. — Echarmion

Well we agree here.

The opportunity for this is long past.

Unfortunately, the dynamic in place is that Russia has lost too much to give back any territory (they had not lost many troops in taking the territory initially, so could have more easily given it back in March-April 2022), and Ukraine has lost too much to psychologically accept it made the wrong choice in fighting for that failed objective.

Furthermore, the pipelines are blown up and there's no way for the West to normalize economic relations with Russia anyways (Putin is Hitler and a "wanted man" etc.), which was the other major piece of leverage in play in 2022, so there is not really any incentive for Russia to concede anything at all.

The only root to a negotiated settlement is the collapse of the current Ukrainian government and essentially just accepting whatever the Russians want.

I think you should put some more Russian propaganda lines in your post. Someone might not have gotten the message. Perhaps some carricature of Zelensky as the greedy Jew? Or is that not up your alley?

Anyways it's quite hilarious that the people who decided to actually fight for their country are the "crybabies" while the guy waffling on the internet about how their favourite country is the best and most righteous thinks himself a geopolitical genius. — Echarmion

Who here has decided to fight for their country?

You?

As far as I know there are no Ukrainians who have joined this discussion and, if so, none currently fighting for their country.

The crybaby position references non-Ukrainians cheerleading Zelensky from a far without skin in the game and approving of or creating apologetics for NATO's policies that led to the war.

I imagine actual Ukrainians were and are still very well aware that trying to join NATO would be baiting Russia into a war and was a dangerous gambit to play, whether they approved of the policy or not.

The cry baby position expressed in your posts and other "war party" (at least as implied by @ssu) Zelensky proponents that simply ignore the obvious danger of trying to join NATO, based on just complaining about Ukraine being ought to join NATO and likewise ought to be free from Russian influence, and now that the war is happening Ukraine ought to get back all their territory.

Welcome to the real world! What ought to happen is not what necessarily happens and it is a fallacy to tie what ought to be the situation in your ideal world to justifying actions that nominally try to achieve that situation.

It is a cry baby position because it does not take into account that there may simply not be a path that gets you what you want, just a like a baby crying over a broken cookie wanting it to be whole again (because the baby does not understand yet how the world works and what they want is impossible).

In the real world there was almost no way to join NATO without causing the very war joining NATO is meant to avoid (so completely idiotic and a dangerous policy that was motivated not by any credible plan to join NATO but to placate nationalists who are either completely delusional thinking NATO would come and save them or then less delusional but actually wanted to escalate the war with Russia; a wish they recieved). If there was a way (in the real world) to join NATO it wasn't declaring the intention to do it "oh someday, it will be so nice" and then let the tensions build for a quarter of a century until the war that essentially every Russian or cold-war-policy expert predicted would occur as a result.

In the real world you may simply not have the military capabilities (and NATO unwilling to even attempt to provide them) to reconquer all the lost territories ... in which case trying to do that is just wasting lives, which is exactly what I said would happen months ago about the "great Ukrainian counter offensive".

Others here predicted it would be easy for Ukraine to cut the land bridge.

I predicted not only would it not be easy but Ukraine would not make any progress at all.

At some point, you should lend some credit to the person who makes correct predictions: I predicted offensive actions would not be possible without supplying the heavy weapons NATO kept saying was basically "common sense" they wouldn't and couldn't supply; I predicted Ukraine might have the offensive capacity to conquer some buffer zones last year (such as the push the Russians back across the river) but that would not indicate they have the offensive capacity to cut the land bridge to Crimea (two very different tasks); I predicted Russian society wouldn't collapse due to sanctions (as history would teach us); Russian partners wouldn't join sanctions (as "the rest of the world" is far closer ideologically to Russia than LGBTQ+ activists, such as Justin "black face" Trudeau, and they need Russian resources and, in particular China, it is an opportunity to attrit NATO): that Ukrainian offensives would have all the same problems as the Russian Northern offensive and burn out (just, you know, a lot more problems as Ukraine does not have much air power, electronic warfare, and a bunch of other capabilities and lacks quantity in capabilities it does have) but that Russia did have a man power problem and had not yet dug in too deep last year so it was at least somewhat possible (but that Russia would simply tactically retreat, inflicting losses that Ukraine could not sustain, so Ukraine would not get very far and they didn't get very far for exactly this reason), whereas this year it is not remotely possible due to both solving the man power issues and building multiple layers of sophisticated defences and minefields and also learning better combined arms integration (of categories of arms that Russia has and Ukraine basically doesn't have).

