Spinoza’s empty foundational definition renders his whole philosophy just as void — aRealidealist

While your interpretation of Spinoza's substance is understandable and to an extent justifiable, many respectable and honorable scholars see it somewhat differently. For example, Valtteri Viljanen (Spinoza's Geometry of Power) when he says: “God-substance is an inexhaustible source of causal power to produce existence, capable of realizing not only himself (subsistence) but an infinite number of finite things (that inhere in God) as dictated by nature. Given that Spinoza equates God's power with his essence (Ip34), and given the close linkage between a thing and its essence (there is, at most, something akin to the distinction of reason between the two) it follows that Spinoza's God is, in essence, a power – the ultimate dynamic factor behind all existence (p. 70-71).”

Ip34: God’s power is God’s essence itself. It follows purely from the necessity of God’s essence that God is the cause of God (by 11) and (by 16 and its corollary) the cause of all things. So God’s power, by which God and all things exist and act, is God’s essence itself.

The only point of my remarks is to show that, for some scholars, Spinoza's substance is not as 'empty' as might be thought, but, rather. for some, an "inexhaustible source of causal power", “the ultimate dynamic factor behind all existence.”

Thank you again for your views and understanding. I do appreciate and respect them, and am glad you posted them; they were helpful to me, as I hope these remarks will be to you and to Dagny and Zophie.

Best wishes to all, Statilius

References for Ip34

Ip11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

Ip16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways i.e. everything that can fall under an unlimited intellect. This proposition must be plain to anyone who attends to the fact that the intellect infers from a thing’s definition a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e. from the very essence of the thing); and that •the more reality the definition of the thing expresses, i.e. •the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves, •the more properties the intellect infers. But the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also expresses an essence that is infinite in its own kind, and so from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite ways (i.e. everything that can fall under an unlimited intellect).

First corollary to Ip16: God is the efficient cause of all things that can fall under an unlimited intellect. [An ‘efficient cause’ is just what we today call a cause. It used to be contrasted to ‘final cause’: to assign an event a final cause was to explain it in terms of its purpose, what it occurred for.]

Acosmist. — 180 Proof

Though it is very easy and altogether understandable to characterize Spinoza as an acosmist, Yitzhak Y. Melamed takes a different view in his "Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought." See Section 2 of Chapter 2: On the Reality of Modes: The Acosmist Reading of Spinoza, and Why it is Wrong.

https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394054.001.0001/acprof-9780195394054

I guess people here dislike Spinoza — Dagny

Quite the contrary. Do not be too dismayed by either Spinoza or his detractors.

I've not yet read the TTP but would like to soon. Which version are you reading?

Regarding your question as to whether Spinoza was an agnostic or atheist, you might keep in mind Spinoza's Letter 21, to Willem van Blijenburgh, in which he says, "My intellect does not extend so far as to embrace all the means God possesses for bringing men to love himself, that is, to salvation."

Part of Spinoza's goal in the TTP was to help people read scripture rightly. In his fine little book, Spinoza's Radical Theology, Charlie Huenemann points out that in the TTP Spinoza was committed to the following three interpretive principles:

1. Interpretations of passages should be as naturalistic as the text allows.
2. Attach significance to passages to the extent that they express scripture's core moral teaching.
3. Reject recalcitrant passages or interpretations as something corrupted.

I hope this helps in your reading. Best wishes. --Statilius

“all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into it's centre, empirical science is no exception” — Statilius

Thanks much for your remarks. Leaving Polanyi to the side for the moment, what is your take on the above statement from Murdoch's The Good Apprentice?

Let's just take this part first. In the book, Stuart says: “all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into it's centre, empirical science is no exception (p.29).”

In thinking about this I read the following remarks by Michael Polanyi, in his 1958 book “Personal Knowledge.” (see link below) Though he may mean more, perhaps this is some of what Stuart is getting at:

“ Theories of the scientific method which try to explain the establishment of scientific truth by any purely objective formal procedure are doomed to failure. Any process of enquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably spread out into a desert of trivialities. . . . In fact, without a scale of interest and plausibility based on a vision of reality, nothing can be discovered that is of value to science; and only our grasp of scientific beauty, responding to the evidence of our senses, can evoke this vision (135).”

“In fact, without a scale of interest and plausibility based on a vision of reality, nothing can be discovered that is of value to science; and only our grasp of scientific beauty, responding to the evidence of our senses, can evoke this vision (135).”

“Empiricism is valid only as a maxim, the application of which itself forms part of the art of knowing (153).”

Speaking of the history of science: “Unfortunately, the empirical method of enquiry—with its associated conceptions of scientific value and of the nature of reality—is far from unambiguous, and conflicting interpretations of it had therefore ever again to fight each other from either side of a logical gap (153).”

“So difficult is it even for the expert in his own field to distinguish, by criteria of empiricism, scientific merit from incompetent chatter (156).”

“To limit the term science to propositions which we regard as valid, and the premisses of science to what we consider to be its true premises, is to mutilate our subject. A reasonable conception of science must include conflicting views within science and admit of changes in the fundamental beliefs and values of scientists (164).”

