A Refutation of Moral Relativism Hi. I think your definition could use a little tuning.
Relativism: Any x subject can, does, or must, have y status relative to z system of y2 qualities.
'Qualities' can be a set of policies, practices, precedents, predicates, principles, procedures, processes, properties, or propositions. There's no reason in particular why I chose p-words other than to show that it doesn't really matter what the base units are called as long as they function as part of a sufficiently cogent argument. Here that value happens to be 'morals'.
The 'system' can be a simple as a prior psychological bias. That opens the door to talk of optical illusions, false memories and hypnotherapy -- all of which are real, effective, and classically erroneous. To deny the existence of systems would potentially imply some kind of terminal noncognitivism. Kant believe it?
Whatever morality a person subscribes to, from the global perspective, is ultimately a matter of the taste of one person. And somehow relativism, with its overtures of tolerance and defeasibility, is the narcissist?