Why am I able to make these predictions that come true?

Because I concern myself with the real world. And Ukraine's inability to reconquer the lost territories means that a diplomatic resolution to the conflict is the only option they have.

In February-March-April 2022 they had far more leverage (and would have far more armed forced intact to deter future Russian aggression) to get the best deal possible, and ending the conflict then would have avoided mass depopulation (most Ukrainians that left would have returned) and significant economic destruction not to mention the deaths and mutilation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers that fought for an unattainable military goal of reconquering all the lost territory.

So yeah, just ignoring the actual facts and the actual situation Ukraine is in and simply justifying the choice to repudiate negotiations because "waaaahhhh Ukraine shouldn't have to!!! Ukraine should just be able to join NATO!!! Russia should just leave!!! Putin can't be trusted!!! waaaaahhh", is both exactly the level of logic of a crying baby simply wanting something that the baby can't have and in many cases doesn't even make any sense (such as fighting a war for "the right to join NATO").

A pledge of neutrality would not resolve the underlying conflict any more than the pledges of Minsk agreements did. Russia denies Ukraine the right to get out of its sphere of influence and is ready to use military means to prevent it. So it is not about NATO membership, it is not about cooperation, Russians will not be satisfied until at least they have a pro-Russian government there, preferably with more direct forms of control (like the Russia-Belarus 'Union State'). — Jabberwock

It is obviously about NATO membership.

But if you want to rewrite history your way, how does striving for NATO membership help?

Your position, and that of and all the previous war and Zelensky proponents here (as in the Western main stream media) is essentially the cry baby approach to geopolitics and international relations. You essentially whine about the fact that Ukraine can't get what it wants (can't be in NATO, can't get Crimea back, can't have Nazi's without criticism, can't get the weapons it wants, can't compete with Russia militarily, can't have nuclear weapons now, can't just disappear Russia somehow) and then whining about Ukraine's situation somehow directly connects to justifying repudiating peace negotiations, repudiating neutrality and committing to a long war of attrition that is incredibly destructive for Ukraine and Ukraine has little hope of winning.

There is no logical connection between whining about Ukraine's unfulfilled desires or whining about Russia's available scope of action that the West can't cancel like some podcaster that angered the LGBTQ+ community in a way that requires no case to be proven, and justification for fighting a losing war.

You're basically explaining how Ukraine could have avoided this destructive war by committing to neutrality ... but!! that won't remove Russian influence from Ukraine!!!

So what? Ahah, it's better to fight to the last Ukrainian?

Russian influence in Ukraine is far less destructive and far easier to deal with than a giant war if you're any normal Ukrainian citizen.

The fundamental fallacy Zelensky and co. use to reject Russia's peace offer and accept neutrality, that Russian promise not to invade later isn't a "guarantee" is that neither winning a war against Russia is guaranteed and, much worse, NATO support required to even have a chance isn't guaranteed.

Boris Johnson's promises of aid and money and whatever weapons Ukraine needs and so on required to fight the Russians, was not anymore guaranteed than Russia's peace offer.

More critically, Boris Johnson's offer could have been easily probed for being disingenuous, as there was zero offer at that time for the weapons systems required to have even a reasonable chance of "beating the Russians".

Zelensky and his generals clearly didn't go through a simple exercise of war gaming out a scenario of the steps required to "beat" the Russians.

Either that or they were explicitly told that they wouldn't be given the weapons needed to go on an offensive, but the idea is Russian society would collapse under sanctions, which didn't happen and now they are essentially trapped in the war.

But considering the Ukrainian leaders, at least Zelensky and Zeluzney, seem genuinely surprised the great big counter offensive didn't work at all and are only now explaining they need better technology to "win", seems to me they genuinely had no idea how Boris was manipulating them.

Obviously there are no guarantees about almost anything.

Saying "we can't trust Russia" is not a reason to reject a deal with Russia. Russia invading anyways later is a risk, but losing the war on hand is also a risk. Russia can't offer some iron-clad guarantee ... neither can NATO of even sticking it through with the hundreds of billions of dollars a year needed to even stay in the war.