“Science is a system of beliefs to which we are committed (171).”

https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo19722848.html

Thag you berry buch!

I don't think I want to get involved in this conversation but I did find something you and your interlocutors may find of interest in regard to the question of the identity of indiscernibles. I found a brief discussion of this issue in Yitzhak Y. Melamed's book, Spinoza's Metaphyics, on page 32, where he says “In [Ethics Part I, Proposition 4], Spinoza presents and proves his own formulation of the identity of indiscerinbles.” At this point, there is a footnote referring the reader to Michael Dela Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996.

He quotes P4 and goes and goes on to say:“P4 --Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.” The individuation principle suggested by this proposition stipulates that '(I) If x ≠ y, then there is some property (either essential or accidental) which belongs to the one but not to the other.' The proof of the proposition is relatively simple by EIpd”:

LATIN:

PROPOSITIO IV. Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum, vel ex diversitate earundem affectionum.

DEMONSTRATIO. Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt (per axiom. 1.), hoc est (per defin. 3. et 5.) extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur, per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt praeter substantias, sive quod idem est (per defin. 4.) earum attributa earumque affectiones. Q. E. D.

ENGLISH (Bennett):

4: Two or more things are made distinct from one another either by a difference in their attributes or by a difference in their states. Whatever exists is either •in itself or •in something else (by A1), which is to say (by D3 and D5) that outside the intellect there is nothing except •substances and •their states. So there is nothing outside the intellect through which things can be distinguished from one another except •substances (which is to say (by D4) their attributes) and •their states.

He refers above to A1, D3, D4, and D5:

A1: Whatever exists is either in itself or in something else. ·As we have already seen, a substance is in itself, a mode is in something else·.

D3: By ‘substance’ I understand: what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e. that whose concept doesn’t have to be formed out of the concept of something else.

D4: By ‘attribute’ I understand: what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence.

D5: By ‘mode’ I understand: a state of a substance, i.e. something that exists in and is conceived through something else.

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/spinoza1665.pdf

I hope you find this helpful. Best wishes to you. --Stabilius

“Being objective is being truthful, making right judgments is a moral activity, all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into its centre . . .” — Statilius

For late-comers, the quote I posted is from Iris Murdoch's 1986 novel, The Good Apprentice. It appears on the page 29 in a book of 522 pages. Given this, and given how novels work, I imagine some kind of resolution or insight into these ideas will appear somewhere near the end. As Chekhov said: ‘If in Act I you have a pistol hanging on the wall, then it must fire in the last act.’

The quote from my original post is part of a dinner-party conversation revolving around questions of religion, science (“science is what's deep”), machines, (“a machine is objective”), objectivity (“being objective is being truthful”), thinking (“all thinking is a function of morality”), mathematics (“it's just our thinking too”), minds (“minds are persons”), artificial intelligence (“artificial intelligence is a misnomer”), losing our language (“and so losing our souls”), etc.

Selected Dialogue:

Stuart: “we are always involved in distinguishing between good and evil,” “Human minds are possessed by individual persons, they are soaked in values, even perception is evaluation,”

“But isn't serious thinking supposed to be neutral?” said Ursula. “We get away from all that personal stuff.”

Stuart: “Serious thinking depends on the justice and truthfulness of the thinker, it depends on the continuous pressure of his mind upon. . . .”

“That's a different point,” said Ursula, “. . . of course discoveries can be used rightly or wrongly, but the thinking itself can be pure, without values, like genuine science, like maths, like – at any rate that's the ideal and. . . .”

Stuart: “You can't just switch it on. . . . as you say it's an ideal, science is an ideal, and partly an illusion. Our trust in science as reason is something frail...."

End of selected dialogue.

There's more, lot's more to this burnished but somewhat bibulous dinner talk. But, alas, I will lose 90% of my readers if I say even one more word. So I'll stop here except to say that I'm still quite taken by the quote from my initial post; it makes deep intuitive sense to me.

Perhaps the idea gives some insight into the 'is/ought' divide. If what Stuart says is true, the chasm doesn't really exist; there is no such thing as a pure 'is': all 'ises' are dyed in 'oughts'. We are always making judgments—whether explicit or implicit.

I have not worked any of this through, at least not enough to argue it well. It would take me a long time to do so, and even then, I'm not sure I could. Perhaps someone could help me think it through.

Thank you again for your questions. I appreciate it.

Thank you for thoughts. I appreciate it. Can you expand on your question a bit? I'm not sure what you mean. Thanks.

How shall we tell of 'ecstasies' beyond telling?

Thank you for your questions. I am glad you joined with us. Please let me know if there is any way I can be of assistance to you. I, too, am new here.

Your excellent questions regarding sex and its various vicissitudes led me to the following questions:

1. What is the the foremost moral end and aim of my life?
2. How do my discussions of sex relate to that end and aim?
3. Do I have an accurate awareness of my motivations in such discussions?
4. In each different situation, are my remarks timely and appropriate?
5. In every situation and with every interlocutor, are my remarks kind?
6. Do my remarks put other's needs and capabilities first?
7. Is there a tendency towards aggressiveness in my discussion of sex, perhaps with some but not with others?
8. Are there any habitual patterns and inveterate tendencies that obscure my clarity in regard to any of these several questions?