Furthermore, even if you can't trust a party doesn't necessarily matter all that much in international relation (especially in international relation when you don't even know who will be in charge later anyways), there would be solid reasons to believe Russia would be simply incentivized to not-invade more than it would be incentivized to invade a neutral Ukraine and also strong reasons to believe there is no winning a war against Russia anyways (and certainly even less at an acceptable cost).

It's so common sense that neutrality is the best strategic option, that completely absurd reasoning is needed to support the war: fighting for a "right to join NATO", fighting to protect other Eastern European countries (that are in NATO), fighting because a peace deal might lead to losing a war later (without a credible plan to win the current war), fighting because "Putin can't be trusted" (NATO being no more trustworthy: go ask the Afghans).

Russia amassing troops made sure the pipeline would not be opened. The idea that Ukraine was just s convenient "outlet for that anger" is just utterly ridiculous, especially since you acknowledge the invasion must have been planned well in advance. — Echarmion

The invasion was certainly planned in advance, that does not mean refusing to open the pipeline didn't anger Putin and the Kremlin and that anger didn't contribute to the final decision to invade.

These sorts of actions are never "locked in". War is an option, diplomacy another option. Diplomacy fails, Germany decides to humiliate Russia by refusing to open a pipeline that took 10 years to build (and plenty of money to German contractors) and Germany didn't make that clear at the common sense time (i.e. before the pipeline is built), so Russia invades to demonstrate, among other things, its not about to be humiliated by Germany.

This is how any business person would read these events.

Imagine if I let you build a bridge across my property, take your money to help build the bridge, but then when the bridge is finished I tell you the paperwork required to actually use the bridge isn't finalized and also go fuck yourself.

You'd be pissed. I guarantee you Putin and all of the elites in Russian business, politics and the military would be equally pissed.

Only to Americans is it "normal" that America can order a country to do some self-defeating thing in order to humiliate another country that it sources energy from to run major sectors of its economy ... while saying it should buy energy from the US instead at way higher cost.

To the rest of the world, having someone build a 10 billion Euro pipeline only to refuse to have it opened is not a normal way to behave.

Russia amassing troops made sure the pipeline would not be opened. The idea that Ukraine was just s convenient "outlet for that anger" is just utterly ridiculous, especially since you acknowledge the invasion must have been planned well in advance. — Echarmion

One interpretation is that the troops started being amassed due to delays in opening the pipeline. It's not so much the physical completion of the project that is the key point but approving the license to open the pipeline on the German side; the physical completion of the project just makes delays on licensing cost money and focuses tension on the issue.

Another interpretation was that Russia would do essentially the same exercise every year (albeit bigger every year) as a show of force to Ukraine (Russia does lot's of readiness exercises) and that it became a media thing in 2022 because the US wanted to put pressure on the Germans to not open the pipeline, with the forces being amassed as evidence the Russians are a hostile.

The pipelines were not merely a strong economic incentive to both the Russians and the Germans to cooperate and maintain peace, but also a symbol of Russian-German "friendship", or whatever you want to call it.

My reading of these events was that the pipeline was absolutely critical and would have informed further decision making. As I explain, the money the pipeline would generate can "finance" the situation in the Donbas at least a little longer (be rationalized as the "cost of doing business") but it would also change the diplomatic situation as Germany would be making a strong signal it has a different foreign policy to that of the US.

This was a huge investment designed to create closer ties and more peaceful relations with Central Europe, and the biggest EU player of Germany, so I think it's common sense Russia would have wanted to reciprocate the good faith act of opening the pipeline with the good faith act of not-invading. The pipelines to Germany dwarf in terms of economic value and diplomatic leverage anything the Donbas has to offer, there is no reason to trade one for the other.

Rather, once not only the Nord Stream 2 is not opened and then Nord Stream blown up entirely, only then does Russia annex the regions as ... if Nord Stream no longer exists then the Donbas and even more of Ukraine is better than nothing.

Right, but that's the precise problem. If it's the risk that Russia reacts to, then Ukraine's current status is pretty much irrelevant. Ukraine can do whatever it wants to remain neutral. As soon as Russia detects a risk to their interests they nevertheless act.

And since Russia clearly considers some domestic political changes risks, Ukraine would be forever under the threat of Russian aggression as soon as the political situation turns in a way Russia considers too risky. — Echarmion

The key is to navigate risk.

Why didn't Russia annex Crimea before 2014?

Because there's also risks to annexing Crimea, so as long as the risks of annexing Crimea, or a full scale invasion, are greater than not-doing-those-things, then Russia doesn't do them.

Hence, you want to minimize risk to your larger neighbour, and the best way to do that is be neutral.

And definitely the position Ukraine is in entails permanent risk and a permanent need to manage that risk.

Joining a military alliance hostile to Russia is a high risk gambit that has enabled (because it provided consolidation of Russian elites about the subject and a justification to the domestic audience) and triggers exactly the war the gambit is designed to prevent.

There is not too many situations in history where this sort of gambit works, and I would honestly be mind-blown if such a gambit has worked in a position analogous to Ukraine.

And if such a gambit ever worked in even remotely similar circumstances, it was because it was entirely prepared in secret, the actors in the gambit knowing that if the large neighbouring power got wind of the plan they would be invaded essentially the next day.

Ukraine has sub optimal strategy at pretty much every critical juncture.

So Russia gets to cuts off choice parts of Ukraine, and when this happens the best thing Ukraine can do is shrug and act like nothing happened? — Echarmion

Pretty much.

The alternative is the war that is currently happening where Ukraine loses far more land, lives, economic power, mass exodus, mass trauma, nothing good.

NATO could send troops into Ukraine at any time since 2008 to protect Ukraine from the current fate, but NATO doesn't because NATO doesn't care about Ukraine nor Ukrainians.

The reason small countries that are close (or close enough) to large powers that they are not friends with (such as Ireland vis-a-vis the UK) often adopt neutral status is precisely to avoid the kind of situation Ukraine is in now. If you don't want to be allies with the large power next door, then the best strategic move is to commit to neutrality and not being allies with anyone. The only exceptions is if there is an imminent or ongoing war between large powers and you are forced to pick sides anyways (can't just stay out of it like Sweden or Switzeralnd).

It's a nice epic fantasy to "reconquer the lost territories" but it was effetively impossible to reconquer Crimea after 2014 and impossible to reconquer the 4 additional oblasts in 2023. It was possible to reconquer at least some of the oblasts in 2023 as the Russians had not yet built extensive fortifications and had a small expeditionary force vulnerable to attack, but that would have required all the heavy weapons that was "common sense" could not be sent to Ukraine in 2022 to as an extension of "whatever it takes" but somehow equally "common sense" needs to be sent now in 2023.

And as soon as the war started I started to explain how offensive actions were not possible without heavy weapons, that it is ridiculous to believe Ukraine could retake significant territory with only shoulder launched missiles.

So, if Zelensky or his generals followed philosophy forum, they would have known my lengthy analysis of why ATGM's and manpads were obviously not sufficient to conduct any sort of offensive, or even counter offensive effectively:

And not just fro me! But this was one point of consensus!

Hence, focus on sending Ukraine anti-tank guided missiles and manpads. These are extremely dangerous weapons for sure, but you can't really assault and take a dug-in position with these weapons; certainly harass supply lines and lay ambushes but they don't really help defend against a concentrated offensive. So, if Russia digs in on the sides of a pincer and has a concentrated offensive to move forward, there's not much Ukraine can do about it with ATGM's and manpads.
— boethius
The basic problem is that for Ukrainians being on the defensive works. But wars are not won just by being on the defensive. Ukraine should make counterattacks and here might be their weak point: to counterattack they should concentrate their forces and firepower and destroy the Russian units. If those Russian units are in a long column in the middle of an urban area, that's easy. If they are in defensive positions, that's hard. And with the concentration the Russian artillery has targets. Likely Ukraine will try to avoid a battle of attrition. Yet the material support coming from NATO countries is substantial. But they would need more than just those ATGMs, but also artillery and medium range Surface-to-Air missile systems. Stingers cannot defend attack from high altitude. And if you are Putin, you don't care about if you hit something else also when destroying the Ukrainian army. — ssu

An exchange from March 10th, 2022.

Except the two times when Russia did actually invade Ukraine, nothing concerning NATO had recently happened.