And then, I came to think that Rilke might be able to shed some light on these questions:

O that man might take this secret, of which the world is full even to its littlest things, more humbly to himself and bear it, endure it, more seriously and feel how terribly difficult it is, instead of taking it lightly. That he might be more reverent toward his fruitfulness, which is but one, whether it seems mental or physical, is of one nature with it and only like a gentler, more ecstatic and more everlasting repetition of physical delight. - In one creative thought a thousand forgotten nights of love revive, filling it with sublimity and exaltation. And those who come together in the night and are entwined in rocking delight do an earnest work and gather sweetnesses, gather depth and strength for the song of some coming poet who will arise to speak of ecstasies beyond telling. http://www.floozy.com/allison/rilke/rilke4.html

How shall we tell of 'ecstasies' beyond telling?

I found the following quote in my reading last night and thought others might find it of interest:

“Being objective is being truthful, making right judgments is a moral activity, all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into its centre . . .”

Guess the author of this tidbit and win a free trip to Phibsborough. Will it make a difference in how we think of it if we discover the author is a composer, author, revolutionary, archbishop, philosopher, actor, or whatever?

It is Iris Murdoch, from "The Good Apprentice." Doesn't this clip the wings of the 'is/ought' question?

Thanks much for doing this. It's just what I was looking for; I'll tag along. Best wishes to you. I appreciate what you are doing. In your 6th post you give "five steps to help you analyze an argument." Can you suggest some brief texts that would be ideal for practicing this type of analysis?

I know this is starting to look like an interview (and is wandering unpardonably off topic), but I'm wondering what you think are the (one or two or three) most important processes or undertakings for philosophy to (re)engage or come to grips with today? Is the question of objectivity one of them?

Thank you. This gives me a bit of traction. Perhaps you draw a line in the sand after Russell for some reason related to this specific question, or perhaps Russell marks for you a more general gloaming, perchance a sadness (am I reading too much into your remarks?). In your many years here, was there a time in your life that was an apex, when things seemed, most and overall,to be moving in a more fruitful direction? Do you see our present era as one of decline? These questions are a bit off topic, so please don't bother with them if you find them out of place. Regards.

Thank you much for your reply. I'm rather new to all of this. Can you say more of what you mean by"this modern stuff?" Do you mean (all) those who are writing about category mistakes today? As compared to . . .? -- Thanks much. I'm enjoying your comments.

Though I know very little about category mistakes, I am about to read the following (14p) paper by Ofra Magidor to help me with this discussion and to better understand the term. I begin with three quotes from her paper: Perhaps others will find this paper useful.

“Category mistakes are highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. Consider for example metaphor. The metaphorical sentences ‘The poem is pregnant’, ‘The silence was liquid’, and ‘My thoughts are racing’ are all category mistakes. Or consider metonymy: a waiter might use the categorically mistaken ‘The ham sandwich is angry’ in reference to the customer who ordered the ham sandwich, and a political reporter ‘The White House decided to change its policy’ in reference to the people working at the White House. Another source of examples can be seen in the domain of fictional discourse. In the context of a fictional work, one can use sentences such as ‘The tree was tired’or even ‘The number two was happy’."
. . .
“Sentences such as ‘The poem is pregnant’ are only category mistakes in so far as we attempt to interpret them literally, and on the face of it there is nothing inconsistent with maintaining that a sentence has a figurative meaning at the same time as being literally meaningless. However, in the remainder of the paper, I argue that this appearance is misleading: reflecting on some of the main theories of figurative language reveals that they are not after all compatible with the meaninglessness view. In Sect. 2, I discuss the case of metaphor, in Sect. 3 the case of metonymy,and in Sect. 4, the case of fictional discourse.”
. . .
“In this paper I argued that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent with many prominent theories concerning various kinds of figurative language. Some (myself included) would take this as reason to reject the meaninglessness view. Others more sympathetic to the view, might take this conclusion as an invitation to provide alternative theories of figurative language,ones that are consistent with the view. Either way, it should be recognized that the debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected.”

https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s11098-015-0575-1?author_access_token=wQ3lwrClut3P8Y-qawc5f_e4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY5uJWshWair3e2M6Cv1bHX3NPFgKxSyV10g8bGa4VO3q0oVpFnPsmfoIQuecakH8exnMejkg7dklKjTMkvV0md1WGKSLSXuISzjLMSEMroF8Q%3D%3D

Thanks very much for your reply to my comments. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by “the interrelated uncertainty of potential and possible information.” Can you say a bit more about that? Best wishes to you.

I've just joined this discussion and hope it's OK to add a couple of notes. One of my favorite discussions of objectivity includes the following remarks:

“. . . as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a center lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity (p3).”

“. . . the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfill his personal obligations to universal standards (p17).”

--from Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy (1964)