So clearly just not joining NATO isn't actually protection against a russian invasion either. — Echarmion

A coup getting rid of the person who implemented the "non-alignment" (except cooperation with NATO ) policy is an obvious change the policy. If a political force topples the president due to his "pro Russian policies" it's pretty clear there's a change in both government and thus policies.

Russia act vis-a-vis the risk, the risk that Ukraine is taking a big and, to the Russians, unacceptable step towards NATO is exceeds what they are willing to tolerate, so they mitigate that risk by annexing Crimea and supporting (perhaps causing if the "Girkin is the key" theory is true) the separatists in the Donbas (so there is additional on-going fighting which makes Ukraine joining NATO exceedingly unlikely before it is resolved).

If you want to ague: NO! Ukraine would have remained neutral! Nuland had zero intention to bring Ukraine closer to NATO nor serious cooperation with anyone in Ukraine! She was just riffing bro!! Russia over reacted!!

Ok, I guess you can make that counter-factual argument. But, even so, Russia is reacting to their perception of Nuland's phone calls, other intelligence, and the violent and chaotic nature of the coup.

Then the status is changed in a major way again in 2019, literally putting the aspiration to join NATO in the constitution, and a full scale invasion happens in 2022.

My argument would be that maybe it takes 3 years to prepare a major invasion especially as the pandemic starts in 2019 and is only more-or-less resolved (enough for people to stop caring much about it) in late 2021 (when winter wave fails to be so impressive).

So, unless starting a full scale invasion in the middle of a pandemic is a good idea, it's possible that delayed Russias plans or then 3 years was anyways the minimum to prepare a full scale invasion.

An additional factor is Zelensky is elected in 2019 promising to make peace with Russia, so seeing what Zelensky does, if peace is feasible, is additional reason to wait.

Another big factor is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This is the other major point of contention along with Ukrainian neutrality. They are also closely connected, as refusing to open Nord Stream 2 would be a strong signal of Europe taking an aggressive posture towards Russia. If the pipeline was opened and business continued as normal with Europe, especially against US protest, that would have been a strong signal that at least Europe does not want any hostilities with Russia ... and there's also the money to consider.

If Nord Stream was opened, the situation in the Donbas remained unsustainable in the long term, but it seems to me extremely likely Russia would not have invaded in 2022, since it was pretty clear (certainly that's what the Western media understood) that Russia was amassing troops as pressure to open the pipeline, and refusing to open the pipeline significantly angered Putin and the Kremlin and invading Ukraine was one outlet for that anger.

So there are other factors, but I would argue that military action in Ukraine was inevitable as long as Ukraine has joining NATO literally in their constitution and a conflict in the Donbas, and 3 years is reasonable time frame to prepare an operation as big as the invasion of 2022. In the meantime there's the pandemic as well as the completion of the pipeline. Pandemic has obvious reasons to wait for its resolution, and the pipeline would have changed the situation in significant ways: would signal Europe has a non-hostile position towards Russia and an independent foreign policy to the US as well as bring in significant money (money that you can then rationalize can support the separatists, at least a little longer); so considering this, my guess would be that Russia would want Germany to get used to the new pipeline and prospering more due to that (strengthening, if not pro-Russian, pro-Russian-gas actors in Germany) and then undertake military action at some later time (potentially the exact same plan, just more active pipelines as leverage, or then tried more limited military options that can be presented as more to do with supporting the separatists than invading Ukraine on 4 different fronts).

The above would be an analysis based on actual facts, but if you want to believe that because 2022 is not literally the same year as 2019 then events in 2022 cannot be triggered by events in 2019 ... I guess be my guest on that.

So, taking all these together: What Zelensky needs to do in 2022 is to somehow re-establish the status quo before 2014. And doing so would cost Ukraine nothing, because Ukraine has no allies and is it fact neutral, while being obviously not neutral and heavily tied to NATO. — Echarmion

Exactly, Ukraine has and is attempting to become not-neutral and its problem is that it has and remains neutral.

Ukraine has no countries that send soldiers to its aid when it is invaded and mutually declare war on the invading country, and Ukraine has likewise no obligation to come to the aid of anyone or declare war just because someone else is invaded. The de facto status of a neutral country.

Of course, it would be nice for Ukraine if Ukraine was magically inside NATO anytime since 1991.

The problem is that Russia views NATO in Ukraine as a serious security threat and will act to stop that from happening.

Russia will obviously invade Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO.

We can discuss the morality of this imperialistic position, but moral arguments would not change this reality.

Ukraine declaring it is going to join NATO, and NATO reciprocating by saying Ukraine is going to join NATO and cooperations and partnerships of various kinds and having NATO training and "advisors", are things that will clearly provoke Russia into invading Ukraine.

It's also a terrible strategy to actually join NATO, but if you (and more importantly NATO who has more experience) wanted to join NATO, you'd want to advance that as much as possible in secret. Then, as happened with Finland, you'd want some countries to commit to bilateral mutual defence during the final ascension process to get all the t's crossed and i'd dotted.

Of course, NATO has had zero intention to let Ukraine in, as it could trigger WWIII which no one wants.

The 2008 declaration was likely to test the WWIII waters to see how Russia would react (of course if Russia just lets it happen, then why not).

Zelensky even asks before the 2022 invasion point blank to the NATO commander, a clear time line for when they'll get into NATO (as pressure is building from Russia), and the answer was there is no time line but "the door will remain open", which was perhaps meant as a clear signal that it would be better to go negotiate a peace with Russia (just because the CIA wants to provoke Russia into a war, doesn't mean military commanders do).

The point is, yes, trying to establish the 2010-2014 status quo, or even the pre-2019 status quo where joining NATO wasn't explicitly a constitutional goal.

Of course, by 2022 there is a significant "extreme nationalist" (some Nazi's, some just super nationalists) contingent in Ukraine that rather war with Russia than peace or any sort of compromise. The Russian language repression being one other clear provocative example of the power of the nationalists.

The constitutional changes to make NATO an explicit foreign policy goal was precisely to make peace nearly impossible and prevent any president, such as Zelensky, from being able to negotiate with the Russians.

So, when I say what are Zelensky's best options, I do not mean they were easy to achieve.

Likely, only pressure from the West would have allowed Zelensky to force through a deal with the Russians. Since people would know Boris Johnson came to commit billions and billions in weapons and hard currency support, likely this made Zelensky's position extremely difficult even if he personally wanted the peace deal.

Why I say his main mistake is having no experience and not understanding that if Boris is pressuring him to continue the war he should negotiate conditions that would actually make the war winnable. Then with a clear refusal to commit the necessary weapons, then maybe Zelensky would have the leverage with enough of the nationalists right to negotiate some sort of peace. Some people, no matter how nationalistic, would see the logic of not losing a war.

But that was not what my quote referred to. You have simply misunderstood it from the beginning. That happens, what is ridiculous that you try to double down on your claims with quotes that clearly support what I wrote (now you have added the third one). — Jabberwock

That's what we are discussing, Zelensky's options in 2022.

My claim is that committing to Neutrality is low cost to Zelensky (and the other leaders needed to make such a change) in 2022 (or before), is low cost because Ukraine has no allies anyways and is not getting into NATO, but high diplomatic cost to Russia.

You then claim that there's no reason to assume neutrality would be sufficient for the Russians because the appearance of "non-alignment" in the 2010 constitutions changes means Ukraine is neutral, and that didn't prevent the annexation of Crimea.

Now, Ukraine is anyways neutral since as well, de facto neutral as it has no allies.

However, neither in 2014, especially during the coup, nor in 2022 is Ukraine making any sort of strong commitment to neutrality.

What we can see is that when there is even vague commitment to neutrality ("non-alignment" appearing in the constitution but paradoxically allowing cooperation with NATO, leaving entirely vague what that could involve), Russia does not invade.

When there is serious ambiguity (serious risk) of what the policy even is, such as in a chaotic coup, Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk to its military base there.

The policy then returns to being ambiguous, with 2 Minsk negotiation processes. During these negotiation Russia does not invade.

Then it is only in 2019 that:

On 7 February 2019 the Ukrainian parliament voted with a majority of 334 out of 385 to change the Ukrainian constitution to help Ukraine to join NATO and the European Union.[109] After the vote, Poroshenko declared: "This is the day when the movement of Ukraine to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance will be consolidated in the Constitution as a foreign political landmark." — Ukraine-NATO relations

It is after this that military and political tensions start to significantly rise leading to the Russian invasion in 2022, during which time Russia repeatedly demands from Ukraine that it declare itself neutral as well as demand NATO commit to not expand further eastward (it would not matter if Ukraine was constitutionally committed to join NATO if NATO officially repudiated further expansion).

Now, if somehow there was some plan to invade Ukraine come-what-may, then Ukraine simply plays into that plan by providing every possible justification (including tolerating literal Nazi battalions going around and doing their thing with NATO provided weapons) Putin would need to sell the war to both partners abroad and the domestic public.

No, not 'some bureaucratic hangups', but a distinct change in the policy, which Yanukovych clearly stated in your own quote, and adopting the law that precluded Ukraine's membership of any military bloc, but allowed for co-operation with alliances such as NATO. That is exactly what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country, i.e. the Wikipedia article which clearly states that in 2014 Ukraine was neutral. That your own quoted source discredits your view is not exactly my problem, is it? — Jabberwock

Again, "what neutrality mean according to your own clear criteria of a neutral country"?

A neutral country is a state that is neutral towards belligerents in a specific war or holds itself as permanently neutral in all future conflicts (including avoiding entering into military alliances such as NATO, CSTO or the SCO). — Neutral Country - Wikipedia

"Co-operation" with alliances such as NATO does not fit the definition of neutrality according to the above definition. Co-operation could exist between NATO and a neutral country if it was for some clearly humanitarian purposes, but no one would claim that "cooperating" with a military alliance is a country that "holds itself as permanently neutral".

The status is not neutral but instead ambiguous (which is not neutrality).

He said the issue of Ukrainian membership of NATO might "emerge at some point, but we will not see it in the immediate future."[citation needed] On 1 March 2010, during his visit to Brussels, Yanukovych said that there would be no change to Ukraine's status as a member of the alliance's outreach program. — Ukraine–NATO relations

Nevertheless, this ambiguity of intentions, playing footsie with NATO, is sufficient to avoid a Russian annexation of Crimea.

However, you get rid of the person that made this ambiguous "maybe NATO, maybe not, neutral but cooperating with NATO" policy in a coup and it's reasonable to assume that the policy is likewise gone.

You're basically arguing: Ukraine was neutral because Yanukovych made it neutral!

Ukraine was not neutral, but the status was at best ambiguous: declaring simultaneously non-alignment ... but not excluding cooperation with NATO, which is basically a contradiction: "We're not choosing sides, but we're allowed to choose this particular side" is not a constitutional declaration of neutrality.

The actual reality, as I've described, is that Ukrainian society is divided on which way to go, so elects a compromise candidate. Once there is a CIA backed coup, it is clear pretty clear which way things are going.

So Russia annexes Crimea to hedge the risk of a completely belligerent Ukraine.

The issue of neutrality remains unresolved.

From 2014 to 2022, Russia tries to resolve the issue of neutrality diplomatically.

Since there is an active border dispute, Ukraine is exceedingly unlikely to join NATO during this time, so there is time to see if there's a diplomatic resolution but the war in the Donbas can't be sustained forever either.

What immediately precipitates the full scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia is Ukraine amassing troops of their own to finish off the separatists.

These are the actual series of events, if you want to live in reality.

The argument that Russia would not be satisfied with neutrality since 2008 is an extremely weak one. Even a vague neutrality does not cause any Russian annexations, much less a full scale invasion.

Since Ukraine has no allies, and has essentially zero chance of getting any allies before the war in question (when allies would be useful to have), committing to neutrality is of low cost to Ukraine but would have significantly increased the diplomatic cost to Russia; perhaps enough to deter annexation and later invasion, perhaps not, but there is no point in fighting a losing war anyways in these circumstances. Sending hundreds of thousands of people to die "on principle" of what sovereign countries should be able to do, is not a moral nor politically astute position.

More proper would be to say "was extremely controversial" and "there were large groups".

But of course, that the attacked unified Ukraine naturally is accepted by some here. — ssu

Over a million Ukrainians take refuge from the war in Russia, so even if we ignore political parties and independent journalism and Ukraine becoming a police state with no elections, there are still large groups that want more ties with Russia, enough to move there.

But if you want to believe that all the refugees that fled to Russia are anti-Russian and Ukrainian society has zero dissenting voices to Zelensky's policy, feel free to believe that.

The point, which I assume you agree with, is that in 2008-2014 it is not clear which way Ukraine is going, more towards NATO or more towards neutrality. Ukraine elects a leaders in 2010 that essentially commits to the status quo, which had not caused any hostilities and maintains the status quo without there being any hostilities, until a CIA backed coup changes the status quo, then hostilities begin.

So, we can deduce that Ukraine's being simply "vaguely" committed to NATO "maybe some day" and maintaining the existing relationship with NATO as-is was sufficient to prevent Russia from invading, but a change of the status quo to get rid of the status quo guy, and you get hostilities beginning in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea.

Here is an interview with the chief negotiator of Ukraine in March 2022:



A bunch has circulated online about this interview making the points that all Russia wanted was neutrality and Boris Johnson was the reason to reject Russia's offer, but above are the points in context (which isn't quite as simply as Russia offered neutrality and Boris Johnson ordered Zelensky to reject it; although that is one reasonable interpretation).

A few points relevant to our current discussion seem to be clarified about the negotiations by someone who was actually there.

So not only did we know a lot about these negotiations and the Russia offer before, now we know even more!!

Russia's only important interest was neutrality (according to the chief negotiator for Ukraine talking to a Ukrainians journalist), all the other points were "cosmetic, political seasoning" in his words.

He then explains the reasons for rejecting the Russian offer was security guarantees (something we've discussed at length).

Russia was not "pretending to negotiate" but really, really, really wanted a deal.

Boris Johnson did not arrive in Kiev simply for tea or to exchange masterbation tips with Zelensky, but encouraged Ukraine to repudiate negotiations and to fight instead.

I.e. exactly what I have been describing about the negotiations is exactly what happened according to someone who was there.

Now, of course, as I've already analyzed, it is completely possible that the Russian offer was in bad faith and they'd invade again later.

The problem with this reason for repudiating negotiations is that to "fight now rather than later" still required confidence that you can win now, which I would argue had no rational basis.

Especially at that time, the West was only supplying Ukraine with "defensive weapons", at the very least Zelensky should have demanded heavy weapons and air power to accept Boris' proposal of continuing the war.

Boris would have explained they won't get heavy weapons and air power (not anytime soon anyways, not until their current military is absolutely wrecked and advanced weapon systems would only for the purposes of propping up Ukraine a little longer) and then Zelensky would have been able to deduce that the Western offer was a poison pill.

As for taking Russia's offer, certainly there are no guarantees, but if you cannot win now then time is on your side and you should play for time in hopes that "events" transpire in your favour or then to find further diplomatic solutions.

And again, had Ukraine accepted neutrality, the diplomatic cost for Russia to invade Ukraine again would be insanely high. Keeping India, Africa and even China happy to keep trading with Russia would be far harder.

Of course, had the West been discussing also with Russia (as the West does currently with Hamas) then additional guarantees from the West to Ukraine could also have made a peace agreement better for Ukraine.

The West does not hold talks because the West did not want peace and did not want to be in a position to be explicitly refusing any Russian proposals that would make the policy of having the Ukrainians fight the Russians, no peace, perfectly clear.

The West is immediately in talks with Hamas, doesn't remotely have the same policy of "it's between Israel and Hamas" because Western policy is peace in the middle-east is perhaps desirable and this will require negotiations. Of course, the US does not put much pressure on Israel at the moment, but it could become politically costly to support "too much" war crimes and ethnic cleansing and so its important to have peace as an option, and that requires talking to both sides.

Notice how no one criticizes the West for "talking with Hamas".

US reveals ‘excruciating’ five-week negotiations behind Israel-Hamas deal

A secret cell headed by CIA and Mossad chiefs, and multiple contacts between US President Joe Biden and leaders of Israel, Qatar, and Egypt underpinned an "excruciating" five weeks resulting in the truce agreement, a US official said. — France 24

CIA cells, multiple contacts between President Joe Biden, did not, and are not, trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine-Russian conflict, no matter how "excruciating" ... why?

Because the West does not care about Ukraine or Ukrainian lives, and won't do anything whatsoever to contribute to a peace and if it seems like it could happen anyways, actively discourages it by sending Boris Johnson and his sophisticated Oxford debate skills to put an end to such nonsense.